No. 12069
I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA
OR F F
1972
BEVERLY J , OLSON,
P l a i n t i f f and Appellant a s t o
Defendant S h a e f e r Plumbing and Heating,
JAMES KAYSER and SHAEFER PLUMBING
AND HEATING,
Defendants, James Kayser t h e Appellant
a s t o P l a i n t i f f Beverly J. Olson.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana.
G. Page Wellcome argued, Bozeman, Montana.
Brown and G i l b e r t , Bozeman, Montana.
Gene I. Brown argued, Bozeman, Montana,
For Respondent:
Berg, ~ ' C o n n e l l , Angel and Andriolo, Bozeman, Montana,
Charles I?. Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana.
Submitted: September 18, 1972
Decided : JAN 1 81 -
9n
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
This i s an appeal from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e f i f t h
j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Madison. P l a i n t i f f , Beverly J.
Olson ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d p l a i n t i f f ) brought s u i t a g a i n s t
defendants James Kayser ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d Kayser) t h e property
owner, and Shaef er Plumbing and Heating ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d
Shaefer) t h e c o n t r a c t o r . P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e d she was i n j u r e d i n
a f a l l on August 29, 1969, occasioned by stepping i n t o a h o l e
which appeared on Kayser's property a s t h e r e s u l t of e i t h e r
n e g l i g e n t excavation, c o n s t r u c t i o n o r maintenance of a d i t c h ,
o r t h e n e g l i g e n t b a c k f i l l i n g and compaction of t h e s o i l i n
t h e d i t c h , which allowed t h e h o l e t o appear a s s o i l s e t t l e d
i n the ditch.
The c a s e was t r i e d t o a j u r y and a t t h e c l o s e of a l l t h e
evidence t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t i n favor of Shaefer
on February 4 , 1971. T h e r e a f t e r , t h e c a s e was submitted t o t h e
j u r y on t h e question of t h e l i a b i l i t y of t h e property owner
Kayser, and on t h e same day t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t a g a i n s t
t h e p l a i n t i f f and i n favor of Kayser.
Upon motion of p l a i n t i f f , t h e t r i a l c o u r t on March 1, 1971,
entered an order g r a n t i n g p l a i n t i f f a new t r i a l a s t o Kayser,
b u t denied p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer.
Kayser appeals from t h e c o u r t ' s order g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l t o
plaintiff. P l a i n t i f f appeals t h e c o u r t ' s order denying p l a i n -
t i f f ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer.
Kayser purchased t h e property i n question on A p r i l 1, 1969,
The property i s l o c a t e d i n Ennis, Montana, and c o n s i s t s of two
b u i l d i n g s with f o u r u n i t s , two of which were occupied by r e n t e r s ,
One of t h e r e n t e r s a t t h e time Kayser bought t h e property was
Deborah Herman, daughter of p l a i n t i f f .
Due t o s e p t i c tanks which would n o t d r a i n and water con-
tamination, Kayser decided t o have t h e u n i t s connected with t h e
c i t y water and sewer. The plumbing work was c o n t r a c t e d t o
Shaefer, The work r e q u i r e d a trench be dug from t h e b u i l d i n g s ,
through a driveway and parking a r e a , t o t h e c i t y s t r e e t t o
connect t h e c i t y s e r v i c e s . After t h e pipes were i n s t a l l e d , t h e
trench was r e f i l l e d and tamped i n t h e a r e a where p l a i n t i f f claims
t o have f a l l e n .
The agreement between Kayser and Shaefer was described
a s a c o s t p l u s job o r on a time and m a t e r i a l b a s i s . Shaefer
s t a r t e d t o work on t h e p r o j e c t around J u l y 1, 1969, and completed
i t on J u l y 9 , 1969, a f t e r which Shaefer moved h i s equipment and
men o f f t h e premises. On t h e d a t e of completion t h e f r o n t p a r t
o f t h e property, which was a parking a r e a adjacent t o t h e s t r e e t ,
was f i l l e d i n and made l e v e l . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e expected normal
f i l l settlement i n t h e d i t c h , Kayser wanted t o r a i s e t h e parking
a r e a with g r a v e l , due t o t h e mud condition t h a t followed r a i n y
periods caused by t h e parking area being lower than t h e s t r e e t .
