IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 31194
IN THE MATTER OF THE UNIVERSE )
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, IN ) Boise, February 2007 Term
LIQUIDATION. )
_______________________________________ ) 2007 Opinion No. 47
GRAIN GROWERS MEMBERSHIP AND )
INSURANCE TRUST, AMERICAN ) Filed: March 28, 2007
SOYBEAN ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP )
AND INSURANCE TRUST, NATIONAL ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
CONTRACT POULTRY GROWERS )
ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP AND )
INSURANCE TRUST, AMERICAN )
INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATIONS )
PARTICIPATING TRUSTS, and )
NATIONAL GROWERS AND STOCKMEN )
GROUP TRUST, )
)
Appellants, )
)
v. )
)
LIQUIDATOR FOR THE UNIVERSE LIFE )
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Respondent. )
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for Ada County. The Hon. Thomas Neville, District Judge.
The judgment order of the district court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Greener Banducci Shoemaker, PA, Boise, for appellants. Chris Burke argued.
Holland & Hart, Boise, for respondent. Newal Squyres argued.
EISMANN, Justice.
This is an appeal from summary judgments construing insurance policy provisions
regarding the amount of money that the insureds are entitled to receive upon termination of the
policies. We affirm the district court’s construction of two of the policies and reverse it as to the
third.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Universe Life Insurance Company (Universe Life) was a life and health insurance
company headquartered in Lewiston, Idaho. Virtually all of the business of Universe Life
consisted of group universal health policies issued to trusts formed by agricultural-related
associations. Those trusts are the Grain Growers Membership and Insurance Trust, the
American Soybean Association Membership and Insurance Trust, the Poultry Growers
Membership and Insurance Trust, the American Independent Agricultural Producers Groups
Trust, and the National Growers and Stockmen Group Trust. The Trusts were the policyholders,
and the Insureds were members of the associations that had formed the Trusts.
On March 4, 1996, the acting director of the Idaho Department of Insurance (Director)
commenced proceedings under Idaho Code § 41-3312 seeking court permission to rehabilitate
Universe Life based upon the request and consent of its board of directors. Universe Life and the
Director stipulated to an order of rehabilitation that was signed by the district court and entered
on March 5, 1996. Pursuant to that order and Idaho Code § 41-3313, the Director was vested
with title to Universe Life’s assets and was obligated to administer them under court supervision.
During 1994, Universe Life decided that it was in the best interests of its policy holders
and shareholders to discontinue its group universal life policies and to transfer such business to
Centennial Life Insurance Company (Centennial Life), a Kansas insurer. The Director approved
the transfer, which was to be accomplished in two stages. In the first stage, approximately forty-
five percent of Universe Life’s group universal health business was transferred to Centennial
Life, along with reserves. When Universe Life attempted to complete the second stage by
transferring its remaining group universal health business, Centennial Life refused to accept the
policies because Universe Life could not provide adequate cash or cash equivalents as reserves
for those policies.
Ultimately, the Director and Universe Life’s parent company found another insurer who
agreed to take over all of the Universe Life’s group universal health insurance business and to
issue new policies that were substantially similar to the Universe Life policies, with the
2
exception that they would not include the Supplemental or Universal Benefits. All of the
Insureds under the Universe Life policies had the right to coverage under these new policies.
On August 8, 1997, the Director submitted a rehabilitation plan to resolve the impasse
created by the breakdown of the transaction with Centennial Life. The plan included rescinding
the agreements between Universe Life and Centennial Life and entering into an agreement with
the new insurer under which it would issue replacement policies for all policies that had been or
were to have been transferred to Centennial Life. The district court approved the plan on
October 8, 1997. To implement the plan, the Trusts cancelled their insurance policies with
Universe Life effective December 1, 1997. After a hearing on February 13, 1998, the district
court ordered Centennial Life to return various assets to Universe Life and granted Universe Life
judgments for various sums against Centennial Life. Nevertheless, Universe Life’s financial
condition continued to deteriorate, and on November 18, 1998, the Director petitioned the court
for an order liquidating Universe Life due to its insolvency. On December 4, 1998, the district
court entered an order granting that petition.
