IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 36846
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Boise, February 2011 Term
)
v. ) 2011 Opinion No. 43
)
RAYMOND GENE CORBUS, ) Filed: March 22, 2011
)
Defendant-Appellant. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
_______________________________________ )
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, Elmore County. The Honorable Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge.
The district court’s restitution order is affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Eric D.
Frederickson argued.
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica
M. Lorello argued.
______________________________
J. JONES, Justice.
Raymond Gene Corbus appeals the district court’s order of restitution. We affirm.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On the night of May 7, 2006, police officers observed Corbus driving his vehicle at
approximately 60 mph in a 35 mph zone. After Corbus drove past the officers, they entered their
police vehicles and activated the overhead emergency lights. Corbus then accelerated and turned
off the headlights on his vehicle. A chase ensued during which Corbus reached speeds in excess of
100 mph. When Corbus slowed to approximately 50 mph to make a turn, the passenger in his front
seat jumped out of the vehicle and was knocked unconscious. Corbus continued driving another
300 yards before hitting a rock and coming to a stop. The passenger was transported to the hospital
where he received medical treatment for the injuries he sustained after jumping from the vehicle.
1
Thereafter, Corbus was charged with felony eluding a peace officer, misdemeanor reckless
driving, and misdemeanor driving without privileges. Corbus pleaded guilty to reckless driving at
his arraignment and later entered a conditional plea of guilty1 to eluding a peace officer pursuant to
a plea agreement with the State. Among other things, the plea agreement provided that the State
would dismiss the driving without privileges charge and would recommend restitution for the
injuries that Corbus’ passenger sustained. As part of Corbus’ sentence, the district court ordered
restitution in an amount to be determined at a restitution hearing. During the restitution
proceedings, Corbus argued that he was not liable for restitution because his passenger’s injuries
were not a result of his criminal conduct but, rather, were a result of the passenger’s independent
choice to flee from the police to avoid being apprehended for violating his probation by consuming
alcohol that evening. No evidence was submitted during the restitution proceedings regarding the
passenger’s motive for jumping from the vehicle. The district court ultimately ordered restitution in
the amount of $18,203.67, finding a sufficient causal connection between Corbus’ conduct and his
passenger’s injuries. The district court found that,
[i]n the court’s view, there is a sufficient causal connection between the conduct for
which the defendant was convicted and the injuries [the victim] sustained. [The
victim] was afraid because he was a passenger in the defendant’s vehicle which he
was driving at a high rate of speed with his headlights off on a road where other
vehicles were located. It was not unreasonable for [the victim] to decide that he
might be better off “bailing out” of the vehicle rather than risk more serious injuries
in the event that the defendant wrecked the vehicle. There is no reason to believe
that [the victim] would have left the defendant’s vehicle, while it was moving, had
the defendant not been engaged in criminal actions that constituted Felony Eluding
and Reckless Driving.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order of restitution, holding
that,
[a]lthough the prosecutor certainly could have done a better job of proving the
passenger’s status as a “victim” by presenting an affidavit from that individual
explaining why he jumped from the vehicle, the facts before the district court
were sufficient to support an inference that the passenger jumped from the car out
of fear for his safety due to Corbus’ criminal conduct of eluding.
State v. Corbus, No. 502, slip op., p. 3 (Ct. App. June 18, 2009).
1
Pursuant to the plea agreement, Corbus reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss the felony eluding charge on double jeopardy grounds. However, the district court’s order with regard to
Corbus’ motion to dismiss is not the subject of this appeal.
2
Corbus then filed a petition for review with this Court. The petition for review was
granted, but was stayed pending this Court’s decision in State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223
P.3d 750 (2009). 2 The Court issued its decision in Lampien on December 23, 2009, and this
appeal was subsequently resumed.
II.
Issue on Appeal
I. Whether the district court’s conclusion that there is a causal connection
between Corbus’ criminal conduct and his passenger’s injuries is supported by
substantial evidence.
III.
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but reviews the district court’s decision
directly. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 371, 223 P.3d at 754. The decision regarding whether to order
restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court’s discretion and is guided by
consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7). State v. Richmond, 137
Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002). The issue of causation in restitution cases is a
question of fact to be decided by the trial court. See Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 204
P.3d 508, 515 (2009). The district court’s factual findings with regard to restitution will not be
disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822,
242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010).
B. Causation
Idaho’s restitution statute permits a court to order restitution for “any crime which results
in an economic loss to the victim.” I.C. § 19-5304(2). The statute defines victim as “a person or
entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.”
