State v. Casey

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-01-0223-PR
Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals, Division One
v. ) No. 1 CA-CR 00-0476
)
FLETCHER CASEY, ) Maricopa County Superior Court
) No. CR 00-000653
Appellant. )
__________________________________________) OPINION

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Bernard J. Dougherty, Judge
AFFIRMED

Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One
Filed April 12, 2001
AFFIRMED

Janet A. Napolitano, Attorney General Phoenix
By: Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel
Criminal Appeals Section
and Doriane F. Zwillinger, Assistant Attorney General
Robert A. Walsh, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Arizona

D. Jesse Smith Tucson
Attorney for Fletcher Casey

Fletcher Casey Yuma
Pro Se
HOWARD, Judge

¶1 Fletcher Casey was charged with aggravated assault and claimed he had acted in self-

defense. Over objection, the trial judge instructed the jury that the state must prove the elements of

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt but that Casey must prove self-defense by a preponderance

of the evidence. Casey was convicted and appealed on due process grounds. The court of appeals

affirmed the conviction and approved the jury instruction. State v. Casey, No. 1 CA-CR 00-0476,

mem. dec. at ¶4 (Ct. App. April 12, 2001). We granted review to examine the validity of that

burden-shifting instruction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, § 5(3) of the Arizona

Constitution.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 According to the evidence at trial, Casey and his pregnant girlfriend rented living

space from Hurst. On an afternoon in January 2000, Casey returned home from looking for work

and found his girlfriend in the living room with Hurst and Hurst’s friend Jimmerson, the eventual

victim of the shooting. Casey believed the others had been smoking crack and was concerned for

both his girlfriend’s health and her safety, as he suspected Jimmerson was attempting to get her high

in order to assault or seduce her.

¶3 Casey and Jimmerson began to argue and then to fight. Jimmerson had placed his

gun on a table, and Casey testified that when Jimmerson reached for the gun, he and Jimmerson had

struggled over it. The gun discharged several times, fired at least twice by Casey. Jimmerson was

hit twice, once below the rib cage and once below the buttocks. The police were dispatched in

response to a call about a shooting and found Jimmerson, obviously wounded, walking out of the

house. A man later identified as Casey ran through the back yard and climbed over a fence.

¶4 Casey was apprehended and charged with aggravated assault. By the time of Casey’s

trial, Jimmerson could not be located and therefore did not testify. The trial judge allowed a police

officer who responded to the scene to testify under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule

2
that Jimmerson said he had been shot by Casey. Casey testified about the struggle over the gun. The

judge instructed the jury as follows:

The defendant must prove the defense of self-defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance means that the defense of self-defense is more
probably true than not. In determining whether the defendant has met
this burden, consider all the evidence, whether produced by the State
or the defendant.

However, the burden of proof with regard to the elements of
the charged offense is with the State. The burden of proof never
shifts during the trial. That burden of proof is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, as defined earlier in these instructions.

Mem. dec. at ¶2. The instruction was based on A.R.S. § 13-205(A) (1997), which provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a defendant shall prove any
affirmative defense raised by a preponderance of the evidence,
including any justification defense [including self-defense].

See A.R.S. §§ 13-401 through 13-417.

¶5 Casey was convicted and appealed. In affirming his conviction, the court of appeals

relied on State v. Farley, 199 Ariz. 542, ¶¶1-2, 19 P.3d 1258, ¶¶1-2 (App. 2001), in which it had held

that the justification instruction does not violate due process. See also State v. Sierra-Cervantes, 201

Ariz. 459, ¶¶ 11-13, 37 P.3d 432, ¶¶ 11-13 (App. 2001).

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 The issue we accepted for review was framed as follows:

Does A.R.S. § 13-205 offend due process in shifting the burden of
proof by requiring a defendant to prove self-defense? Framed another
way, is lack of justification a matter that must be proved by the state
beyond a reasonable doubt once a defendant has properly pled, and
the evidence raises the issue of, self-defense?

3
¶7 Casey argues that once the evidence raises a question of self-defense, our case law

treats lack of justification as, essentially, an element of the offense that due process requires the state

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Casey relies for this proposition on State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz.

88, 688 P.2d 980 (1984), and a number of other Arizona cases. The state argues, on the other hand,

that self-defense is simply an affirmative defense and that the legislature may require a defendant

to assume the burden of proving its existence. For this proposition, the state relies on the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S. Ct. 1098, 94 L. Ed. 2d 267

(1987).

