IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 34526
RAYMAJEAN HENDERSON, )
)
Claimant-Appellant, )
)
Coeur d’Alene, April 2009 Term
v. )
)
2009 Opinion No. 80
ECLIPSE TRAFFIC CONTROL AND )
FLAGGING, INC., Employer, IDAHO )
Filed: June 5, 2009
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND )
LABOR, )
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
Respondents. )
)
_______________________________________ )
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho.
The order of the Industrial Commission is reversed.
Starr Kelso, Coeur d‟Alene, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondents. Tracey K.
Rolfsen argued.
_____________________
J. JONES, Justice
Raymajean Henderson appeals the Industrial Commission‟s decision upholding retroactive
denials of her claims for unemployment insurance benefits. We reverse.
I.
Raymajean Henderson worked on a seasonal basis as a road construction foreman for
Eclipse Traffic Control & Flagging, Inc. (Eclipse). Henderson worked for Eclipse throughout most
of the year, but was laid off each winter due to lack of work. During the seasonal layoffs,
Henderson typically filed claims for, and received, unemployment insurance benefits. Of
importance to this appeal are Henderson‟s benefit claims for the winters of 2004-05 and 2005-06.
On November 16, 2004, after being laid off for the winter, Henderson filed a claim for
unemployment insurance benefits, which became effective on November 14, 2004. She disclosed
1
that Eclipse had laid her off due to lack of work during the off-season but had committed to
rehiring her when the weather improved. Thus, the Idaho Department of Labor (Department)
classified Henderson as “job attached”1 and required that she maintain weekly contact with Eclipse
in order to fulfill her work-seeking requirements.
Less than one month after being awarded benefits, Henderson and her husband moved to a
residence they owned in Kailua Kona, Hawaii. While there, Henderson continued collecting
unemployment insurance benefits. She filed weekly claim reports from December 12, 2004 to
February 26, 2005 and received weekly benefit checks in the amount of $227.00. In her claim
reports, Henderson indicated that she was not living outside of her local labor market area. Yet, at
the time, Henderson was living in Hawaii and had changed her residence address on file with the
Department to her residence in Hawaii.
Henderson lived in Hawaii for most of the winter. In February 2005, however, she
returned to Idaho and changed her address on file with the Department back to her Idaho address.
In March, Henderson resumed working for Eclipse. She remained employed there until June 2005,
at which point she began working for Aapex Construction, Inc. (Aapex). Like her employment at
Eclipse, Henderson‟s position at Aapex was seasonal.
Aapex laid Henderson off the following winter. On November 14, 2005, Henderson filed a
claim for unemployment insurance benefits, which became effective on November 13, 2005. Once
again, the Department classified Henderson as a job attached employee and required her to
maintain weekly contact with Aapex to fulfill her work-seeing requirements.
On December 12, 2005, Henderson moved to her residence in Hawaii. Just like the
previous winter, she continued to collect unemployment insurance benefits while living there.
Henderson filed claim reports for the weeks ending on December 10, 2005 through April 1, 2006
and received weekly benefit checks in the amount of $325.00. Although she changed her residence
address on file with the Department to her home in Hawaii and spent the entire winter there,
Henderson continued to indicate on her weekly claim forms that she was not away from the area in
which she normally worked.
1
Henderson‟s job attachment classification pertains to claimants “who have a firm attachment to an employer,
industry or union, or who are temporarily or seasonal unemployed, and expect to return to their former jobs or
employers in a reasonable length of time.” IDAPA 09.01.30.575.04.a.
2
Henderson returned to Idaho in April 2006 and resumed working for Aapex. Once back in
Idaho, she changed her residence address on file with the Department back to her Idaho address.
Nearly one year later, on February 13, 2007, Henderson called the Department to inquire about a
tax form she had not received for her 2006 benefits. A Department employee, Shirley Ackerman,
informed Henderson that the form had been mailed to her Hawaii address. Upon noticing
Henderson‟s Hawaii address, Ackerman became suspicious of Henderson‟s eligibility and decided
to conduct an investigation. Based on her investigation, Ackerman concluded that Henderson was
ineligible for some of the previously awarded benefits because, while she was living in Hawaii, she
was away “from the area where she normally works . . . [and] therefore was not available for
work.” Consequently, Ackerman determined that Henderson “will be denied [benefits for] the
weeks effective her change of address . . . and continuing until she returned to Idaho and changed
her address again.”
