State Ex Rel. Douglas v. DISTRICT COURT, ETC.

140. 12402 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA THE STATE OF MONTANA, on t h e r e l a t i o n of WILLIAM A . DOUGLAS, County A t t o r n e y o f L i n c o l n County, Petitioner, THE LIISTKICT COURT o f t h e ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n , and t h e HON. ROBERT S . KELLER, D i s t r i c t J u d g e , Respondents. ;IRLGTTJAL PROCEEDING : Counsel o f Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : W i l l i a m A . Douglas a r g u e d , County A t t o r n e y , Libby, Montana F o r Respondents: J o s e p h F. Daley a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana. Submitted : March 5, 1973 Decided : MAR 2 6 1973 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding i n which p e t i t i o n e r , William A . Douglas, county a t t o r n e y of Lincoln County, seeks va- c a t i o n of a d i s t r i c t c o u r t w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l i s s u e d t o t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t of Libby, Montana. T h i s m a t t e r commenced on December 9, 1972, when P a t r i c i a Hughes complained t o t h e j u s t i c e o f t h e peace of Libby, Montana, t h a t h e r daughter had been given i n t o x i c a t i n g beverages by one Allen Beito. Mrs. Hughes placed under oath by t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace, t o l d him h e r f i f t e e n y e a r o l d daughter had come home a t 5:00 a.m. intoxicated. That t h e i n t o x i c a t i n g beverages had been given t o h e r daughter by Allen B e i t o . Thereupon, t h e j u s t i c e drew up a complaint which M r s . Hughes signed. A warrant was i s s u e d f o r t h e a r r e s t of A l l e n B e i t o . B e i t o was taken i n t o custody, a r r a i g n e d , and following h i s p l e a of g u i l t y h e was sentenced t o 90 days i n t h e county j a i l . A f t e r sentence had been imposed, defendant gave n o t i c e of a p p e a l and a p p l i e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y control, A h e a r i n g was h e l d b e f o r e D i s t r i c t Judge Robert S. K e l l e r , and on December 28, t h e c o u r t ordered t h e judgment of t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t vacated. He a l s o s e t a s i d e both t h e complaint and t h e warrant of a r r e s t . The q u e s t i o n h e r e i s whether t h e r e was adequate probable cause t o f i l e a complaint and i s s u e a w a r r a n t of a r r e s t ; and t h u s whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n s e t t i n g them aside, I n t h e o r d e r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e complaint and quashing t h e a r r e s t w a r r a n t , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge s t a t e d t h e c a s e of S t a t e ex r e l . Wicks v. D i s t r i c t Court, Mon t . , 498 P,2d 1202, 1203,1204, 30 St.Rep, 506, was c o n t r o l l i n g . k review of t h a t c a s e l e a d s t h i s Court t o f i n d t h a t Wicks does n o t go a s f a r a s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found. I n Wicks, t h e f a c t s a r e much d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h o s e of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . There, t h e a l l e g e d o f f e n s e had taken p l a c e f o u r months b e f o r e t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y sought a warrant of a r r e s t . Here, t h e d i s t r a u g h t mother went promptly t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e w i t h h e r complaint. I n Wicks,neither t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y n o r t h e m a g i s t r a t e could remember whether a n examination under o a t h occurred p r i o r t o i s s u i n g t h e complaint. Here, t h e complaint was prepared by t h e m a g i s t r a t e d u r i n g a d e t a i l e d examination of t h e complainant under o a t h . In Wicks, t h i s Court s a i d : "The complaint of t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y , * ;k *d i s c l o s e s n o t h i n g more than the bald conclusion t h a t Wicks s o l d a q u a n t i t y of mari- huana t o Hunter on a c e r t a i n d a t e some f o u r months p r e v i o u s l y * *. I' I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e r e was conclusion made by t h e m a g i s t r a t e b a s e d ' upon a, f a c t u a l submission given by t h e complainant. The second c h a l l e n g e r a i s e d t o t h e complaint and a r r e s t w a r r a n t by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r , concerns t h e u s e o f h e a r s a y evidence a s a b a s i s f o r probable cause t o i s s u e a complaint. