IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA’I`E OF IDAH{)
Docket No. 33862
H. RAY HARRISON and JULIE )
HARRIS()N, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs"lqppellants’ Boise january 2098 Term
9
"' 2003 opinion No. 16
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THE BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL )
DISCIPLINE of the IDAHO STATE )
BOARD OF MEI)ICINE, a subdivision of the )
State of Idaho, Department of Self- )
Regulating Agencies,
Filed: Jaeuary 29, 2008
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
)
Defeiidant-Respondent. )
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaiio, Ada
County. Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge.
District court order dismissing complainr, affirmed.
Rossman Law Group, PLLC, Boise, for appellants Chad Maithew Nicholson
argued
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent J ames
Delund Carlson, Deputy Atiorney General argued
BURDICK, Jusiice
This appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to effect
timely service We affir“rn.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEBURAL BACKGRO'UNI)
Appellants H. Ray Harrison and Julie Ha.rrison (the Harrisons) fried a complaint against
Respondeni Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine (the Boarci).
The complaint alleged tire Board was negligent for allowing Dr. Jeffrey.Hartford to retain his
medical license in light of his history of drug and alcohol abuse and violation of the Board’s
requirement that he refrain from use of drugs or alcohol This complaint was filed with ihe court
on Novernber 14, 2005. The Attorney Generai was served with the complaint on l\/,[ay l(), 2006.
The Secretary of State was served with the complaint on Eune 2, 2006.
()n May 26, 2006, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the Harrisons’ complaint The
Board argued it was immune from suit and that the Harrisons had failed to serve process within
six months of filing their complaint as required by I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). After a hearing, the district
court concluded the l“:'[arrisons failed to timely complete service of process and dismissed their
complaint 'I`he Harrisons appeaied.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When this Court reviews a district court’s order granting a motion to disrniss, we employ
the same standard used when reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Gz'bson v.
Ada County, 142 idaho 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). “The standard of review on
appeai front an order granting summary judgment is the same standard that is used by the district
court in ruling on the motion." Id.
}III. ANALYSIS
'l`he Harrisons argue the idaho Rules of Civil Procedure did not require service upon the
Secretary of State within six months after filing their complaint and that if such service was
required they have shown "good cause" for the failure to effect service The Board argues the
Harrisons did not comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and that in the alternative, it is
entitled to absolute immunity and immunity pursuant to I.C. § 39-13920. We will first address
the service requirement and then good cause Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary
to consider the Board’s irrnnunity argurnents.
A. The complaint was untimely served.
'i`he interpretation of the idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter of law over which
this Court exercises tree review. Ccznyon Counly Bd. of Equczlz'zation v. Amalgamnted Sugar Co.,
143 idaho 58, 60, 137 93d 445, 447 (2006). 'i`he idaho Rules of Civil Procedure “shail be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive deterrnination of every action and
proceeding." I.R.C.P. l(a); Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 idaho 867, 878, 136 P.?)d 338, 349 (2006).
'i`lie Board argues it was necessary for the Harrisoirs to comply with the portion of the
Idaho Tort Claims Act (I"I`CA) requiring that "[i]n all actions under this act against the state or its
employee the summons and complaint shall be served on the secretary of state. . . l.C. § 6~
916. 'l`he Harrisons argue this statutory requirement does not contain any specific time lirnit, and
thus, their claim is not barred by their failure to serve the Secretary of State within six months.
Tlie Board argues the timeliness requirement in I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) applies
That rule provides that absent a showing of good cause, service of the summons and
complaint must be made upon a defendant within six months after filing the complaint l.R.C.P.
-fl(a)(ll). Our rules of civil procedure then provide that service upon the state of idaho is made by
delivering two copies of the summons and complaint to the attorney general, and in addition,
"[i]n all actions brought under specific statutes requiring service to be made upon specific
individuals or officials, service shall be made pursuant to the istatute. . . ." I.R.C.P. d(d)($).
'I`hus, reading the rules together, when the State is a defendant, the attorney general and officials
who require service pursuant to statutes under which an action is brought must be served and that
service of the summons and complaint must be made within six months after filing the
complaint
'l`he l-larrisons first argue that I.R.C.P. ¢l(d)($) only requires service be made upon the
Attorney General and that service upon individuals for actions brought under a specific statute is
only "in addition" to that requirement 'l`his argument is without rneiit. The rule covers service
upon the State and it requires (l) that service always be inade upon the attorney general and (2)
that service be made upon other officials when required by statute. Service upon the persons
designated in I.R.C.P. 4(d)(5) must be made within six months after filing the complaint and the
failure to do so without good cause results in dismissal of the action I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2).