Kayser f i r s t attempted t o o b t a i n g r a v e l f o r h i s premises
sometime around August 1, 1969, by c o n t a c t i n g Shaefer again b u t
was n o t i f i e d by Shaefer t h a t i t could n o t do t h e job because i t
d i d not have t h e equipment nor a g r a v e l p i t , T h e r e a f t e r , Kayser
contacted a Steve Hubner who owned a g r a v e l p i t and asked him
i f he could b r i n g i n t h e gravel. Hubner agreed t o b r i n g i n t h e
g r a v e l and spread i t i n t h e parking a r e a and by subsequent
c o n t a c t s with Shaefer, Shaefer was t o h e l p spread t h e g r a v e l t o
f i l l o t h e r h o l e s on t h e property. However, before t h e g r a v e l was
brought t o t h e property, p l a i n t i f f f e l l and sustained t h e i n j u r i e s
which a r e t h e b a s i s of t h i s a c t i o n .
On t h e n i g h t of August 29, 1969, approximately two days be-
f o r e t h e g r a v e l was spread on t h e property, p l a i n t i f f while going
t o v i s i t h e r daughter, Deborah Herman, stepped i n a h o l e i n t h e
driveway, pitched forward, and s t r u c k h e r f a c e on t h e edge of a
cement sidewalk. The a r e a of t h e f a l l was u n l i g h t e d , except f o r
a c i t y s t r e e t l i g h t which was obstructed by a l a r g e t r e e i n f u l l
summer f o l i a g e .
Varying d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e h o l e a r e found i n t h e testimony.
P l a i n t i f f described t h e h o l e a s being t h e depth of t h e length
of h e r l e g , o r a t l e a s t p a s t h e r knee, and somewhat l a r g e r than
t h e diameter of h e r l e g . Kayser t e s t i f i e d he was on t h e property
a week before t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e r e was no such hole. Steve
Hubner, who d e l i v e r e d g r a v e l t o t h e premises two days a f t e r t h e
f a l l , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he'*not see any such hole. Marilyn Olson,
another daughter of p l a i n t i f f , t e s t i f i e d she observed a h o l e
approximately eighteen inches deep i n t h e a r e a . The Ennis
n i g h t marshal1 Fred Rankin, who i n v e s t i g a t e d the a r e a a f t e r t h e
a c c i d e n t , t e s t i f i e d t o seeing a h o l e and described i t a s being
e i g h t and possibly t e n inches deep.
From a l l i n d i c a t i o n s , t h e h o l e appeared from t h r e e t o four
days o r possibly a week b e f o r e p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l . Fred Rankin
t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e apparent cause of t h e hole. He s t a t e d t h e r e
was a period of heavy r a i n s e v e r a l days before p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l ,
and i t was h i s opinion t h e hole was caused by t h e r a i n . His
explanation i s n o t i n c o n f l i c t with Kayser's testimony--that
he was l a s t on t h e property a week before t h e accident and a t
t h a t time t h e r e was no hole. Additionally, an kin's explanation
i s given f u r t h e r credence by t h e testimony of Marilyn Olson,
who was l i v i n g with h e r s i s t e r Deborah a t t h e time, and who d i d
observe t h e hole b u t t e s t i f i e d t h a t two weeks p r i o r t o t h e
accident t h e r e was no hole.
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s order g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Kayser
stated:
"The motion of t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r a new t r i a l a s t o
t h e defendant James Kayser i s granted.
"The b a s i s f o r g r a n t i n g t h i s motion i n t h e opinion
of t h e Court i s t h a t :
"1. The evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y
the v e r d i c t .
If
"2. The v e r d i c t i s a g a i n s t t h e law of t h e case.
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s order denying p l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r
a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer s t a t e d :
"The motion of t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r a new t r i a l i s
denied a s t o t h e defendant Shaefer Plumbing and
Heating .
"The reasons f o r t h e r u l i n g a r e a s follows:
"On J u l y 9 , 1969, defendant Shaefer Plumbing and
Heating Company had completed t h e work f o r M r .
Kayser and on t h a t day removed h i s men, m a t e r i a l s
and equipment from t h e job. Said defendant had
r e f i l l e d t h e trench h e had dug completely from t h e
f r o n t l i n e of t h e property of Mr. Kayser back t o
t h e second s e p t i c tank using a l l t h e m a t e r i a l s
excavated from t h e trench i n doing so. The f r o n t
p o r t i o n of t h e trench where t h e a c c i d e n t occurred was
by him completely f i l l e d and compacted. Both Mr.
Kayser and M r . Shaefer r e a l i z e d t h e trench ground
'would s e t t l e , 1
"Mr. Kayser accepted the Shaefer Plumbing and
Heating Company work completed on J u l y 9, 1969,
and upon p r e s e n t a t i o n of a b i l l paid him f o r
h i s work, machine use and m a t e r i a l s .
