State v. Meister

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 35048

STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Moscow, April 2009 Term
)
v. ) 2009 Opinion No. 91
)
DAVID JOSEPH MEISTER, ) Filed: July 7, 2009
)
Defendants-Appellants. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
)

Appeal from the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Latah County.
Hon. John R. Stegner, District Judge.

The sentence is vacated, the conviction is vacated and this case is remanded for
new trial.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Erik
Lehtinen argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah
Cudé argued.

_______________________________
W. JONES, J.
This case arises from the 2001 shooting death of Tonya Hart in Moscow, Idaho. David
Meister was charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder; it was alleged
that Meister shot Tonya in exchange for $1000. A jury convicted Meister on both counts, and
Meister appealed. The court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings and re-
sentencing. The state petitioned this Court for review. This Court accepted review on the
following issues: (1) whether this Court‟s decision in State v. Larsen, 91 Idaho 42, 415 P.2d 685
(1966) or I.R.E. 403 is the controlling authority for the admissibility of alternate perpetrator
evidence, (2) whether I.R.E. 804(b)(3) contains a corroboration requirement for the admission of
confessions of an alternate perpetrator, and (3) whether the district court violated Meister‟s right

1
to due process, right of appeal, and Fifth Amendment rights by threatening a harsher sentence if
Meister refused to admit guilt.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 11, 2001 Tonya Hart was shot twice in her home in Moscow, Idaho, which
she shared with her boyfriend Jesse Linderman. The shooter approached the front entrance of
Tonya‟s trailer and then proceeded to the back entrance.1 When Tonya opened the back entrance
of the trailer she was shot twice, once in the chest and once in the face. The shooter then
retreated behind the trailer, running through a snow covered field and eventually exiting the field
on a nearby road. A neighbor heard the gun shots and went to Tonya and Jesse‟s trailer. He then
called 911 and proceeded unsuccessfully with resuscitation efforts. Tonya was pronounced dead
at the scene.
In August of 2002 the police interrogated David Meister in connection with Tonya‟s
death and Meister confessed that he shot Tonya in exchange for a $1000 payment from Jesse
Linderman.2 Meister was charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
Charges were initially filed against Linderman for conspiracy to commit murder but those
charges were later dismissed because the only evidence tying Linderman to the crime was
Meister‟s confession.
At trial Meister attempted to admit evidence that another individual, Lane Thomas, was
responsible for Tonya‟s shooting. The district court refused any evidence which showed Thomas
was an alternate perpetrator of the crime, including several confessions. A jury convicted
Meister on both counts and the district court sentenced him to a fixed term of life for the murder
conviction and a unified sentence of life with 40 years fixed for the conspiracy conviction.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether this Court‟s decision in Larsen, 91 Idaho 42, 415 P.2d 685 or I.R.E. 403
is the controlling authority for the admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence.
2. Whether I.R.E. 804(b)(3) contains a corroboration requirement for the admission
of Lane Thomas‟ confessions.

1
The shooter‟s movement is based on footprints left in the snow.
2
Meister later claimed that his confession was invalid because it was coerced, taken in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the interrogation process was not video-taped. These claims are not presently
before the Court.