On April 30, 1999, the Trusts filed various proofs of claim regarding the distribution of
Universe Life’s assets. Claims 1-5 dealt with policies providing Supplemental Benefits. Those
policies provided each Insured with an account funded by a portion of the Insured’s policy
premiums and by monies from Universe Life. The balance in the account was called the
Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulation. An Insured could use his or her Supplemental
Benefit Premium Accumulation to pay premium increases and to pay increases in the applicable
deductible for medical benefits. The Insured could also, subject to certain requirements and
limitations, withdraw money from it to use as he or she wished. Under certain circumstances,
Universe Life could exact a “Surrender Charge” when paying an Insured his or her Supplemental
Benefit Premium Accumulation. The Director did so in this case. In Claims 1-5 the Trusts
contend that the Director did not have the authority to impose the Surrender Charges.
Claims 7-10 dealt with the policies that provided Universal Benefits. The Universal
Benefit provided each insured with a credit that could be applied to premium increases and/or
increases in the applicable deductible. In addition, the policies also provided an account, called a
Withdrawal Value, consisting of monies provided by Universe Life. Upon the termination of the
policies, the Director paid each insured his or her Withdrawal Value. In addition, the Director
paid insureds who had asked, prior to termination, to apply their available Universal Benefits to
3
premium increases and/or increases in their deductibles. In Claims 7-10, the Trusts contended
that Insureds who had not asked to apply their available Universal Benefits prior to policy
termination should be able to use those benefits retroactively to reimburse themselves for
premium and/or deductible increases they had paid. The Director denied those claims.
Claim 13 dealt with Universal Benefit policies covering Insureds in Montana. These
policies provided that if the insurer terminated the policy for any reason, it must “return the UB”
to the Insureds. The Trusts contended that termination of the policies in connection with a court-
ordered rehabilitation plan should be considered cancellation by the insurer under this policy
provision. The Director denied that claim.
The Trusts timely filed objections to the denied Claims, and the Director then asked the
district court to hear the matter as provided in Idaho Code § 41-3339. In July 2001, the Trusts
and the Director filed motions for partial summary judgment with respect to Claims 1-5 and 7-
10. The motions were heard on September 10, 2001, and on July 31, 2002, the district court
issued a memorandum decision and order denying the Trusts’ motion and granting the Director’s
motion. In October 2002, the Director filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to
Claim 13. That motion was heard on October 31, 2002, and on July 30, 2003, the district court
entered a memorandum decision and order granting the motion. The Trusts appealed the court’s
decisions. This Court remanded the matter for entry of a judgment, and on December 2, 2005,
the district court entered judgment denying the claims. This appeal then proceeded.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Does this Court lack jurisdiction because the Trusts did not file a notice of appeal within
forty-two days after the district court entered its order on July 30, 2003, granting the
Director’s motion for summary judgment?
2. Did the district court err in holding that the Director could deduct surrender charges from
the balances owed the Insureds upon termination of the Supplemental Benefit policies?
3. Did the district court err in holding that the Insureds under the Universal Benefit Policies
could not retroactively apply their Universal Benefits after the policies had been
terminated?
4. Did the district court err in holding that the Trusts’ termination of the Montana policies at
the request of the Director did not constitute termination by Universe Life?
4
III. ANALYSIS
A. Does this Court Lack Jurisdiction Because the Trusts Did Not File a Notice of Appeal
Within Forty-Two Days After the District Court Entered Its Order on July 30, 2003,
Granting the Director’s Motion for Summary Judgment?
The Director contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the Trusts did not file
their appeal within forty-two days of the entry of the final judgment. The Trusts filed their
notice of appeal on September 29, 2004. The Director asserts that the final judgment in this
action was the Memorandum Decision and Order entered by the district court on July 30, 2003,
over one year before the Trusts filed their notice of appeal.
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Twin Falls County v. Coates, 139
Idaho 442, 80 P.3d 1043 (2003). If the Trusts did not file their notice of appeal timely, then this
Court does not have jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed. Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139
Idaho 448, 80 P.3d 1049 (2003). Whether or not the Trusts’ appeal was timely depends upon
whether the Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 30, 2003, constitutes a final
judgment.
