In Re Nickolas S.

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

IN RE NICKOLAS S. ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-10-0092-PR
)
) Court of Appeals
) Division One
) No. 1 CA-JV 09-0147
)
) Maricopa County
) Superior Court
) No. JV173845
)
)
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Commissioner

VACATED
________________________________________________________________

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
224 Ariz. 52, 226 P.3d 1038 (2010)

VACATED
________________________________________________________________

CHRISTINA M. PHILLIS, MARICOPA COUNTY JUVENILE PUBLIC Phoenix
DEFENDER
By Ellen Edge Katz, Deputy Juvenile Public Defender
Attorneys for Nickolas S.

MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Phoenix
By Linda Van Brakel, Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for State of Arizona
________________________________________________________________

B A L E S, Justice

¶1 Nickolas S. was adjudicated delinquent for violating

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 15-507 (2009), which
makes it a crime for a person to “knowingly abuse[]” teachers or

other school employees. The court of appeals held, and the

State does not contest, that when pure speech is involved, the

statute applies only to “fighting words.” The limited issue

before us is therefore whether this case involves fighting words

as defined by the United States Supreme Court. Although

Nickolas insulted a teacher with derogatory and offensive words

(and was suspended from school for doing so), we must vacate his

juvenile adjudications because his words were not inherently

likely to provoke a violent reaction by the teacher.

I.

¶2 Nickolas was adjudicated delinquent for two counts of

violating A.R.S § 15-507. The first count concerned an incident

when Nickolas was assigned to a classroom for students serving

on-campus suspension. Nickolas refused to give the teacher his

cell phone after she saw him using it in class. She called

security, and Nickolas said “bitch” under his breath.

¶3 The second count stemmed from an incident two days

later involving the same teacher. Nickolas asked to be sent to

another classroom. The teacher told him to wait while she

obtained administrative approval. After ten or fifteen minutes,

Nickolas yelled, “This is stupid, I want to go to [Room] 205.”

The teacher again asked him to wait. Nickolas began playing

with his cell phone. When the teacher told him to put it away,

2

he refused and began arguing. Other students noticed the

disruption and some stood up; the teacher testified that the

“whole room basically lost control.” Nickolas yelled “This is

fucking bull shit” and “You’re a fucking bitch” while looking at

the teacher in a challenging manner from about ten feet away.

Disregarding his teacher’s instructions, Nickolas left the

classroom, yelling “Fucking bitch” and “You stupid bitch.” When

the teacher looked out the door to see where he was going, he

shouted “Get away from me you fucking bitch.”

¶4 Nickolas was suspended from school for ten days for

his outbursts. Apart from his suspension, Nickolas was also

charged with violating A.R.S § 15-507. At his adjudication

hearing, Nickolas did not dispute the facts but argued that his

speech was protected by the First Amendment. The juvenile court

rejected this argument, adjudicated him delinquent on both

counts, and placed him on summary probation.

¶5 The court of appeals vacated the adjudication for the

first incident but affirmed as to the second. In re Nickolas

S., 224 Ariz. 52, 59 ¶ 29, 226 P.3d 1038, 1045 (App. 2010).

Noting that A.R.S. § 15-507 may encompass constitutionally

protected speech, and thus is facially overbroad, the court of

appeals held that the statute could be constitutionally applied

in cases involving speech only if it is narrowed to fighting

words – “[t]hose personally abusive epithets which, when

3

addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common

knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” Id.

at 58 ¶¶ 22–23, 226 P.3d at 1044 (citation omitted). The court

concluded that the first incident, when Nickolas said “bitch”

under his breath, could not support a delinquency charge under

A.R.S § 15-507. Id. at 58–59 ¶ 25, 226 P.3d at 1044–45. The

court concluded, however, that the second incident was one in

which “a reasonable person in these circumstances might well

react violently when confronted with such repeated, angry, and

personal epithets.” Id. at 59 ¶ 28, 226 P.3d at 1045.

