No. 12282
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
HRL H
AOD . LEITHEISER ,
Claimant and Respondent,
M N A A STATE PRISON,
OTN
Employer,
and
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable S i d G. S t e w a r t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Harris, Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana.
Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana.
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana.
For Respondent:
J a r d i n e , Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great F a l l s ,
Montana.
Jack L. Lewis argued, Great F a l l s , Montana.
Submitted: December 1, 1972
PER CURIAM:
I n t h i s c a u s e a motion t o d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l was f i l e d
by respondent on t h e ground t h a t a p p e l l a n t s f a i l e d t o p e r f e c t
t h e i r a p p e a l w i t h i n t h e time p e r m i t t e d by s t a t u t e .
The r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s : O February 3 , 1972, t h e d i s t r i c t
n
c o u r t of Powell County e n t e r e d judgment i n f a v o r of t h e c l a i m a n t
and r e s p o n d e n t , Harold H. L e i t h e i s e r , r e v e r s i n g an o r d e r denying
compensation t h e I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board. February 7 ,
1972, n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment was mailed t o c o u n s e l f o r de-
f e n d a n t s and a p p e l l a n t s , Montana S t a t e P r i s o n and t h e I n d u s t r i a l
Accident Board ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d a p p e l l a n t s ) . O February 7 ,
n
1972, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s
of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law. O February 8 , 1972, a p p e l l a n t s
n
mailed a motion f o r a new t r i a l t o t h e opposing a t t o r n e y s and t o
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , which motion was f i l e d on February 9 , 1972.
Under Rule 5 ( b ) , M. R.Civ.P., t h e s e r v i c e of t h e motion f o r a new
t r i a l was complete upon m a i l i n g . The motion f o r a new t r i a l d i d
n o t c o n t a i n a n o t i c e of h e a r i n g and no h e a r i n g was h e l d . March
2 , 1972, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c l e r k mailed a n o t i c e t o a p p e l l a n t s
t h a t t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l was denied. O A p r i l 20, 1972,
n
a p p e l l a n t s mailed n o t i c e of a p p e a l t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r f i l i n g .
This n o t i c e of a p p e a l was r e c e i v e d and f i l e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
c l e r k on A p r i l 21, 1972.
The b r i e f s of t h e l i t i g a n t s i n d i c a t e a c o n f l i c t i n t h e i r
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Montana Rules of A p p e l l a t e
C i v i l Procedure, W w i l l therefore discuss b r i e f l y the pertinent
e
code p r o v i s i o n s and precedent a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s c a s e .
Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., provides:
" ( a ) FILING THE N O T I C E O APPEAL, A a p p e a l
F n
s h a l l be t a k e n by f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l i n
che d i s t r i c t c o u r t . F a i l u r e of an a p p e l l a n t t o
t a k e any s t e p o t h e r than t h e t i m e l y f i l i n g of a
n o t i c e of a p p e a l does n o t a f f e c t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e
appeal-, b u t i s ground o n l y f o r such a c t i o n a s t h e
supreme c o u r t deems a p p r o p r i a t e , which may i n c l u d e
d i s m i s s a l of t h e a p p e a l . Ir
The f i n a l sentence of Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R..App.Civ.P., is
i d e n t i c a l t o a provision of Rule 3(a) of t h e Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. 9 ~ o o r e ' sFederal P r a c t i c e 5 203.10,
summarizes t h e a p p l i c a t i o n given t h i s provision. It s t a t e s
i n part:
h he n o t i c e of appeal i s f i l e d with t h e c l e r k
when i t i s received i n t o h i s custody and c o n t r o l .
Since timely f i l i n g of t h e n o t i c e i s held t o be
e s s e n t i a l t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t of
appeals, t h e p r e c i s e time t h a t t h e n o t i c e was
f i l e d can be of overwhelming importance."