The Director received approximately 250 proofs of claim to be reviewed and processed in
this case. As a result, the district court entered a “Claims Administration Procedures Order” on
August 3, 2000, which included the following provision:
On each Claim determination with respect to which timely objections have
been filed by an objecting Claimant, and judicial review is pursued by the
Claimant, the Court may make written findings of fact and conclusions of law,
along with a disposition of the Claim (the “Award”), which disposition shall
become final with respect to the Claim allowed or disallowed. Unless a motion
for reconsideration is filed, the Award shall become final. If a motion for
reconsideration is filed, the Court may address that motion in its discretion.
The above-quoted provision in the district court’s order does not make the determination
of a claim final for purposes of appeal. The finality of a judgment resolving less than all of the
claims in a lawsuit is governed by Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Merchants,
Inc. v. Intermountain Indus., Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 556 P.2d 366 (1976). That rule requires entry of
5
a Rule 54(b) Certificate,1 and no such Certificate was executed with respect to any of the
determinations at issue in this appeal.
On May 13, 2004, the Trusts filed a motion seeking a Rule 54(b) certification with
respect to the issues decided by the district court in its orders granting summary judgment
entered on July 31, 2002, and July 30, 2003. The district court heard that motion on June 30,
2004, and on May 19, 2005, it entered an order denying the motion. In its order, the court stated,
“[A]s of July 30, 2003, the Court had entered its Orders and ruled on all of the pending issues.”
When listing the issues it had ruled on, the district court only listed those issues between the
Trusts and the Director. It did not state that all other claims in the lawsuit had been resolved.
The resolution of all claims between some parties in a lawsuit does not constitute a final
judgment unless there is a judgment certified as final as required by Rule 54(b). As that Rule
states,
In the absence of such determination [that there is no just reason for delay] and
direction [for entry of the judgment], any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the actions as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.
For the Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 30, 2003, to constitute a final
judgment, it must have determined the last remaining claim in the lawsuit, not merely the last
remaining claim between the Trusts and the Director. The Director does not argue and has not
shown that it did so. Indeed, the district court register of actions shows the entry of orders
approving claims on September 12, 2003, and July 1, 2004; the entry of a stipulation for
dismissal of a claim on March 2, 2004; and the entry of an order settling a lawsuit on November
15, 2004. The Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 30, 2003, could have been a
final judgment only if it was certified as final as provided in Rule 54(b) or if it resolved the last
1
Rule 54(b)(1) requires that the Rule 54(b) Certificate be in substantially the following form:
RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue
and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
6
remaining issue in the case. It was not so certified and it did not resolve the last remaining issue
in the lawsuit. It also was not a final judgment because neither it nor the earlier memorandum
decision and order constituted a judgment. They were simply orders granting summary
judgment.
The district court’s Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 30, 2003, was not a
judgment. It merely granted the Director’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Claim
13. After explaining why it thought the Director was entitled to prevail on his motion for
summary judgment, the district court concluded by stating:
For the reasons stated above, Universe Liquidator’s Motion For Summary
Judgment is hereby GRANTED because this Court concludes there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. This Order is intended to have the effect of affirming the
Liquidator’s [Director’s] decision denying Claim 13. Counsel for the Liquidator
shall provide any proposed judgment considered necessary to implement this
decision, subject to the right of counsel for the Trusts to review for form.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
The earlier “Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment” entered on July 31, 2002, was likewise not a judgment. It merely granted the
Director’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Claims 1-5 and 7-10 and denied
the Trusts’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the same claims. It concluded:
For the reasons stated above, the Trusts’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is hereby DENIED, and Universe Liquidator’s [Director’s] Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Trusts’ Claims 1-5 And Claims 7-10 is
GRANTED. The Trusts, on behalf of the certificate holders, do not have Class 2
priority policyholder claims in Claims 1-5 or Claims 7-10 under Idaho Code § 41-
3342(2) because the Trusts’ cancellation of the GUH policies terminated the
policyholders rights to any supplemental or unvested benefits as a matter of law.
