NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-3665
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JOSEPH ARUANNO,
Appellant
v.
OFFICER GREEN, D.O.C. Staff;
STEVE JOHNSON, Administrator;
CINDY SWEENEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-01542)
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 14, 2013
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed May 30, 2013)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant, Joseph Aruanno, appeals from the order of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his civil rights action for failure to state a
claim. We will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.
The District Court‟s opinions entered on July 12, 2010, June 22, 2011, and August 30,
2012, contain recitations of the allegations of Aruanno‟s complaint and amended complaints
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, from which the District Court quoted extensively. We need not
repeat those allegations in detail here and, instead, briefly note the following. Aruanno is
confined at the Special Treatment Unit (STU) in Avenel, New Jersey, and submitted a
complaint which he sought to proceed with in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
He named as defendants three staff members at the STU (Officer Green, Administrator Steve
Johnson, and Superintendent Cindy Sweeney), and listed various other individuals in an
attachment to the complaint. These included Lt. Robert Kent, Officer Clements, Administrator
Paul Lagana, then Commissioner George W. Hayman, then Public Advocate Ron Chen, then
DHS Commissioner Kevin Ryan, Director Merrill Main, Christine Todd Whitman, James
McGreevey, Richard Codey, and Jon Corzine. Aruanno alleged that defendants are denying
him proper access to the yard to minimize his exposure to indoor smoking and that defendant
Johnson is allowing smoking indoors, thus exposing him to environmental tobacco smoke
(“ETS”) which poses an unreasonable risk of harm to his health in violation of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 He further alleged that he was threatened and assaulted for
having brought the matter to the attention of the defendants. As relief, Aruanno sought ten
million dollars in damages and injunctive relief.
1
As the District Court properly noted, because Aruanno is civilly committed, his ETS claim is
brought pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982). Eighth Amendment standards are nonetheless
applicable as the minimal standard that must be met. See Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v.
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979).
2
The District Court granted Aruanno in forma pauperis status and screened the complaint
for dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Even with the liberal construction afforded a pro se
litigant, the District Court concluded that the complaint was subject to summary dismissal.
The District Court dismissed the complaint against defendants Cindy Sweeney, Officer
Clements, George W. Hayman, Ron Chen, Kevin Ryan, Merrill Main, Christine Todd
Whitman, James McGreevey, Richard Codey, and Jon Corzine because Aruanno made no
specific, non-conclusory, factual allegations against them. With respect to defendants Johnson,
Officer Green, Lt. Kent, and Paul Lagana, the District Court determined that, although
mentioned in the body of the complaint, the factual assertions set forth against these defendants
were likewise conclusory or too nebulous to state a plausible claim as required by the Supreme
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The District Court thus dismissed
Aruanno‟s complaint for failure to assert facts to support the conclusion that he had been
exposed to unreasonable levels of ETS, that officials were deliberately indifferent to this
exposure, or that he had been threatened and subjected to excessive force. However, the
District Court allowed Aruanno the opportunity to file an amended complaint to state a
cognizable claim. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
Aruanno filed an amended complaint consisting of a five-page narrative. Aruanno
asserted, inter alia, that certain staff (namely, Kent, Green, and Lagana) have been observed
smoking indoors, that some staff members and patients feel as though they have a right to
smoke wherever and whenever they wish, and that, as a result, patients have been exposed to
smoking in the dayroom, the small yard, and the telephone room. Aruanno further stated that
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he was moved into a room that smelled of stale cigar or cigarette smoke and that, during the
actual move, he suffered nausea, chest pains, and difficulty breathing. Aruanno noted that he
was eventually permitted to go to “medical” where he was given medication. See Am. Compl.
at 3. The District Court screened the amended complaint and concluded that Aruanno failed to
provide factual support showing that he himself was exposed to an unreasonably high level of
ETS and, thus, he failed to satisfy the objective element of the ETS claim, nor did the facts set
forth in the amended complaint establish how each defendant was deliberately indifferent to a
health risk as a result of his ETS exposure as required by Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
35-36 (1993). Aruanno‟s amended complaint was thus dismissed for failure to state a claim
and he was afforded one final opportunity to amend his complaint to state facts establishing a
claim under Helling.