On March 30, 2007, the Department issued two eligibility determinations regarding
Henderson‟s eligibility for benefits during the winters of 2004-05 and 2005-06. According to the
determinations, Henderson was not eligible for benefits from December 12, 2004 to February 26,
2005 and December 4, 2005 to April 1, 2006 because she was out of the area in which she
normally works during those periods and, thus, was not available for work. The Department
subsequently issued a determination of overpayment, demanding Henderson repay the benefits she
received while living in Hawaii.
Henderson appealed the eligibility determinations to an appeals examiner, who affirmed
the Department‟s determinations. The appeals examiner reasoned that Henderson was not
“available for suitable work” while living in Hawaii because she was outside of her local labor
market. Consequently, he concluded that the benefits Henderson received for the periods she was
in Hawaii were overpayments. Although the examiner acknowledged that the overpayments were
“not the result of a false statement or misrepresentation made by [Henderson],” he ordered her to
repay the overpayments because they were not solely the result of Departmental error.
Henderson then appealed the appeals examiner‟s determination to the Commission, which
affirmed the decision after conducting a de novo review of the record. Based on the appeals
examiner‟s findings of fact and some of its own additional findings, the Commission concluded
that Henderson was not eligible for benefits during the periods she was in Hawaii. Relying on a
case from California, the Commission reasoned that “when [Henderson] left Idaho, she essentially
3
took a „temporary vacation‟ from the Idaho labor market.” See In re Gosha, Precedent Benefit
Decision No. P-B-260 (Cal. 1976). Because Henderson moved to a location “in which there [was]
no available employment” and she had “no reasonable expectation of finding any,” she voluntarily
“rendered herself unavailable for work.” The Commission concluded Henderson was obligated to
repay the benefits she received while residing in Hawaii.
After the Commission denied Henderson‟s motion for reconsideration, she appealed to this
Court. On appeal, Henderson challenges the Commission‟s conclusion that she was ineligible for
benefits during the periods she was in Hawaii. Initially, she asserts that the Department lacked
jurisdiction to reconsider her eligibility for those periods. Alternatively, she contends that even if
the Department had jurisdiction, it erred in concluding she was unavailable for work. In making
this argument, Henderson challenges the validity of the Department‟s regulation defining
“availability.” Finally, Henderson argues that, even if she was ineligible for benefits while living
in Hawaii, she should not be required to repay the overpayments.
II.
On appeal we are presented with five issues, namely: whether (1) the Department lacked
jurisdiction to reconsider Henderson‟s eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits; (2) the
Department‟s regulation defining the availability requirement for job attached claimants exceeds
the Department‟s statutory authority; (3) the Commission‟s finding that Henderson was ineligible
for unemployment insurance benefits was supported by substantial and competent evidence; (4) the
Commission erred in concluding that Henderson was required to repay the overpayments; and (5)
Henderson is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
A.
On appeal from an Industrial Commission decision, this Court‟s review is limited to
questions of law. IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 9; see also Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432,
434, 974 P.2d 78, 80 (1999). Such questions are subject to free review. Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138
Idaho 343, 346, 63 P.3d 469, 472 (2003). Conversely, the Commission‟s factual findings will be
upheld so long as they are not clearly erroneous. See Oxley v. Med. Rock Specialties, Inc., 139
Idaho 476, 479, 80 P.3d 1077, 1080 (2003). Factual findings will not be regarded as clearly
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. See Pimley, 132 Idaho at
434, 974 P.2d at 80. “Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657,
4
67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). In determining whether substantial and competent evidence exists, we
will “not re-weigh the evidence or consider whether we would have reached a different conclusion
from the evidence presented.” Id. Rather, it is up to the Commission to weigh the conflicting
evidence and “determine the credit and the weight to be given the testimony admitted.” Bullard v.
