IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35077
CAROL A. BOUDREAU, )
)
Appellant, )
v. )
Boise, June 2009 Term
)
CITY OF WENDELL, a political subdivision )
2009 Opinion No. 99
of the State of Idaho, and an incorporated )
municipality; and REX L. STRICKLAND, )
Filed: July 16, 2009
Mayor; IRENE ROUNSEFELL, Council )
President; RICK COWEN, Councilman; )
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
DON BUNN, Councilman; and JASON )
HOUSER, Councilman, Individually and in )
their official capacity, and DOES I – X. )
)
Respondents. )
)
Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Gooding County.
Hon. Barry Wood, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondents.
Fuller Law Offices, Twin Falls, for appellant. Daniel Brown argued.
James J. Davis, Boise, for respondents. James Davis argued.
__________________________
W. JONES, Justice
I. NATURE OF CASE
This case involves Appellant Carol Boudreau’s (Boudreau) removal from the appointive
office of Wendell City Clerk. The issue presented in this case is whether I.C. § 50-206
establishes that city clerks are at-will employees, subject to removal from the appointive office
without notice or a hearing, even when an employment manual outlines procedures for dismissal,
including notice and a hearing.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Boudreau was appointed to the position of Wendell City Clerk on July 14, 2003. At that
time, Boudreau was provided with a copy of the Personnel Manual for the City of Wendell. The
Personnel Manual specifically states in all capital letters: “THIS PERSONNEL POLICY IS NOT
A CONTRACT.” The Personnel Manual outlines the right to notice and a hearing for employees
in the event of discharge or demotion.
On February 1, 2007, Boudreau was presented with a written reprimand for malicious
gossip, failure to report serious issues to her supervisor, and not using her time productively. On
August 9, 2007, the City of Wendell Mayor sent a second letter to Boudreau informing her that
she was subject to disciplinary actions because of her behavior at work. The letter provided
notice of the basis for the proposed action in accordance with the Personnel Manual and required
Boudreau to respond in five days by submitting any grievance she had about the decision in
writing.1 On August 29, 2007, pursuant to I.C. § 50-206, and after a unanimous vote by the
Wendell City Council, Boudreau was removed from the position of city clerk.
Boudreau filed a Verified Complaint on September 19, 2007, alleging wrongful
termination, interference with a contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and quasi estoppel. Therein, Boudreau claimed that the City of Wendell, Rex Strickland, Ilene
Rounsefell, Rick Cowen, Donn Bunn, and Jason Houser (City of Wendell) wrongly terminated
her employment when she was not provided with notice and a hearing as provided for in the
Personnel Manual.
The City of Wendell filed an Answer on October 4, 2007, denying Boudreau’s
allegations. On October 24, 2007, the City of Wendell filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. On December 3, 2007, Boudreau filed a
memorandum in opposition to the City of Wendell’s motion; the City of Wendell filed a reply.
The City of Wendell then filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Carol Boudreau on
December 11, 2007. The district court held a hearing on the motions on December 18, 2007,
during which time Boudreau’s counsel indicated that he was not prepared to respond to the
allegations of the Motion to Strike because he had not learned of the motion until the hearing.
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The record does not reflect whether Boudreau responded to the letter with a written grievance, but it appears that
she responded to the allegations verbally during a conversation with Mayor Strickland.
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On January 25, 2008, the district court entered an order denying the Motion to Strike2 and
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. The court found that while portions of Boudreau’s
employment may have been governed by the employment handbook, the Idaho legislature
determined that the means by which a city clerk is removed is to be exclusively governed by the
terms of I.C. § 50-206. Because the Wendell City Council removed Boudreau in strict
accordance with I.C. § 50-206, the court held there was no genuine issue of material fact and the
City of Wendell was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Boudreau appealed to this Court.
Neither party requests attorney fees on appeal.
III. ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether I.C. § 50-206 establishes that city clerks are at-will employees, subject to
removal from the appointive office without notice or a hearing, even when an employment
manual outlines procedures for dismissal, including notice and a hearing.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court uses the same
standard a district court uses when it rules on a summary judgment motion. See C Systems, Inc.
v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 561, 181 P.3d 485, 487 (2008) (citing Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144
Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007)). Summary judgment shall be rendered when “the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). All facts are viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. See C Systems, 145 Idaho at 561, 181 P.3d at 487 (citing Ticor Title, 144
Idaho at 122, 157 P.3d at 616).