Counsel for the Liquidator [Director] shall provide any proposed judgments
considered necessary to implement this decision, subject to the right of counsel
for the Trusts to review for form. AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
An order granting summary judgment does not constitute a judgment. Camp v. East Fork
Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002); Hunting v. Clark County School Dist. No.
161, 129 Idaho 634, 931 P.2d 628 (1997). “Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate
document.” I.R.C.P. 58(a); accord, Hunting v. Clark County School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho
634, 931 P.2d 628 (1997). Both orders granting summary judgment stated that counsel for the
7
Director could submit an appropriate judgment, but that was apparently not done. On July 6,
2004, the Trusts filed a motion asking the district court to enter a judgment complying with Rule
58(a) as to Claims 1-5, 7-10, and 13. The district court heard that motion on July 22, 2004, and
on August 19, 2004, it entered an order denying the motion.
On August 10, 2005, the Director filed a motion in this Court seeking to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 30, 2003, was a
final judgment and the notice of appeal had not been timely filed. By order issued on September
16, 2005, we denied the order, suspended the appeal, and remanded the case to the district court
for entry of a final judgment. On December 2, 2005, the district court entered a judgment on the
claims that are at issue in this appeal, but it did not certify that judgment as final pursuant to Rule
54(b). Thus, that judgment would be final only if all other claims in the case have been resolved.
It appears from the district court register of actions that all claims in this case have been
resolved, and the district court file is now closed.
In summary, the district court did not enter a judgment as to the claims at issue on this
appeal until December 2, 2005. The Trusts’ notice of appeal filed on September 29, 2004, was
therefore premature, not late. It appears that judgments have been entered resolving all claims in
this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
The substantive issues on this appeal were decided by the district court on motions for
summary judgment. In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court’s standard of
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002). All disputed facts are
to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues
of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free
review. Id.
8
B. Did the District Court Err in Holding that the Director Could Deduct Surrender
Charges from the Balances Owed the Insureds upon Termination of the Supplemental
Benefit Policies?
Some of the policies at issue provided a Supplemental Benefit, which was an account that
the Insured could use to pay future increases in policy premiums and/or to satisfy deductible
amounts in excess of $250.00. In addition, the Insured could make partial withdrawals of money
from the account. The accounts were funded by a portion of the Insured’s premium payments
and by Universe Life making annual interest payments and annual allocations of a portion of the
Surrender Charges it had collected during the prior year. The Surrender Charges were charges
that Universe Life was entitled to exact under specified circumstances before paying an Insured
his or her Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulation, which is the balance in his or her
account. To implement the rehabilitation plan, the Trusts terminated these policies. The issue is
whether the policies permitted Universe Life, and therefore the Director, to exact a surrender
charge upon such termination.
The applicable policy provisions regarding the surrender charge were as follows:
SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT PREMIUM ACCUMULATION means the sum
total of Supplemental Benefit Premium credited with interest and Surrender
Charge Allocations, as reduced by the Use of the Supplemental Benefit and
Surrender Charges.
....
PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS
Insured may withdraw as a partial surrender a minimum of $250. Insured’s
partial surrender withdrawals are limited to the amount Insured’s Supplemental
Benefit Premium Accumulation exceeds (1) the applicable surrender charge, and
(2) a minimum Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulation balance of at least
$250 if Insured elected single coverage, or $500 if Insured elected married or
family coverage.
....
SURRENDER CHARGE
When Supplemental Benefit Premium payments terminate, the Supplemental
Benefit Premium Accumulation will be available to Insured subject to a Surrender
Charge. This Charge will be the smaller of . . . .
The Surrender Charge will not be applied in the event of:
1. Insured’s death;
2. Insured’s retirement from farming or ranching after, and, having made
Supplemental Benefit Premium payments for at least 10 years;
9
3. Attainment of age 70;
4. Insured’s Total Disability;
5. The termination of the Group Insurance Trust;
6. The termination of the Supplemental Benefit;
7. An application of Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulations for:
a. Payment of future increases in Policy Premiums;
b. Payment of Deductible charges; or
8. Suspension of Supplemental Benefit Premium payments because the
Maximum Amount of Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulation has
been reached.
....