Sun Valley Aviation, Inc., 128 Idaho 430, 432, 914 P.2d 564, 566 (1996). Moreover, when
reviewing one of the Commission‟s decisions, this Court “views all . . . facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the Commission.” Oxley, 139 Idaho at 479,
80 P.3d at 1080 (quoting Boley v. State Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 280, 939 P.2d
854, 856 (1997)).
Whether an unemployment compensation claimant has satisfied statutory eligibility
requirements is an issue of fact. Burnside v. Gate City Steel Corp., 112 Idaho 1040, 1042, 739
P.2d 339, 341 (1987). Thus, an eligibility determination will be upheld if it is supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Id. The claimant carries the burden of proving that all
eligibility requirements have been met. Qualman v. State Dep’t of Employment, 129 Idaho 92, 95,
922 P.2d 389, 392 (1996).
B.
Henderson argues that the Department did not have jurisdiction on March 30, 2007 to
retroactively reverse her awards of unemployment insurance benefits for the periods of December
12, 2004 to February 26, 2005 and December 4, 2005 to April 1, 2006.2 Citing I.C. § 72-1368(3),
Henderson asserts that the initial eligibility determinations made in December 2004 and December
2005 became final and binding on the Department because they were not appealed within 14 days.
She further contends that by virtue of the limitations period in I.C. § 72-1368(4) the Department
lost jurisdiction to redetermine the awards one year after those initial eligibility determinations
became final. Henderson did not raise her jurisdictional challenge before the Commission.
The Department counters that it retained jurisdiction to reconsider Henderson‟s eligibility
because eligibility determinations are “not a one-time affair.” It contends that an initial eligibility
determination merely addresses whether a benefit year exists and whether disqualification should
be assessed. Since a decision regarding Henderson‟s availability for work could not be made when
2
Although Henderson started receiving unemployment insurance benefits in November of each year, the
Department only made the determination of ineligibility with respect to benefits she received after moving to Hawaii
each year.
5
she initially filed her claim for benefits, the Department argues that it retained jurisdiction to make
such a determination at a later date. Moreover, the Department asserts it was free to issue the two
rulings because it had not previously issued an eligibility determination regarding Henderson‟s
availability for work during the periods in question.
As a general rule, this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Luskin v. Dep’t of Employment, 100 Idaho 584, 586, 602 P.2d 947, 949 (1979). “However, an
exception exists where the jurisdiction of the tribunal to hear the cause is raised.” Id. Issues of
jurisdiction are considered fundamental and “cannot be ignored when brought to our attention.”
Dunlap v. Cassia Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 233, 235, 999 P.2d 888, 890 (2000).
Questions of jurisdiction, even those not raised below, “should be addressed prior to considering
the merits of an appeal.” Id. Thus, we will consider Henderson‟s jurisdictional challenge prior to
considering the merits of her appeal.
Administrative agencies are “creature[s] of statute” and, therefore, are “limited to the
power and authority granted [them] by the Legislature.” Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho
513, 514, 915 P.2d 1371, 1372 (1996). Because the Department is an administrative agency, it
“exercises limited jurisdiction, and nothing is presumed in favor of its jurisdiction.” Id.; see also
Dep’t of Employment v. St. Alphonsus Hosp., 96 Idaho 470, 472, 531 P.2d 232, 234 (1975). Idaho
Code section 72-1368 sets out the procedure for consideration and determination of claims for
unemployment insurance benefits. This section provides jurisdiction for the Department‟s
administrative proceedings, as well as for review of those proceedings by the Industrial
Commission and for further appeal to this Court. With this jurisdictional foundation in mind, we
turn to consideration of Henderson‟s jurisdictional contentions.
Henderson first argues that the Department is bound by its initial determinations made in
December 2004 and December 2005, that she was eligible for unemployment insurance benefits,
because those determinations were not appealed within 14 days as provided in I.C. § 72-1368(3).
