No. 12746
I N THE S P E E COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
URM F F OTN
1974
BERNARD JAMES FITZPATRICK ,
Petitioner,
ROGER W. CRIST, WARDEN MONTANA STATE PRISON,
Respondent.
Counsel of Record:
For P e t i t i o n e r :
David J. Patterson, argued, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
Thomas A. Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General,
argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted : November 12, 1974
M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e
Court.
T h i s i s a n o r i g i n a l proceeding i n t h i s Court.
On A p r i l 15, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r Bernard F i t z p a t r i c k and on
A p r i l 1 7 , 1972, one Gus Gardner were a r r e s t e d f o r t h e murder
o f a f e l l o w inmate a t t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n i n Deer Lodge,
Montana. During t h e t r i a l on February 28, 1973, Gardner was
granted a directed v e r d i c t of not g u i l t y , but p e t i t i o n e r w a s
convicted of second degree murder and sentenced t o a term o f
twenty y e a r s , t o be served c o n s e c u t i v e l y w i t h t h e f i v e y e a r term
he w a s s e r v i n g a t t h e time of h i s a r r e s t . Petitioner unsuccessfully
challenged c e r t a i n e v i d e n t i a r y m a t t e r s upon a p p e a l t o t h i s Court,
which a f f i r m e d h i s c o n v i c t i o n on December 4 , 1973. S t a t e v.
Fitzpatrick, Mont . , 516 P.2d 605, 30 St.Rep. 1052.
On A p r i l 22, 1974, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d pro se a " P e t i t i o n f o r
W r i t of Habeas corpus" w i t h t h i s Court. Among o t h e r t h i n g s , he
a l l e g e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r e j u d i c e d h i s r i g h t s by f a i l i n g t o
make t i m e l y appointment of counsel; t o a r r a i g n him i n t h e manner
r e q u i r e d by law; o r t o g r a n t him a speedy ttial as demanded.
On t h e same day t h i s Court i s s u e d ail o r d e r r e f e r r i n g t h e
p e t i t i o n t o t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t i n o r d e r t h a t i t a s c e r t a i n
t h e v a l i d i t y o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s a l l e g a t i o n s and t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e
action. The Montana Defender P r o j e c t i s a c l i n i c a l l e g a l a i d
program supervised by t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Montana Law School and
s t a f f e d by s e n i o r law s t u d e n t s . P r o f e s s o r David J. P a t t e r s o n and
s t u d e n t Ken Green s p e n t s e v e r a l months i n v e s t i g a t i n g p e t i t i o n e r ' s
c l a i m s and from p r i s o n r e c o r d s , l e t t e r s , and t h e l i k e , were
a b l e t o c o n s t r u c t a f a c t u a l framework s a t i s f a c t o r y t o t h i s Court
f o r t h e purpose of a c t i n g upon t h e p e t i t i o n . F i n a l l y , i t was
agreed among a l l concerned t h a t i n o r d e r t o e x p e d i t e matters t h i s
proceeding would be considered a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g , (See
Chapter 26, T i t l e 95, R.C.M. 1947, S e c t i o n s 95-2601-2608), rather
t h a n an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r habeas corpus under t h e Montana Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The b r i e f s w i t h a t t a c h e d e x h i b i t s submitted i n p e t i t i o n e r ' s
lehalf by t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t b r i n g t o l i g h t t h e s e events:
A f t e r h i s " a r r e s t " on A p r i l 15, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r w a s taken t o a
s e g r e g a t i o n c e l l w i t h i n t h e main w a l l s of t h e p r i s o n . Three days
l a t e r a complaint c h a r g i n g murder was i s s u e d and an i n i t i a l h e a r i n g
was h e l d i n t h e deputy warden's o f f i c e . P e t i t i o n e r and Gardner
were informed of t h e i r r i g h t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e r i g h t t o appointed
counsel. P e t i t i o n e r r e q u e s t e d appointed counsel a t t h a t t i m e .
On A p r i l 26, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r was t r a n s f e r r e d from h i s s e g r e -
g a t i o n c e l l t o a maximum s e c u r i t y c e l l (one used f o r d i s c i p l i n a r y
purposes) where he s t a y e d u n t i l J u l y 19, 1972.
