NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 15 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-50205
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01510-GW-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
YOO TAIK KIM, AKA Walter Goldman
Kim, AKA Yoo Taek Kim,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 9, 2013**
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, PAEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Yoo Taik Kim was convicted in a jury trial of seven counts of fraud and
false statements on immigration documents. He appeals his conviction on the
grounds that the government’s evidence was insufficient. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient
evidence for any rational trier of fact to find that Kim knowingly and deliberately
made a false statement or caused a false statement to be made on the I-129 visa
renewal form, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) and § 1001 (Counts 1 and 2).
See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Given
the evidence that Trans Bay told Kim it would renew the visas of no more than
nine workers, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Kim knowingly
misrepresented that Trans Bay had authorized the renewal of visas for twenty-five
workers.
Likewise, there was sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to
conclude that Kim made false statements on his naturalization application in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) and § 1001 (Counts 3, 5, 6, and 7). First, there
was sufficient evidence that Kim knowingly concealed his employment history on
the application by failing to list his employment with Hi-Cap Enterprises. Second,
there was sufficient evidence that Kim was required to file both personal and
corporate taxes during the relevant period and that he knowingly misstated on the
application that he had filed all required taxes. Finally, there was sufficient
evidence that Kim falsely stated on the application that he had never committed a
crime for which he had not been arrested. A rational jury could believe that Kim
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knew he had made false statements on the I-129 visa renewal form and knew that
such false statements were unlawful. Given Sheila Norman’s testimony regarding
her standard procedure in interviewing naturalization applicants, a reasonable juror
could conclude that Kim made the false statements attributed to him. United States
v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1301 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). A rational trier of fact could
have concluded that these misstatements were material in light of testimony by
immigration officials that an applicant’s history of false statements regarding
employment history and evidence of tax problems are capable of affecting the
outcome of a naturalization application.
Finally, because an immigration officer testified that an applicant for
naturalization who had previously lied to immigration officers would likely be
denied naturalization, a reasonable juror could have concluded that the evidence
satisfied the heightened materiality standard required for Kim’s conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 1425 (Count 4). See United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148,
1154–55 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
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