No. 12527
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1974
ARTHUR S . FUNAGAN,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
MICHAEL CURRAN,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable P a u l G. H a t f i e l d , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant :
Hoyt, Bottomly and G a b r i e l , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
John C . Hoyt a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
F o r Respondent :
Smith, Emmons and B a i l l i e , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
W i l l i a m T. B a i l l i e a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Submitted: March 22, 1974
Decided
'APR.1'1 1974.
Filed: APR 17 1974
Mr. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by t h e p l a i n t i f f i n a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y
a c t i o n from a n o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Cascade County,
t h e Hon. P a u l G. H a t f i e l d p r e s i d i n g , g r a n t i n g summary judgment
t o t h e defendant.
The p l a i n t i f f , A r t h u r S . F l a n a g a n , was employed by de-
f e n d a n t , Michael C u r r a n , a s a r a n c h hand. While s o employed he
was r u n o v e r by a t r a c t o r and s u f f e r e d t h e i n j u r i e s complained
of i n t h i s a c t i o n . Viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o p l a i n -
t i f f t h e circumstances surrounding t h e a c c i d e n t a r e as follows:
P l a i n t i f f was an " o l d t i m e " r a n c h hand who had d u r i n g most of
h i s working l i f e been more i n v o l v e d w i t h h o r s e s t h a n t r a c t o r s
o r o t h e r t h i n g s mechanical. He d i d , however, know how t o o p e r a t e
a t r a c t o r and had s p e n t i n c r e a s i n g amounts o f t i m e d o i n g s o o v e r
t h e l a s t f i v e years. A s a p a r t of h i s d u t i e s f o r defendant,
p l a i n t i f f operated t h e t r a c t o r involved i n t h e accident. This use
w a s on a d a i l y b a s i s f o r t h r e e weeks p r o c e e d i n g t h e a c c i d e n t .
During t h i s p e r i o d t h e p l a i n t i f f had d i f f i c u l t y s t a r t i n g t h e t r a c -
tor. Another employee showed him how t o s t a r t i t by "jumping" t h e
p o i n t s of t h e solenoid with a p a i r of p l i e r s . P l a i n t i f f used
t h i s method by s t a n d i n g by t h e s i d e of t h e t r a c t o r between t h e
f r o n t and r e a r wheel. H e d i d t h i s d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d he
used t h e t r a c t o r . The p l a i n t i f f informed t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s foreman,
mechanic and o t h e r employees o f t h e s t a r t e r d i f f i c u l t i e s . On t h e
day o f t h e a c c i d e n t he parked t h e t r a c t o r w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n of
n o t u s i n g it u n t i l t h e s t a r t e r d e f i c i e n c y was r e p a i r e d . However,
a " r u s H t j o k came up and p l a i n t i f f w i t h o u t c h e c k i n g t o s e e i f t h e
t r a c t o r was i n g e a r jumped t h e p o i n t s of t h e s o l e n o i d t o s t a r t i t .
The t r a c t o r was i n g e a r and when i t s t a r t e d r a n o v e r p l a i n t i f f
causing severe i n j u r i e s .
On J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1973, d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r summary judgment
was heard arid t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n d i c a t e d 'I * * * t h a t I think
t h a t t h i s c a s e i s one f o r summary judgment a s a m a t t e r of law
* * *." However, b e c a u s e an a p p e a l t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme
C o u r t was pending i n t h e c a s e of Hammond v . Hager, 160 Mont. 391,
503 P.2d 52, 2 9 St.Rep. 945, i n v o l v i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e a v a i l -
a b i l i t y of t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y
n e g l i g e n c e i n a g r i c u l t u r a l employment c a s e s , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
s t a y e d i t s p r o c e e d i n g s u n t i l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e a p p e a l by t h e
United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . O A p r i l 2 , 1973, t h e Supreme C o u r t
n
d i s m i s s e d t h e a p p e a l f o r want of a s u b s t a n t i a l f e d e r a l q u e s t i o n .