On May 4 , 1972, p e t i t i o n e r s e n t a l e t t e r t o t h e Honorable Sid
S t e w a r t , t h e n d i s t r i c t judge of t h e t h i r d j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , r e -
q u e s t i n g a c o u r t appointed a t t o r n e y . While a w a i t i n g word on t h i s
r e q u e s t , p e t i t i o n e r had h i s w i f e c o n t a c t t h e l a w f i r m of S a n d a l l ,
Moses 6 Cavan of B i l l i n g s , Montana, about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e -
p r e s e n t i n g him and Gardner. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , D. Frank Kampfe,
Esq., of t h a t f i r m , made an appointment t o v i s i t p e t i t i o n e r t o
d i s c u s s t h e c a s e and make f e e arrangements.
On May 1 8 , 1972, William Taylor, Esq., o f Deer Lodge v i s i t e d
p e t i t i o n e r a t the prison. Apparently Taylor was s e n t by Judge
Stewart i n response t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s l e t t e r of May 4. After dis-
c u s s i n g t h e c a s e w i t h p e t i t i o n e r , Taylor a d v i s e d p e t i t i o n e r he
would n o t r e p r e s e n t him.
Kampfe v i s i t e d p e t i t i o n e r and Gardner a t t h e p r i s o n on May 30,
1972. Gardner paid Kampfe $800 a s a r e t a i n e r and informed him t h a t
he (Gardner) might be a b l e t o r a i s e t h e money needed t o r e p r e s e n t
b o t h defendants. P e t i t i o n e r claimed an i n a b i l i t y t o pay anything.
On J u l y 5 , 1972, Kampfe withdrew from t h e c a s e because of a
c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t w i t h i n h i s law firm. He r e t u r n e d $700 t o
Gardner, keeping t h e o t h e r $100 f o r t i m e and expenses i n c u r r e d i n
making t h e v i s i t t o t h e p r i s o n . Kampfe a l s o advised t h e Montana
Defender P r o j e c t of t h e c a s e and asked t h a t defendants b e c o n t a c t e d
a s soon a s p o s s i b l e .
On July 12, 1972, t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t n o t i f i e d pep
titioner t h a t t h e Defender P r o j e c t d i d n o t r e p r e s e n t anyone a t
the trial level. P r o f e s s o r P a t t e r s o n , however, o f f e r e d t o keep
p e t i t i o n e r a d v i s e d of t h e proceedings a g a i n s t him and informed
him of h i s r i g h t t o c o u r t appointed counsel.
On J u l y 1 5 , 1972, t h r e e months a f t e r h i s a r r e s t , p e t i t i o n e r
was s t i l l i n maximum s e c u r i t y and without t h e a i d of counsel.
On t h i s d a t e , i n a l e t t e r t o t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t , p e t i -
t i o n e r expressed h i s disappointment w i t h t h e p r o j e c t ' s i n a b i l i t y
t o r e p r e s e n t him and mentioned h i s d i f f i c u l i t i e s i n g e t t i n g l e g a l
a s s i s t a n c e ; h i s confinement i n maximum s e c u r i t y s i n c e A p r i l ; and,
h i s ignorance of t h e s i t u a t i o n . He c l o s e d w i t h a p l e a t o have
1I
someone from t h e ~ e f e n d e r ' sP r o j e c t come down and t a l k t o u s and
II
l e t u s know j u s t what i s going on.
On J u l y 25, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r s e n t t h e s e papers t o t h e d i s t r i c t
court :
I. A motion t o f i l e and proceed i n forma p a u p e r i s ;
2. A motion f o r appointment of c o u n s e l ;
3. A demand f o r s p e e e t r i a l ; and
4. A motion t o d i s m i s s .
A l l of t h e s e papers were r e c e i v e d and f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
on J u l y 27, 1972.
On August 22, 1972, over f o u r months (126 days) a f t e r t h e
i n i t i a l appearance, p e t i t i o n e r ' s p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g began. Peti-
t i o n e r t e s t i f i e d h e w a s i n d i g e n t and r e q u e s t e d appointed counsel.
The h e a r i n g t h e r e f o r e w a s continued f o r a week t o a l l o w appointment
o f counsel. The s t a t e , however, d i d t a k e d e p o s i t i o n s of f o u r major
witnesses then present.
