SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Supreme Court
) No. CR-01-0296-PR
Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) No. 2 CA-CR 00-0227
)
SAMUEL PHILLIP VIRAMONTES, ) Pima County
) Superior Court
) No. CR-67216
Appellant. )
) Consolidated with
___________________________________)
)
STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Supreme Court
) No. CR-01-0414-PR
Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) No. 2 CA-CR 99-0373
)
) Pima County
JASON JARED BECK, ) Superior Court
) No. CR-60232
Appellant. )
) O P I N I O N
___________________________________)
VIRAMONTES
Appeal from Superior Court of Pima County
The Honorable Michael Cruikshank, Judge
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
Court of Appeals, Division Two
200 Ariz. 452, 27 P.3d 809 (2001)
VACATED
_______________________________________
BECK
Appeal from Superior Court of Pima County
The Honorable Michael Brown, Judge
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
Court of Appeals, Division Two
Memorandum Decision Dated September 25, 2001
VACATED
VIRAMONTES
Isabel G. Garcia, Pima County Legal Defender Tucson
By Robb P. Holmes
Attorneys for Appellant
Janet Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General Phoenix
By Randall M. Howe Phoenix
Cynthia Ryan Tucson
Attorneys for Appellee
BECK
Isabel G. Garcia, Pima County Legal Defender Tucson
By Joy Athena
Attorneys for Appellant
Janet Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General Phoenix
By Randall M. Howe Phoenix
Diane M. Acosta Tucson
Attorneys for Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
Z L A K E T, Justice (Retired)
¶1 Samuel Viramontes and Jason Beck were separately
convicted of first degree murder and each received a natural life
sentence. We consolidated their cases and granted review without
oral argument to decide whether a trial court, in a first degree
murder case where the state has not sought the death penalty, may
consider in sentencing those aggravating factors provided for by
Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-702. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to Arizona Constitution, Article VI, Section 5(3) and
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.19.
¶2 Viramontes was convicted of killing Kevin Stratton. The
state did not seek the death penalty and the trial court sentenced
him to natural life in prison, having found four aggravating
factors: 1) the presence of an accomplice, 2) the defendant’s
failure to avail himself of past rehabilitative efforts, 3) his
juvenile history, and 4) a prior conviction. The court of appeals
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affirmed the sentence, holding that it was permissible for the
trial court to utilize the aggravating factors set forth in
section 13-702. State v. Viramontes, 200 Ariz. 452, 455, 27 P.3d
809, 812 (App. 2001).
¶3 Beck was convicted of kidnapping and killing David
Nickell. The state did not seek the death penalty. The trial
court relied on the following factors in handing down a natural
life sentence: 1) Beck’s 34 point I.Q. advantage over his co-
defendant, 2) his lack of remorse, 3) the cruelty involved in the
killing, 4) the significant emotional harm to the victim, 5) the
use of a deadly weapon, 6) Beck’s temperament and personality, and
7) the presence of an accomplice. In a memorandum decision, the
court of appeals affirmed the sentence based on its previous
opinion in Viramontes.
ANALYSIS
¶4 We review issues of statutory construction de novo.
Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230
(1996).
¶5 Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1105(C) states that
"[f]irst degree murder is a class 1 felony and is punishable by
death or life imprisonment as provided by § 13-703." Section 13-
703(A), as it was in effect at all times pertinent to this case,1
1
After these defendants were sentenced, section 13-703 was
amended by Laws 2001, Ch. 260, § 1. The legislature inserted a new
subsection B, redesignated existing subsections B to H as C to I,
and modified internal subsection references to conform to the
reorganization of the section. The wording of the relevant
sections remained the same. Additionally, on August 1, 2002 the
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reads in part as follows: "A person guilty of first degree murder
as defined in § 13-1105 shall suffer death or imprisonment . . . in
accordance with the procedures provided in subsections B through G
of this section." Subsection (A) further specifies that a person
convicted of first degree murder is subject to 1) death, 2) natural
life in prison, or 3) life in prison with the possibility of
parole.
¶6 Section 13-702, on the other hand, explicitly limits its
reach to classes 2 through 6 felonies. Moreover, subsection F
states: "Nothing in this section affects any provision of law that
imposes the death penalty, [or] that expressly provides for
imprisonment for life." A.R.S. § 13-702(F).
¶7 Viramontes and Beck argue that the plain language of
section 13-703(A) requires the application of its aggravators and
sentencing procedures in all first degree murder convictions. The
state, on the other hand, contends that the statute is implicated
only if the death penalty has been sought--that is, where the trial
court must choose either life or death. It does not apply, says
the state, where the only choice is between 1) natural life and 2)
life with the possibility of parole.