¶6 Nickolas petitioned for review, arguing that the court

of appeals misapplied the fighting words doctrine by focusing on

the theoretical reaction of a hypothetical reasonable person

instead of the likely reaction of the teacher addressed by the

speech. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of

the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

II.

¶7 Before we turn to the precise issue presented, “it is

useful first to canvass various matters which this record does

not present.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971).

A.

¶8 This case does not concern the propriety of school

discipline. Although students do not “shed their constitutional

rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse

4

gate,” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.

503, 506 (1969), schools may discipline students for certain

speech that would be constitutionally protected if made by

non-student speakers outside a school setting, see, e.g., Morse

v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007) (upholding discipline

for displaying, at a school-sanctioned event, a banner

encouraging illegal drug use); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.

Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)(upholding discipline for a

student’s “offensively lewd and indecent speech” at a school

assembly). Nickolas acknowledged below that his conduct was

appropriately subject to school discipline, and he has not

challenged his ten-day suspension. Recognizing that a school

may discipline a student for a profanity-laced classroom

outburst, we need not here address more generally the

constitutional limits on school discipline for student comments.

¶9 We also do not consider the application of other

criminal statutes to conduct like that displayed by Nickolas.

Arizona’s criminal code includes provisions that not only punish

threats, intimidation, assaults, and disorderly conduct in

general, but also more specifically prohibit assaults and

disruptive conduct in schools. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1202

(threatening and intimidation), -1203 (assault),

-1204(A)(8)(d) (aggravated assault of school employee), -2904

(disorderly conduct), -2911 (interference with or disruption of

5

educational institution). Consistent with the First Amendment,

states and local governments may impose criminal sanctions under

narrowly drawn statutes for conduct that disrupts classrooms or

other school activities. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408

U.S. 104, 118–19 (1972). Nickolas, however, was not charged

with violating any statute targeting the disruption of school

activities.

B.

¶10 Nickolas was instead charged with violating

A.R.S. § 15-507, which appears among Arizona’s education

statutes and provides:

A person who knowingly abuses a teacher or other
school employee on school grounds or while the teacher
or employee is engaged in the performance of his
duties is guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor.

¶11 Although § 15-507 has a long history that predates

statehood, this Court has never interpreted its scope. When

first adopted, the statute made it a crime for a person to

“insult or abuse any teacher in the presence of the school.”

1901 Territorial Code § 606; see also Ariz. Penal Code, tit.

XIV, § 696 (1913) (same). In 1978, the statute was expanded to

make it unlawful for a person to “knowingly insult[] or abuse[]

a teacher on school grounds or while the teacher is engaged in

the performance of his duties.” 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 201,

§ 255. The legislature last amended the statute in 1989 by

6

deleting the proscription on “insults” while extending the

statute to prohibit the “abuse” not only of teachers but also

other school employees. 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 124, § 1.

¶12 We have no occasion here to conclusively define the

reach of A.R.S. § 15-507. The court of appeals held, and the

State does not dispute, that Nickolas was prosecuted based

solely on his speech. Nickolas did not argue below that the

statute does not apply to pure speech, an interpretation that

could be supported by the fact that the 1989 amendment deleted

the word “insults” from the statute. The State, without

advocating this interpretation, acknowledged before this Court

that the history of A.R.S. § 15-507 may reflect an intent by

some legislators to limit the statute to cases involving

physical abuse. We assume, but do not decide, that the current

statute may apply to certain speech absent any physical abuse.

¶13 But if the statute does apply to pure speech, the

question then becomes “what kind of speech?” The First

Amendment bars states from punishing “the use of words or

language not within ‘narrowly limited classes of speech.’”

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521–22 (1972) (quoting

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)). The

limited categories of unprotected speech include fighting words.