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t w a s u n w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e evidence of t h e mother of t h e v i c t i m , s i n c e t h e r e was no evidence given by t h e v i c t i m h e r s e l f , n o r anyone who was a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t . I n looking a t t h e q u e s t i o n of h e a r s a y and whether i t c a n b e used t o e s t a b l i s h t h e n e c e s s a r y probable c a u s e , we look t o United S t a t e s Supreme Court c a s e s which d e a l w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n . A g u i l a r v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S,Ct. 1509, 12 L ed 2d 7 2 3 , h e l d t h a t a n a f f i d a v i t may be based upon h e a r s a y and need n o t r e f l e c t t h e d i r e c t p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s of t h e a f f i a n t . That p a r t i c u l a r c a s e was d e a l i n g w i t h a s e a r c h w a r r a n t ; however, a s we s a i d i n Wicks: "The showing of 'probable c a u s e ' r e q u i r e d f o r i s s u a n c e o f a w a r r a n t of a r r e s t i s s i m i l a r and analogous t o t h e &owing of Iprobable c a u s e ' r e - q u i r e d f o r i s s u a n c e of a s e a r c h warrant." I t follows t h a t t h e r e a s o n i n g of A g u i l a r would be a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e i n s t a n t case. Hearsay can be used a s t h e b a s i s o f probable cause f o r a complaint a n d l o r a r r e s t w a r r a n t . This concept was further expanded by United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct, 741, 13 L ed 2d 684, which recognized that a finding of probable cause may be based upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial and the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to war- rants. Looking at the facts in the instant case, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this Court, we find there was probable cause to issue the warrant and the arrest was valid. Petitioner in his application for a writ of supervisory control prayed for relief in defining the latitude permissible in and the limitations upon the process of determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest. In his brief in support of his application for a writ of supervisory control, petitioner argues that a district court is without jurisdiction to exercise supervisory control of lower courts. That issue was not raised in the proceedings of this matter and was not part of the relief asked for by petitioner in his petition to this Court. Since the matter is a question of constitutional law concerning the power and jurisdiction of the district court, we follow our long established practice of not discussing constitutional questions, unless they are necessarily involved or necessary to the decision. National Surety Corp. v. Kruse, 121 Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317; Stenberg v. Stenberg, Mont . , 505 P,2d 110, 30 St.Rep.50. Accordingly, we will not discuss the constitutional question of the use of a writ of supervisory control by district courts over justice courts, In reviewing the district court's order, we find the judgment of the justice court was vacated and set aside. This action of the district court is supportable not on the basis of a writ of supervisory control, as argued by petitioner, but on the basis of appeal from the judgment, which defendant also filed. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r a l l o w s defendant a new t r i a l and a l s o allows defendant t o change h i s p l e a of g u i l t y t o n o t guilty, Such a c t i o n by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s analogous t o t h e power of t h i s Court, The s i t u a t i o n i s t h e same a s when a de- fendant would a p p e a l a c o n v i c t i o n t o t h i s Court, a f t e r having plead g u i l t y t o t h e charge. I n S t a t e v. McBane, 128 Mont. 369, 275 P.2d 218, t h i s Court ordered t h a t a judgment be s e t a s i d e and allowed t h e defendant t o change h i s p l e a from g u i l t y t o n o t guilty, Since t h a t power l i e s i n t h i s Court over t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i t would f o l l o w t h a t a s i m i l a r power would l i e w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s over j u s t i c e c o u r t s on appeal. The o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n s o f a r a s i t v a c a t e s t h e judgment of t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d ; however, t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e o r d e r which s e t s a s i d e t h e complaint and w a r r a n t of a r r e s t i s reversed. W i s s u e Supervisory Control and t h e cause i s remanded e t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r proceedings n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s opinion. Assochke J u s t i c e