Chronis v. Steinle

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

RYAN JOHN CHRONIS, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-08-0394-SA
Petitioner, )
) Maricopa County
v. ) Superior Court
) No. CR2008-006808-001 DT
HON. ROLAND J. STEINLE, JUDGE OF )
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE )
OF ARIZONA, in and for the )
County of Maricopa, ) O P I N I O N
)
Respondent Judge, )
)
)
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. )
ANDREW P. THOMAS, the Maricopa )
County Attorney, )
)
Respondent/Real Party in )
Interest. )
)
__________________________________)

Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Roland J. Steinle, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED
________________________________________________________________

JAMES J. HAAS, MARICOPA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Phoenix
By Stephen J. Whelihan, Deputy Public Defender
Bobbi Falduto, Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Ryan John Chronis

ANDREW P. THOMAS, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY Phoenix
By James P. Beene, Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for the State of Arizona
________________________________________________________________

B A L E S, Justice

¶1 We hold that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(c)

permits a defendant in a capital murder case to request a
determination of probable cause as to alleged aggravating

circumstances.

I.

¶2 Ryan Chronis was arrested after police found the body of

his girlfriend, Brianna Wood, in the car he was driving. A grand

jury indicted Chronis for first-degree murder. The State

subsequently filed an Allegation of Death Penalty and Notice of

Aggravating Factors, alleging that Chronis had killed Wood in an

“especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat.

(“A.R.S.”) section 13-703(F)(6) (Supp. 2006). The State later

clarified that it was alleging only that Chronis committed the

offense in a cruel manner.

¶3 Chronis filed a motion to dismiss the death penalty notice

because no finding of probable cause had been made as to the

aggravator. The trial court denied the motion, stating that Arizona

Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(c) “may include a challenge to the

factual underpinnings of a capital aggravator,” but that Chronis had

not carried his burden of proving that probable cause did not exist.

Chronis filed a motion to reconsider, along with another motion to

dismiss the death penalty notice for lack of probable cause. The

trial court denied the motions.

¶4 Chronis filed a petition for special action in this Court.

We accepted jurisdiction because Chronis has no equally plain,

speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal, see Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1,
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and the case presents a novel question of statewide importance that

is likely to recur. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz.

251, 252 ¶ 3, 63 P.3d 282, 283 (2003). We have jurisdiction under

Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Rules

of Procedure for Special Actions 1, 3(a), 4, and 7.

II.

¶5 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(c) provides:

The filing of a notice to seek the death penalty with
noticed aggravating circumstances shall amend the
charging document, and no further pleading needs to be
filed. A defendant may challenge the legal sufficiency
of an alleged aggravating circumstance by motion filed
pursuant to Rule 16.

¶6 This case turns on the meaning of the phrase “legal

sufficiency of an alleged aggravating circumstance.” We construe

rules of court using the same principles applicable to interpretation

of statutes. See State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289 ¶ 7, 160 P.3d

166, 168 (2007). The primary goal in interpreting a rule is to give

effect to the intent of the rule-makers. See Devenir Assocs. v. City

of Phoenix, 169 Ariz. 500, 503, 821 P.2d 161, 164 (1991). To ascertain

that intent, we examine “the rule’s context, the language used, the

subject matter, the historical background, the effects and

consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” State v. Aguilar, 209

Ariz. 40, 47 ¶ 23, 97 P.3d 865, 872 (2004).

A.

¶7 “Legal sufficiency” is not defined in the rules of criminal

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procedure. The State contends that this phrase in Rule 13.5(c) means

the same thing as does “insufficient as a matter of law” as used in

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.6(b). Rule 16.6(b) requires

that an indictment, information, or complaint be dismissed if, on

a defendant’s motion, the court finds that the charging document is

“insufficient as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.6(b).

¶8 The State argues that Arizona courts have construed Rule

16.6(b) as permitting a challenge only to whether a charging document

provides adequate notice and not inquiry into the facts of the case.

See Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 556 ¶ 4, 136 P.3d 874, 875

(2006); State ex rel. Preimsberg v. Rosenblatt, 112 Ariz. 461, 462,

543 P.2d 773,774 (1975); State v. Rickard-Hughes, 182 Ariz. 273, 275,

895 P.2d 1036, 1038 (App. 1995); State v. Kerr, 142 Ariz. 426, 431,

690 P.2d 145, 150 (App. 1984). Thus, the State concludes, Rule

13.5(c) should be similarly limited.

