No, 13192
I N THE SUPKEME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A
F OTN
1975
STATE ex r e l . , J O E R. THELEN and
G. BARBARA THELEN, husband and w i f e ,
Relators,
C I T Y OF MISSOUTA, through i t s C i t y C o u n c i l ,
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
Counsel o f Record :
For R e l a t o r s :
J u l i o K. Morales a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
F r e d C. Root and V i c t o r F. Val-genti, M i s s o u l a , Montana
V i c t o r F. V a l g e n t i a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
ttor .Amicus C u r i a e :
Thomas Mahan a r g u e d , Helena, Montana
Submitted : October 2 9 , 1975
Decided :
fJEC - 8 !$)",
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e
Court .
T h i s i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding brought by p r o p e r t y owners
o f t h e c i t y o f Missoula praying t h a t an a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t of p r o h i b i -
t i o n i s s u e d i r e c t i n g t h e c i t y of Missoula t o r e s t r a i n from f u r t h e r
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e s a l e of t h e i r r e s i d e n c e and i n t h e e s t a b l i s h -
ment of a home f o r t h e developmentally d i s a b l e d i n a one-family
r e s i d e n t i a l zone.
R e l a t o r s a r e r e s i d e n t s of t h e c i t y o f Missoula and owners
under a c o n t r a c t f o r deed of a r e s i d e n c e i n t h a t c i t y . The p r o p e r t y
i s l o c a t e d i n a zone c l a s s i f i e d by t h e c i t y a s R - I , one-family
residential district. The zoning c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , a s s e t f o r t h i n
s e c t i o n 32.93 of t h e code of t h e c i t y of Missoula, a l l o w s u s e s
II
of t h e premises a s follows: Any u s e p e r m i t t e d i n RR-I". Such
u s e s a r e s e t out i n s e c t i o n 32-9.8 of t h e code of t h e c i t y of
Misscula a s :
( a ) One-family dwelling.
(b) Parks and Playgrounds.
The a p p l i c a b l e d e f i n i t i o n o f "family" i s c o n t a i n e d i n
s e c t i o n 32-2 of t h e code of t h e c i t y of Missoula, and provides:
11
One o r more persons r e l a t e d by blood, a d o p t i o n ,
o r marriage, e x c l u s i v e of household s e r v a n t s , l i v i n g
and cooking t o g e t h e r a s a s i n g l e housekeeping u n i t ,
o r n o t more than two persons though n o t r e l a t e d by
blood, adoption o r marriage, l i v i n g and cooking t o g e t h e r
a s a s i n g l e housekeeping u n i t s h a l l be deemed t o c o n s t i -
t u t e a family. I I
R e l a t o r s d e s i r e t o s e l l t h e i r r e s i d e n c e and r e c e i v e d an
o f f e r from t h e Missoula Developmentally Disabled Community Homes
Council, a n o n p r o f i t o r g a n i z a t i o n , which i n t e n d s t o u s e t h e home
f o r n o t more than 8 developmentally d i s a b l e d persons. Because t h e
p r o p e r t y was l o c a t e d i n an R - I a r e a , t h e m a t t e r was taken b e f o r e
t h e Missoula c i t y c o u n c i l t o s e e what a c t i o n i t would t a k e i n view
of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1974 amended T i t l e 11,
C i t i e s and Towns, Chapter 27, Building Regulations-Zoning Commission
s e c t i o n s providing f o r community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t i e s . Sections
11-2702.1 and 11-2702.2, R.C.M. 1947, now exempt homes f o r t h e
developmentally d i s a b l e d from t h e p r o v i s i o n s of l o c a l zoning o r d i n -
ances. They provide:
"11-2702.1. Community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t y - - d e f i n e d .
I
Community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t y ' means (1) a group,
f o s t e r , o r o t h e r home s p e c i f i c a l l y provided a s a p l a c e
of r e s i d e n c e f o r developmentally d i s a b l e d o r handicapped
persons who do n o t r e q u i r e n u r s i n g c a r e , o r (2) a
d i s t r i c t youth guidance home e s t a b l i s h e d pursuant t o
s e c t i o n 10-1103, o r (3) a halfway house operated i n ac-
cordance w i t h r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e department of h e a l t h
and environmental s c i e n c e s f o r t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of
a l c o h o l i c s o r drug dependent persons. 11
"11-2702.2. F o s t e r , boarding homes, community r e s i d e n t i a l
f a c i l i t i e s considered r e s i d e n t i a l . A f o s t e r o r boarding
home operated under t h e p r o v i s i o n of s e c t i o n s 10-520
through 10-523, o r community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t y s e r v i n g
e i g h t (8) o r fewer persons, i s considered a r e s i d e n t i a l
u s e of p r o p e r t y f o r purposes of zoning i f t h e home provides
c a r e on a twenty-four (24) hour a day b a s i s .