¶8 This court analyzes a statute’s constitutionality de novo as a matter of law. See

Arizona Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Superior Court, 190 Ariz. 490, 494, 949 P.2d 983, 987 (App. 1997).

We have a duty to construe statutes in harmony with the constitution when it is reasonably possible

to do so. See Aitken v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ariz. 387, 389, 904 P.2d 456, 458 (1995). Normally

we interpret clauses in the Arizona Constitution in conformity with decisions of the United States

Supreme Court and its interpretation of similar clauses in the United States Constitution. See Pool

v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984). However, “interpretation of the

state constitution is, of course, our province.” Id.

CURRENT STATUTE

¶9 In 1997, the legislature enacted section 13-205(A), which states: “[A] defendant

shall prove any affirmative defense raised by a preponderance of the evidence, including any

justification defense under chapter 4 of this title.” See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 136, § 4. Self-

defense is a “justification defense under Chapter 4.” See §§ 13-401 through 13-417. Thus, the

legislature has made clear its intention that a defendant bears the burden of proving the defense of

self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

¶ 10 “‘Power resides with the legislature to define that conduct which will not be tolerated

in an ordered society . . . .’” State v. Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶9, 977 P.2d 131, ¶9 (1999), quoting

4
State v. Bly, 127 Ariz. 370, 371, 621 P.2d 279, 280 (1980); see State v. Viramontes, 240 Ariz. 360,

¶12, 64 P.3d 188, ¶12 (2003) (“It is not our place to pass on the wisdom of” legislative decisions

concerning criminal procedure.); State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 490, 491, 924 P.2d 494, 495 (App.

1996) (“The authority to define crimes and fix the penalties for such crimes rests with the legislature,

not the judiciary.”). This power also extends, at least within constitutional bounds, to defenses. See,

e.g., State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540-41, 931 P.2d 1046, 1050-51 (1997) (legislature decides

whether “to adopt the defense of diminished capacity” and the “Court does not have the authority”

to do so), citing State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 212-13, 403 P.2d 521, 529 (1965); Paul H. Robinson,

Criminal Law Defenses § 24(a), at 86 (1984) (“Legislatures refine basic [justification] principle[s]

to provide in each case a suitable justification defense . . . .”). Section 13-103(A), A.R.S., states:

“All common law offenses and affirmative defenses are abolished. No conduct or omission

constitutes an offense or an affirmative defense unless it is an offense or an affirmative defense under

this title or under another statute or ordinance.” Because the legislature has determined that self-

defense is not an element of the crime but is to be proven by the defendant, this court must respect

the legislature’s decision, unless that decision is unconstitutional under either the federal or state due

process clause.

CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS

¶ 11 “Statutes are presumed constitutional and the burden of proof is on the opponent of

the statute to show it infringes upon a constitutional guarantee or violates a constitutional principle.”

State v. Wagstaff, 164 Ariz. 485, 494, 794 P.2d 118, 127 (1990). The federal and state due process

clauses contain nearly identical language and protect the same interests. See U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 4; see also State v. Melendez, 172 Ariz. 68, 71, 834 P.2d 154, 157

(1992) (“The touchstone of due process under both the Arizona and federal constitutions is

fundamental fairness.”). Although this court is not bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of

a federal constitutional clause, those interpretations have “great weight” in accomplishing the desired

5
uniformity between the clauses. Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271; see State v. Noble, 171

Ariz. 171, 173, 829 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1992) (identical federal and state constitutional clauses

interpreted similarly).

¶ 12 In Martin, the Supreme Court held that an Ohio statute requiring a defendant to prove

self-defense did not violate the federal due process mandate, as declared in In re Winship, 397 U.S.

358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375 (1970), that a defendant may not be convicted

“except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged.” The dissent in Martin pointed out that the requirement that the state prove

premeditation, defined as calculated intent, could conflict with the self-defense requirement that the

danger be sudden. Nevertheless, the majority upheld the statute, stating that the jury could be

properly instructed. Accordingly, section 13-205 does not violate the federal due process clause.

