SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
ALEXA J. MORGAN; NANCY B. ) Arizona Supreme Court
BROHNER, ) No. CV-04-0222-PR
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Court of Appeals
Cross-Appellees, ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 03-0232
v. )
) Maricopa County
CARILLON INVESTMENTS, INC.; ) Superior Court
MICHAEL SIMPSON and his wife ) No. CV02-012785
JANE DOE SIMPSON, )
)
Defendants-Appellees, ) O P I N I O N
Cross-Appellants. )
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Mark R. Santana, Judge
REVERSED AND REMANDED
________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
207 Ariz. 547, 88 P.3d 1159 (App. 2004)
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
RENAUD COOK DRURY MESAROS, PA Phoenix
by Michael Salcido
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Apellees
HOLLOWAY ODEGARD FORREST KELLY & KASPAREK, P.C. Phoenix
by Peter C. Kelly, II
and Matthew M. Nicely
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants
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P E R C U R I A M
¶1 This court granted review to determine whether the
court of appeals erred in not affirming the trial court’s
dismissal of Alexa J. Morgan’s application to set aside an
arbitration award, which she filed fourteen months after the
entry of the arbitration award, as untimely. We conclude that
there was no error.
¶2 The relevant facts of this case are set forth in the
court of appeals opinion, and we adopt them here by reference.
See Morgan v. Carillon Invs., Inc., 207 Ariz. 547, 548, ¶¶ 1-5,
88 P.3d 1159, 1160 (App. 2004).
¶3 In its petition for review, Carillon Investments,
Inc., claims that Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-1513
(2003) establishes the appropriate deadline for filing a motion
to set aside an arbitration award. It further argues that Hatch
v. Double Circle Ranch, 22 Ariz. App. 124, 524 P.2d 958 (1974),
which imposed A.R.S. § 12-1513’s ninety-day limitation on a
motion to vacate an arbitration award filed pursuant to A.R.S. §
12-1512, is dispositive in this case. The court of appeals,
however, disagreed with the Hatch opinion and concluded that
neither A.R.S. § 12-1513 nor A.R.S. § 12-1512 (2003) provided a
statute of limitations for filing a motion to set aside an
arbitration award. Morgan, 207 Ariz. at 552, ¶ 23, 88 P.3d at
1164. Thus a conflict now exists between extant opinions of the
court of appeals. We therefore issue this opinion to clarify
this important area of the law.
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¶4 We conclude that the court of appeals opinion in this
case is the better reasoned opinion and adopt its reasoning as
our own. A party seeking to set aside an arbitration award may
file its motion pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1512, which does not
impose a statute of limitations. A prevailing party has the
ability to preclude the spectre of an unlimited limitations
period for filing a motion to vacate an arbitration award by
filing a motion to confirm the award pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-
1511 (2003), thereby triggering the twenty-day limitation in
which to file an opposition. In light of this ruling, Morgan’s
motion was timely. We therefore affirm the opinion of the court
of appeals and remand this case so that the trial court may
properly consider Morgan’s motion.
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Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice
__________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice
__________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Justice
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Michael D. Ryan, Justice
__________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice
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