Hammond v . Hager, U.S. -
1 -S.Ct. , 36 L ed 2d 303.
This dismissal e f f e c t i v e l y affirmed our determination t h a t t h e
d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e were
available. O A p r i l 5 , 1973, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e n t e r e d summary
n
judgment f o r d e f e n d a n t .
P l a i n t i f f r a i s e s two i s s u e s on t h i s a p p e a l . (1) T h a t t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d by g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t summary judgment w i t h -
o u t a l l o w i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t arguments i n
o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e motion; (2) t h a t the d i s t r i c t court erred i n
d e c i d i n g t h a t t h e r e was no m a t e r i a l f a c t u a l d i s p u t e and a s a m a t t e r
of law t h a t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t o r had assumed
t h e r i s k of h i s employment.
Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., p r o v i d e s f o r a h e a r i n g on a motion
f o r summary judgment a s a m a t t e r of r i g h t . I f i n f a c t the plain-
t i f f was d e n i e d t h e r i g h t t o be h e a r d on t h e m e r i t s of t h e motion
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was i n e r r o r . I n t h i s c a s e it i s c l e a r t h a t
p l a i n t i f f had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d on t h e m e r i t s a t t h e
h e a r i n g on J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1973. The t r a n s c r i p t of t h a t h e a r i n g d o e s
n o t i n d i c a t e t o what e x t e n t t h e m e r i t s were argued s i n c e a p a r t
of t h e h e a r i n g was o f f t h e r e c o r d . I t i s , however, r e c i t e d i n t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r s t a y i n g p r o c e e d i n g s t h a t argument had been
heard on the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk. From this it appears that plaintiff had the opportunity
to be heard and in fact was heard on the merits of the motion
for summary judgment.
Plaintiff's second issue on this appeal is whether or
not the district court erred in concluding that there was no
material dispute of fact and as a matter of law plaintiff was
contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of his employ-
ment. Preliminary to a detailed discussion it is necessary to
recall the well established rules governing summary judgment.
Summary judgment is not a proper tool for resolving disputed
issues of fact and is accordingly improper whenever material
factual matter is in dispute. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., Mustang
v. Jos. Schlitz rew wing Co.,
Beverage Co., 1nc.L Mont .
, 511 P.2d 1, 30 St.Rep. 565;
Dunjo Land Co. v. Hested Stores Co., Mont - . , 515 P.2d
961, 30 St.Rep. 939. Further, the burden of showing that there
is no disputed issue of material fact is on the party seeking
summary judgment. Kober & Kyriss v. Billings Deac. Hosp., 148
Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476; Stensvad v. Miners & Merchants Bank of
Roundup, Mont . , 517 P.2d 715, 30 St.Rep. 1178; Rosen v.
Midkiff , -Mont. , 519 P.2d 416, 31 St.Rep. 215.
From our examination of the record herein, consisting of
the pleadings, answers to interrogatories and depositions, we
conclude that the district court was correct in determining that
the defendant had borne his burden and shown there was no material
dispute of fact with regard to the defense of assumption of risk.
The showing required to sustain the defense of assumption of risk
is set out in D'Hooge v. McCann, 151 Mont. 353, 443 P.2d 747, and
states:
" * * * four elements must be proven by the em-
ployer in order to establish assumption of risk
by the employee: (1) knowledge, actual or implied,
of the particular condition; (2) appreciation of
t h i s c o n d i t i o n as dangerous; (3) a v o l u n t a r y r e -
maining o r c o n t i n u i n g i n t h e f a c e of t h e known
dangerous c o n d i t i o n s ; ( 4 ) i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g a s
t h e u s u a l and p r o b a b l e consequence of t h i s
dangerous c o n d i t i o n . * * * "
Each o f t h e s e e l e m e n t s i s e s t a b l i s h e d by p l a i n t i f f ' s answers t o
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and by h i s d e p o s i t i o n .
