Case: 12-13232 Date Filed: 05/21/2013 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-13232
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-20645-UU
GREGORY MAURICE SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN,
JIM FULTZ,
Unit Manager,
STANLEY TYSON,
Case Manager,
UNKNOWN BUREAU OF PRISONS STAFF,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(May 21, 2013)
Case: 12-13232 Date Filed: 05/21/2013 Page: 2 of 3
Before HULL, MARTIN, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Smith, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s sua
sponte dismissal of his Bivens 1 action against his prison warden and other prison
employees for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
We affirm. 2
Smith’s suit alleged prison officials deprived him of a constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in failing to comply with Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
policy when he challenged information in his administrative prison file.
Specifically, Smith’s Bivens claim is premised on the following theory. First,
Smith claims BOP Program Statement 5800.11(15)(c) (Sept. 8, 1997) confers a
liberty interest in providing that when an inmate challenges information in his file,
prison officials “shall”—which is to say must—“take reasonable steps to ensure the
accuracy of challenged information.” In Smith’s view, the mandatory nature of
this procedural scheme confers a liberty interest for purposes of procedural due
process. Second, Smith alleges prison officials deprived him of 5800.11(15)(c)’s
liberty interest by failing to “take any reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy” of
1
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.
Ct. 1999, 2004–05 (1971).
2
Although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), we review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) using the same standards that govern
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissals, Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 2003).
2
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information in his file “before using such information against [him].” According
to Smith, prison officials used inaccurate information against him when they
deemed him unsuitable “for placement at a Minimum facility.” (Id.).
The district court did not err in dismissing Smith’s complaint for failure to
state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Smith’s due process Bivens
theory requires alleging not only the deprivation of a liberty interest, but also that
such deprivation “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship” relative “to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84,
115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). As pleaded, however, Smith’s complaint alleges
only that he was denied placement in a less-secure prison as a result of the
purported deprivation. Absent extraordinary circumstances, such a denial does not
amount to an “atypical” or “significant hardship.” See id.; cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 494, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1264 (1980) (concluding that “the stigmatizing
consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric
treatment” and “mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness,
constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections”).
Accordingly, Smith’s complaint fails to state a cognizable Bivens claim.
The district court’s order dismissing Smith’s complaint is AFFIRMED. 3
3
Because oral argument is unnecessary to affirm the district court’s dismissal, we deny
as moot Smith’s motion for appointment of counsel for oral argument.
3