FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 17 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OSCAR ARMANDO LARIN- No. 09-73105
DOMINGUEZ,
Agency No. A014-185-015
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued February 5, 2013
Submitted May 16, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, W. FLETCHER, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Oscar Armando Larin-Dominguez, a citizen of El Salvador, appeals the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his motion to reopen his 2004
removal proceeding so that he can apply for cancellation of removal. Larin-
Dominguez claims that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
2004 hearing; (2) his due process rights were violated when the Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) failed to adequately advise him regarding his right to counsel; and (3) his
waiver of appeal was not considered and intelligent. The BIA denied Larin-
Dominguez’s motion on the grounds that he failed to establish prejudice and
validly waived appeal of the removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252.1 We grant Larin-Dominguez’s petition and remand.
Larin-Dominguez’s motion to reopen was not filed within ninety days of the
entry of his removal order as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) and 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(2). However, he is entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline
because of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d
1176, 1191–93 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the filing period for a motion to reopen
is subject to equitable tolling on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel). We
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The government contends that we lack jurisdiction because Larin-
Dominguez’s petition for review is moot. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala,
166 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1999). According to the government, we cannot
provide Larin-Dominguez with an effective remedy given that he remains subject
to a separate, independently executed 2005 removal order for illegal entry without
inspection. However, the 2005 removal is not the subject of this appeal, and it is
conceivable that Larin-Dominguez could bring a separate challenge to that removal
order and/or its subsequent reinstatement. Given this possibility, we cannot say
that it is “impossible for [us] to grant any effectual relief whatever to [Larin-
Dominguez].” Knox v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287
(2012). Consequently, we find Larin-Dominguez’s petition is not moot.
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review the BIA’s denial of Larin-Dominguez’s motion to reopen for abuse of
discretion. He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 2007).
1. The BIA abused its discretion in finding that Larin-Dominguez was not
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to appear at the 2004 removal hearing. Had
Larin-Dominguez been represented by competent counsel at the time of his
removal hearing, he could have plausibly obtained relief from deportation. See
Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Prejudice is found
when the performance of counsel was so inadequate that it may have affected the
outcome of the proceedings.” (quoting Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 527
n.12 (9th Cir. 2000))); Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding prejudice established where evidence in the record “could plausibly have
supported a finding that [the petitioner] was eligible for relief” (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although our opinion in Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1015 (9th
Cir. 2004)—under which Larin-Dominguez’s cocaine possession conviction would
no longer qualify as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes—had been
withdrawn at the time of Larin-Dominguez’s hearing, the procedural history of that
case strongly suggested that our withdrawal concerned jurisdictional issues, not the
underlying merits. Under such circumstances, Larin-Dominguez’s attorney likely
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would have sought a continuance pending resolution of this highly relevant case, or
at the very least, advised him not to waive appeal. Had Larin-Dominguez obtained
a continuance, he could have applied for cancellation of removal with the benefit
of our final decision in Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905 (9th Cir.
2004), which was reissued in substantially the same form just weeks after his
removal hearing. Consequently, Larin-Dominguez would have been eligible for
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
It is also plausible that the IJ would have exercised discretion in favor of
awarding Larin-Dominguez cancellation of removal, given that he had lived in the
United States for forty years, had been a lawful permanent resident since he was
five years old, and has U.S. citizen parents and children.
2. The BIA also abused its discretion in denying Larin-Dominguez’s motion
to reopen on due process grounds. When Larin-Dominguez’s counsel failed to
appear, the IJ offered him a continuance in order to secure his attorney’s presence
at the hearing. However, the IJ did not inform Larin-Dominguez that he had a
right to an attorney other than the one that he had already retained (and who had
failed to appear). He also failed to advise Larin-Dominguez as to the possibility of
obtaining free legal services or provide him with a list of such services. This
constituted a violation of Larin-Dominguez’s due process right to counsel. See
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Hernandez-Gil v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2007) (“When an
immigrant has engaged counsel and the IJ is aware of the representation, if counsel
fails to appear, the IJ must take reasonable steps to ensure that the immigrant’s
statutory right to counsel is honored.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)–(3) (directing
that the IJ “shall . . . (1) [a]dvise the respondent of his or her right to representation
. . . by counsel of his or her own choice . . . [,] (2) [a]dvise the respondent of the
availability of free legal services . . . located in the district . . . [, and] (3) [a]scertain
that the respondent has received a list of such programs . . .”). Larin-Dominguez
need not show prejudice to prevail on his due process claim. Montes-Lopez v.
Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if he did, we would find
that he was prejudiced for the reasons discussed supra.
3. The IJ failed to inform Larin-Dominguez of his right to counsel and then
advised him that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, notwithstanding that
our initial decision in Cazarez-Gutierrez strongly suggested otherwise. Under
these circumstances, Larin-Dominguez’s waiver of appeal was not considered and
intelligent. See United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Without . . . information [as to the availability of relief from deportation, the
alien], who was not represented by counsel, could not make a considered and
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intelligent decision about whether to apply for [relief], and could not make a
considered and intelligent decision about whether to appeal the IJ’s . . . order.”).
PETITION GRANTED.
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