FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT SAUNDERS, No. 12-15578
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02559-GEB-
KJN
v.
LAW OFFICES OF ELAINE VAN MEMORANDUM *
BEVEREN; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013 **
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Robert Saunders appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) alleging that defendant Elaine Van
Beveren violated his constitutional rights while representing his minor children in
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
custody proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v. Harrington, 152
F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Saunders’s § 1983 claim against Van
Beveren and her law firm because Saunders failed to allege facts showing that Van
Beveren acted under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
325 (1981) (court-appointed defense counsel did not act under color of state law
for purposes of § 1983 “when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions”);
Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093-96 (9th Cir. 2003) (court-appointed
guardian ad litem for a minor did not act under color of state law where her
functions were to advocate for the child’s best interests and provide the court with
independent information regarding the custody dispute).
The district court properly dismissed Saunders’s § 1985(3) claim against
Van Beveren and her law firm because the claim was premised on the same factual
allegations as Saunders’s § 1983 claim, and because Saunders failed to allege
discriminatory animus. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-68
(9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the intent requirement of an equal protection claim,
including under a “class of one” theory, and explaining that the absence of a
deprivation of rights under § 1983 precludes a § 1985(3) claim premised on the
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same allegations); Caldeira v. County of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir.
1989) (invidiously discriminatory, racial or class-based animus is a necessary
element of a § 1985(3) claim).
The district court properly dismissed Saunders’s claims against the County
of Sacramento because the claims were based on Van Beveren’s appointment by
the Superior Court, which is an agency of the State, not the County. See Greater
L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A]
suit against the Superior Court is a suit against the State, barred by the eleventh
amendment.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Saunders’s motion
to amend the judgment because the motion raised only arguments that the court
had properly rejected. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2011) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion and setting forth grounds for
amending the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
We are unpersuaded by Sanders’s contentions that the district was biased
against him or failed to address his objections to the magistrate judge’s findings
and recommendations, or that defendants admitted Saunders’s allegations by
failing to file a responsive pleading.
AFFIRMED.
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