IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35784
IN THE MATTER OF THE )
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS )
OF: JOHN DOE 1 )
-------------------------------------------------------- ) Boise, September 2009 Term
JANE DOE and JOHN DOE 1, )
) 2009 Opinion No. 131
Appellants-Respondents, )
) Filed: October 20, 2009
v. )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
JOHN DOE II )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bingham County. Hon. Joel E. Tingey, District Judge; Hon. Ryan W. Boyer,
Magistrate.
Order terminating parental rights, affirmed.
Randall Crane Attorneys, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for appellant.
Jane Doe and John Doe 1, Blackfoot, pro se respondents.
______________________________________
BURDICK, Justice
John Doe II appeals from the district court order affirming the magistrate court‟s order
terminating his parental rights as to his two children, T.W. and Q.W. Doe II alleges that the
magistrate‟s finding, that the termination of Doe II‟s parental rights was in the best interest of his
children, was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
John Doe II is the father of two children, T.W. and Q.W. (the children) born on
November 14, 2000, and February 19, 2003, respectively. On February 16, 2007, Jane Doe and
John Doe I (the biological mother and stepfather) filed a petition seeking to terminate Doe II‟s
parental rights, and initiate an adoption of the children by Doe I. A termination hearing was held
on December 18, 2007, and on January 2, 2008, the magistrate court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law. On January 22, 2008, the magistrate court terminated Doe II‟s parental
1
rights to the children pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(e). Doe II submitted a motion for a new trial
or amended judgment, which was denied by the magistrate court on July 29, 2008, nunc pro tunc
July 21, 2008. Doe II appealed from the order terminating parental rights to the district court,
which affirmed the order on September 22, 2008.
Doe II and Jane Doe were divorced on March 16, 2004, when Q.W. and T.W. were two
and four, respectively. From the time of the divorce until February 19, 2005, Doe II maintained
visitation with the children, having them in his custody for three days a week for three weeks,
and for one day every fourth week.
On February 27, 2005, Doe II became the subject of a criminal investigation and was
unable to visit with the children until December 2005. From December 2005 until March 2006,
Doe II had three supervised visits with the children under the direction of Family Court Services.
From April 2005 until March 29, 2006, T.W. saw Ruby Walker, Ph.D., (Dr. Walker) for
counseling due to Jane Doe‟s concerns about T.W.‟s aggression. On April 6, 2006, Doe II was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter with a firearms enhancement and sentenced to thirty years,
with twenty-five years determinate.
At the time Doe II was incarcerated Q.W. was four and T.W. was six. Doe II‟s
conviction and sentence were affirmed, and the denial of his motion based upon Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 was affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision on August 16,
2007. If released after serving only his determinate sentence, Doe II will be released on April 6,
2031, when Q.W. is 28, and T.W. is 30.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As articulated in Doe v. State:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate‟s
findings of fact and whether the magistrate‟s conclusions of law follow from
those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow
therefore and if the district court affirmed the magistrate‟s decision, we affirm the
district court‟s decision as a matter of procedure.
137 Idaho 758, 759-60, 53 P.3d 341, 342-43 (2002) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1981)). “Substantial
competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” In re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 761, 203 P.3d 689, 691 (2009) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 345-46, 144 P.3d 597, 599-600
2
(2006)). “„[T]his Court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial
court‟s judgment‟ when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.” Matter of
Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 608, 818 P.2d 310, 312 (1991) (quoting In Interest of Castro,
102 Idaho 218, 221, 628 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1981)).
III. ANALYSIS
This case comes before this Court in accordance with a petition filed under Title 16,
chapter 20 of the Idaho Code, titled “Termination of Parent and Child Relationship.” Idaho
Code § 16-2001(2) states, “[i]mplicit in this chapter is the philosophy that wherever possible
family life should be strengthened and preserved . . . .” “It is axiomatic that preservation of the
family unit is a right protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a
familial relationship with his or her child.” In Interest of Baby Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 50, 936 P.2d
690, 693 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); In the Interest of
Bush, 113 Idaho 873, 749 P.2d 492 (1988)). “It is well settled that, in a proceeding to terminate
a parent-child relationship, the due process clause mandates that the grounds for termination
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.” Doe v. Dep’t of Health and Welfare, Human
Servs. Div., 141 Idaho 511, 513, 112 P.3d 799, 801 (2005) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982)).