This argument is without merit. While an eligibility determination becomes final as to the claimant
and his or her employer, if not appealed within the 14-day period, it does not become conclusive as
to the Department. Since the Department does not play an adversarial role in the proceedings it
conducts and it typically has no information to act upon other than that provided by the claimant
and his or her employer, it would hardly comport with concepts of due process and fair play to
preclude the Department from revising a decision based on new information that comes to light.
6
Indeed, the Legislature has made provision for just such a circumstance by allowing the
Department to make a redetermination when new information becomes available. See I.C. § 72-
1368(4).
The initial processing of a claim for unemployment insurance benefits is handled by the
Department, which plays no adversarial role in its own proceedings.3 The Department, acting
through its claims examiner and, in the event of an appeal, its appeals examiner, performs as an
impartial tribunal in considering and determining unemployment insurance claims. I.C. § 72-
1368(3) calls for the claims examiner, acting on behalf of the Department, to consider the claim
and make factual findings. The appeals examiner considers evidence presented by the interested
parties and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law. I.C. § 72-1368(6). At neither stage
does the Department perform in other than a decision-making role. Where the Department plays
no adversarial role in these initial proceedings, it makes little sense to contend that a decision is
final and binding on the Department unless it appeals. It seems rather unlikely that the Department
would appeal its own decision.
The expedited nature of these proceedings must also be considered. Because of the need to
speed remedial relief to workers who lose their jobs, the Legislature has provided an expedited
procedure for processing unemployment benefits claims. I.C. § 72-1368(12) specifically exempts
such proceedings from the contested case and judicial review provisions of the Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 52, title 67, Idaho Code (IDAPA). The Department has adopted
its own procedure recognizing that such “proceedings must be speedy and simple,” in order to
comply with federal and state law. IDAPA 09.01.06.008.01. As such, the Department has little
means of providing informational input into the proceedings. The Department obtains the claim
from the claimant and solicits the response of the employer, but typically does not provide its own
input into the proceedings, instead relying on information provided by the claimant and employer,
who in some cases are adversaries and in other cases are acting in concert. In recognition that the
proceedings are designed to be simple so to provide expedited relief, exhaustive findings are not
required. If, based on his or her factual findings, the claims examiner concludes that a claimant is
eligible for benefits, he or she must determine “the date his benefit year begins, the weekly benefit
3
Only when the claimant or employer seeks review of a Department decision by the Industrial Commission does the
Department assume an adversarial role – to defend its decision.
7
amount, the total benefit amount, the base period wages, and the base period covered employers.”4
I.C. § 72-1368(3). Such an initial eligibility determination “is preliminary and determines only
whether a benefit year is established and whether or not disqualification should be assessed at that
time” – it “is not a final adjudication of the right to unemployment benefits.” Talley v.
Unemployment Comp. Div. of Indus. Accident Bd., 63 Idaho 644, 648-49, 124 P.2d 784,
785 (1942). In other words, eligibility is generally not litigated unless questions are raised from
the information presented or unless the issue is contested by the employer.
Furthermore, I.C. § 72-1368 specifically provides the Department authority to redetermine
eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. Eligibility redeterminations may be made under
two circumstances. See I.C. § 72-1368(3) & (4). First, claims examiners may issue
redeterminations upon their own motion if the initial determination has not become final. I.C.
§ 72-1368(3). A determination becomes final if an appeal has not been filed by an interested party
within fourteen days of the notice of decision being mailed. Id. More importantly, the director of
the Department:
may make a special redetermination whenever he finds that a departmental error
has occurred in connection with a determination, or that additional wages of the
claimant or other facts pertinent to such determination have become available or
have been newly discovered, or that benefits have been allowed or denied or the
amount of benefits fixed on the basis of nondisclosure or misrepresentation of fact.
I.C. § 72-1368(4). Where the Department specifically has the ability to redetermine eligibility,
despite a determination having become final for lack of an appeal, it is clear the Department is not
bound by the fourteen-day appeal provision.
Henderson‟s contention regarding the application of the one-year limitation period in I.C.