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) (emphasis added). The term economic loss includes “the value of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket
losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct.” I.C. § 19-
5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a
2
In Lampien, this Court articulated the requisite framework for analyzing the issue of causation in criminal cases.
3
causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries
suffered by the victim.
As articulated by this Court in Lampien, causation consists of actual cause and true
proximate cause. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 223 P.3d at 757. “Actual cause is the factual
question of whether a particular event produced a particular consequence.” Id. (quoting Cramer,
146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d at 515). The “but for” test is used in circumstances where there is
only one actual cause or where two or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. Id. On
the other hand, true proximate cause deals with “whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such
harm would flow from the negligent conduct.” Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d
at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must determine whether the injury and manner
of occurrence are so highly unusual “that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the
possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the
injury to occur.” Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d at 515).
An intervening, superseding cause is “an independent act or force that breaks the causal
chain between the defendant’s culpable act and the victim’s injury.” Id. In general, an
intervening, superseding cause replaces the defendant’s act as the proximate cause of the
victim’s injury. Id. at 374–75, 223 P.3d at 757–58. However, to relieve a defendant of criminal
liability, an intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence. Id. at 375,
223 P.3d at 758. “The defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible consequence
might reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the possibility
of harm of the kind that could result from his act.” Id.
We find there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Corbus’ conduct was
both the actual and proximate cause of the passenger’s injuries, and that the passenger’s act of
jumping from the vehicle was not an intervening, superseding cause sufficient to relieve Corbus
of liability for the passenger’s injuries.
1. Actual Cause
In this case, the issue of actual cause involves the factual question of whether the
passenger’s injuries would not have occurred but for Corbus’ criminal conduct. On appeal,
Corbus offers several arguments related to the passenger’s motive for jumping out of the vehicle.
However, the passenger’s motive for jumping out of the vehicle is irrelevant when determining
actual cause. Regardless of whether the passenger jumped from the vehicle to avoid being
4
apprehended by the police, or because he feared for his personal safety, he would not have
needed to do so if it had not been for Corbus’ acts of driving recklessly and eluding police
officers and then failing to stop in response to their overhead emergency lights. In other words,
Corbus’ argument fails because even if the passenger jumped from the vehicle to avoid being
apprehended for a probation violation, the passenger would have never come into contact with
law enforcement that night if it were not for Corbus’ act of speeding and then eluding and failing
to stop. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that but for
Corbus’ criminal conduct, his passenger would not have been injured. 3
2. Proximate Cause
In this case, the issue of proximate cause involves the factual question of whether the
passenger’s act of jumping from the vehicle and sustaining injuries was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of Corbus’ criminal conduct. The district court found that “[i]t was not unreasonable
for [the victim] to decide that he might be better off “bailing out” of the vehicle rather than risk
more serious injuries in the event that the defendant wrecked the vehicle.” While the district court
did not specifically mention foreseeability, the district court’s finding that the passenger acted
reasonably by jumping from the vehicle to avoid serious injury is akin to a finding that the
passenger’s actions were foreseeable. In other words, because the district court concluded that the
passenger’s act of jumping from the vehicle was not an unreasonable reaction to Corbus’ criminal
conduct, the court implicitly recognized that Corbus should have reasonably foreseen that his
actions could lead to such a result. 4 Therefore, this Court must determine whether the district
court’s conclusion regarding proximate cause is supported by substantial evidence.
Corbus’ arguments regarding the passenger’s motive for jumping from the vehicle are
more relevant when it comes to proximate cause because the passenger’s motive affects the
analysis of whether jumping from the vehicle was a reasonably foreseeable reaction to Corbus’
3
While the district court did not specifically use the words “but for,” the district court did find that “[t]here is no
reason to believe that [the victim] would have left the defendant’s vehicle, while it was moving, had the defendant
not been engaged in criminal actions that constituted Felony Eluding and Reckless Driving.”
4
To support its conclusion, the district court also cited to the case of State v. Hill, No. 49291-8-I, 2002 WL 31082005,
at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2002), where the court held that the defendant could be required to pay restitution to the
victim who, after being assaulted by the defendant, panicked, fled away in a car at a high rate of speed, and crashed,
because the victim’s actions were “not only foreseeable, but highly likely.” This further demonstrates that the district
court, after adequately conducting an analysis regarding proximate cause, found that the passenger’s injuries were
reasonably foreseeable in light of Corbus’ criminal conduct.