¶ 13 Under the due process clause of Arizona’s constitution, fundamental fairness is still

the touchstone. Melendez, 172 Ariz. at 71, 834 P.2d at 157. Requiring the defendant to prove self-

defense or other affirmative defenses is not fundamentally unfair. See Martin, 480 U.S. at 236, 107

S. Ct. at 1103, 94 L. Ed. 2d 267. We see no compelling reason to interpret the state due process

clause differently in this context from the federal clause. See Noble, 171 Ariz. at 173, 829 P.2d at

1219; Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271. Moreover, the conflict between the premeditation

element of murder and the components of self-defense that troubled the dissenters in Martin does

not exist with respect to the offense of aggravated assault. As relevant here, a defendant commits

aggravated assault by committing assault and causing serious physical injury to another or

committing assault using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. A.R.S. § 13-1204(A). The state

therefore was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Casey had intentionally, knowingly,

or recklessly shot the victim. A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, 13-1204. Casey was then required to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the reason he shot the victim was to prevent the victim from

6
causing serious physical injury to him or his pregnant girlfriend. See A.R.S. §§ 13-205, 13-404, 13-

405, 13-406. Casey was not required to disprove any element of the offense and the potential

conflict found in murder cases does not exist here.

¶ 14 Furthermore, our courts have found that the legislature did not violate defendants’

due process rights by placing the burden of proving other affirmative defenses, such as entrapment

under A.R.S. section 13-206 and insanity under A.R.S. section 13-502, on the defendant. See State

v. Moorman, 154 Ariz. 578, 586, 744 P.2d 679, 687 (1987) (defendant may be required to prove

insanity defense); State v. Preston, 197 Ariz. 461, 4 P.3d 1004 (App. 2000) (defendant may be

required to prove entrapment defense under clear and convincing standard). A self-defense claim

also justifies conduct which would otherwise be criminal, and it is appropriate to treat similar

defenses in the same fashion from a constitutional standpoint.

¶ 15 Therefore, based on the legislature’s constitutional authority to define crimes and

defenses, the meaning of the federal due process clause and the desired uniformity with it, and the

legislature’s treatment of other defenses, which we have held constitutional, we hold section 13-205

does not violate the due process clause of Arizona’s constitution.

PRIOR ARIZONA CASES

¶ 16 Casey argues, however, that prior Arizona cases on self-defense compel a different

result. But the cases on which Casey relies are based on statutory interpretation rather than the

Arizona’s due process clause.

A. Statutory context of the cases

¶ 17 Even in territorial days, the state’s burden of showing proof beyond a reasonable

doubt was set forth in statute. See Pen. Code 1901, § 923. The codification of that requirement has

7
survived to date and is now found in A.R.S. § 13-115. See 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, § 40;

Code 1939, § 44-1810; Rev. Code 1928, § 5044; Laws 1919, ch. 146, § 4; Pen. Code 1913, § 1036;

Pen. Code 1901, § 923. Similarly, various statues have set forth defenses to the crimes of assault

and murder. See Pen. Code 1901, § 933 (defense in murder case); Pen. Code 1913, § 1046; Rev.

Code 1928, § 5050; Code 1939, § 44-1814; A.R.S. § 13-454; 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 138, § 4;

see also Pen. Code 1901, §§ 181-82 (justifiable homicide); Pen. Code 1913, §§ 180-81; Rev. Code

1928, § 4590; Code 1939, § 43-2908; A.R.S. § 13-462; 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, § 15; see

also Pen. Code 1901, §§ 213-14 (defenses to assault); Pen. Code 1913, §§ 213-14; Rev. Code 1928,

§ 4612; Code 1939, § 43-602; A.R.S. § 13-246; 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, § 4.

¶ 18 When the Arizona Constitution was adopted in 1910, the framers granted the accused

many rights. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. II, §§ 10, 14, 15, 24, 25. The framers specifically included

the right to due process, id. at § 4, but did not specifically include the concept of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt or specify a defendant’s burden regarding a justification defense. Rather, the

framers left undisturbed the definitions of burdens of proof in the existing Penal Code.1 The cases

upon which Casey relies, accordingly, have focused on statutes defining the burden as opposed to

constitutional provisions.

B. Anderson and Hunter analysis

¶ 19 Casey relies on Anderson v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 50, 76 P. 636 (1904), a murder case,

as authority for the proposition that due process requires the state to disprove self-defense beyond

a reasonable doubt. But Anderson predates the Arizona Constitution and interpreted now repealed

provisions of Arizona’s Penal Code that allocated the burden of proof. In that case, the jury was

1
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), has now engrafted the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt onto the federal due process clause.

