12-3267-cv
Sanchez-Vazquez v. Rochester City School District, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 14th day of May, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
9 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
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13 LUIS O. SANCHEZ-VAZQUEZ,
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 12-3267-cv
17
18 ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
19 SUPERVISOR GLEN DUNFORD, supervisor,
20 individually,
21 Defendants-Appellees.
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23
24 APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: CHRISTINA A. AGOLA, Christina A.
25 Agola, PLLC, Brighton, NY.
26
27 APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: EDWIN LOPEZ-SOTO, General
28 Counsel (Michael E. Davis, of
1
1 counsel), Rochester City School
2 District, Rochester, NY.
3
4 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
5 Court for the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.).
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
8 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
9 AFFIRMED.
10
11 Plaintiff-appellant Luis O. Sanchez-Vazquez appeals
12 from the judgment of the United States District Court for
13 the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.), dismissing
14 the complaint on the pleadings. We assume the parties’
15 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
16 history, and the issues presented for review.
17
18 “This Court ‘review[s] de novo a district court's
19 dismissal of a complaint pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ. P.]
20 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the
21 complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
22 the plaintiffs' favor.’” Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164,
23 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co.,
24 228 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2000)).
25
26 Hostile work environment claims, whether under 42
27 U.S.C. § 1981 or the New York Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”),
28 can be analyzed pursuant to the core substantive standards
29 that apply to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
30 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida,
31 N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004); Reed v. A.W.
32 Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1177 (2d Cir. 1996). A
33 hostile work environment “is permeated with discriminatory
34 intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently
35 severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
36 employment.” Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570
37 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations
38 omitted). “Isolated instances of harassment ordinarily do
39 not rise to this level.” Id.
40
41 Considered in their totality and viewed in the light
42 most favorable to Sanchez-Vazquez, the offensive incidents
43 alleged are insufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial
44 as to severity or pervasiveness. Sanchez-Vazquez alleges
2
1 five incidents, over four years, based on his race and
2 national origin. This Circuit has “found triable issues of
3 fact only where the harassment was of greater frequency and
4 severity than anything” Sanchez-Vazquez has demonstrated.
5 See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 379 (2d Cir. 2002)
6 (five incidents occurring over more than four years).
7
8 Moreover, only three of the five statements alleged by
9 Sanchez-Vazquez can be construed as race related in
10 character. Although this Court can include all statements,
11 even facially neutral ones, “among the ‘totality of the
12 circumstances’ that courts consider in any hostile work
13 environment claim,” id. at 378, the ambiguous nature of
14 these statements further weakens any inference that the
15 conditions were so severe as to state a claim for a
16 racially hostile work environment.
17
18 We affirm dismissal regarding Sanchez-Vazquez’s claims
19 of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social
20 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Sanchez-Vazquez fails to
21 show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a
22 municipal policy or custom. Id. 692-94.
23
24 We have considered all of Sanchez-Vazquez’s contentions
25 on this appeal and have found them to be without merit.
26 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby
27 AFFIRMED.
28
29 FOR THE COURT:
30 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
31
32
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