140. 12402
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
THE STATE OF MONTANA, on t h e r e l a t i o n of
WILLIAM A . DOUGLAS, County A t t o r n e y o f
L i n c o l n County,
Petitioner,
THE LIISTKICT COURT o f t h e ELEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r
t h e County o f L i n c o l n , and t h e HON. ROBERT S .
KELLER, D i s t r i c t J u d g e ,
Respondents.
;IRLGTTJAL PROCEEDING :
Counsel o f Record:
For P e t i t i o n e r :
W i l l i a m A . Douglas a r g u e d , County A t t o r n e y , Libby,
Montana
F o r Respondents:
J o s e p h F. Daley a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana.
Submitted : March 5, 1973
Decided : MAR 2 6 1973
M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
T h i s i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding i n which p e t i t i o n e r ,
William A . Douglas, county a t t o r n e y of Lincoln County, seeks va-
c a t i o n of a d i s t r i c t c o u r t w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l i s s u e d
t o t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t of Libby, Montana.
T h i s m a t t e r commenced on December 9, 1972, when P a t r i c i a
Hughes complained t o t h e j u s t i c e o f t h e peace of Libby, Montana,
t h a t h e r daughter had been given i n t o x i c a t i n g beverages by one
Allen Beito. Mrs. Hughes placed under oath by t h e j u s t i c e of
t h e peace, t o l d him h e r f i f t e e n y e a r o l d daughter had come home
a t 5:00 a.m. intoxicated. That t h e i n t o x i c a t i n g beverages had
been given t o h e r daughter by Allen B e i t o . Thereupon, t h e
j u s t i c e drew up a complaint which M r s . Hughes signed. A warrant
was i s s u e d f o r t h e a r r e s t of A l l e n B e i t o . B e i t o was taken i n t o
custody, a r r a i g n e d , and following h i s p l e a of g u i l t y h e was
sentenced t o 90 days i n t h e county j a i l .
A f t e r sentence had been imposed, defendant gave n o t i c e of
a p p e a l and a p p l i e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y
control, A h e a r i n g was h e l d b e f o r e D i s t r i c t Judge Robert S.
K e l l e r , and on December 28, t h e c o u r t ordered t h e judgment of
t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t vacated. He a l s o s e t a s i d e both t h e complaint
and t h e warrant of a r r e s t .
The q u e s t i o n h e r e i s whether t h e r e was adequate probable
cause t o f i l e a complaint and i s s u e a w a r r a n t of a r r e s t ; and t h u s
whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n s e t t i n g them
aside,
I n t h e o r d e r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e complaint and quashing t h e
a r r e s t w a r r a n t , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge s t a t e d t h e c a s e of S t a t e
ex r e l . Wicks v. D i s t r i c t Court, Mon t . , 498 P,2d 1202,
1203,1204, 30 St.Rep, 506, was c o n t r o l l i n g . k review of t h a t
c a s e l e a d s t h i s Court t o f i n d t h a t Wicks does n o t go a s f a r a s
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found. I n Wicks, t h e f a c t s a r e much d i f f e r e n t
t h a n t h o s e of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . There, t h e a l l e g e d o f f e n s e had
taken p l a c e f o u r months b e f o r e t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y
sought a warrant of a r r e s t . Here, t h e d i s t r a u g h t mother went
promptly t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e w i t h h e r complaint. I n Wicks,neither
t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y n o r t h e m a g i s t r a t e could remember
whether a n examination under o a t h occurred p r i o r t o i s s u i n g t h e
complaint. Here, t h e complaint was prepared by t h e m a g i s t r a t e
d u r i n g a d e t a i l e d examination of t h e complainant under o a t h . In
Wicks, t h i s Court s a i d :
"The complaint of t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y ,
* ;k *d i s c l o s e s n o t h i n g more than the bald
conclusion t h a t Wicks s o l d a q u a n t i t y of mari-
huana t o Hunter on a c e r t a i n d a t e some f o u r
months p r e v i o u s l y * *.
I'
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e r e was conclusion made by t h e m a g i s t r a t e
b a s e d ' upon a, f a c t u a l submission given by t h e complainant.
