Case: 12-30852 Document: 00512231579 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/06/2013
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 6, 2013
No. 12-30852
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
MICHAEL K. WILLIAMS, also known as Spider Mike,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 5:06-CR-50127-2
Before SMITH, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Michael K. Williams appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence based on amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses. Because his appeal is
foreclosed by United States v. Carter, 595 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 2010), we AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
In 2006, Williams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
deliver more than 50 grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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No. 12-30852
841(a)(1) and 846. Williams’ guidelines sentencing range was 121 to 151 months
of imprisonment, but he was subject to a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment of 240 months for his prior felony drug conviction. Prior to
sentencing, the Government filed a § 3553(e) motion for a sentencing reduction
for his substantial assistance to authorities. The district court granted the
motion and sentenced Williams to 132 months of imprisonment.
In 2008, Williams filed a pro se motion for a reduction of sentence under
§ 3582(c)(2) based on amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered
the offense levels for most crack cocaine offenses. The district court denied the
motion on the basis that the court had already reduced his sentence below the
statutory minimum. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s judgment,
noting that “when a defendant is subject to a statutory minimum sentence above
the upper end of his guideline range, even if the district court departs
downwardly from that minimum under a statutory exception, 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) provides no authority to the district court to later modify the sentence
based on amendments to the guideline range.” United States v. Williams, 373 F.
App’x 488, 489 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Carter, 595
F.3d 575, 581 (5th Cir. 2010)).
In 2010, after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), Williams
again moved for a sentencing reduction under § 3553(e). The district court
denied the motion, and Williams, through the Federal Public Defender, timely
appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under
§ 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672
(5th Cir. 2009).
ANALYSIS
Section 3582(c)(2) permits the discretionary modification of a defendant’s
sentence if he “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
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Case: 12-30852 Document: 00512231579 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/06/2013
No. 12-30852
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission” and “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). If a
defendant is eligible for a sentence modification under § 3582(c)(2), the district
court weighs the applicable § 3553(a) factors to decide whether a reduction “is
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.”
Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010).
Where, as here, a defendant is “subject to a statutory minimum sentence
above the upper end of his guidelines range, even if the district court departs
downwardly from that minimum under a statutory exception, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) provides no authority to the district court to later modify the
sentence based on amendments to the guideline range.” United States v. Carter,
595 F.3d 575, 581 (5th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Anderson, 591 F.3d
789, 791 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a prisoner sentenced as a career offender
similarly was ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2)). Williams
contends that Carter is irreconcilable with Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2685, 2692–95 (2011), a case in which a plurality of the Supreme Court
concluded that defendants who enter into plea agreements under Rule
11(c)(1)(C) that specify a particular sentence are eligible for relief under §
3582(c)(2). But, as we have explained previously, “Freeman did not address,
even tangentially, either of the factual scenarios presented in Carter or
Anderson”; and its reasoning does not apply to the situation presented here.
United States v. Barber, No. 12-30141, 2013 WL 1197919, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar.
25, 2013) (affirming district court’s denial of defendant’s motion for sentence
reduction on that basis that his sentence was “based on” a statutory mandatory
minimum and not on a sentencing range that subsequently has been lowered).
CONCLUSION
Carter remains good law after Freeman, and, applied here, renders
Williams ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). We AFFIRM.
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