9 ~ o o r e ' sFederal P r a c t i c e 5 204.02, s t a t e s i n p a r t :
"Discussion of t h e time f o r appeal must begin
by d i r e c t i n g a t t e n t i o n t o a h o s t of cases holding
with unanimity t h a t unless an appeal i s timely
taken t h e reviewing c o u r t l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o
hear i t . Although t h a t holding i s n o t a s l o g i c a l l y
compelling a s i t once was, t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r pro-
v i d i n g a p r e c i s e l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e p o i n t of time a t
which l i t i g a t i o n comes t o an end s t r o n g l y m i l i t a t e s
a g a i n s t i t s overthrow. A s t h e Committee Note ac-
companying Rule 3 admonishes:
" ' ~ u l e3 and Rule 4 combine t o r e q u i r e t h a t a
n o t i c e of appeal be f i l e d with t h e c l e r k of t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h i n the time prescribed f o r
t a k i n g an appeal. Because t h e timely f i l i n g of
a n o t i c e of appeal i s "mandatory and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l " ,
United S t a t e s v. Robinson, 361 U . S . 220,224 (1960),
compliance with t h e provisions of those r u l e s i s
of t h e utmost importance. t 11
This a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e f i l i n g r u l e has been followed
c o n s i s t e n t l y by t h i s Court. S t a t e v. Wibaux County Bank, 85 Mont.
Reid v. D i s t r i c t Court , Mnt
o .
693; McVay v. McVay, 128 Mont. 31, 270 P.2d 393; Jackson v. Tinker,
M nt
o . Y P.2d , 29 St.Rep. 1070.
W e therefore find i t i s well established i n t h i s s t a t e
t h a t f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e f i l i n g r u l e on appeal c r e a t e s a
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f e c t which t h i s Court w i l l ' a l t e r only on most
extenuating circumstances, which do n o t appear here. Appellants
h e r e , from t h e i r b r i e f , appear t o be i n agreement with our holdings
a s t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l n a t u r e of t h e a p p e l l a t e f i l i n g r e q u i r e -
ment. Their contention involves t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of Rule 5 , M.R.
App. Civ. P . , . i n l i g h t of Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M,R.Civ.P., i n arriving a t
a determination o f :
(1) H w many days d i d t h e a p p e l l a n t s have w i t h i n which
o
to file?
(2) When d i d t h i s time p e r i o d begin t o run and, conse-
q u e n t l y , when d i d i t e x p i r e ?
Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., i s e s s e n t i a l l y a reenactment of
former s e c t i o n 93-5606, R.C.M. 1947, w i t h a change from f i f t e e n
days t o t e n days i n t h e s e l f - e x e c u t i n g p r o v i s i o n f o r d e n i a l of
p o s t judgment motions. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , Rule 59(d) p r o v i d e s :
1I
I f t h e motion i s n o t n o t i c e d up f o r h e a r i n g and
no h e a r i n g i s h e l d t h e r e o n , i t s h a l l be deemed
denied a s of t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e p e r i o d of time
[ I 0 days] w i t h i n which h e a r i n g i s r e q u i r e d t o be
h e l d under t h i s Rule 59. "
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l was served
on February 8 , 1972. That motion d i d n o t c o n t a i n a n o t i c e of
h e a r i n g , and no h e a r i n g was h e l d . Under Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P.,
t h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l was a u t o m a t i c a l l y denied t e n days a f t e r
s e r v i c e on February 18, 1972. S t a t e ex r e l . Sinko v. D i s t r i c t
Court, 64 Mont. 181, 208 P. 952; S t a t e ex r e l . K i n g , v . . D i s t r i c t
Court, 107 Mont. 476, 86 P.2d 755; G i l r e a t h v. D i s t r i c t Court,
127 Mont. 431, 265 P.2d 651; Green v . D i s t r i c t Court, 126 Mont.
176, 246 P.2d 813. The f a c t t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c l e r k mailed
a l e t t e r d a t e d March 2, 1972, which s t a t e d :
"Pleased ( s i c ) be advised t h a t t h e Court on
t h i s d a t e denied t h e Motion f o r New T r i a l
f i l e d by you on February 9 , 1972."
i s of no l e g a l e f f e c t . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was without j u r i s -
d i c t i o n t o g r a n t - deny a motion f o r a new t r i a l on March 2,
or
1972. B o p e r a t i o n of t h e s e l f - e x e c u t i n g p r o v i s i o n of Rule 5 9 ( d ) ,
y
M.R.Civ.P., t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l was "deemed denied"
("deemedf1 i n t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n h a s been h e l d t o be synonymous w i t h
"consideredr', "determined", o r "adjudged") on Febuary 18, 1972.