POLICY TERMINATION
If the Policy terminates and a replacement policy is available, then We, at Our
option may;
1. transfer the Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulation to the
replacement policy; or
2. return the Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulation to Insured; or
3. make available an individual product. The Supplemental Benefit Premium
Accumulation will be transferred to such product.
The issue is whether any of the above-quoted policy provisions permit Universe Life to
deduct a surrender charge under the circumstances involved in this case. “In construing an
insurance policy, the Court must look to the plain meaning of the words to determine if there are
any ambiguities. This determination is a question of law. In resolving this question of law, the
Court must construe the policy ‘as a whole, not by an isolated phrase.’” Cascade Auto Glass,
Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005) (citations
omitted).
The Director argues that the policy provision beginning “SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT
PREMIUM ACCUMULATION” imposes a surrender charge in these circumstances. The
applicable wording states, “SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT PREMIUM ACCUMULATION
means the sum total of Supplemental Benefit Premium credited with interest and Surrender
Charge Allocations, as reduced by the Use of the Supplemental Benefit and Surrender Charges.”
That provision does not impose a surrender charge any more than it requires Universe Life to
credit an Insured’s account with interest and surrender charge allocations or requires the Insured
to use his or her Supplemental Benefit. Other provisions in the policy require Universe Life to
credit the accounts with interest payments and surrender charge allocations and specify how
those sums will be determined. Likewise, other provisions of the policy specify how an Insured
10
can use the Supplemental Benefit and when surrender charges apply and do not apply. This
provision of the policy merely defines the term “SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT PREMIUM
ACCUMULATION.” The Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulation is simply the balance
in an Insured’s Supplemental Benefit account. It is the total of the Supplemental Benefit
Premiums and Surrender Charge Allocations less any Surrender Charges imposed and any
withdrawals from using the Supplemental Benefit.
The Director also relies upon the first sentence in the policy provision entitled
“SURRENDER CHARGE.” That sentence states, “When Supplemental Benefit Premium
payments terminate, the Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulation will be available to
Insured subject to a Surrender Charge.” Once the policies were terminated, the Insureds
naturally stopped paying the policy premiums. Each Insured’s policy premium included a
percentage that was applied as the supplemental benefit premium. During the first year it was
15% of the total policy premium, and it could increase thereafter. Thus, when the Insureds
stopped paying their premiums upon the termination of the policies, they also stopped paying the
supplemental benefit premiums. According to the Director, for the Insureds to avoid the
surrender charges, they would have had to continue paying the supplemental benefit premiums
after the policies had been terminated.
The provision entitled “SURRENDER CHARGE” also provides, “The Surrender Charge
will not be applied in the event of: . . . The termination of the Supplemental Benefit.” The
termination of the policies terminated the supplemental benefits. Therefore, under this provision
no surrender charge is applicable. The Director argues that “termination of the Supplemental
Benefit” should be read to mean termination of only the supplemental benefit while leaving the
other provisions of the policies in force. That is not what it states. On its face, it applies to
“[t]he termination of the Supplemental Benefit,” and that benefit terminated when the Trusts
terminated these policies. Universe Life was no longer offering policies with a Supplemental
Benefit.
The Director’s proposed interpretation is inconsistent with his construction of the
provision he claims authorizes the surrender charge. That provision authorizes the imposition of
a surrender charge upon the termination of “Supplemental Benefit Premium payments.” It refers
only to the termination of the supplemental benefit premium payments, not the termination of the
policy premium payments. The Director contends it is applicable because the supplemental
11
benefit premiums were included in the policy premiums, so when the Insureds stopped paying
the policy premiums they also stopped paying the supplemental benefit premiums. The
supplemental benefit was also one of several benefits provided by the policy. The termination of
the policy terminated that benefit. If termination of the policy premium payments constitutes
termination of the included supplemental benefit premium payments, then termination of the
policy includes termination of the included Supplemental Benefit.
The Director also argues that the Trusts made a judicial admission that they are not
entitled to recover the surrender charges. On December 4, 1998, counsel for the Grain Growers
Membership and Insurance Trust filed a motion seeking to modify the proposed order of
liquidation. He proposed that the order include a provision stating that his client would assert
claims for the payment of “unvested benefits pursuant to GUH policies” as Class Three and
Class Four Claims and that “these benefits are designated ‘supplemental benefit accumulations.’”