¶8 "[W]hen the language [of a statute] is clear and
unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction."
Arizona Legislature passed Senate Bill 1001, which further amended
section 13-703, renumbered section 13-703.01 as 13-703.04, added
new sections 13-703.01 and -703.05, and amended section 13-1105.
Most of these changes related to death sentences, in response to
Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
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Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223
(1991). In the absence of ambiguity, we must give effect to that
language and may not employ other means of statutory
interpretation. Id. See also Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S.
Constr. Co., Inc., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994).
¶9 We believe that sections 13-702, 13-703, and 13-1105 are
clear. Section 13-1105 provides that any person guilty of first
degree murder must be sentenced pursuant to section 13-703.
Section 13-703(A) expressly states that a person guilty of first
degree murder shall suffer death or imprisonment pursuant to its
terms. And, section 13-702 expressly applies only to class 2
through class 6 felonies, with subsection (F) thereof stating that
the statute has no effect on first degree murder sentencings.
¶10 The state tries to make much of the disjunctive language
in subsections 13-703(A) and (E). Both speak in terms of death or
life imprisonment. Thus, the state argues, the statute applies
only in cases where the actual choice to be made is between death
and life. We believe that such an interpretation is too
restrictive and overlooks the clear language mandating that a
sentencing determination for first degree murder be made pursuant
to section 13-703. Nothing in the statutes expresses or implies
that the procedures and aggravators of section 13-703 apply only to
cases in which the state has sought the death penalty. Rather, it
is clearly the nature and classification of the crime that
determines the appropriate sentencing statute.
¶11 The state argues that we should examine legislative
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history to properly construe the statute. While helpful under some
circumstances, a review of legislative history is generally
unnecessary and inappropriate where statutory language is without
ambiguity. Although we recognize that the impetus for significant
revision of section 13-703 was the United States Supreme Court
decision in a capital case, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.
Ct. 2726 (1972), we cannot ignore the plain wording of our
statutes.
¶12 We agree with the court of appeals’ observation that
trial judges impose consecutive sentences every day amounting to
natural life in prison without the special sentencing procedures of
section 13-703. That fact, however, does not inform our decision
here. The statutes limit sentencing procedures in a non-capital
first degree murder case to those set forth in section 13-703. It
is not our place to pass on the wisdom of such limits; that is a
decision for the legislature.
¶13 Moreover, nothing presented to us indicates that the
legislature intended for non-capital first degree murder defendants
to be sentenced using those aggravators listed in section 13-702.
The court of appeals and the state rely on State v. Sproule, 188
Ariz. 439, 937 P.2d 361 (App. 1996), and State v. Guytan, 192 Ariz.
514, 968 P.2d 587 (App. 1998). But that reliance is misplaced.
First, neither of those cases is binding on this court. Second,
they are both easily distinguishable. In Sproule, the state sought
the death penalty. Following a hearing pursuant to section 13-703,
the trial judge determined that death was not warranted and ordered
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a natural life sentence. In Guytan, the defendant claimed that the
trial court had double counted factors from sections 13-702 and 13-
703 in sentencing him to natural life. The Guytan court did not
explicitly approve of the use of aggravators from both statutes; it
simply rejected the defendant’s claim, relying on Sproule.
¶14 Finally, the court of appeals here rejected Viramontes’
claim that the aggravators must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Viramontes, 200 Ariz. at 455, 27 P.3d at 811. We agree.
Section 13-703, as it was in effect at all times pertinent hereto,
makes no mention of an evidentiary standard of proof.
Nevertheless, we have consistently required aggravators to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in capital cases. See, e.g.,
State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 286, 614 P.2d 825, 828 (1980); see
also State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 500, 826 P.2d 783, 797 (1992);
State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 322, 666 P.2d 57, 67 (1983). In
non-capital cases, aggravators need only be supported by reasonable
evidence. See State v. Meador, 132 Ariz. 343, 347, 645 P.2d 1257,
1261 (App. 1982); Matter of Varbel, 182 Ariz. 451, 455 n.7, 897
P.2d 1337, 1341 n.7 (1995). This would include aggravators in non-
capital first degree murder cases.
DISPOSITION
¶15 Because the aggravators in section 13-703 are the only
ones permitted in a first degree murder prosecution where the state
has not sought the death penalty, these cases are remanded for
resentencing. The court of appeals’ decisions are vacated.
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____________________________________
THOMAS A. ZLAKET, Justice (Retired)
CONCURRING:
____________________________________
CHARLES E. JONES, Chief Justice
____________________________________
RUTH V. MCGREGOR, Vice Chief Justice
____________________________________
STANLEY G. FELDMAN, Justice
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