2
 3. Whether the district court violated Meister‟s right to due process, right of appeal,
and Fifth Amendment rights by threatening a harsher sentence if Meister refused
to admit guilt.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of Appeals
decision, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly
reviews the decision of the lower court.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389
(2007). This Court freely reviews questions of law. Questions of relevancy are reviewed de
novo. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996). “Whether evidence is
relevant is an issue of law.” State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App.
1993). “The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its judgment will
only be reversed when there has been an abuse of that discretion.” Zichko, 129 Idaho at 264, 923
P.2d at 971. Thus, the inquiry is two-fold; we must first freely review and determine whether the
proffered evidence is relevant, and secondly we evaluate whether the district court abused its
discretion in determining whether the probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho at 819, 864 P.2d at 657.
ANALYSIS
The alternate perpetrator evidence that Meister attempted to admit at trial consists of
Lane Thomas‟ confessions and evidence which tends to suggest that Lane Thomas was the actual
perpetrator of the crime.3 Thomas‟ confessions and evidence which tends to implicate him in the
shooting of Tonya are governed by two standards under Idaho law. This Court must first
determine the standard for admission of alternate perpetrator evidence. Although Thomas‟
3
Meister submitted an offer of proof seeking to admit the following evidence: (1) an approximation of what time the
shooting occurred; (2) Thomas was familiar with and grew up near the road where the shooter exited the field;
(3)Thomas and Hart had previously been involved in an altercation; (4) Thomas and Linderman had previously been
involved in a drug sale which resulted in Linderman being robbed and assaulted; (5) Linderman made statements to
police after the shooting that Thomas was no longer allowed at the trailer he shared with Tonya due to their
adversarial relationship; (6) Thomas admitted to police that he had stolen a briefcase of marijuana which was found
on the road where the shooter exited the field; (7) Thomas generally meets the description of the male seen walking
on the road the night of the shooting; (8) Thomas went to his sister‟s house to sleep on her sofa the night of the
shooting and that she thought Thomas was lying and was involved in the shooting; (9) Thomas‟ wife told Thomas‟
sister and her husband that if they talked to police “they would be next;” (10) Thomas voluntarily submitted a
written statement to police that he had been on the road where the shooter exited the field on the night of the
shooting; (11) Thomas‟ criminal record; (12) Thomas‟ confession to a fellow inmate that he was involved in the
shooting; (13) Thomas‟ confession to a second inmate that he was involved in the shooting; (14) Thomas‟ twin
brother burned a bag of clothes in the weeks following the shooting; (15) Thomas‟ twin brother generally meets the
eyewitness description of the male seen walking on the road the night of the shooting; and (16) Thomas‟ twin
brother now resides at a psychiatric institution.

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confessions are included under the umbrella of alternate perpetrator evidence, the confessions
also constitute hearsay. Therefore, the confessions must then be analyzed for admission pursuant
to the hearsay rules. The State argues that all of the evidence in Meister‟s offer of proof is
inadmissible pursuant to various evidentiary rules. The State‟s motion in limine seeking
exclusion of all alternate perpetrator evidence was granted; therefore, Meister‟s counsel was
never afforded the opportunity to lay the foundation properly for any of the evidence. This Court
will refrain from acting as a fact-finder and makes no determination as to whether the evidence is
admissible.
The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). “This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law.” Id. The right to present a defense includes the right to offer
testimony of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to present the defendant‟s version of the
facts “to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.” Id. However, this right must be
balanced against any interest the state has in the criminal trial process; “the Sixth Amendment
„does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the
adversarial system.‟” State v. Albert, 138 Idaho 284, 287, 62 P.3d 208, 211 (Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1988)).
In the present case, Meister was not afforded the opportunity to provide a full and
complete defense for the crimes of which he was accused. The district court applied the wrong
standard for the admission of the alternate perpetrator evidence; therefore, this Court vacates
Meister‟s conviction and remands this case for a new trial.
I.R.E. 403 is the controlling authority for the admissibility of alternate perpetrator
evidence.
This Court addressed the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to present evidence of
an alternate perpetrator in Larsen, 91 Idaho 42, 415 P.2d 685. The Court held that a defendant
must produce a “train of facts or circumstances, as tend clearly to point out some one besides the
[defendant] as the guilty party.” Id. at 47-48, 415 P.2d at 690-91. It requires more than just
“conjectural inferences” that a party other than the defendant committed the crime. Id. at 48, 415
P.2d at 691. In 1985, the Idaho Rules of Evidence were adopted which established that all
relevant evidence is admissible, unless otherwise provided by the Idaho Rules of Evidence or