The district court did not grant the motion. In his affidavit in support of the motion, counsel
stated that his client had “canceled the GUH policies . . . and the certificateholders [Insureds]
were paid all SBA/UB benefits that had vested and that were contractually due upon cancellation
by the policyholder.” The Director contends that this statement constituted a judicial admission.
“A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attorney, in the course of judicial
proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the
opposing party of some fact.” Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139
Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004). “A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear,
unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact within the party’s peculiar knowledge, not
a matter of law. . . . [and] not opinion.” 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 770 (1994).
In prior opinions, we have held that judicial admissions include admitting an allegation in
an opposing party’s pleading, Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 341, 63 P.3d
441, 447 (2003); a stipulation entered into by parties or their counsel, Reding v. Reding, 141
Idaho 369, 109 P.3d 1111 (2005); and counsel’s admission at trial of a factual issue upon which
the opposing party had the burden of proof, McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 782-83,
430 P.2d 670, 673-74 (1967). Conversely, we have held that judicial admissions do not include a
party’s allegation in a complaint filed in a separate but related lawsuit, Curtis v. Canyon
Highway District No. 4, 122 Idaho 73, 84, 831 P.2d 541, 552 (1992), overruled on other grounds
by Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 462, 886 P.2d 330, 338 (1994); or a party’s
12
allegation in a pleading that was later amended or withdrawn, Swanson v. State, 83 Idaho 126,
135, 358 P.2d 387, 392 (1960).
The statement made by counsel for the Grain Growers Membership and Insurance Trust
does not constitute a judicial admission. It was not made for the purpose, or with the effect, of
dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact. Insofar as is relevant
here, it was not a statement of fact; it was a statement of law or opinion regarding the
interpretation of the SBA Policies. Counsel later admitted in a brief lodged September 5, 2001,
that his legal opinion as to the interpretation of the Policies was incorrect.
The Director also argues that the Trusts are estopped to challenge the imposition of the
surrender charge because they approved the Rehabilitation Plan and accepted its benefits.
Nowhere does the Plan provide that surrender charges would be deducted when paying the
Insureds the balances of their Supplemental Benefit Premium Accumulations. The stated
objectives of the Plan included: “Pay certificate holders [Insureds] the SBA/UB cash benefits
contractually due on cancellation of the GUH policies by the Trusts or the insurer. This amount
is greater than the amount due a certificate holder who individually cancels coverage.”
Regarding payment of sums due, the Plan stated, “To the extent of assets in excess of such
claims reserve, the Rehabilitator [Director] shall pay the amount of the respective SBA/UB cash
withdrawal benefit to each GUH Plan certificate holders [sic] as of the date of termination of the
applicable GUH policy.” There was no mention of exacting any surrender charge.
In summary, the policies provided, “The Surrender Charge will not be applied in the
event of: . . . The termination of the Supplemental Benefit.” Upon the termination of the
policies, the supplemental benefit terminated. The policies did not permit Universe Life to retain
a surrender charge when paying the Insureds the balances of their Supplemental Benefit
Premium Accumulations. We therefore reverse the district court on this issue.
C. Did the District Court Err in Holding that the Insureds under the Universal Benefit
Policies Could Not Retroactively Apply their Universal Benefits after the Policies Had Been
Terminated?
Some of the policies provided a Universal Benefit in the form of a credit that an Insured
could apply to pay premium increases (“Levelized Premium Benefit”) and/or obtain
reimbursement of increases in his or her deductible (“Supplemental Deductible Benefit”). In
13
addition, each Insured could have an associated “Withdrawal Value,” which is a sum comprised
of interest and experience returns2 paid by Universe Life. The Withdrawal Value could be used
to pay a Levelized Premium Benefit or a Supplemental Deductible Benefit that was in excess of
the available Universal Benefit credit. The insured could also make partial withdrawals of cash
from his or her Withdrawal Value.
