FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK ALEANDRE MISSUD, I, No. 12-15658
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-03567-EMC
v.
MEMORANDUM *
STATE OF NEVADA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013 **
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Patrick Alexandre Missud, I, appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 putative class action alleging due
process and equal protection claims arising from various prior lawsuits involving a
Nevada real estate transaction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo both a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, Schwarzenegger
v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004), and for failure to
state a claim, Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1120
(9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Missud’s claims against defendant
D.R. Horton, Inc. because it neither had continuous and systematic contacts with
the State of California nor availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the
State to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. See Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 410.10 (allowing for jurisdiction over non-residents coextensive with due
process requirements); Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800-803 (setting forth tests
for general and specific personal jurisdiction under the California long-arm
statute).
The district court properly dismissed Missud’s claims against various state
and federal judges on the basis of absolute judicial immunity because Missud
failed to allege facts tending to show that these judges acted “in the clear absence
of jurisdiction” in issuing adverse rulings against him in his prior lawsuits. See
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-58 (1978) (unless they clearly lack
jurisdiction to act, judges are absolutely immune from liability for their judicial
acts even if their exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave
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procedural errors).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in entering a narrowly-tailored
pre-filing order against Missud as a vexatious litigant because it carefully reviewed
the relevant facts, and made each necessary finding under the applicable factors.
See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007)
(setting forth standard of review and factors to be considered before the entry of a
pre-filing order against a vexatious litigant).
Missud’s successive requests for the wholesale judicial notice of various
documents from numerous prior proceedings for the purpose of validating his
arguments and claims, set forth in his opening and reply briefs, are denied.
Missud’s contentions regarding alleged corruption in the federal and state
judiciaries, fraud in the mortgage industry and the private financial sector, and
conspiracies against him, are unpersuasive.
Issues not expressly raised on appeal, including the dismissal of Missud’s
claims against the remaining defendants on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and for failure to serve, are deemed waived. See Cook v. Schriro, 538
F.3d 1000, 1014 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
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