Idaho Code § 16-2005 provides the conditions under which termination of parental rights
may be granted, and I.C. § 16-2005(1) states:
The court may grant an order terminating the relationship where it finds that
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child and that one (1)
or more of the following conditions exist: (a) The parent has abandoned the child.
(b) The parent has neglected or abused the child. (c) The presumptive parent is
not the biological parent of the child. (d) The parent is unable to discharge
parental responsibilities and such inability will continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being of
the child. (e) The parent has been incarcerated and is likely to remain
incarcerated for a substantial period of time during the child’s minority.
(Emphasis added). “Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination.” State v.
Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007).
Here the magistrate found by clear and convincing evidence that Doe II is currently
incarcerated and likely to remain incarcerated during the remainder of his children‟s minority.
3
This finding is clearly supported by substantial and competent evidence, and is not challenged by
Doe II on appeal.
Doe II alleges that the magistrate lacked substantial and competent evidence upon which
to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children‟s best interest to
terminate Doe II‟s parental rights.
Magistrate courts generally have broad discretion in their deliberations; this Court does
not reweigh evidence, but “defer[s] to the trial court‟s unique ability to „accurately weigh the
evidence and judge the demeanor of the witnesses‟ and take into account the trial court‟s
„superior view of the entire situation.‟” Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117 (quoting Doe v.
Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 809, 992 P.2d 1205, 1209 (1999)). “Findings are competent, so long as
they are supported by substantial, albeit possibly, conflicting, evidence.” Roe v. Doe, 142 Idaho
174, 177, 125 P.3d 530, 533 (2005) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Roberts v. Roberts,
138 Idaho 401, 405, 64 P.3d 327, 331 (2003)). “[T]his Court will indulge all reasonable
inferences in support of the trial court‟s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights
be terminated.” Roe, 142 Idaho at 177, 125 P.3d at 533 (internal quotations omitted) (alteration
in original) (quoting Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 900, 71 P.3d 1040, 1047 (2003)).
Here the magistrate rested his decision upon three findings of fact, specifically: (1) the
prospective step-father is an experienced counselor and will work to ensure T.W. and Q.W.‟s
emotional health, (2) any emotional bond between Doe II and his children has evaporated, at
least from the children‟s perspective, and (3) it would be deleterious for the children to attempt
to reformulate that bond in the prison environment.
It is not disputed that Doe I has been employed by the Department of Health and Welfare,
first as a clinician, and then as a clinical supervisor, for over seventeen years. The magistrate
court found that “[g]iven [Doe I]‟s experience as an experienced Master‟s level counselor, this
court would understand that [Doe I] would see that [Doe II]‟s life is woven into the boys‟ lives in
such a way to preserve their emotional health.” This is consistent with Doe I‟s testimony before
the magistrate court.
The magistrate court found that “the Guardian ad litem testified verbally and in writing
that the boys appear to have no independent recollection of [Doe II] without significant prompt
which she felt unqualified to provide.” This finding is consistent with the Report of the
Guardian ad Litem, and with her testimony.
4
The magistrate court also found that Dr. Walker “indicated that requiring contact with the
young boys and [Doe II] in the prison environment is neither desirous nor healthy.” This finding
is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Walker at the termination hearing, where she testified,
inter alia, “I absolutely do not like children seeing parents in jail. I‟ve counseled many children
of parents that are incarcerated, and I do discourage it.”
It is clear that the findings of facts are supported by substantial and competent evidence
and support the magistrate‟s holding, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best
interest of the children for Doe II‟s parental rights to be terminated.
IV. CONCLUSION
As there was substantial and competent evidence supporting the factual findings of the
magistrate court, we affirm the district court‟s decision affirming the magistrate court‟s order
terminating Doe II‟s parental rights.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.
5