Id. at 523; see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577,

1584 (2010) (discussing traditional categories of unprotected

7

speech). A “statute must be carefully drawn or be

authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and

not be susceptible of application to protected expression.”

Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522.

¶14 Nickolas argued below that A.R.S. § 15-507 is

unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The court of appeals

held that Nickolas has standing to assert these constitutional

challenges and that the statute is overbroad, but that the

statute could withstand a First Amendment challenge if it is

limited to fighting words in cases involving pure speech. 224

Ariz. at 58 ¶ 22, 226 P.3d at 1044. The State has not

challenged the court of appeals’ holding regarding standing, and

we therefore today assume Nickolas has standing to raise the

overbreadth argument. Cf. State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc.,

220 Ariz. 567, 569 ¶ 10, 208 P.3d 218, 220 (2009) (noting the

narrowing of issues where state had not challenged certain

determinations by court of appeals).

¶15 If A.R.S. § 15-507 applies to pure speech, it is

undeniably overbroad. By its terms, § 15-507 declares that it

is a crime for any “person” to “abuse[]” a teacher or other

school employee “on school grounds” or while the teacher or

employee is “engaged in . . . his duties.” “Abuse” is not

statutorily defined. In ordinary usage, the word “abuse” means

“[t]o hurt or injure by maltreatment; ill-use” or “[t]o assail

8

with contemptuous, coarse, or insulting words; revile.” The

American Heritage Dictionary 8 (4th ed. 2000).

¶16 If “abuse” includes contemptuous, coarse, or insulting

words, the statute would extend to a broad range of protected

speech directed at school employees while on school grounds or

engaged in their duties. Cf. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 525 (noting

that dictionary definition of “abusive” extends beyond fighting

words). As the court of appeals noted, one could easily

formulate statements that would fall within the reach of the

statute that are otherwise protected by the First Amendment.

224 Ariz. at 57 ¶ 20, 226 P.3d at 1043. Indeed, the statute

arguably would extend to a spectator who jeers at the visiting

team’s coach during a high school football game. The State

itself acknowledged that the statute is facially overbroad.

¶17 The court of appeals noted, however, that determining

A.R.S. § 15-507 is overbroad does not end the inquiry because

courts have a “duty to save a statute, if possible, by

construing it so that it does not violate the constitution.”

224 Ariz. at 57–58 ¶ 21, 226 P.3d at 1043–44 (quoting Readenour

v. Marion Power Shovel, 149 Ariz. 442, 445, 719 P.2d 1058, 1061

(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the State’s

urging, the court of appeals concluded that § 15-507 can be

upheld by limiting its reach to fighting words in cases

involving pure speech. Id. at 58 ¶ 22, 226 P.3d at 1044.

9

¶18 Although courts properly construe statutes to uphold

their constitutionality, courts cannot salvage statutes by

rewriting them because doing so would invade the legislature’s

domain. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Superior Court of Maricopa

Cnty., 112 Ariz. 292, 295, 541 P.2d 392, 395 (1975); cf.

Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (making same observation in

interpreting federal statute). Rather than adopting narrowing

constructions, several other courts have held that statutory

prohibitions on “teacher abuse” are facially unconstitutional.

See Shoemaker v. State, 38 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Ark. 2001) (similar

statute overbroad and vague); Ketchens v. Reiner, 239 Cal. Rptr.

549, 553–54 (App. 1987) (same); Commonwealth v. Ashcraft, 691

S.W.2d 229, 232–33 (Ky. App. 1985) (same); State v. Reyes, 700

P.2d 1155, 1159 (Wash. 1985) (same). Nickolas has not argued

that the court of appeals erred in adopting a narrowing

construction to uphold A.R.S. § 15-507, so we assume for present

purposes that the statute is not fatally overbroad or vague if

narrowed to apply to fighting words.

III.