4
other rules for the courts of Idaho.4 I.R.E. 402. “These rules govern all actions, cases and
proceedings in the courts of the State of Idaho.” I.R.E. 101(b). This Court is presented with the
inquiry of whether alternate perpetrator evidence is subjected to a different standard for
admission than all other evidence; that is, whether Larsen or I.R.E. 403 governs the admission of
alternate perpetrator evidence. This Court finds that Larsen was implicitly overruled when the
Idaho Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1985.
The court of appeals addressed a similar issue in State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 67
P.3d 1283 (Ct. App. 2003). There the court stated that a review of excluded evidence requires an
inquiry as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence pursuant to
I.R.E. 403. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho at 675, 67 P.3d at 1287. However, the court ultimately
concluded that the evidence offered by the defendant was properly excluded because it “was of
negligible probative value, and . . . the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the
evidence pursuant to the „direct connection doctrine‟ and I.R.E. 403.” Id. at 676, 67 P.3d at
1288. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Kerchusky as standing for the proposition that “[I.R.E.]
403 thus embodies a concern, reflected in the cases from other states . . . and articulated by the
Idaho Supreme Court in [Larsen], that evidence of third party guilt should not be admitted unless
there is some evidence directly connecting the third party to the crime in question.” Gray v.
Klauser, 86 Fed. Appx. 279, 2004 WL 61243, at *4 (9th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion)
(emphasis added). But, the Ninth Circuit also stated that “Idaho courts do not apply a specialized
rule in [the admission of alternate perpetrator evidence], but deem third party evidence
inadmissible” if it does not meet the requirements of I.R.E. 403. Id. (emphasis added).5
Therefore, it remains unclear whether the court of appeals of this state applies Larsen, I.R.E.
403, or a combination thereof when reviewing the admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence.
As previously stated, this Court adopts an approach which holds that the Rules of
Evidence generally govern the admission of all evidence in the courts of this State. The Rules of
Evidence generally include all relevant evidence, whereas Larsen generally excluded alternate
perpetrator evidence regardless of relevance. The Rules of Evidence embody the balancing test
which safeguards a defendant‟s constitutional right to present a defense along with protection of
the state‟s interest in the integrity of the criminal trial process. For instance, I.R.E. 412 employs

4
It is noted that while the Rules of Evidence provide for the inclusion of all relevant evidence, Larsen dictated that
alternate perpetrator evidence, regardless of relevance, was generally excluded.
5
Both these statements interpret alternate perpetrator evidence as generally excluded.

5
a two-part test to evaluate whether a defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to a defense is violated
in light of I.R.E. 412.6 State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct. App. 2003).
“First, the trial court must consider whether the evidence proffered is relevant. If it is not
relevant, the defendant has no constitutional right to present it. If the evidence is relevant, the
trial court must ask whether other legitimate interests outweigh the defendant‟s interest in
presenting the evidence.” Id. Due to the highly sensitive nature of sex crimes in general, this
standard has been found to effectively balance the state‟s interest in protecting victims of sex
crimes from disclosing their past sexual behavior except in limited circumstances and the
defendant‟s interest in presenting a defense for the crimes of which s/he is accused.
The Rules of Evidence properly protect the trial court‟s discretion to limit relevant
evidence if the probative value is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” I.R.E. 403. The Rules effectively
address the concerns from Larsen. The Larsen Court was concerned that a defendant will
attempt to admit evidence where the sole purpose is to infer that an individual other than the
accused committed the crime. If the defendant proffers evidence which merely tends to mislead
the jury that another person committed the crime, or the evidence is not relevant because it does
not tend to make the defendant‟s involvement more probable or less probable, then it is within
the trial court‟s discretion to find the evidence inadmissible. Mere inferences that another person
could have committed the crime will most likely not be relevant, and if relevant will still be
subject to the limitation provisions of I.R.E. 403. “A defendant has no right to present irrelevant
evidence and even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded in certain cases.” Self, 139 Idaho
at 722, 85 P.3d at 1121. The Idaho Rules of Evidence effectively safeguard against the
admission of “conjectural inferences” without the lower courts needing to apply the Larsen
direct connection doctrine. This Court finds that Larsen was implicitly overruled by the
adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
In the present case, the court‟s ruling does not address whether the evidence is relevant
and admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 401, 402 or 403. Instead, the court ruled that any evidence

6
I.R.E. 412 applies to sex crimes and dictates the test for whether a victim‟s past sexual behavior is relevant and
whether that evidence should be admissible. That is, if the evidence is deemed relevant pursuant to I.R.E. 412(b), a
different standard than relevance pursuant to I.R.E. 401, then it will be admissible if “the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” I.R.E. 412(c)(3).