On August 24, 1972, Judge Stewart appointed James J. Masar, Esq.,
o f Deer Lodge t o r e p r e s e n t p e t i t i o n e r . From t h e i n i t i a l h e a r i n g ,
where p e t i t i o n e r f i r s t r e q u e s t e d appointment of c o u n s e l , t o t h e
a c t u a l appointment t h e r e was a d e l a y of over f o u r months (128 d a y s ) .
On August 28, 1972, t h e p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g was completed. The
o r d e r b i n d i n g p e t i t i o n e r and Gardner over t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r
t r i a l was issued on October 4 , 1972, and t h e Information a g a i n s t
them was f i l e d on October 12, 1972.
The t r i a l of both defendants began on February 26, 1973,
and l a s t e d two days. From t h e d a t e of t h e demand f o r speedy t r i a l
t o t h e d a t e of t h e t r i a l over seven months (216 days) had elapsed.
I n l i g h t of t h e above f a c t s , p e t i t i o n e r contends:
1. The f o u r month delay between t h e i n i t i a l hearing and t h e
preliminary hearing v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n 95-902, R.C.M. 1947.
2. The four month delay i n t h e appointment of counsel de-
prived p e t i t i o n e r of h i s r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e counsel.
3. The seven month delay between t h e demand f o r speedy t r i a l
and t h e t r i a l deprived p e t i t i o n e r of h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l .
A t t h e o u t s e t i t should be observed t h a t we a r e proceeding
on t h e assumption p e t i t i o n e r has n o t waived these i s s u e s , d e s p i t e
h i s f a i l u r e t o r a i s e them e a r l i e r . W do n o t r e j e c t t h e general
e
proposition t h a t such questions should be interposed a s promptly
a s p o s s i b l e , but only say t h a t t h e unusual f a c t s of t h i s c a s e make
a c l e a r c u t determination of waiver d i f f i c u l t . Unless t h e r e i s
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence of waiver, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims must be heard
on t h e i r m e r i t s .
The b a s i c r i g h t t o counsel i s f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e United
S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e Montana Code of Criminal
Procedure. The narrow i s s u e here i n when t h i s r i g h t a t t a c h e s
and whether a four month delay i n t h e appointment of counsel, while
t h e defendant i s confined i n maximum s e c u r i t y , renders counsel i n -
effective. W e a r e convinced t h a t under both f e d e r a l and Montana
law p e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t t o appointed counsel attached no l a t e r than
h i s i n i t i a l hearing; t h a t p e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t waive h i s r i g h t t o
appointed counsel; and t h a t t h e delay i n t h e appointment o f counsel
was p r e j u d i c i a l t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s case.
Our law provides t h a t any a r r e s t e d person must be brought without
unnecessary delay before a judge f o r an i n i t i a l appearance, and
t h a t i t i s t h e duty of t h a t judge t o advise defendant of h i s r i g h t
t o counsel, and of h i s r i g h t t o have counsel assigned by a c o u r t of
record. Sections 95-901 and 95-902, R.C.M. 1947. Obviously the
court's duty cannot end with a mere reading of his rights to
defendant; if defendant requests counsel to be appointed the
court without unnecessary delay must determine indigency and
appoint counsel accordingly. How can this duty be fulfilled by
delaying the appointment of counsel for four months while the
state prepares its case and the defendant lingers in a prison
or a jail? The length of the delay here, coupled with petitioner's
plight during the interim, shocks one's concept of fundamental
fairness and due process. Federal cases compel the same result.
See: Escobedo v, Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S,Ct. 1758, 12 L ed
2d977; United States v Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18
.
L ed 2d 1149.
Our holding on the issue of delay in appointing counsel for
petitioner is buttressed by a showing of actual prejudice. One
defense petitioner raised at trial was that of alibi. The delay
saw a release from the state prison of many potential alibi
witnesses and caused a loss of memory in those who remained,
On April 15, 1972, the date of petitioner's arrest, the section
of the prison to which petitioner was assigned contained 112
inmates, By August 24, 1972, the date counsel was appointed, 65
of these inmates had been released. This turnover of inmates
seriously undermined counsel's ability to conduct interviews to see
who could verify petitioner's alibi.
Another defense concerned the interchange and labeling of
prisoner clothing. Introduced in evidence at trial were three
articles of blood stained clothing. Only one of these articles--
a pair of prison issued levis--bore petitioner's name. Petitioner
contends that on the day of his arrest he could account for all
the lev* issued to him, but the *l$y in appointing counsel made
it impossible for his attorney to investigate and prove such a
contention. Unquestionably, the deprivation of counsel for four
months rendered these defenses virtually meaningless.