¶19 The fighting words doctrine originated in the Supreme

Court’s 1942 decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S.

at 571–73. Chaplinsky called a city marshal “a God damned

racketeer” and a “damned fascist” and was convicted of violating

a statute making it unlawful to publicly address another person

10

with “offensive, derisive or annoying word[s].” Id. at 569. In

rejecting Chaplinsky’s arguments that the statute violated the

First Amendment, the Court broadly observed:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or ‘fighting’ words - those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.

Id. at 571–72 (footnotes omitted).

¶20 The statute at issue in Chaplinsky had been

“authoritatively construed” by the New Hampshire Supreme Court

to apply only to words that “have a direct tendency to cause

acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark

is addressed.” Id. at 572-73. Noting that the addressee’s

subjective reaction is not determinative, the state court said:

The test is what men of common intelligence would
understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight. * * * The English language has a
number of words and expressions which by general
consent are ‘fighting words' when said without a
disarming smile. * * * Such words, as ordinary men
know, are likely to cause a fight.

Id. at 573. The state court concluded that “[t]he statute, as

construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words

plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the

addressee . . . .” Id. The Supreme Court in Chaplinsky held

that “[w]e are unable to say that the limited scope of the

11

statute as thus construed contravenes the constitutional right

of free expression.” Id.

¶21 Since Chaplinsky, the Court has narrowed both the

fighting words doctrine and the categories of unprotected

speech. For example, the Court has held that fighting words

must be directed personally to an addressee and that words may

not be proscribed merely to maintain a suitable level of

discourse or because they may tend to provoke a violent

reaction. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20, 23-24.

¶22 In Cohen, the Court held that the First Amendment

barred the prosecution of a person for wearing a jacket with the

words “Fuck the Draft.” Id. at 26. The Court said that

fighting words are “those personally abusive epithets which,

when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of

common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent

reaction.” Id. at 20 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568). The

Court concluded that “[n]o individual actually or likely to be

present could reasonably have regarded the words on [Cohen’s]

jacket as a direct personal insult.” Id. See also Texas v.

Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (characterizing fighting words

as those an onlooker would consider a “direct personal insult or

an invitation to exchange fisticuffs”).

¶23 The Court has also recognized that words must be

considered in the context in which they are spoken to assess

12

their character as fighting words. In Gooding, the Court struck

down a Georgia statute proscribing the use of “opprobrious words

or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace.”

405 U.S. at 519. The Court concluded that the statute had not

been narrowly construed to apply only to words that have “a

direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom,

individually, the remark is addressed.” Id. at 524 (quoting

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Instead, the state courts had applied the law to “utterances

where there was no likelihood that the person addressed would

make an immediate violent response.” Id. at 528; see also Lewis

v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J.,

concurring) (“[W]ords may or may not be ‘fighting words,’

depending upon the circumstances of their utterance.”); Cohen,

403 U.S. at 20 (recognizing that words were not used “in this

instance” in a personally provocative fashion); cf. Johnson, 491

U.S. at 409 (noting that speech cannot be punished as incitement

without “careful consideration of the actual circumstances”).

¶24 Based on the Supreme Court’s decisions, we agree with

the Washington Supreme Court that analyzing whether particular

speech constitutes fighting words involves a three-step inquiry.

City of Seattle v. Camby, 701 P.2d 499, 501 (Wash. 1985).

“First, the words must be directed at a particular person or

group of persons. There must be an addressee.” Id. Second,

13

the words must be personally abusive epithets or insults that

“when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of

common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent

reaction.” Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20). Third, the

words must be evaluated in the context in which they are used to

determine if it is likely that the addressee would react

violently. See id. at 501-02; see also Gooding, 405 U.S. at

524; Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 210 Ariz. 513, 519–20 ¶ 25,

115 P.3d 107, 113–14 (2005) (concluding that a letter to the

editor did not constitute fighting words because it was not a

“face-to-face confrontation” or “directed toward any particular

individual,” did not contain “personally abusive words or

epithets,” and was not “likely to provoke a violent reaction by

the reader”).