5
criminal conduct. Despite Corbus’ argument that the passenger jumped from the vehicle to avoid
being apprehended for a probation violation, the district court specifically found that the
passenger jumped to avoid the serious injury that could result from Corbus’ driving. Because the
district court’s factual findings with regard to the passenger’s motive for jumping from the vehicle
affect the analysis regarding foreseeability, this Court must first determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that the passenger jumped from the
vehicle for safety reasons.
Corbus argues that because the State did not submit an affidavit from the passenger or call
the passenger to testify as to his motive for jumping from the vehicle, there is no evidence to
support the district court’s conclusion that the passenger jumped from the vehicle out of fear for his
safety. Corbus further argues that because there is evidence in the record indicating that, at the time
of the incident, the passenger was on felony probation for an earlier conviction for driving under
the influence and had been at a bar the night of the incident consuming alcohol in violation of his
probation, it is just as likely the passenger jumped from the vehicle to avoid being apprehended for
violating his probation.
We find there is substantial evidence to support an inference that the passenger jumped
from the vehicle because he feared for his safety. In the criminal information charging Corbus
with the crime of felony eluding a peace officer, the State alleged that,
the Defendant . . . did operate a motor vehicle . . . and willfully attempted to elude a
pursuing police vehicle after being given a visual signal to stop, and in doing so
either (a) traveled in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted speed
limit, to-wit: in excess of 100 m.p.h. in a 55 and/or 65 m.p.h. speed zone(s) or (b)
drove his vehicle in a manner as to endanger or be likely to endanger the property of
another or the person of another, to-wit: the Defendant drove in a reckless manner
including speeding in excess of 100 m.p.h., passing other vehicles, and turning off
his headlights after sunset, all in violation of I.C. § 49-1404(1) and (2)(a) or (c).
In the criminal information charging Corbus with the crime of reckless driving, the State
alleged that,
the Defendant . . . did operate a motor vehicle . . . carelessly and heedlessly; without
due caution and circumspection and/or at a speed or in a manner to be likely to
endanger persons or property; by driving in excess of 100 m.p.h. with his headlights
turned off after 9:18 p.m., with other vehicles on the roadway, all in violation of I.C.
§ 49-1401.
6
Upon pleading guilty to reckless driving and entering a conditional plea of guilty to
felony eluding a peace officer, Corbus admitted to engaging in the criminal conduct alleged by
the State in the information. State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 546, 661 P.2d 328, 331 (1983)
(holding that “a valid guilty plea, voluntarily and understandingly given, is a judicial admission
of all facts charged by the indictment or information”). In other words, Corbus admitted to
driving at speeds in excess of 100 mph, without headlights on, while it was dark, and while there
were other vehicles on the road. Corbus also admitted that such conduct was likely to put other
people in danger. Therefore, while we agree with the Court of Appeals that the State could have
done a better job proving the passenger’s status as a victim during the restitution proceedings,
there is substantial evidence to support an inference that the passenger jumped from the vehicle
because he feared for his safety.
The next question then is whether, assuming the passenger jumped from the vehicle out
of fear for his safety, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the passenger’s
act of jumping from the vehicle and sustaining injuries was reasonably foreseeable. Corbus
argues that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the passenger would risk serious injury by
jumping from a fast-moving vehicle. The State argues that the passenger’s act of jumping from
the vehicle was a reasonably foreseeable reaction to Corbus’ dangerous criminal acts.
We find there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the passenger’s act of
jumping from the vehicle and sustaining injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of Corbus’
criminal conduct. The facts before the district court demonstrate that Corbus had created an
extremely dangerous situation for his passenger by driving at night, at excessive speeds, with no
headlights on. Given the dangerous manner in which Corbus was driving that night, it was
reasonably foreseeable that his passenger would decide to jump from the vehicle to avoid a
potentially serious car accident. This is especially true given that jumping from the vehicle was
the only means available to the passenger to escape the dangerous situation. A reasonable person
in Corbus’ position, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm that his conduct might
produce, would have reasonably expected such an injury to his passenger to occur.