8
instructed, in accordance with Penal Code 1901, § 933, that if the act was unlawful, the law

presumed the criminal intent and the defendant was required to prove a justification defense. The

court was troubled by the potential for conflict between the element of “malice” and the defendant’s

claim that he had acted in self-defense, just as the dissenters in Martin were. See Anderson, 9 Ariz.

at 56, 76 P. at 638 (“Malice is as much an essential element in the crime of homicide as is the

killing.”). But the court in Anderson did not decide the case on constitutional grounds and

specifically limited its holding to one of statutory construction, stating: “It seems . . . more

reasonable to hold that the statute means . . . .” 9 Ariz. at 55, 76 P. at 638. See also Rosser v. State,

45 Ariz. 264, 267, 42 P.2d 613, 614 (1935) (instruction reflecting § 933 did not “improperly place[]

the burden upon defendant to prove self-defense”). Accordingly, Anderson held that the statute,

rather than the due process clause of Arizona’s Constitution, required the state disprove self-defense

beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 20 Casey also relies on State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 688 P.2d 980 (1984), another

murder case. The court there found that the trial court had committed fundamental error by

instructing the jury: “If you decide the defendant’s conduct was justified, you must find the

defendant not guilty.” Id. at 89-90, 688 P.2d at 981-82. Despite the fact that Winship had been

decided fourteen years earlier, Hunter did not mention it or its constitutional underpinnings. As this

court later commented:

Hunter does not mention any constitutional provision and is
remarkable for its silence on the question of whether the fundamental
error had its origins in the constitution. . . . However, Hunter does
not involve the state’s due process obligation to prove the elements
of the crime but, rather, the burden-shifting of the state’s obligation
to prove the absence of justification for defendant’s actions.

State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174 n.8, 823 P.2d 41 n.8 (1991).

9
¶ 21 Hunter relied on two authorities for the proposition that the state must prove every

element of the crime, including disproving self-defense, beyond a reasonable doubt. One authority

was section 13-115(A), the statute which establishes the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable

doubt. Invoking the statute does not implicate the due process clause.

¶ 22 The second authority was Everett v. State, 88 Ariz. 293, 356 P.2d 394 (1960). Everett

was an assault case interpreting a then existing assault statute mentioned previously, section 13-246,

which stated, in relevant part: “Violence used to the person does not amount to assault or battery

in . . . self-defense, or defense of another against unlawful violence to his person or property.”

Everett, 88 Ariz. at 296, 356 P.2d at 396. Accordingly, the Everett court concluded, as a matter of

statutory construction, that the statute made lack of self-defense an element of the crime. Again, in

this decision the court did not invoke the due process clause to justify its result.

¶ 23 Finally, the current assault statutes are completely different from those considered in

Everett and do not make lack of self-defense an element of the crime. See, e.g.,§ 13-1204. In fact,

section 13-205 specifically states that self-defense is an affirmative defense. Therefore, even if

Everett had established that lack of self-defense was an element of the crime under the former

statute, it has no application to the current statute. Accordingly, neither the holding nor the rationale

of Hunter compels a finding that section 13-205 is unconstitutional.

¶ 24 Our decision in State v. Cannon, 157 Ariz. 107, 755 P.2d 412 (1988), further supports

our conclusion. In Cannon, although we refused to overturn Hunter based on Martin as the state had

urged, again we did not indicate that the requirement that self-defense be disproved by the state

beyond a reasonable doubt was constitutionally based. In discussing the state’s argument that, by

removing the word “unlawful” from the definition of assault and murder in revisions to the new

10
criminal code, the legislature had intended to relieve the state of its burden to disprove self-defense,

we stated:

This argument, while clever, is unconvincing. First, the
legislature gave no express indication of such an intent, nor, if the
burden was to be shifted to the defendant, what the burden was to be.
When it does so intend, as in the case of the insanity defense, . . . it
has made its intent and the nature of the burden clear. Second, the
method by which the state seeks to infer an intent depends upon a
body of constitutional law that did not exist at the time the criminal
code was being drafted by a special commission or first passed by the
legislature. Third, when a change is to be made of a principle of law
that has existed since territorial days, we require that legislative intent
be clear and not inferred from a labored analysis as likely to mask
legislative intent as to explicate it. Finally, the fact that the purported
legislative intent was not discovered by the state for over ten years is
a fair indication it never existed.

Cannon, 157 Ariz. at 108, 755 P.2d at 413 (citation omitted). If the requirement that the state

disprove self-defense were constitutionally based, legislative intent would have been immaterial.

And the legislature has now given an “express indication” of its intent and has specified the burden.

Further, the legislature has acted pursuant to “a body of constitutional law” allowing the change.

Finally, the legislature’s intent was “discovered” as soon as section 13-205 was enacted. The

legislature has therefore fulfilled the requirements set forth in Cannon.