¶25 With respect to assessing the circumstances in which

words are used, the Supreme Court has not been entirely clear

about the relevance of the characteristics of the particular

addressee. Chaplinsky recognized that the state court had

observed that the test for fighting words turns on the reactions

of “men of common intelligence” or the “average addressee”

rather than the subjective reactions of the actual addressee.

315 U.S. at 573. Subsequent decisions have referenced the

reaction of an “ordinary citizen,” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20, but

have also required consideration of the “likelihood that the

14

person addressed would make an immediate violent response.”

Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528.

¶26 The underlying rationale for the fighting words

doctrine is that some speech may be suppressed because it would

likely provoke an immediate violent reaction by the person to

whom it is addressed. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. “The

addressee's personal disagreement with or anger over words said

to him does not, by itself, mean that the words can be punished

as fighting words.” Camby, 701 P.2d at 501. First Amendment

protections should not dissolve merely because words are spoken

to a particularly sensitive or combative addressee. See id.;

cf. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23 (speech may not be suppressed based

merely on possible reaction of persons with “lawless and violent

proclivities”).

¶27 But this does not mean that all characteristics of the

addressee should be ignored in determining if speech constitutes

fighting words. The Supreme Court has directed that words must

be considered in the specific context in which they are spoken

to determine if they likely will provoke a violent response.

That context should include objectively discernible attributes

or characteristics, such as occupation, of the particular

addressee. See Lewis, 415 U.S. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring)

(noting that properly trained police officer may be expected to

exercise greater restraint than ordinary citizen); Camby, 701

15

P.2d at 502. Stated differently, it is necessary to determine

whether an “average addressee” in the circumstances of the

actual addressee would likely react violently to the words. See

Camby, 701 P.2d at 502; see also In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424,

428 ¶ 20, 36 P.3d 772, 776 (App. 2001) (affirming delinquency

adjudication based on racial slurs “likely to provoke a violent

reaction when addressed to an ordinary citizen of African-

American descent.”); In re Louise C., 197 Ariz. 84, 86 ¶ 8, 3

P.3d 1004, 1006 (App. 1999) (juvenile’s derogatory language to

principal did not constitute fighting words because “[it] was

not likely to provoke an ordinary citizen to a violent reaction,

and it was less likely to provoke such a response from a school

official”).

¶28 The court of appeals here acknowledged that “courts

should consider the listener’s status and context, and may take

into account his or her subjective reaction in assessing whether

speech rises to the level of fighting words.” In re Nickolas,

224 Ariz. at 59 ¶¶ 27-28, 226 P.3d at 1045. Noting that “a

reasonable person in these circumstances might well react

violently when confronted with such repeated, angry, and

personal epithets” as were uttered by Nickolas, the court of

appeals affirmed the adjudication of delinquency for the second

incident. Id. at 59 ¶¶ 28-29, 226 P.3d at 1045. For purposes

of the fighting words doctrine, however, the inquiry is not

16

whether a reasonable person “might” react violently, but instead

whether someone in the circumstances of the addressee would

likely react violently in the context in which the words were

spoken.

¶29 The addressee here was a teacher monitoring students

in an on-campus suspension classroom. Nickolas vulgarly

insulted the teacher from about ten feet away by calling her a

“fucking bitch”; he repeated this insult and also shouted

“stupid bitch” while leaving the classroom, and he then again

shouted “fucking bitch” in the hallway while the teacher was

watching him from the classroom door. Considering the

circumstances in which Nickolas uttered his words, we do not

believe that his insults would likely have provoked an ordinary

teacher to “exchange fisticuffs” with the student or to

otherwise react violently. Cf. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409

(holding that flag burning did not “fall within that small class

of ‘fighting words’”).

¶30 We do not believe that the natural reaction of the

average teacher to a student’s profane and insulting outburst,

unaccompanied by any threats, would be to beat the student.