The second c h a l l e n g e r a i s e d t o t h e complaint and a r r e s t
w a r r a n t by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r , concerns t h e u s e o f h e a r s a y
evidence a s a b a s i s f o r probable cause t o i s s u e a complaint.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t w a s u n w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e evidence of t h e
mother of t h e v i c t i m , s i n c e t h e r e was no evidence given by t h e
v i c t i m h e r s e l f , n o r anyone who was a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t .
I n looking a t t h e q u e s t i o n of h e a r s a y and whether i t c a n
b e used t o e s t a b l i s h t h e n e c e s s a r y probable c a u s e , we look t o
United S t a t e s Supreme Court c a s e s which d e a l w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n .
A g u i l a r v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S,Ct. 1509, 12 L ed 2d 7 2 3 ,
h e l d t h a t a n a f f i d a v i t may be based upon h e a r s a y and need n o t
r e f l e c t t h e d i r e c t p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s of t h e a f f i a n t . That
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e was d e a l i n g w i t h a s e a r c h w a r r a n t ; however, a s
we s a i d i n Wicks:
"The showing of 'probable c a u s e ' r e q u i r e d f o r
i s s u a n c e o f a w a r r a n t of a r r e s t i s s i m i l a r and
analogous t o t h e &owing of Iprobable c a u s e ' r e -
q u i r e d f o r i s s u a n c e of a s e a r c h warrant."
I t follows t h a t t h e r e a s o n i n g of A g u i l a r would be a p p l i c a b l e t o
t h e i n s t a n t case. Hearsay can be used a s t h e b a s i s o f probable
cause f o r a complaint a n d l o r a r r e s t w a r r a n t .
This concept was further expanded by United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct, 741, 13 L ed 2d 684, which
recognized that a finding of probable cause may be based upon
evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial and
the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should
be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to war-
rants.
Looking at the facts in the instant case, and the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court and this Court, we find there
was probable cause to issue the warrant and the arrest was valid.
Petitioner in his application for a writ of supervisory
control prayed for relief in defining the latitude permissible
in and the limitations upon the process of determining probable
cause for issuing a warrant of arrest. In his brief in support
of his application for a writ of supervisory control, petitioner
argues that a district court is without jurisdiction to exercise
supervisory control of lower courts. That issue was not raised
in the proceedings of this matter and was not part of the relief
asked for by petitioner in his petition to this Court. Since
the matter is a question of constitutional law concerning the
power and jurisdiction of the district court, we follow our long
established practice of not discussing constitutional questions,
unless they are necessarily involved or necessary to the decision.
National Surety Corp. v. Kruse, 121 Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317;
Stenberg v. Stenberg, Mont . , 505 P,2d 110, 30 St.Rep.50.
Accordingly, we will not discuss the constitutional question
of the use of a writ of supervisory control by district courts
over justice courts,
In reviewing the district court's order, we find the
judgment of the justice court was vacated and set aside. This
action of the district court is supportable not on the basis of
a writ of supervisory control, as argued by petitioner, but on
the basis of appeal from the judgment, which defendant also filed.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r a l l o w s defendant a new t r i a l
and a l s o allows defendant t o change h i s p l e a of g u i l t y t o n o t
guilty, Such a c t i o n by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s analogous t o t h e
power of t h i s Court, The s i t u a t i o n i s t h e same a s when a de-
fendant would a p p e a l a c o n v i c t i o n t o t h i s Court, a f t e r having
plead g u i l t y t o t h e charge. I n S t a t e v. McBane, 128 Mont. 369,
275 P.2d 218, t h i s Court ordered t h a t a judgment be s e t a s i d e
and allowed t h e defendant t o change h i s p l e a from g u i l t y t o n o t
guilty, Since t h a t power l i e s i n t h i s Court over t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t , i t would f o l l o w t h a t a s i m i l a r power would l i e w i t h t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t s over j u s t i c e c o u r t s on appeal.
The o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n s o f a r a s i t v a c a t e s t h e
judgment of t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d ; however, t h a t p o r t i o n
of t h e o r d e r which s e t s a s i d e t h e complaint and w a r r a n t of a r r e s t
i s reversed.
W i s s u e Supervisory Control and t h e cause i s remanded
e
t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r proceedings n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
t h i s opinion.
Assochke J u s t i c e