PRESENT ARIZONA AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE STATUTES

¶ 25 Casey further relies on the following language of another statute, A.R.S. § 13-403,

to support his position that lack of self-defense should be treated as an element of the crime: “The

use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable

and not criminal under any of the following circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) Subsections one

through five then list various circumstances under which certain persons may come within the

statute’s protection, including: a person in loco parentis, a jailer, a person in charge of a common

11
motor carrier, and a physician. Id. These individuals all have a duty to maintain order in various

circumstances. Even if the legislature, in essence, decriminalized actions taken to fulfill their duty,

as Casey claims,2 Casey does not fall within any of the subsections.

¶ 26 Subsection six, on which Casey relies, is not another in the list of circumstances

which the legislature has selected for special treatment. It is a separate sentence that states: “A

person may otherwise use physical force upon another person as further provided in this chapter.”

Id. (6) (emphasis added). The language in the introductory portion of the statute can apply only to

the “circumstances” contained in subsections one through five. Subsection six does not indicate that

the legislature intended to decriminalize actions allegedly taken in self-defense in the myriad of other

situations in which such a claim may arise.

¶ 27 Additionally, Casey’s reading of subsection six renders a portion of section 13-205

meaningless. See State v. Pitts, 178 Ariz. 405, 407, 874 P.2d 962, 964 (1994) (we avoid

interpretation of statute that renders it meaningless). Section 13-205 requires that the defendant

prove by a preponderance of the evidence, among other things, any justification defense in chapter

four. Subsection six, on the other hand, according to Casey, makes the lack of the defenses in

chapter four a quasi-element that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, rendering

that portion of section 13-205 meaningless. On the other hand, applying the introductory paragraph

only to the five listed circumstances avoids this direct and irreconcilable conflict. Accordingly, we

reject as a matter of statutory interpretation Casey’s attempt to, in effect, combine section 13-404,

which defines self-defense, with the introductory language in section 13-403.

2
We are not required today to determine the legislative intent in A.R.S. § 13-403(1) through
(5), or the ramifications of that intent. We therefore leave that decision to another day.

12
¶ 28 Finally, the actual statutes defining self-defense do not mention that the conduct

permitted is “not criminal.” Section 13-404(A) states, in pertinent part, that “a person is justified

in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person

would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use

or attempted use of unlawful physical force.” This section simply says the action is “justified” and

makes self-defense a justification defense. See §§ 13-205, 13-401. It does not decriminalize the

action, as section 13-403 may do with respect to those special circumstances described in subsections

one through five. And section 13-401(B) states, in part, that “justification, as defined in [Chapter

4], is a defense in any prosecution for an offense pursuant to this title.” Taking the statutes as a

whole and giving them a common sense reading, lack of self-defense is not an element of the crime

of assault but an affirmative defense under section 13-205 that the defendant must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence.

¶ 29 Casey therefore has failed to show that either past Arizona cases or the current

statutes mandate our declaring section 13-205 unconstitutional. Under section 13-205, self-defense

remains a viable defense, like insanity and entrapment, despite the fact that the burden of proof is

on the defendant. Because the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Casey committed each

element of the crime of aggravated assault, the purposes of the constitutional requirement of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt have been satisfied. As we stated, in approving the shifting of the burden

on insanity:

As was stated in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, [209,] 97
S. Ct. 2319, [2326,] 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, [291] (1977), “[i]f the State . . .
chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality
or punishment, . . . the State may assure itself that the fact has been
established with reasonable certainty. To recognize . . . a mitigating
circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in

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 each case . . . if in [the State's] judgment [it] would be too
cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.”

State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192, 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986) (alterations in Fletcher).

¶ 30 We hold that the legislature has the constitutional authority to shift the burden of

proof for self-defense to the defendant and therefore uphold section 13-205.3 The decisions of the

trial court and of the court of appeals are affirmed.

____________________________________
Joseph W. Howard, Judge*

CONCURRING:

__________________________________________
Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice

__________________________________________
Ruth V. Mcgregor, Vice Chief Justice

__________________________________________
William J. O’Neil, Judge*

*Justices Rebecca White Berch and Michael D. Ryan did not participate in the determination of this
matter; pursuant to article VI, section 3, of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Joseph W.
Howard, Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, and the Honorable William J.
O’Neil, Presiding Judge of the Superior Court in Pinal County, were designated to sit on this case.
Justice Stanley G. Feldman recused himself from further consideration of this case after his
retirement.

3
We do not need to resolve today whether an impermissible conflict exists in certain first-degree
murder cases between the requirement that the state prove the premeditation element beyond a reasonable
doubt and the burden-shifting effect of A.R.S. § 13-205, or whether additional instructions would be
required or sufficient to resolve any conflict.

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