The t i m e i n which n o t i c e of a p p e a l must be f i l e d w i t h t h e
J i s c r i c t c o u r t i s s e t f o r t h i n Rule 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P. When t h e
appealing p a r t y i s an agency of t h e s t a t e of Montana, a s a r e ap-
p e l l a n t s h e r e , s i x t y days from s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of e n t r y of judg-
ment a r e allowed i n which t o f i l e . This r u l e a l s o makes p r o v i s i o n
f o r suspension of t h e running of t h e s i x t y day f i l i n g time i n
t h e event of f i l i n g of v a r i o u s enumerated post judgment motions.
Concerning t h e suspension of f i l i n g time, Rule 5 , M,R.App.Civ.P.,
provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
1'
The running of t h e time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e
of appeal i s suspended a s t o a l l p a r t i e s by a
timely motion f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t c o u r t by
any p a r t y pursuant t o t h e Montana Rules of C i v i l
Procedure h e r e a f t e r enumerated i n t h i s sentence,
and t h e f u l l time f o r appeal fixed by t h i s r u l e
commences t o run and i s t o be computed from mailing
by t h e c l e r k of n o t i c e of t h e e n t r y of any of t h e
following o r d e r s made upon a timely motion under
such r u l e s : ** 9~ (4) denying a motion f o r a new
t r i a l under Rule 59.''
Under a p p e l l a n t s ' proposed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s r u l e
t h e i r s i x t y day a l l o t t e d period i n which t o f i l e an appeal was
suspended by t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l and did n o t commence
t o run again u n t i l March 3 , 1972, t h e day they received t h e
l e t t e r from t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , r a t h e r than on
February 19, 1972, t h e day a f t e r t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l
was deemed denied under t h e s e l f - e x e c u t i n g provision of Rule
59 (d) , M.R. Civ, P. Appellants' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s not: c o r r e c t .
~ ~ p e l l a n t misconstruction of Rule 5 , M,R.App.Civ. P.,
s'
apparently r e s u l t s from a f a i l u r e t o take i n t o account t h e
i n t e r a c t i n g and a p p l i c a b l e provisions of Rule 5 9 , M.R.Civ.P..
I'
The r e f e r e n c e i n Rule 5 , M.R.App,Civ.P., t o t h e time being com-
puted from mailing by t h e c l e r k of n o t i c e " a p p l i e s i n cases wherein
t h e c o u r t holds a hearing on a motion o r a c t s on a motion p r i o r
t o t h e t e n day s e l f - e x e c u t i n g d e n i a l provision of Rule 59(d),
M.R,Civ.P. However, once t h e s e l f - e x e c u t i n g d e n i a l of a motion
under Rule 59(d) becomes e f f e c t i v e , any subsequent order by t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t concerning t h a t motion i s o u t s i d e t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n and, consequently, n u l l , void, and without
effect.
A p p e l l a n t s f proposed c o n s t r u c t i o n of Rule 5 , M.R.App.Civ.
P . , would r e s u l t i n an untenable s i t u a t i o n wherein i t would be
p o s s i b l e f o r an unlimited extension of t h e time f o r appeal. Dis-
t r i c t c o u r t s would be placed i n t h e p o s i t i o n of being r e q u i r e d t o
i s s u e o r d e r s concerning motions over which they no l o n g e r had
j u r i s d i c t i o n and which were a l r e a d y denied. Judgments of t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t s would n o t become f i n a l and would be s u b j e c t t o
a p p e a l u n t i l s i x t y days a f t e r such t i m e , i f e v e r , t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t i s s u e d such a n u l l , v o i d , and e x t r a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l o r d e r .
This would be c o n t r a r y t o t h e e f f e c t and o p e r a t i o n of Rule 59,
M.R.Civ.P., and Rule 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P., and Montana p r e c e d e n t .
Accordingly, we h o l d a p p e l l a n t s f time f o r f i l i n g t h i s
a p p e a l commenced running a s of February 18, 1972, and e x p i r e d
s i x t y days t h e r e a f t e r , on A p r i l 1 8 , 1972. It i s r e g r e t t a b l e
t h a t t h i s Court must impose t h i s r u l e i n a c a s e i n v o l v i n g s o
narrow a time margin; however, an e x c e p t i o n f o r one would u l -
t i m a t e l y become an e x c e p t i o n f o r a l l , and an e x c e p t i o n of one day
would u l t i m a t e l y become a n e x c e p t i o n i n d e f i n i t e l y .
This a p p e a l was n o t t i m e l y taken and i s d i s m i s s e d .