UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1709
KIMBERLY RENE BAKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:11-cv-00040-JPJ-PMS)
Submitted: April 30, 2013 Decided: May 6, 2013
Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Wolodymyr Cybriwsky, Prestonsburg, Kentucky, for Appellant.
Eric P. Kressman, Regional Chief Counsel, Victor Pane,
Supervisory Attorney, M. Jared Littman, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Rick
Mountcastle, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kimberly Rene Baker appeals the district court’s
orders: granting summary judgment to the Commissioner and
upholding the decision of the Commissioner denying Baker’s
application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income; and denying her motion for reconsideration. We
have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. Baker v. Social Sec. Comm’r, No. 1:11-cv-00040-JPJ-PMS
(W.D. Va. Feb. 16, 2012; Apr. 2, 2012). * We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
We reject Baker’s claim that she is entitled to a sentence
six remand on the basis of a subsequent administrative decision
awarding benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). The
subsequent decision pertains to an application for benefits
filed by Baker after the date of the unfavorable decision that
is the subject of this appeal. “[A] subsequent favorable
decision itself, as opposed to the evidence supporting the
subsequent decision, does not constitute new and material
evidence under § 405(g).” Allen v. Commissioner, 561 F.3d 646,
653 (6th Cir. 2009). Baker has not met her burden of showing
that evidence relied upon in reaching the favorable decision
pertains to the period under consideration in this appeal. We
conclude that the evidence is not material to the earlier,
unfavorable decision.
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