6
relating to Lane Thomas as an alternate perpetrator was inadmissible pursuant to this Court‟s
decision in Larsen. This finding was in error. The court refused the request of the defense to
call Lane Thomas as a witness and any witness which may impeach Lane Thomas‟ testimony, or
to present any evidence which would tend to show that a person other than Meister committed
the crime. By excluding all this evidence from being presented in any context throughout the
course of trial the district court prevented Meister from presenting potentially relevant facts that
may have developed throughout the course of the trial. Meister should be afforded the
opportunity to present his complete and full defense, which includes the presentation of all
relevant evidence in the context of trial pursuant to any limitations of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. The district court erred by applying the wrong standard for admissibility of alternate
perpetrator evidence, and therefore, abused its discretion. Therefore, this Court grants Meister a
new trial.
Lane Thomas’ confessions must meet the standards of I.R.E. 804(b)(3) in order to be
admissible.
Trial counsel and the district court applied this Court‟s standard in Larsen for a
determination of whether Thomas‟ confessions were admissible. The application of Larsen is
incorrect because it was implicitly overruled by this Court‟s adoption of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. Therefore, whether Thomas‟ confessions should have been admitted is dictated by
I.R.E. 401, 402, 403 and 804(b)(3).
Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay
is not admissible unless it falls under an exception in the Idaho Rules of Evidence or another rule
formulated by the Idaho Supreme Court. I.R.E. 802. A statement is not hearsay if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness and it is
[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant‟s
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject declarant to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by declarant against another, that a
reasonable man in declarant‟s position would not have made the statement unless
declarant believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

I.R.E. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added). These corroborating circumstances are necessary and must
“clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 16-17, 909

7
P.2d 624, 634-35 (Ct. App. 1995). Several confessions may act to corroborate each other.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973) (listing several factors that would provide
considerable assurance that hearsay statements are reliable, including “[t]he sheer number of
independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each.”)
The court of appeals dealt with the present issue in State v. Meister, 2007 WL 2821981
(Ct. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion) by adopting Arizona‟s standard in State v. LaGrand, 153
Ariz. 21, 28, 734, P.2d 563, 570 (Ariz. 1987). In LaGrand, the Arizona supreme court
established seven factors7 for determining the reliability and corroboration of a statement
subjected to the hearsay exception established in 804(b)(3). Id. at 27-28, 734 P.2d at 569-70.
The court ultimately held that “a judge‟s inquiry, made to assure himself [or herself] that the
corroboration requirement of Rule 804(b)(3) has been satisfied, should be limited to asking
whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant’s statement would
permit a reasonable person to believe that the statement could be true.” Id. at 28, 734 P.2d at
570 (emphasis added). This will protect the province of the jury as the fact-finder and prevent
the judge from “be[ing] able to bootstrap himself [or herself] into the jury box via evidentiary
rules.” Id. This Court adopts Arizona‟s standard and seven factor test for the corroboration
requirement pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3).
The offer of proof and the record contain two reports from people who heard Lane
Thomas confess to the Tonya Hart shooting. One is a police report taken from an inmate in
Spokane County.8 The other is a handwritten statement taken by the Latah County Sherriff‟s
Office along with the officer‟s notes.9 Additionally, Thomas made a third inculpatory statement