§ 72-1368(4) does, however, have merit. Henderson contends that the Department had one year
from the date of its initial benefit determinations in December 2004 and December 2005 in which
to redetermine her eligibility. While the Department did not label its determinations issued on
March 30, 2007, as “redeterminations,” it appears that this is what, in effect, they were. I.C. § 72-
1368, while providing a procedure for considering and processing a claimant‟s application for
benefits, including procedures for determination and redetermination of the application, does not
provide a jurisdictional basis for administrative redeterminations that do not meet the requirements
4
Conversely, if the examiner concludes that the claimant is ineligible, the determination must “include the reasons
for the ineligibility.” I.C. § 72-1368(3).
8
specified therein. I.C. § 72-1368(4) specifically states that a “special redetermination must be
made within one (1) year from the date of the original determination,” except where nondisclosure
or misrepresentation is involved. Here, the Department has concluded that there was no
nondisclosure or misrepresentation. Thus, the Department had no jurisdiction to make a
redetermination under I.C. § 72-1368 more than one year after the original determination.
However, the original determination for the respective claim years is not December 2004
and December 2005 as contended by Henderson. Eligibility for benefits under Idaho Code § 72-
1366(4) is determined on a weekly basis. Because a claimant “may be eligible one week and
ineligible the following week,” his or her continuing eligibility must be reevaluated on a weekly
basis. Talley, 63 Idaho at 649, 124 P.2d at 785. The Department issued its eligibility
determinations on March 30, 2007. Henderson applied for and received benefits for each week in
2006 through the week ending April 1, 2006. Presuming the determination for that final week was
made at the beginning of the week, rather than at the end, the Department was just a few days short
of the statutory deadline for making a redetermination that might have been effective for the final
week. All previous weeks, however, were clearly beyond the one year limitation.
While it appears that the Department lost jurisdiction under I.C. § 72-1368 to redetermine
Henderson‟s entitlement to benefits, that does not necessarily mean that the Department has no
recourse under other provisions of the Employment Security Law to seek recovery of benefits to
which Henderson might not have been entitled. I.C. § 72-1369 provides the Department with
several remedies to recover benefits to which a person was not entitled. Subsection (2) provides
for the director of the Department to assess civil penalties in certain instances, subsection (3)
allows for collection of overpayments by creation and enforcement of liens or by pursuit of civil
action, and subsection 4(a) grants the director of the Department authority to deduct a past
overpayment from any future benefits of the claimant. See Norton v. Dep’t of Employment, 94
Idaho 924, 928, 500 P.2d 825, 829 (1972) (where this Court approved the Department‟s action in
withholding benefits to a claimant on a current unemployment claim until a past overpayment was
satisfied, even though collection proceedings with regard to the past overpayment were precluded
by the then-applicable three-year statute of limitations).
In reviewing the provisions of section 72-1369 to determine whether that statute provides a
basis for the Department‟s present action, some troubling questions appear. A civil action under
subsection (3) is to be commenced within five years “from the date of the final determination
9
establishing liability to repay.” One might ask how this limitations period relates to the one and
two year limitations for redeterminations in section 72-1368. Are the limitations periods in section
72-1368 true statutes of limitation or are they merely designed to limit the time in which an
administrative determination can be reconsidered by the Department? Further, is section 72-1369
a stand-alone provision allowing various methods of recovery apart from the administrative
procedure in section 72-1368 or does section 72-1369 merely provide a means for recovery of
overpayments determined in accordance with section 72-1368? Also, what is meant by a
“determination establishing liability to repay?” The Employment Security Law does not set out
any procedure for making such a determination and, if the statute is meant to authorize the same, is
there any period of limitation that applies to the making of such a determination? This Court need
not address any of those or other questions involving the interplay between section 72-1368 and
section 72-1369 because this case does not involve a lien, a civil action, or deduction of an
overpayment from a future benefit. Although section 72-1369 does hint that the director may have
the ability to pursue an administrative proceeding to recover an overpayment, we need not
determine that issue because it is clear the statute does not provide the jurisdictional requisite, i.e.
the prescribed administrative procedure. The Legislature appears to make a practice of providing
the administrative procedure to be employed in making the various determinations provided for in
the Employment Security Law. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 72-1353(1), 72-1357(3), 72-1359, 72-1361, 72-
1368, & 72-1372(3). Thus, because I.C. § 72-1369 provides no administrative procedure, that
statute cannot be used as a basis to support the Department‟s action here.