V. ANALYSIS
Boudreau argues that the City of Wendell contractually agreed, per the Personnel
Manual, to go beyond the requirements of I.C. § 50-206 and provide the additional protections of
notice and a hearing prior to removing her from the position of city clerk. Boudreau agrees that
she was given adequate notice, but claims that she was denied her right to a hearing.
2
In denying Respondents’ Motion to Strike, the district court determined that the contested portions of the Affidavit
of Carol A. Boudreau were immaterial to its summary judgment determination.
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The issue presented in this case requires this Court to interpret I.C. § 50-206 to determine
whether city clerks are appointive officers, characterized as at-will employees, and subject to
removal from such position without cause.
When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect
to the legislature’s intent in passing the statute. It must begin with the literal
words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. Where the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as
written, without engaging in statutory construction.
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, __, 207 P.3d 988, 994 (2009)
(citations omitted).
I.C. § 50-204 states in part: “The mayor, except as otherwise provided . . . with the
consent of the council shall appoint a city clerk, a city treasurer, a city attorney and such other
officers as may be deemed necessary for the efficient operation of the city.” There is no dispute
that Boudreau became an appointive officer within the definition of I.C. § 50-204 when she was
appointed to the position of Wendell City Clerk. I.C. § 50-206 states:
Any appointive officer, unless appointed under sections 50-801 through 50-812,
may be removed by the mayor for any cause by him deemed sufficient; but such
removal shall be by and with the affirmative vote of one half ( 1/2 ) plus one (1)
of the members of the full council; provided, that the city council, by the
unanimous vote of all its members, may upon their own initiative remove any
appointive officer.
The statutory language of I.C. § 50-206 clearly provides two methods for removal of an
appointive officer. First, the mayor may remove an appointive officer with the vote of one half
of the members of the city council plus one. Second, an appointive officer may be removed by
unanimous vote of the city council. In this case, the city council unanimously voted to remove
Boudreau from the position of city clerk, which was in full compliance with the requirements of
I.C. § 50-206 for removal of appointive officers. The statutory scheme for appointing and
removing an appointive officer is clear and unambiguous that appointive officers are at-will and
subject to removal without cause.
Moreover, in Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 797 P.2d 135 (1990), this Court
specifically indicated that appointive officers within the meaning of I.C. § 50-204 may be
removed from such appointive position without notice or a hearing. The issue in that case was
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whether the Garden City chief of police was an “appointive officer” within the meaning of I.C. §
50-204. This Court stated:
Since Bunt was not the city clerk, treasurer, or attorney mentioned in I.C. § 50-
204, the question is whether Bunt, as the Garden City Chief of Police, was one of
the other “such officers” referred to in that section. If so, Bunt was an appointive
officer who could be removed without receiving notice or a hearing.
Id. at 428, 797 P.2d at 136 (emphasis added). The court went on to hold that Bunt was an
appointive officer and therefore could be removed from the office without notice or a hearing
pursuant to I.C. § 50-206. In the present case, Boudreau was clearly an appointive officer under
I.C. § 50-204. Thus, under the applicable statutory scheme and Bunt, Boudreau was not entitled
to notice or a hearing prior to being removed from the position of city clerk by unanimous vote
of the Wendell City Council.
Moreover, in Idaho local governments cannot override statutes enacted by the legislature.
See IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2; see also Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff’s Dept., 139 Idaho 5, 8,
72 P.3d 845, 848 (2003); Black v. Young, 122 Idaho 302, 308, 834 P.2d 304, 310 (1992); Gowey
v. Siggelkow, 85 Idaho 574, 587, 382 P.2d 764, 773 (1963). Thus, once the legislature
determined that a municipal appointive officer is at-will and provided for the removal of such an
officer without notice or a hearing, the municipality could not alter that status by adopting a
Personnel Manual. Accordingly, we hold the district court properly granted summary judgment
to the City of Wendell.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s decision. Costs to
Respondents.
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON, and Justice pro tem KIDWELL,
CONCUR.
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