W a l s o b e l i e v e t h e seven month delay between t h e demand f o r
e
speedy t r i a l and t h e t r i a l i t s e l f v i o l a t e d p e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t
t o a speedy t r i a l . The United Sta t e s and t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s
guarantee an accused t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The United S t a t e s
Supreme Court and t h i s Court have adopted e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same t e s t
It
t o determine whether a t r i a l i s speedy". Compare Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101, w i t h S t a t e
v. Lagerquist, 152 Mont. 21, 445 P.2d 910. Barker d e s c r i b e s
t h i s t e s t a s a balancing t e s t "in which t h e conduct of both t h e
prosecution and t h e defendant a r e weighed." It i d e n t i f i e s t h e
f a c t o r s involved a s :
1. Length of delay;
2. Reason f o r delay;
3. ~ e f e n d a n t ' sa s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t ; and
4. Prejudice t o defendant.
Applying t h i s t e s t t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , w e f i n d :
Length of delay: Seven months. W e emphasize t h i s delay i s
-
n o t considered a per s e v i o l a t i o n of p e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t t o a
speedy t r i a l , but under t h e circumstances h e r e i t i s thought long
enough t o s h i f t t o t h e s t a t e t h e burden of explaining t h e reason f o r
t h e delay and showing absence of prejudice t o p e t i t i o n e r .
Reason f o r delay: The s t a t e ' s contention t h a t it took much
t i m e t o g a t h e r and analyze t h e evidence used a g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r
a t h i s t r i a l i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because t h e record h e r e e x p l a i n s
t h i s caused no more than two and one-half months of t h e delay.
Moreover, t h e evidence gathering process s t a r t e d before p e t i t i o n e r
demanded a speedy t r i a l . It i s n o t s e r i o u s l y contended t h a t
p e t i t i o n e r o r h i s counsel c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e delay.
~ e f e n d a n t ' sa s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t : petitioner's written
demand f o r speedy t r i a l seven months before h i s t r i a l began i s a
matter of record.
Prejudice t o defendant: Barker explained what l a y a t t h e h e a r t
of t h i s f o u r t h f a c t o r :
"* * * Prejudice, of course, should be assessed
in the light of the interests of defendants which the
speedy trial right was designed to protect. This
Court has identified three such interests: (i) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii)
to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, be-
cause the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
his case skews the fairness of the entire system.
If witnesses die or disappearduring a delay, the pre-
'udice is obvious. There is also prejudice ii defense
iitnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the
distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always
retlected in the record because what has been forgotten
can rarely be shown. " (Emphasis added).
To the same effect is State v Mielke, 148 Mont. 320, 322, 420
.
P.2d 155, citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct.
773, 15 L ed 2d 627.
We think petitioner was clearly prejudiced with respect to all
three interests discussed in Barker. First, when petitioner was
arrested he was serving a sentence at the "honor farm" of the state
prison, but thereafter he was placed in maximum security for over
three months. Without more, the state merely asserts such con-
finement was lawful and necessary. This is hardly sufficient to
carry the state's burden.
Second, petitioner's predicament maximized, rather than
minimized, his anxiety and concern. This is amply demonstrated
by his letter of July 15, 1972, to the Montana Defender Project
and by his motion for speedy trial of July 27, 1972, wherein he
alleged physical and mental anguish of such a nature as to inhibit
him from assisting in his own defense. The state's position that
any man accused of a serious crime will suffer some anxiety and
concern and that minimization of these emotions is largely subject
to individual quirks of personality utterly fails to come to grips
with the stark realities here.
Third, what has already been said about the delay in appointment
of counsel impairing petitioner's alibi defense applies even more
strongly to the problem of speedy trial, since petitioner's trial
was delayed another six months after counsel was finally appointed.
From the foregoing, it is plain the state by its unexcused
inaction deprived petitioner of effective representation by counsel
and a speedy trial. Since we have decided the case on these issues,
it becomes unnecessary to consider whether section 95-902, R.C.M.
1947, was violated.
The judgment of conviction of February 28, 1973, is-set aside
and the sentence vacated, with prejudice.
.....................................
Chief Justice
We Concur:
Justices.