Because we determine that the Department was without jurisdiction to pursue this
proceeding, we need not address the issues pertaining to the interpretation and application of the
Department‟s regulations. The Industrial Commission‟s order is hereby reversed.
C.
Henderson argues that she is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1). She maintains that her appeal was “made necessary as a result of
groundless and arbitrary agency action” that did not have a reasonable basis in fact or law.
According to Henderson, the decisions rendered by the Department and the Commission were
based on “different and varying grounds and interpretations of a clear law and a clearly written
Claimant Handbook that at no time reflect[ed] that a „job attached‟ worker can not live in an area
different from where she lived while working for the „attached employer.‟” The Department
10
argues that Henderson is not entitled to fees under section 12-117 because its determinations were
supported by the facts and law.
I.C. § 12-117 provides:
in any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state
agency . . . and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney‟s fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
Henderson is not entitled to fees under this statute. Although Henderson is the prevailing party,
she is not entitled to fees because she has failed to show that the Department acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court has not previously had occasion to rule on the
jurisdictional issues presented by I.C. § 72-1368. Therefore, section 12-117 does not justify an
award of fees.
III.
The Industrial Commission‟s decision is reversed. No attorney fees on appeal.
Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and HORTON CONCUR.
Chief Justice EISMANN, concurring in the result.
I concur in the result. When a worker applies for unemployment benefits, the
Department makes an initial determination as to the worker‟s eligibility. As provided in Idaho
Code § 72-1368(3) (emphasis added):
A representative of the department hereinafter referred to as a claims
examiner shall examine a claim filed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section
and, on the basis of the facts found by him, shall determine whether the claimant
is eligible for benefits and, if eligible, the date his benefit year begins, the weekly
benefit amount, the total benefit amount, the base period wages, and the base
period covered employers. In the event of a denial of benefits, the determination
shall include the reasons for the ineligibility.
That initial determination becomes final in fourteen days, unless within that fourteen-day period
an appeal is filed. Id.
That initial determination is not a determination of the right to continue to receive weekly
unemployment benefits. “During the benefit year, employees may be eligible one week and
11
ineligible the following week.” Talley v. Unemployment Comp. Div. of the Indus. Accident Bd.,
63 Idaho 644, 649, 124 P.2d 784, 785 (1942) After the initial determination is made, the
employee must send in weekly reports showing that he or she is still eligible to receive benefits.
Therefore, “[t]he Unemployment Compensation Law requires the eligibility of an applicant for
unemployment compensation to be determined weekly before such applicant is entitled to
receive benefits . . . . A compensable week can never be determined at the time the first claim
for compensation benefits is filed and the Initial Determination made.” Id. at 650, 124 P.2d at
786.
Idaho Code § 72-1368(4) permits the director of the Department to make a
redetermination of a prior determination, whether it was the initial determination or a subsequent
weekly determination. The time period within which that redetermination must occur is not
affected by whether or not the prior determination was made after a contested hearing. There is
nothing in the statute indicating that it only limits the time period for redetermining a prior
determination that occurred as a result of an adversarial proceeding. The statutory time limits
apply to all prior determinations regarding eligibility for benefits or the amount of benefits,
whether the initial determination or subsequent weekly determinations. The statute provides
insofar as is relevant:
The director may make a special redetermination whenever he finds that a
departmental error has occurred in connection with a determination, or that
additional wages of the claimant or other facts pertinent to such determination
have become available or have been newly discovered, or that benefits have been
allowed or denied or the amount of benefits fixed on the basis of nondisclosure or
misrepresentation of fact. The special redetermination must be made within one
(1) year from the date of the original determination, except that a special
redetermination involving a finding that benefits have been allowed or denied or
the amount of benefits fixed on the basis of nondisclosures or misrepresentations
of fact may be made within two (2) years from the date of the original
determination.