P l a i n t i f f ' s knowledge of t h e s t a r t e r d e f e c t i s b a l d l y
s t a t e d i n h i s answer t o d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e r r o g a t o r y :
" 4 . Did you know p r i o r t o October 31, 1967, t h a t
t h e Ford d i e s e l had a d e f e c t i v e s t a r t i n g s y s t e m * * *
"ANSWER: Yes."
P l a i n t i f f ' s d e p o s i t i o n e l a b o r a t e s on t h i s answer and i n d i c a t e s
t h a t h e was aware of t h e s t a r t e r d e f e c t f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e weeks.
A p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e s t a r t e r c o n d i t i o n a s d a n g e r o u s i s less
baldly s t a t e d but equally c l e a r . P l a i n t i f f had been o p e r a t i n g
t r a c t o r s f o r over 5 years. F u r t h e r h e had been o p e r a t i n g t h e
t r a c t o r i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c c i d e n t f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e weeks. H e had
a l s o worked a s a t r u c k d r i v e r . I n h i s own words, " * * * prior to
t h i s I d i d a l o t of trucking * * *". While it i s a s s e r t e d t h a t
p l a i n t i f f was an " o l d t i m e " r a n c h hand t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o i n d i -
c a t e t h a t he was of l e s s t h a n normal i n t e l l i g e n c e . I t seems c l e a r
t h a t a p e r s o n o f normal i n t e l l i g e n c e who had o p e r a t e d v a r i o u s t y p e s
o f machinery would a p p r e c i a t e t h e f a c t t h a t s t a n d i n g d i r e c t l y i n
f r o n t o f t h e t i r e o f a t r a c t o r w h i l e a t t e m p t i n g t o s t a r t it was
dangerous. T h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n o f r i s k c a n be d i r e c t l y i n f e r r e d
from t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s s t a t e m e n t i n r e s p o n s e t o an i n t e r r o g a t o r y
that " * * * we a d v i s e d them and t o l d them w e w e r e n ' t g o i n g t o
u s e i t u n t i l it was f i x e d * * *." This response w a s r e i t e r a t e d
i n p l a i n t i f f ' s deposition.
The p l a i n t i f f ' s v o l u n t a r y r e m a i n i n g i n t h e f a c e of t h i s
known d a n g e r i s o b v i o u s . He o b j e c t e d t o t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e
s t a r t e r b u t t h e n proceeded t o a g a i n s t a r t t h e t r a c t o r by "jumping"
t h e p o i n t s of s o l e n o i d , t h u s c o n s e n t i n g t o a c c e p t r i s k i n v o l v e d .
The f i n a l e l e m e n t needed t o e s t a b l i s h t h e d e f e n s e of
a s s u m p t i o n o f r i s k , a n i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from t h e known d a n g e r o u s
condition, is equally clear. The r i s k o f s t a r t i n g a v e h i c l e
w h i l e s t a n d i n g i n f r o n t o f i t i s t h a t i t may r u n o v e r t h e i n d i -
v i d u a l who d o e s s o . I n t h i s c a s e t h e r i s k was r e a l i z e d when t h e
t r a c t o r s t a r t e d and r o l l e d o v e r t h e p l a i n t i f f -
The d e f e n s e s of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and a s s u m p t i o n
of r i s k a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o c a s e s o f a g r i c u l t u r a l employment,
Hammond v. Hager, s u p r a . I f e i t h e r i s e s t a b l i s h e d it w i l l b a r
p l a i n t i f f ' s r e c o v e r y , t h u s n e g a t i n g any i s s u e w i t h r e g a r d t o de-
fendant's negligence. Since a s heretofore indicated t h e defense
o f a s s u m p t i o n of r i s k i s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s
c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e c o r d , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n g r a n t -
i n g summary judgment t o t h e d e f e n d a n t .
The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
./
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Justice
W concur:
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Ch'ef Justice C .
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Justices