SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
LETTIE PRESTON and RODENA ) Arizona Supreme Court
PRESTON, Co-Personal ) No. CV-10-0292-PR
Representatives of the Estate of )
WILLIAM EVERETT PRESTON, on ) Court of Appeals
behalf of the Estate of WILLIAM ) Division One
EVERETT PRESTON, deceased; and ) No. 1 CA-CV 09-0106
LETTIE PRESTON and RODENA )
PRESTON on behalf of WILLIAM ) Maricopa County
EVERETT PRESTON'S statutory ) Superior Court
beneficiaries pursuant to A.R.S. ) No. CV2008-012783
section 12-612(A), )
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants, )
) O P I N I O N
v. )
)
KINDRED HOSPITALS WEST, L.L.C., )
a Delaware limited liability )
company, dba KINDRED HOSPITAL )
ARIZONA-SCOTTSDALE; KINDRED )
HEALTHCARE OPERATING, INC., a )
Delaware corporation; KEVIN )
NICHOLSON, Administrator; STEVE )
SMITH, Executive Director; SCOTT )
FLODEN, Executive Director, )
)
Defendants/Appellees. )
)
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable John A. Buttrick, Judge
REVERSED AND REMANDED
________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals Division One
225 Ariz. 223, 234 P.3d 450 (2010)
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
WILKES & MCHUGH, P.A. Phoenix
By Melanie L. Bossie
And
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT E. BOEHM, P.C. Phoenix
By Scott E. Boehm
Attorneys for Lettie Preston, Rodena Preston, Estate of
William Everett Preston, and Statutory Beneficiaries of
William Everett Preston
HOLLOWAY ODEGARD FORREST & KELLY, P.C. Phoenix
By Vincent J. Montell
Anthony J. Fernandez
Larry J. Wulkan
Attorneys for Kindred Hospitals West LLC, Kindred Hospital
Arizona-Scottsdale, Kindred Healthcare Operating Inc, Kevin
Nicholson, Steve Smith, and Scott Floden
________________________________________________________________
B A L E S, Justice
¶1 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) requires every
action to be “prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.” An action cannot be dismissed for failure to name
the proper party, however, “until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection” for the real party in interest to
ratify, join, or be substituted into the action. Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 17(a). We hold that Rule 17(a) does not require a plaintiff
to show that an initial failure to name the real party in
interest resulted from an understandable mistake or difficulty
in identifying the proper party.
I.
¶2 This lawsuit was filed by personal representatives on
behalf of the Estate of William Everett “Billy” Preston. A
Grammy Award-winning soloist, Preston also performed with the
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Beatles and many other musicians. See, e.g., The Beatles with
Billy Preston, Get Back (Apple Records 1969). In 2005, he was
admitted to Kindred Hospitals in Scottsdale, Arizona. He died
the next year. The complaint against Kindred Hospitals West,
L.L.C. and other defendants (collectively “Kindred”) alleges
wrongful death, negligence, and elder abuse under the Adult
Protective Services Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 46-455
(West Supp. 2010).
¶3 Kindred moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
the personal representatives lacked standing to sue. Before
entering the hospital, Preston had filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. After his
death, the bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding.
Kindred argued that the claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate
and therefore the bankruptcy trustee was the real party in
interest. The personal representatives agreed but opposed the
motion to dismiss, requesting an opportunity to join or
substitute the trustee pursuant to Rule 17(a). The trustee also
filed a declaration supporting the personal representatives’
pursuit of the action.
¶4 The superior court granted Kindred’s motion to
dismiss, commenting that the purpose of Rule 17(a) is “to
prevent the forfeiture of claims when the determination of the
real party to bring suit is difficult to make or when an
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understandable mistake has been made.” Because the personal
representatives knew of the bankruptcy, the superior court found
that it was not difficult to determine the proper plaintiff and
there was no understandable mistake.
¶5 The court of appeals reversed, stating that “the
unambiguous language of the Rule itself, and well-established
tenets of statutory construction lead us to conclude that
neither an understandable mistake nor difficulty in determining
the proper party is necessary to allow ratification, joinder, or
substitution of the Bankruptcy Trustee under Rule 17(a).”
Preston v. Kindred Hosps. W., L.L.C., 225 Ariz. 223, 227 ¶ 16,
236 P.3d 450, 454 (App. 2010).
¶6 We granted Kindred’s petition for review to consider
the proper interpretation of Rule 17(a), an issue of statewide
importance. The Court has jurisdiction under Article 6, Section
5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2003).
II.