"~ifty days l a t e r t h e accident t o t h e p l a i n t i f f
occurred on August 28, 1969, There i s no evidence
t h a t Shaefer Plumbing and Heating incurred any
l i a b i l i t y between J u l y 9 , 1969, and August 28, 1969,
t h e d a t e of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s a c c i d e n t . There was
t h e r e f o r e no i s s u e f o r t h e jury. Moreover t h e r e
was no c o n f l i c t i n g evidence and t h e r e was b u t one
conclusion t o be drawn from t h e evidence. 11
I n t h e f i r s t appeal, p l a i n t i f f seeking a new t r i a l a g a i n s t
Shaefer, t h e law on t h e s u b j e c t of c o n t r o l of premises was
s t a t e d by t h i s Court i n Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 354,
12 P.2d 856, and most r e c e n t l y reaffirmed i n Hannifin v. C a h i l l -
Mooney Construction Co., M nt
o . 9 - P. 2d , 29 S t .
Rep. 493, 496.
I n Ulmen, p l a i n t i f f drove an automobile i n t o an open
excavation and a g a i n s t a concrete c u l v e r t , which p l a i n t i f f supposed
was a r e g u l a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d and used highway. There were two
defendantq the g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r and a subcontractor f o r t h e
c o n c r e t e work. A t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t t h e concrete work
was complete, b u t had not been accepted by t h e g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r
o r t h e s t a t e highway commission. A judgment of $10,000 was
entered a g a i n s t both defendants and they appealed. This Court
i n affirming a s t o the general contractor, but reversing a s t o
t h e subcontractor, Roscoe, held:
"It i s a l s o unimportant t h a t Roscoe's work had n o t
been 'accepted'. I t was completed and he had with-
drawn a l l c o n t r o l over i t , so t h a t i t was a t t h e
time of t h e a c c i d e n t but an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e
unfinished highway, no p a r t of which would be
accepted u n t i l ~ c h w i e g e r ' s [general c o n t r a c t o r ]
e n t i r e c o n t r a c t had been f u l l y executed.
"'The general r u l e i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t an
independent c o n t r a c t o r i s n o t l i a b l e f o r i n j u r i e s
t o t h i r d persons, occurring a f t e r t h e c o n t r a c t o r
has completed t h e work and turned i t over t o t h e
owner o r employer and t h e same has been accepted
by him *** the l a t t e r i s substituted a s the
responsible p a r t y . The reason f o r t h e s u b s t i t u -
t i o n of l i a b i l i t y i s found i n t h e g e n e r a l d o c t r i n e
t h a t an a c t i o n f o r negligence w i l l n o t l i e u n l e s s
t h e defendant was under some duty t o t h e i n j u r e d
p a r t y a t t h e t i m e and place where t h e i n j u r y oc-
curred which he omitted t o perform.' (14 R.C.L.
107)".
Ulmen contains an i n depth discussion with c i t a t i o n s i n
support of t h e holding which was r e i t e r a t e d verbatim i n
Hannifin, decided by t h i s Court June 30, 1972.
I n Hannifin, t h e defendant, Cahill-Mooney Construction
Company, was given a c o n t r a c t by t h e S t a u f f e r Chemical Company
t o remove c e r t a i n equipment from a b u i l d i n g a t i t s p l a n t n e a r
Butte, Montana. Following termination of t h e work and approxi-
mately two months following C a h i l l - ~ o o n e y ' s departure from t h e
premises, p l a i n t i f f Hannifin, an employee of S t a u f f e r Chemical
Company, f e l l through a h o l e i n f l o o r i n g which had been c r e a t e d
a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e removal of equipment. This Court h e l d ,
c i t i n g Ulmen, t h a t t h e duty t o p r o t e c t t h i r d persons a t t a c h e s
t o independent c o n t r a c t o r s "only when he has such c o n t r o l over
II
the property a s t h e master o r c o n t r a c t e e would otherwise have.
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s order of March 1,
1971, made t h e c l e a r observation t h a t t h e accident occurred
f i f t y days a f t e r defendant Shaefer surrendered c a r e of t h e
premises t o Kayser. Shaefer incurred no l i a b i l i t y following i t s
d e p a r t u r e from t h e premises and t h e r e was no i s s u e f o r t h e jury.
Accordingly, t h e t r i a l c o u r t properly denied p l a i n t i f f ' s motion
f o r a new t r i a l a g a i n s t Shaefer.
The c o u r t ' s order g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l a s t o defendant
Kayser i s very b r i e f and a s s i g n s two grounds:
"1. The evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e
verdict .
"2. The v e r d i c t i s a g a i n s t t h e law of t h e case. I I
A f t e r b r i e f s and argument, i t can only be concluded t h a t
the t r i a l c o u r t considered i t s e l f i n e r r o r when i t i n s t r u c t e d t h e
jury a s t o t h e duty t h e defendant landowner owed t h e p l a i n t i f f .