Arizona teachers exemplify a higher level of professionalism, as

the conduct of the teacher involved here reflected. Nickolas’s

conduct, although reprehensible, is properly punished through

school discipline or possibly prosecution under other statutes

17

rather than by characterizing it as fighting words likely to

provoke a violent reaction by his teacher.

IV.

¶31 We reverse the decision of the court of appeals

insofar as it affirms the adjudication of delinquency for the

second incident, we vacate the opinion of the court of appeals,

and we vacate the juvenile court’s order of adjudication as to

both counts.

_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

CONCURRING:

_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice

_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice

_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice

_____________________________________
Joseph W. Howard, Judge∗

∗
Pursuant to Article 6, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution,
the Honorable Joseph W. Howard, Chief Judge of the Arizona Court
of Appeals, Division Two, was designated to sit in this matter.
18

P E L A N D E R, Justice, concurring

¶33 I join in the Court’s opinion because it narrowly and

correctly holds that Nickolas’ “words were not inherently likely

to provoke a violent reaction by the teacher.” Supra, ¶ 1. I

write separately, however, to make clear the following points.

¶34 Whether the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 15-507 is

properly analyzed under the “fighting words” doctrine, or

whether the statute’s constitutional reach is limited to

fighting words, are issues that are not before us and,

therefore, neither addressed nor resolved by our opinion today.

Rather, we decide the case on very discrete grounds, limited to

the sole issue raised on review and argued by the parties:

whether Nickolas’ words constitute “fighting words,” as

delineated by the United States Supreme Court.

¶35 That issue is different from the question of whether

Nickolas’ profanity-laced tirade against the teacher in a

classroom setting was covered and protected by the First

Amendment. As to that question, I flatly reject Nickolas’

contention at oral argument that he had a constitutional right

to say what he did to the teacher. He did not. See, e.g.,

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400, 406 n.2 (2007) (holding

that student did not have “a First Amendment right” to wield

banner that said “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at off-campus, school-

approved event, and noting that “First Amendment rights are

19

‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school

environment’”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.

Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.

Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“[T]he constitutional rights

of students in public school are not automatically coextensive

with the rights of adults in other settings.”); see also Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972) (rejecting

notion that one “has an absolute constitutional right to use all

parts of a school building . . . for his unlimited expressive

purposes” when the “forbidden conduct ‘materially disrupts

classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the

rights of others’”) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).

¶36 Constitutional considerations aside, I also believe

that Nickolas’ verbal barrage against the teacher here

constituted “abuse” within the meaning of § 15-507 and,

therefore, was statutorily proscribed.1 See In re Paul M., 198

Ariz. 122, 126-27 ¶¶ 13-19, 7 P.3d 131, 135-36 (App. 2000)

1
We generally do not reach constitutional issues if the case
can be decided on statutory grounds. See State v. Gomez, 212
Ariz. 55, 61 ¶ 31, 127 P.3d 873, 879 (2006); Petolicchio v.
Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Ass’n, 177 Ariz. 256, 259, 866
P.2d 1342, 1345 (1994); cf. State v. Korzuch, 186 Ariz. 190,
195, 920 P.2d 312, 317 (1996) (recognizing general rule but
addressing constitutional issue when it predominated throughout
litigation and no alternative “grounds were raised or argued by
either party”). Given the parties’ framing and briefing of the
single, limited issue presented on review, however, the Court
correctly observes that “[w]e have no occasion here to
conclusively define the reach of A.R.S. § 15-507.” Supra, ¶ 12.
20

(Pelander, J., dissenting) (in case in which no constitutional

issues were raised or addressed, arguing that juvenile’s loudly

and aggressively directing profanity at teacher’s aide on school

grounds, in presence of other students, constituted “abuse”

under § 15-507). My concurrence in the Court’s correct

resolution of the narrow constitutional issue presented here

does not alter my view on these points.

_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice

21