Lian Ling Ang v. Holder

11-3749 Ang v. Holder BIA Bukszpan, IJ A089 009 168/169 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 29th day of May, two thousand thirteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 REENA RAGGI, 8 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _______________________________________ 12 13 LIAN LING ANG, ALWIS ROTHER, 14 Petitioners, 15 16 v. 11-3749 17 NAC 18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _______________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONERS: David J. Rodkin, New York, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart Delery, Acting Assistant 26 Attorney General; Thomas B. 27 Fatouros, Senior Litigation Counsel; 28 Kathryn M. McKinney, Attorney, 29 United States Department of Justice, 30 Office of Immigration Litigation, 31 Washington, D.C. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 4 is DENIED. 5 Lian Ling Ang and her husband Alwis Rother, natives and 6 citizens of Indonesia, seek review of an August 24, 2011, 7 order of the BIA affirming the March 15, 2010, decision of 8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Joanna M. Bukszpan, which denied 9 their application for asylum and withholding of removal. In 10 re Lian Ling Ang, Alwis Rother, Nos. A089 009 168/169 11 (B.I.A. Aug. 24, 2011), aff’g Nos. A089 009 168/169 (Immig. 12 Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 15, 2010). We assume the parties’ 13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 14 in this case. 15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 16 the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen 17 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The 18 applicable standards of review are well established. See 19 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 20 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 21 The only issue before us is Petitioners’ eligibility 22 for asylum and withholding of removal on the asserted ground 23 that they suffered past persecution based on ethnicity and 2 1 religion, giving rise to a presumptive well-founded fear of 2 future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); Paul v. 3 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2006). The BIA has 4 defined persecution as a “threat to the life or freedom of, 5 or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who 6 differ in a way regarded as offensive.” Matter of Acosta, 7 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled in part on 8 other grounds by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 9 (1987); accord Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 10 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). The harm must be sufficiently 11 severe to rise above “mere harassment.” Ivanishvili, 433 12 F.3d at 341. Here, the agency reasonably found that the 13 mistreatment Ang endured did not rise to the level of 14 persecution. 15 Petitioners argue that the IJ failed to consider Ang’s 16 experiences in the aggregate in concluding that she did not 17 suffer past persecution. However, the BIA explicitly noted 18 that the “cumulative effect” of Ang’s experiences did not 19 rise to the level of persecution. Moreover, the record 20 supports the agency’s conclusion that, in the aggregate, Ang 21 was not harmed to the degree necessary to reach the high 22 threshold of “persecution,” but rather experienced “mere 3 1 harassment.” See id. The record shows that in 1995, Ang’s 2 house was robbed, while Ang and her family were in it, by 3 three ethnic Indonesian men who claimed to be police 4 officers; in 1996 Ang jumped out of a moving minibus to 5 avoid being mugged by an ethnic Indonesian; in 2002, she was 6 mugged by three Indonesian men; and in 2003, her husband was 7 attacked and hit by a group of ethnic Indonesians. However, 8 neither Ang nor her husband were ever subjected to serious 9 physical or mental harm to the degree that their lives or 10 freedom were actively threatened, and, as a result, these 11 unfortunate experiences in Indonesia do not rise to the 12 level of past persecution. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 13 222; see also Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 182 14 (2d Cir. 2006). Although “non-life threatening violence and 15 physical abuse” may constitute persecution as well, Beskovic 16 v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006), the 17 agency did not err in determining that the sporadic 18 instances during which Ang or her husband endured physical 19 harm did not rise to the level of persecution when 20 considered in the aggregate. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 21 632 F.3d 820, 821 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that isolated 22 instance of physical violence followed by brief detention, 23 viewed in context, was not persecution). 4 1 Because Ang did not establish that she suffered past 2 persecution, the agency did not err in denying her 3 application for asylum and withholding of removal. 4 Moreover, because that finding is dispositive of 5 Petitioners’ claim, we do not reach Petitioners’ argument 6 that the harm was on account of a protected ground. 7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 8 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 9 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 10 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 11 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for 12 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with 13 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 14 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 15 FOR THE COURT: 16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 17 5