Corbus argues that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the passenger would jump from
a vehicle traveling at such a high rate of speed. However, this argument fails to take into account
the fact that Corbus had previously been driving his vehicle at speeds in excess of 100 mph, and
it was not until he finally slowed down to 50 mph, to make a turn, that the passenger decided to
7
jump. It was not unreasonable for the passenger to jump at this time because there is nothing to
indicate if, or when, Corbus would have again slowed to a speed lower than 50 mph during his
attempt to elude the police. Moreover, if the passenger had decided to remain in the vehicle and
Corbus would have gotten into a car accident, Corbus would certainly be liable for the
passenger’s injuries. There is no reason why Corbus should not similarly be liable for the injuries
that resulted from the passenger’s decision to avoid a potentially serious car accident by jumping
from the vehicle when Corbus finally slowed to make a turn. Because it was reasonably
foreseeable that the passenger would be injured after jumping from the vehicle to escape the
dangerous situation that Corbus had created, the district court’s conclusion regarding proximate
cause will not be disturbed on appeal.
Corbus cites to the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d
689 (Ct. App. 2007), to support his argument that he did not cause his passenger’s injuries. In
Shafer, the defendant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident and the district court
awarded restitution for the accident victim’s injuries. Id. at 371, 161 P.3d at 690. The Court of
Appeals reversed the order of restitution on the ground that the victim’s losses did not result
from the criminal act for which the defendant was convicted. Id. at 372, 161 P.3d at 691. The
court noted that,
[t]o prosecute this offense, the State need not prove that the defendant was
responsible for the accident, and a guilty plea for leaving an injury accident is not an
admission of fault in the accident itself. A driver may be guilty of leaving the scene
even when the other driver is wholly responsible for the accident. Under such
circumstances, it would be not only unauthorized by I.C. § 19-5304, but also unjust
to impose upon a defendant liability for economic loss caused by the accident.
Id. at 373, 161 P.3d at 692.
Contrary to Corbus’ argument, Shafer provides no guidance here. Unlike in Schafer, the
victim’s injuries in this case were incurred during, and as a result of, Corbus’ criminal acts. In
Schafer, the defendant’s conduct did not cause the victim’s injuries because it was not the act of
leaving the scene of the accident that led to the injury but, rather, it was the conduct that caused
the car accident that led to the injury. In this case, Corbus’ act of driving recklessly and eluding a
peace officer was the conduct that caused the passenger to jump from the vehicle and sustain
injuries.
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3. Intervening Cause
Finally, Corbus argues that the passenger’s independent, voluntary act of jumping from
the vehicle was an intervening, superseding cause of the passenger’s injuries and, thus, he is not
liable for restitution. The State argues that Corbus’ act of jumping from the vehicle does not
constitute an intervening, superseding cause because it was not an unforeseeable and
extraordinary occurrence sufficient to relieve Corbus of liability for the passenger’s injuries.
We find that the passenger’s act of jumping from the vehicle was not an intervening,
superseding cause of the passenger’s injuries. Generally, the contributory negligence of the
victim is not enough to relieve the defendant of criminal liability. State v. Taylor, 67 Idaho 313,
316, 177 P.2d 468, 470 (1947). In order to be considered an intervening, superseding cause, the
victim’s conduct must have been an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence. Lampien, 148
Idaho at 374, 223 P.3d at 757. There are several factors to consider when determining whether an
intervening act is sufficient to constitute a superseding cause, including whether (1) the operation
or the consequences appear to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances;
(2) the intervening act is operating independently of any situation created by the actor’s
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such situation; (3) the operation
of the intervening force is due to a third person’s act or failure to act; (4) the intervening force is
due to an act of a third person which is wrongful toward the other and, as such, subjects the third
person to liability to him; and (5) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person
which sets the intervening force in motion. Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 329, 411 P.2d 768,
771 (1966) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2D, § 442).
In this case, because the alleged intervening, superseding cause involves the conduct of
the victim rather than some third-party actor or force, the analysis is essentially the same as for
determining whether Corbus’ criminal conduct was the proximate cause of the passenger’s
injuries. As explained above, it was reasonably foreseeable that the passenger would be injured
by jumping from the vehicle to escape the dangerous situation that Corbus had created. In other
words, the passenger’s injuries were not an extraordinary consequence of Corbus’ criminal
conduct. Furthermore, the passenger’s actions were not independent of the situation that Corbus
created but, rather, were taken in response to the danger created by Corbus’ criminal conduct.
The passenger’s act of jumping from the vehicle was a reasonable reaction to the dangerous
situation, especially given the lack of alternatives available to the passenger. Consequently, there
9
is no intervening cause in this case sufficient to relieve Corbus of liability for his passenger’s
injuries.
IV.
Conclusion
There is substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that there is a
sufficient causal connection between Corbus’ criminal conduct and his passenger’s injuries.
Therefore, the district court’s order of restitution is affirmed.
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and HORTON
CONCUR.
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