The redetermination must be made within one year of the date of the prior determination,
or within two years if benefits were allowed or denied, or their amount was fixed, on the basis of
nondisclosures or misrepresentations of fact. In this case, there were no nondisclosures or
misrepresentations of fact, so the one-year period applied. Because the Department‟s
redeterminations of the prior weekly determinations were not made within the applicable one-
year periods, it had no power to make them.
12
Idaho Code § 72-13695 does not provide the Department with statutory authority to make
the redeterminations in this case. The overpayment of benefits can only occur if, as a result of a
5
The statute provides as follows:
72-1369. Overpayments, civil penalties and interest -- Collection and waiver.
(1) Any person who received benefits to which he was not entitled under the provisions
of this chapter or under an unemployment insurance law of any state or of the federal government
shall be liable to repay the benefits and the benefits shall, for the purpose of this chapter, be
considered to be overpayments.
(2) Civil penalties. The director shall assess the following monetary penalties for each
determination in which the claimant is found to have made a false statement, misrepresentation, or
failed to report a material fact to the department:
(a) Twenty-five percent (25%) of any resulting overpayment for the first determination;
(b) Fifty percent (50%) of any resulting overpayment for the second determination; and
(c) One hundred percent (100%) of any resulting overpayment for the third and any
subsequent determination.
(3) Any overpayment, civil penalty and/or interest which has not been repaid may, in
addition to or alternatively to any other method of collection prescribed in this chapter, including
the creation of a lien as provided by section 72-1360, Idaho Code, be collected with interest
thereon at the rate prescribed in section 72-1360(2), Idaho Code. The director may also file a civil
action in the name of the state of Idaho. In bringing such civil actions for the collection of
overpayments, penalties and interest, the director shall have all the rights and remedies provided
by the laws of this state, and any person adjudged liable in such civil action for any overpayments
shall pay the costs of such action. A civil action filed pursuant to this subsection (3) shall be
commenced within five (5) years from the date of the final determination establishing liability to
repay. Any judgment obtained pursuant to this section shall, upon compliance with the
requirements of chapter 19, title 45, Idaho Code, become a lien of the same type, duration and
priority as if it were created pursuant to section 72-1360, Idaho Code.
(4) Collection of overpayments.
(a) Overpayments, other than those resulting from a false statement, misrepresentation,
or failure to report a material fact by the claimant, which have not been repaid or
collected, may, at the discretion of the director, be deducted from any future benefits
payable to the claimant under the provisions of this chapter. Such overpayments not
recovered within five (5) years from the date of the final determination establishing
liability to repay may be deemed uncollectible.
(b) Overpayments resulting from a false statement, misrepresentation, or failure to report
a material fact by the claimant which have not been recovered within eight (8) years from
the date of the final determination establishing liability to repay may be deemed
uncollectible.
(5) The director may waive the requirement to repay an overpayment, other than one
resulting from a false statement, misrepresentation, or failure to report a material fact by the
claimant, and interest thereon, if:
(a) The benefit payments were made solely as a result of department error or
inadvertence and made to a claimant who could not reasonably have been expected to
recognize the error; or
(b) Such payments were made solely as a result of an employer misreporting wages
earned in a claimant‟s base period and made to a claimant who could not reasonably have
been expected to recognize an error in the wages reported. The director, in his sole
discretion, may also compromise a civil penalty assessed under subsection (2) of this
section and/or interest.
13
redetermination, the Department has concluded that an employee received more in benefits than
he or she was entitled to receive. Idaho Code § 72-1368 sets forth the time limits within which
that redetermination must occur. Once the redetermination has been made, Idaho Code § 72-
1369 sets forth the manner of collecting the overpayment and the time limits within which the
collection proceedings must occur. The collection of an overpayment as provided in Section 72-
1369 can only occur if there has been a prior redetermination of the overpayment as provided in
Section 72-1368. Because there had been no timely redetermination in this case, there was no
overpayment to collect under the procedures set forth in Section 72-1369.
(6) Neither the director nor any of his agents or employees shall be liable for benefits
paid to persons not entitled to the same under the provisions of this chapter if it appears that such
payments have been made in good faith and that ordinary care and diligence have been used in the
determination of the validity of the claim or claims under which such benefits have been paid.
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