7
Those factors are: (1) whether the declarant is unavailable; (2) whether the statement is against the declarant‟s
interest; (3) whether corroborating circumstances exist which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the exculpatory
statement, taking into account contradictory evidence, the relationship between the declarant and the listener, and
the relationship between the declarant and the defendant; (4) whether the declarant has issued the statement multiple
times; (5) whether a significant amount of time has passed between the incident and the statement; (6) whether the
declarant will benefit from making the statement; and (7) whether the psychological and physical surroundings
could affect the statement. LaGrand, at 27-28, 734 P.2d at 569-70.
8
According to the statement Thomas disclosed the following information: (1) Thomas knew Tonya because he used
to buy drugs from Linderman at the Hart-Linderman trailer; (2) Thomas and another individual went to the trailer
the night of the shooting, knocked on the front door and then ran to the back door; (3) Thomas saw the other
individual shoot Tonya in the face and the chest; (4) the two then ran across a field and over a fence and drove away
in Thomas‟ car.
9
According to the officer‟s notes Thomas disclosed the following information: (1) Thomas frequently talked about
Tonya‟s shooting; (2) Thomas referred to himself as “framed by law enforcement;” (3) Thomas was continually
upset about being under suspicion for the shooting of Tonya; (4) around June 2002 Thomas‟ “tone had changed”
when he spoke about the shooting; (5) Thomas then began to brag about the information he had regarding the
shooting; (6) Thomas said that law enforcement would not be able to link him to the shooting; (7) Thomas laughed

8
after Meister‟s conviction which is contained in Meister‟s motion for a new trial. The first two
confessions were made by Thomas to fellow inmates at the Whitman County Jail. The
inculpatory statement was made as a threat to a woman who was owed money by Thomas. 10 All
three of the statements tend to implicate that Thomas was the person or one of the people
responsible for the shooting death of Tonya.
The district court ruled in limine that the defense would not be allowed to call Lane
Thomas to testify or be allowed to call the persons who heard the confessions potentially to
impeach any testimony provided by Lane Thomas. When defense counsel asked for the basis of
the court‟s ruling the court replied “I think I‟ve given it.” The court did not issue a written order
memorializing the basis of its decision. The only authority discussed during the motion hearing
was this Court‟s decision in Larsen. Although the district court applied the wrong standard to
determine whether the statements were admissible, the district court did make a finding that the
evidence presented in the offer of proof did not sufficiently corroborate the evidence. Therefore,
the district court correctly found that some corroboration is necessary in order for the statements
to be admissible. The governing standard of whether a third-party‟s statements tending to
inculpate the declarant and exculpate the accused is governed by I.R.E. 804(b)(3). Further, this
Court adopts Arizona‟s test for a trial court to determine whether the third-party confessions are
sufficiently corroborated in accordance with I.R.E. 804(b)(3); that test being, whether evidence
in the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant‟s statement would permit a reasonable
person to believe that the statement could be true. This test is desirable because it prevents the
trial judge from substituting himself or herself as the ultimate fact-finder. If the statements
clearly establish trustworthiness through corroborating evidence it is within the province of the
jury to weigh the testimony and determine where the truth lies. The district court applied the
wrong standard to determine whether Lane Thomas‟ confessions should be excluded.

when he received an “apology letter” from the Sheriff‟s office; (8) Thomas showed the inmate the letter; (9) Thomas
said “they‟ll never catch me;” (10) Thomas openly discussed his dislike for Linderman and Tonya; (11) Thomas had
been at the Hart-Linderman trailer the night of the shooting intending to steal drugs from Tonya because Thomas
had been “ripped off” by Linderman.
10
The police report contains the following information: (1) the woman “rudely” asked Thomas to repay his debt; (2)
Thomas approached her house one night when the girl was alone at home; (3) the girl picked up a baseball bat
before answering the door because she was afraid of Thomas; (4) Thomas threatened to burn down her house; (5)
Thomas said he had killed a woman and it would not be “hard” to kill again; (6) Thomas said that another individual
was in prison and serving time for the murder of the woman that Thomas killed; (7)Thomas then told her “that she
was one of the top three women he would rape.”

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 Whether the district court violated Meister’s right to due process, right of appeal,
and Fifth Amendment rights by threatening a harsher sentence if Meister refused to admit
guilt.
We decline to address this issue because Meister‟s sentence has been vacated and this
case is remanded for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this Court vacates Meister‟s conviction and sentence and
remands this case for a new trial.

Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.

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