¶9 As an initial matter, we note that Arizona case law belies

the State’s contention that challenges to the “legal sufficiency”

of charging documents may question only whether they provide

sufficient notice. Arizona courts have entertained challenges to

charging documents on grounds involving the right to a unanimous jury

verdict, double jeopardy, jurisdiction, and failure to allege a

crime. See State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377, 389 ¶ 54, 79 P.3d 64, 76

(2003) (“Charging more than one act in a single count is forbidden

because it . . . ‘present[s] a hazard of a non-unanimous jury verdict’
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. . . .”); Rickard-Hughes, 182 Ariz. at 275, 895 P.2d at 1038 (noting

that an indictment is sufficient if it “protects the defendant from

subsequent prosecution for the same offense”); State v. Superior

Court (Clough), 7 Ariz. App. 170, 177, 436 P.2d 948, 955 (1968) (“The

purpose of an information is to give notice of the charges brought

and serve as a record to prevent double jeopardy.”); State v. Smith,

66 Ariz. 376, 379, 189 P.2d 205, 207 (1948) (“[I]n a criminal case

. . . the jurisdictional facts constituting the offense [must be]

set forth in the information . . . .”); Mejak, 212 Ariz. at 556

¶ 4, 136 P.3d at 875 (“If a defendant can admit to all the allegations

charged in the indictment and still not have committed a crime, then

the indictment is insufficient as a matter of law.”). Indeed, a

motion under Rule 16.6 (b) “can be based on any ground recognized

by law.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.6(b) cmt.

¶10 Similarly, the language “legal sufficiency of an alleged

aggravating circumstance” does not categorically exclude challenges

that involve application of law to facts. See, e.g., United States

v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (assessing “legal

sufficiency of the facts alleged” in probable cause affidavit);

Dintino v. Echols, 243 F. Supp. 2d 255, 263 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (assessing

in malicious prosecution case the “facts and circumstances”

supporting “legal sufficiency of the affidavit of probable cause”);

Gonzales v. City of Phoenix, 203 Ariz. 152, 156 ¶ 19, 52 P.3d 184,

188 (2002) (noting in context of malicious prosecution case that “the
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evidence was legally sufficient for a jury determination of no

probable cause”); State v. King, 66 Ariz. 42, 45-46, 182 P.2d 915,

917 (1947) (noting in criminal case that whether “the evidence was

legally sufficient . . . was a question of law for the court”). We

therefore conclude that Rule 13.5(c) does not by its terms exclude

a challenge to the “legal sufficiency” of an aggravator based on a

lack of probable cause.

B.

¶11 Because the language of Rule 13.5(c) does not clearly

delineate the kinds of challenges it permits, we find the petition

for the adoption of the rule useful in considering the rule’s

background and context. See Aguilar, 209 Ariz. at 45-46 ¶¶ 18-20,

97 P.3d at 870-71 (examining petition to amend rules to establish

the background surrounding a rule’s adoption).

¶12 The petition for adoption of Rule 13.5(c) reflects the

unique circumstances surrounding its promulgation. In August 2002,

after the United States Supreme Court declared Arizona’s death

penalty statutes unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002), the state legislature quickly passed a bill to conform

Arizona’s statutes to the requirements of the Constitution. See 2002

Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1 (5th Spec. Sess.). Later that month, the

Maricopa County Attorney, joined by the Arizona Attorney General,

moved to amend several Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See

Maricopa County Attorney’s Motion to Amend Rules 8.2, 11.2, 13.5,
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15.1, 15.2, 15.9, 18.1, 18.5, 18.6, 19.1, 20, 23.2, 24.1, 26.2, 26.3,

26.9 and 26.10, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Motion to

Amend”), R-02-0033 (Aug. 28, 2002) (on file with the Clerk of the

Court). The County Attorney and the Attorney General proposed that

the rules be amended on an “emergency interim basis.” Id.

¶13 This Court adopted the amendments, with some changes, on

an emergency basis and called for comments to follow. Order Amending

Rules 8.2, 11.2, 13.5, 15.1, 15.2, 15.9, 18.1, 18.5, 18.6, 19.1, 20,

23.2, 24.1, 26.2, 26.3, 26.9, and 26.10, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure (“Order Amending Rules”), R-02-0033 (Oct. 11, 2002). Rule

13.5(c), although renumbered, was adopted verbatim from the Motion

to Amend and has not been changed since its adoption.

