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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-13685
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00268-MEF-WC
ALVIN TUCKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SEJONG ALABAMA, LLC,
SEJONG GEORGIA, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(May 23, 2013)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alvin Tucker, an African-American citizen of the United States, appeals pro
se the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sejong Alabama,
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LLC and Sejong Georgia, LLC (collectively “Sejong”) in Tucker’s employment
discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); and several Alabama
torts. On appeal, Tucker argues that the district court erred in granting Sejong’s
motion for summary judgment on Tucker’s discriminatory and retaliatory
termination claims under § 1981 and Title VII, as well as on his state law claims.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
The only federal claims that Tucker has preserved for appeal are his claims
of discriminatory and retaliatory termination. Tucker argues that the district court
erred in finding that he had offered no direct evidence of discrimination. This
argument is without merit. Tucker has failed to identify any statements by
Sejong’s managers that show a discriminatory intent without inference. See
Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000).
Tucker has likewise not established sufficient circumstantial evidence of a prima
facie case of discrimination or retaliation with regard to his termination.
Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Tucker established a prima facie case
for his discrimination and retaliation claims, the district court did not err in
granting Sejong’s motion for summary judgment because Tucker did not show that
Sejong’s reason for firing him was pretextual. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229
F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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