There were four r e n t a l u n i t s and one driveway and parking a r e a
f o r t h e use of t h e t e n a n t s . The f a c t t h a t only two t e n a n t s were
i n r e s i d e n c e , and one d i d n o t use t h e f a c i l i t y a v a i l a b l e t o
t h e t e n a n t s , does not a l t e r t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t t h e r e was a common
a r e a f o r t h e use of t h e t e n a n t s . The a l l e g e d i n j u r y occurred
i n t h i s a r e a and t h e arguments concerning t h e l a c k of proof of
common usage o r t h a t p e d e s t r i a n t r a v e l was allowed i n t h e a r e a
does n o t r e s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n , a s t h e r e was likewise no proof
t o t h e contrary.
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14 properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n regard
t o an i n v i t e e without using t h e term i t s e l f :
11
A owner who l e a s e s o r r e n t s a p o r t i o n of h i s
n
property and r e t a i n s c o n t r o l of another p a r t
which a tenant i s e n t i t l e d t o use i n connection
with t h e p o r t i o n leased o r rented t o him, i s
s u b j e c t t o l i a b i l i t y t o o t h e r s lawfully on t h e
premises with t h e consent of t h e t e n a n t f o r i n -
j u r i e s caused by a dangerous c o n d i t i o n e x i s t i n g
on t h e p a r t of t h e premises under t h e owner's
c o n t r o l i f , by t h e e x e r c i s e of reasonable c a r e ,
h e could have discovered t h e condition and made
it safe.
"An owner i s not l i a b l e t o o t h e r s lawfully on t h e
premises with t h e consent of t h e t e n a n t f o r i n -
j u r i e s r e s u l t i n g from a condition of t h e premises
t h e danger of which i s known t o t h e person lawfully
on t h e premises o r i s obvious, u n l e s s t h e owner
should a n t i c i p a t e t h e harm d e s p i t e such knowledge
o r obvious danger. 11
See Lake v. Emigh, 121 Mont. 87, 190 P.2d 550; Callahan v.
Buttrey, 186 F.Supp. 715 (D.C.Mont. 1960).
I n s t r u c t i o n s No. 26 and No. 27 were i n e r r o r :
"INSTRUCTION NO. 26. One of t h e i s s u e s t o be d e t e r -
mined by you i n t h i s c a s e i s t h e duty of c a r e owed
t o P l a i n t i f f a t t h e time and p l a c e t h e accident oc-
curred. Determination of t h i s i s s u e depends upon
whether p l a i n t i f f was a l i c e n s e e o r an i n v i t e e .
II
A l i c e n s e e i s a person who, f o r h i s own p l e a s u r e ,
convenience, o r b e n e f i t , e n t e r s o r remains upon
premises i n t h e possession of another with express
o r implied permission of t h e possessor.
If
A i n v i t e e i s a person who e n t e r s upon land i n
n
t h e possession of another a t t h e i n v i t a t i o n of
t h e possessor o r f o r t h e common i n t e r e s t o r
mutual advantage of both t h e possessor and t h e
person e n t e r i n g . I t
"INSTRUCTION NO, 27. If you f i n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f
was a l i c e n s e e , then I i n s t r u c t you t h a t t h e only
duty owed t o h e r was t o r e f r a i n from w i l l f u l o r
wanton a c t s of misconduct, o r a c t i v e negligence
a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from passive negligence, o r t o
warn p l a i n t i f f of any hidden o r concealed dangers,
i f any.
If
I f you f i n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was an i n v i t e e , then
t h e duty owed t o h e r was t h a t of ordinary c a r e . 11
Duty i s a l e g a l question t o be determined by t h e t r i a l
c o u r t and submitted t o t h e j u r y , under proper i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
I f t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t i n t h e f a c t s t h a t would change o r a l t e r
t h e duty owed t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , depending on which f a c t s t h e
j u r y a c c e p t s , then t h e c o u r t must i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y i n t h e
a l t e r n a t i v e t o make a f a c t determination and then apply t h e
c o r r e c t duty o r standard furnished by t h e c o u r t . That was n o t
done i n t h i s case,
W do n o t r e j e c t defendant Kayser's argument based on
e
B e r t h e l o t e v. Loy O i l Co,, 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187, however,
t h e e r r o r h e r e does a f f e c t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e moving
party. Tigh v. College Park Realty Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d
The determination by t h e t r i a l c o u r t on a motion f o r a
new t r i a l involves t h e e x e r c i s e of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n and may
n o t be d i s t u r b e d on review, unless i t i s c l e a r l y shown t h a t
t h e t r i a l c o u r t manifestly abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . This has
n o t been shown h e r e .
Accordingly, t h e o r d e r s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t appealed from
a r e affirmed.
/ Associate J u s t i c e 4
................................
Associate Justices.