¶14 The Motion to Amend explicitly represented that Rule

13.5(c) would “allow the defendant to request a determination of

probable cause [as to noticed aggravators] before trial if the

defense deems it appropriate.” Motion to Amend at 8. Rejecting an

assertion that aggravators should be alleged in the charging

document, the amendment proposed a compromise under which the State

would continue to file notices of death penalty and notices of

aggravating circumstances after the indictment or filing of a

criminal complaint, and defendants thereafter could obtain probable

cause determinations. Id. at 5-6. The compromise reflected that

after Ring it was unclear whether the state or federal constitution

required aggravators to be alleged in charging documents or otherwise
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subjected to probable cause determinations. Id. at 6-7. Providing

for a later probable cause determination was thus intended to avoid

certain constitutional issues.

¶15 Based on the background to its adoption, Rule 13.5(c) is

most reasonably interpreted as allowing for a probable cause hearing.

The proponent of the rule – the State of Arizona – expressly

contemplated in its rule petition that a challenge to the “legal

sufficiency of an aggravating circumstance” would encompass a

determination of probable cause. Although statements in rule

petitions or in comments responding to such petitions are by no means

determinative of a rule’s purpose and meaning, given the

circumstances of this petition, we conclude that the Court’s intent

in adopting the rule was to provide a right to a probable cause

determination on aggravators as proposed by the Motion to Amend.

¶16 Our conclusion is not affected by McKaney v. Foreman, 209

Ariz. 268, 100 P.3d 18 (2004). There a divided Court held that

“aggravating factors essential to the imposition of a capital

sentence need not be alleged in the grand jury indictment or the

information in order to satisfy constitutional due process.” 209

Ariz. at 273 ¶ 23, 100 P.3d at 23. Two justices dissented from this

conclusion, reasoning that Arizona’s constitution requires

aggravating circumstances to be included in the charging document.

Id. at 275 ¶¶ 33-34, 100 P.3d at 25 (Hurwitz, J., joined by Ryan,

J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The dissenting
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justices, however, agreed that McKaney was not entitled to special

action relief. They noted that he had an adequate remedy under Rule

13.5(c), which allowed him to seek a hearing on whether the alleged

aggravating circumstances were based on probable cause. Id. at 276

¶¶ 36-38, 100 P.3d at 26.

¶17 The majority opinion in McKaney did not mention Rule

13.5(c) much less interpret its scope. The Court’s holding in that

case can only be understood as deciding whether the state

constitution requires that aggravators be alleged in a charging

document, not whether a court rule provides a procedural right to

a probable cause determination. See Ariz. Const. art. 6 § 5(5)

(granting this Court the “[p]ower to make rules relative to all

procedural matters in any court”).

III.

¶18 Having concluded that Rule 13.5(c) provides a defendant

with an avenue for requesting a probable cause determination, we note

that the proper procedure to be followed is generally described in

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 5. As in all Rule 5 proceedings,

the burden of proof rests on the State to prove that probable cause

exists as to the aggravating circumstance. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

5.3(a) (“[T]he magistrate shall determine and state for the record

whether the prosecution’s case establishes probable cause.”). In

such a hearing, however, a court will admit only evidence that is

material to the question whether probable cause exists, id., and the
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judge may consider evidence without regard to any motions to

suppress, id. 5.3(b), and may consider certain forms of hearsay, id.

5.4(c).

¶19 Given the focused nature of probable cause hearings and

the prosecution’s wide ability to offer different forms of evidence,

we are not persuaded by the State’s argument that allowing probable

cause determinations on aggravating factors will impinge upon the

authority of prosecutors or the rights of victims. Prosecutors are

ethically bound not to allege aggravating factors that they know are

not supported by probable cause. See Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 42, ER 3.8(a).

Affording a right to a probable cause determination on aggravators

does not infringe on any substantive power of prosecutors. Nor will

probable cause hearings unduly burden victims. The admissibility

of hearsay implies that victims generally need not testify at

probable cause hearings. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 5.4(c)(3) (allowing

witness to testify to statements of others).

IV.

¶20 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(c) allows a

defendant in a capital case to request a probable cause determination

for alleged aggravating circumstances. Such determinations are to

be made following the procedure in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure

5, under which the State bears the burden of proof. The trial court

erred because it did not provide a probable cause hearing and it

placed the burden of proof on Chronis. We therefore grant special
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action relief, vacate the orders of the trial court denying a probable

cause hearing, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

_______________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

CONCURRING:

_______________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_______________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_______________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

_______________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

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