The Insureds were paid the amounts of their respective Withdrawal Values as of
December 1, 1997, the date these policies were terminated. If, prior to that termination date, an
Insured had requested that his or her Universal Benefit be applied to increases in the Insured’s
premium and/or deductible, that sum was also paid. The issue is whether the Insureds who had
not made that request prior to the termination of the policies are entitled to have their Universal
Benefits applied retroactively to give them refunds of premium increases and/or deductible
increases that they had already paid.
The policies provided that upon their termination the Insureds were entitled to receive the
amounts of their respective Withdrawal Values. The applicable policy provision stated:
When Coverage Ends – If an Insured’s coverage ends for any reason, he or she
will be entitled to receive payment of his or her remaining Withdrawal Value. If
the termination is due to death of an Insured or his or her withdrawal value is not
transferred to a continuing spouse or dependents, it will be paid to that Insured’s
beneficiary. Upon an Insured’s death, his or her unused Universal Benefits
accrued, including Withdrawal Values, may be transferred to the surviving spouse
or dependents if they elect to continue their coverage under this plan.
Any additional unused Universal Benefit credit was available only if the Insured died and the
insured’s surviving spouse or dependents elected to continue the insurance coverage. That did
not happen in this case. Thus, the Insureds under these policies were paid what the policies
provided.
The Trusts contend that the Director arbitrarily picked December 1, 1997, as the deadline
for Insureds to have submitted claims to apply their Universal Benefits. That date is the date the
Trusts terminated the policies. Upon termination of the policies, the above-quoted provision
2
“Experience return” was defined as “the insurance company’s earned premiums for the group in excess of those
required to produce the company’s targeted incurred losses, insurance expenses and commissions and administrative
allowances, and stipulated profits.”
14
specified the sum that the Insureds were entitled to receive. The Director’s selection of that date
with respect to payment of such benefits was not arbitrary.
In summary, the Universal Benefit policies specified the amounts that the Insureds were
entitled to receive when “an Insured’s coverage ends for any reason,” which it did when the
policies were canceled. They were paid that sum. We affirm the district court on this issue.
D. Did the District Court Err in Holding that the Trusts’ Termination of the Montana
Policies at the Request of the Director Did Not Constitute Termination by Universe Life?
The Montana Universal Benefit policies included a provision stating, “[I]f the insurer
terminates the master policy for any reason, the insurer will either (1) transfer the UB to a
replacement policy; (2) return the UB to the certificate holder; or (3) make available a similar
product and transfer the amount of the UB account to the new product.” If the insurer, Universe
Life, did not cancel the policies, then the Insureds would be paid only a portion of these benefits.
The Trusts argue that their cancellation of the policies at the request of the Director should
constitute cancellation by Universe Life. In support of this argument, the Trusts assert that the
Director in his capacity as rehabilitator of the insurance company “steps into the company’s
shoes.” Assuming that this metaphor is accurate, it was the Trusts who canceled the policies, not
the Director. The Director asked, but did not require, that they do so, nor did the district court
require that they do so.
The Trusts assert that their cancellation of the policies is not binding upon them because
the cancellation was obtained by fraud or mistake. In their brief, the Trusts do not explain the
nature of the alleged fraud or mistake. They simply state that they raised the issue below and
cite to portions of the record on appeal. There is no allegation in their brief that they cancelled
the Montana policies because of any mistaken belief or fraudulent representation that their
cancellation would be considered cancellation by Universe Life or the Director. The Trusts’
passing reference to this issue shows that they did not believe it meritorious enough to support
with argument and authority. Therefore, we will not address it. Inama v. Boise County ex rel.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003) (“We will not consider issues
cited on appeal that are not supported by argument and propositions of law”).
15
Our resolution of the issues as to the plain meaning of the applicable policy provisions
renders moot the remaining issues raised by the Trusts on appeal. We will therefore not address
them.
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court regarding the Director’s authority to retain a Surrender
Charge from the sum paid to the Insured’s under the Supplemental Benefit policies and we
affirm the district court regarding the Universal Benefit Policies and the Montana policies.
Because both sides prevailed in part, we do not award costs on appeal.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER, and Justices TROUT, BURDICK and JONES CONCUR.
16