¶7 Whether Rule 17(a) requires a plaintiff to show that a
failure to name the real party in interest resulted from an
understandable mistake or difficulty in identifying the party is
an issue of first impression in Arizona. Rule 17(a) provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. . . . No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest until a
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for
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ratification of commencement of the action by, or
joinder or substitution of, the real party in
interest; and such ratification, joinder or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the
action had been commenced in the name of the real
party in interest.
¶8 We apply principles of statutory construction to
interpret court rules. E.g., State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 47
¶ 23, 97 P.3d 865, 872 (2004) (interpreting Ariz. R. Evid.
404(c)). Accordingly, if a rule is clear and unambiguous, we
need not look beyond its “language to determine the drafters’
intent.” Id. at 47 ¶ 23, 97 P.3d at 872 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We give unambiguous language its
“usual, ordinary meaning unless doing so creates an absurd
result.” Id.
¶9 By its terms, Rule 17(a) does not require a plaintiff
to prove an understandable mistake or difficulty in identifying
the proper party in order to avoid dismissal. The accompanying
notes, however, state that the rule is intended to “prevent
forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is
difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made.”
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 17(a), State Bar Committee Notes, 1966 Amend.
Kindred argues that these notes limit the application of Rule
17(a). But, in describing the purpose of the rule, the
Committee Notes do not purport to specify the only circumstances
in which substitution of the real party is permitted. Moreover,
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the notes cannot alter the rule’s clear text. See Aguilar, 209
Ariz. at 48 ¶ 26, 97 P.3d at 873 (“Although a comment may
clarify a rule's ambiguous language, a comment cannot otherwise
alter the clear text of a rule.”).
¶10 Interpreting the federal counterpart to Rule 17, some
federal courts have held that the trial court must find it was
difficult to determine the proper party plaintiff or that an
understandable mistake was made before allowing substitution of
the real party in interest. See, e.g., Wieburg v. GTE Sw. Inc.,
272 F.3d 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing cases interpreting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3)). But not all federal courts require
such a showing. See, e.g., Esposito v. United States, 368 F.3d
1271, 1275–77 (10th Cir. 2004) (cautioning against an “over-
emphasis on the understandability” of the mistake); Jenkins v.
Wright & Ferguson Funeral Home, 215 F.R.D. 518, 522 n.4 (S.D.
Miss. 2003) (observing that the Advisory Committee Note to Rule
17(a) is in “apparent conflict with the Rule itself”). Having
considered the federal cases, we decline to engraft requirements
onto Rule 17 beyond those reflected in the text of the rule.
¶11 Moreover, even those federal courts that generally
interpret Rule 17 to require a showing of understandable mistake
or difficulty in identifying the proper party would not
necessarily reach a different result in a case like this.
Construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(3) liberally to
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allow amendments, federal courts ordinarily allow substitution
of the real party in interest for an improperly named plaintiff
with identical claims. See Wieburg, 272 F.3d at 309 (concluding
that “in the light of Rule 17(a)’s purpose of preventing
forfeitures . . . it was an abuse of discretion for the district
court to dismiss the action without explaining why the less
drastic alternatives of either allowing an opportunity for
ratification by the Trustee, or joinder of the Trustee, were
inappropriate”); Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners,
Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that the
proposed substitution of the real party in interest should have
been granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)).
¶12 Kindred also argues that Rule 17(a) must be construed
in harmony with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). The
latter rule, however, is not particularly relevant here. Rule
15(c) governs the relation back of amendments “changing the
party against whom a claim is asserted,” ordinarily the
defendant. When a real party in interest is substituted for an
incorrectly named plaintiff with identical claims, Rule 17(a)
itself provides the relevant relation-back rule, stating that
the “substitution shall have the same effect as if the action
had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.”
¶13 Finally, Kindred contends that construing Rule 17(a)
as liberally allowing amendments to name the real party in
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interest may lead to abuse, such as substitution of a plaintiff
on the eve of trial after prolonged litigation. These concerns
can be addressed by the trial court’s exercise of its discretion
under Rule 15(a) in ruling on motions to amend. See Owen v.
Superior Court (Donald), 133 Ariz. 75, 79, 649 P.2d 278, 282
(1982) (recognizing trial court’s power to deny leave to amend
where “there has been undue delay, dilatory action or undue
prejudice”). Kindred has not argued that it would be prejudiced
by the proposed amendment to substitute the plaintiff here
(indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the substitution of one
representative plaintiff for another with identical claims could
result in prejudice), so we need not further address the
circumstances in which a trial court may properly deny
substitution of a real party in interest based on Rule 15(a).
III.
¶14 We affirm the opinion of the court of appeals and
remand this case to the superior court for further proceedings.
_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
CONCURRING:
_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice
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_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice
_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice
_____________________________________
Robert M. Brutinel, Justice
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