Aruanno‟s second amended complaint fared no better. Despite the District Court‟s
admonishment that the second amended complaint must be complete on its face, and in total
disregard of the court‟s warning that it would not attempt to piece together allegations in the
complaint, amended complaint, and second amended complaint, Aruanno nonetheless filed a
document which the District Court accurately described as a “rambling letter.” The District
Court observed that, once again, Aruanno failed to describe the nature of the degree of his
exposure to ETS. Instead, referencing the opinion of the Surgeon General and the fact that
other ETS lawsuits have been filed by “residents with chronic breathing conditions” – thus,
putting defendants on notice of the problem – Aruanno insists that any exposure to ETS at this
point is constitutionally unreasonable. Having determined that Aruanno‟s assertion is not an
4
accurate statement of the constitutional standard used to evaluate ETS claims, the District
Court concluded that Aruanno failed to assert non-conclusory facts showing that he was
exposed to unreasonable levels of ETS or that defendants were deliberately indifferent to that
exposure. As such, the District Court dismissed Aruanno‟s second amended complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary
review over the District Court‟s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint
for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a
complaint pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Upon careful consideration, we agree with the District Court‟s assessment of Aruanno‟s
complaint and amended complaints, and we will affirm for substantially the same reasons set
forth in the District Court‟s opinions. Aruanno did not allege sufficient factual allegations to
support a plausible claim that he was exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS contrary to
contemporary standards of decency, see Helling, 509 U.S. at 35, or that any of the named
defendants were deliberately indifferent to any unreasonable health risks he faces in the STU
on account of his exposure to ETS. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (To
establish liability under the Eighth Amendment, an “official must both be aware of facts from
5
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.”). We will briefly address the issues Aruanno presents on appeal.
Aruanno protests that the District Court incorrectly applied the standard set forth in
Helling to the facts alleged in his complaints. According to Aruanno, the District Court is
bound by the Surgeon General‟s statement that “any exposure to second hand smoke is
harmful” when considering the sufficiency of his allegations regarding his ETS claim. See
Informal Br. at 3. Aruanno also argues that the District Court “avoided state law and statute”
that prohibit indoor smoking in conducting its analysis. Id. at 4. Initially, we point out that
Aruanno‟s complaint was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The Supreme Court has set
forth the two essential elements of a § 1983 action: „(1) whether the conduct complained of
was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct
deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.‟” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). Aruanno‟s reliance on state laws and statutes is thus
misplaced. Additionally, while we do not question the veracity of the conclusion that exposure
to second hand smoke is harmful, the District Court correctly determined that it is the standard
set forth by the Supreme Court in Helling (e.g., that exposure to ETS is actionable where that
exposure causes an “unreasonable risk of serious damage” to a person‟s health) that is to be
employed in reviewing the sufficiency of Aruanno‟s allegations.
Aruanno further asserts that the District Court “avoided undeniable evidence” regarding
the amount of his ETS exposure. Such was not the case. The District Court reviewed the
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complaint pursuant to the screening provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. No discovery
was conducted and no evidence submitted which the District Court could have ignored.
Contrary to appellant‟s contention, the District Court did not err by failing to appoint experts to
take samples from the walls of his cell and his blood, or to perform some mathematical
calculation based on the amount of cigarettes sold to patients in the STU and the number of
hours per day that smokers have access to the outdoor areas, in order to determine the amount
of ETS to which he has been exposed. That the factual allegations set forth in Aruanno‟s
complaints failed to state an ETS claim that was plausible on its face justified the District
Court‟s decision to summarily dismiss the action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Aruanno also seems to argue that the District Court ignored his claims that he was
denied medical attention and that excessive force had been used against him. With respect to
the allegation that he was denied medical attention, however, Aruanno acknowledged that he
eventually “complain[ed] to medical, where he was given medication.” See Am. Compl. at 3.
Moreover, on more than one occasion, Aruanno has stressed that he intended this case to be
focused on his claim regarding exposure to second hand smoke. Id.; Informal Br. at 2. We,
thus, cannot fault the District Court for failing to extract an additional claim based on the
denial of medical care from Aruanno‟s filings. Additionally, Aruanno has specifically denied
seeking to pursue a claim regarding excessive force. See Am. Compl. at 3 (“First, this case is
not about that excessive force but focuses on the smoking issue.”). Aruanno is a seasoned pro
se litigant, and the District Court committed no error in proceeding in accordance with his
expressed intentions.
7
As we discern no error in the District Court‟s dismissal of Aruanno‟s case for failure to
state a claim, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
8