The Harrisons next argue their negligence action was not "brought under" the ITCA
within the meaning of I.R.C.P. 4(<1)(5). 'l`he Harrisons base this argument on their assertion that
ITCA does not grant any substantive rights to sue the state»-iiistead, the substantive right to sue
is based on common law negligence However, this argument is without merit
ITCA provides that unless otherwise provided in the act, "every governmental entity is
subject to liability for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or
omissions . . . where the governmental entity if a private person or entity would be liable for
money damages under the laws of the state of ldaho. . . ." l.C. § 6-903(a). This statutory
provision makes clear that ITCA is not merely procedural and that it provides a substantive right
of recovery. Id.; see also Lawz.‘on v. Ci.ty c)fPocai.‘ello, 126 ldaho 454, 458, 886 P..’Zd 330, 334
(1994) (ITCA "renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts
or omissions."); Lelz`efeld v. Johnson, 104 idaho 357, 375, 659 P.Zd lll, 129 (1983) ("The right
to recover from the State is statutory and is analogous to fa] statutory cause of action . . . 'fhe
I'I`CA provide[s] a right of recovery. . . .").
'l`he Harrisons’ right to sue the State arises from ITCA which is a statutory creation.
Consequently, we hold the Harrisons’ action was "brought under" the statutory guidelines of the
ITCA, and thus, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2), I.R.C.P. ¢l(d)(§), and i.C. § 6-916, the Harrisons
should have served the summons and complaint upon the Secretary of State as well as the
Attorney General within six months alter filing the coinplaint.
B. The Harriscns have not sliown good cause for the untimely service
'l`he Harrisons argue dismissal was inappropriate in this case because good cause exists
for their failure to serve the summons and coinplaint upon the Secretary of State within six
months after filing the complaint 'i`hey assert there was no basis to believe it was necessary to
serve the Secretary of State, and their misunderstanding was based on a reasonable interpretation
oi` the rules.
It` the summons and complaint are not served upon the defendant within six months after
filing the complaint "and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good
cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dis1nissed as to that
defendant without prejudice. . . ." I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). Whether good cause exists is a factual
deterrnination. Sctmmz`s v. Magnete.k, Inc., 130 idaho 342, 346, 94l P.Zd 314, 318 (1997). As
such, the Court uses the same standard of review as that used to review an order granting
summary judgment. Id. When reviewing a trial court’s decision that a party failed to establish
good cause, we "must liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor." Id. The party who failed to
effect timely service has the burden to demonstrate good cause. Id.
There is no bright-line test in determining whether good cause exists Marrz°n v. Hob[z`t,
l33 Idaho 372, 375, 987 P.Zd 284, 287 (1999). "[W]hether legal excuse has been shown is a
matter for judicial determination based upon the facts and circumstances in each case." Ial. ’i`he
focus of the good cause inquiry is on the six-inonth time period following the filing of the
complaint Id. "lf a plaintiff fails to make any attempt at service within the time period of the
rule, it is likely that a court will find no showing of good cause." Id. at 377, 987 P.Zd at 289; see
also Cumpbell v. Reagan, 144 idaho 254, ___, 159 P.3d 891, 894 (2007). Courts look to factors
outside of the plaintiffs control including sudden illness, natural catastrophe, or evasion of
service ofprocess. M:rrtin, 133 Idaho at 377, 987 P.Zd at 289. Lack of prejudice is irrelevant to
the good cause anaiysis. Id. at 375, 987 P.Zd at 28'7.
In this case, the Harrisons have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate good cause
'I`hey made no attempt at any service upon the Secretary of State within the six month time
period Consideriiig the circumstances of this case, ignorance or misinterpretation of the rnles’
requirements based on a mistaken and narrow reading of the "hronght under” clause in I.R.C.P.
4(d)(5) is not good cause Therefore, we hold the Harrisons failed to_show good cause for their
failure to comply with the timely service requirement of I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2).
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the dismissal of the Harrisons’ complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). Costs
to Respondent.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices 3. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.