11
The homes a r e a permitted u s e i n a l l r e s i d e n t i a l zones,
i n c l u d i n g , b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o , r e s i d e n t i a l zones f o r
s i n g l e - f a m i l y dwellings. Nothing i n t h i s paragraph s h a l l
b e construed t o p r o h i b i t a c i t y o r county from r e q u i r i n g
a c o n d i t i o n a l u s e permit i n o r d e r t o maintain a home
pursuant t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s paragraph; provided such
home i s l i c e n s e d by t h e department of h e a l t h and environ-
mental s c i e n c e s and t h e department of s o c i a l and r e h a b i l i -
t a t i o n s e r v i c e s . Any s a f e t y o r s a n i t a r y r e g u l a t i o n of t h e
department o r any o t h e r agency of t h e s t a t e o r p o l i t i c a l
s u b d i v i s i o n t h e r e o f which i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o r e s i d e n t i a l
occupancies i n g e n e r a l may n o t be a p p l i e d t o a community
r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t y s e r v i n g e i g h t (8) o r fewer persons. 11
Hearings were h e l d b e f o r e a s p e c i a l committee of t h e c i t y
c o u n c i l and t h e c o u n c i l . Both proponents and opponents f o r a l l o w i n g
t h e s a l e t o t h e n o n p r o f i t group were r e p r e s e n t e d . The f i n a l a c t i o n
by t h e c i t y c o u n c i l d i r e c t e d t h e c i t y a t t o r n e y t o f i l e an a c t i o n
t e s t i n g t h e amendments t o t h e s t a t e zoning law exempting homes f o r
t h e developmentally d i s a b l e d . The consensus of t h e c i t y c o u n c i l was
t h a t w h i l e i t d i d n o t oppose l a u d a b l e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n ,
t h e purpose of t h e law s u i t was t o c h a l l e n g e t h e s t a t e ' s t a k i n g over
c i t y zoning; zoning under t h e law t h e r e t o f o r e had been a l o c a l l y
c o n t r o l l e d f u n c t i o n t h a t should be l e f t a t t h e l o c a l l e v e l .
Thereafter the city of Missoula filed an action against
relators entitled City of Missoula vs. Joe R. Thelen and
Barbara G. Thelen, his wife, and Susan K. Browder, seeking
an order to permanently enjoin and prohibit relators, their
successors and assigns, from residence use of said premises by
more than one family. In addition, the city filed a lis pendens
notice preventing the consummation of the sale by relators, as well
as preventing the future use of the home as a group home for the
developmentally disabled.
Three issues are pertinent in this proceeding:
1. Are relators entitled to have this Court assume
original jurisdiction in this cause?
2. Are relators exempt from the city zoning power,
classification and definition of a one-family residence district?
3. Are sections 11-2702.2, 71-2001, 71-2004, 71-2401
through 71-2414, and 80-2607 through 80-2610, R.C.M. 1947, relating
to establishment, operation and appropriation for group home facili-
ties constitutional within the purview of the United States Consti-
tution and the 1972 Montana Constitution?
For the purposes of this opinion we will combine the
first two issues. Relators argue that recourse to the district
court and subsequent appellate channels will not afford them ade-
quate relief in that the final disposition of the issue presented
by their petition affects the validity of the buy-sell agreement
entered into between relators and the Missoula Developmentally
Disabled Community Homes Council; that the city has repeatedly
stated it intended to bring the issue to this Court to establish
judicial precedent; and that reaching a supreme court decision
through appellate channels will unreasonably delay the sale of
the residence, the construction of a new residence planned by
relators with proceeds of the sale,and the eventual use of the
residence as a group residence within the statutes of this state.
Respondent city argues that relators are attempting to
short circuit the district court process and this Court is asked
to act in a vacuum, alleging that relators who now claim urgency,
have made no effort to bring the matter to trial in the district
court and have thereby denied this Court a factual determination
that could be properly disposed of by this Court on appeal.
Respondent cites and relies on this court's holding in State ex rel.
Kober & Kyriss v. District Court, 147 Mont. 116, 117, 410 P.2d 945,
where this Court held:
It
In view of the provisions of the Montana Rules of
Appellate Civil Procedure for the expeditious handling
of appeals we are not inclined to issue writs of
supervisory control as a method of short cut appeal, ex-
cept under the most extenuating circumstances which we need
not attempt to catalog. In this cause no such circum-
stances appear. I t
Looking to the quoted language, we ask what, if any, are
the extenuating circumstances here that would warrant intervention
of this Court at this time? First, relators, with their buy-sell
agreement, are unable to sell their property due to the law suit
filed by respondent city and the lis pendens notice. Second, a
zoning regulation of respondent city that has been neutralized by
an act of the legislature. Third, the provisions of Article XII,
Section 3 3 ,
() 1972 Montana Constitution which provides:
"The legislature shall provide such economic
assistance and social and rehabilitative ser-
vices as may be necessary for those inhabitants
who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune
may have need for the aid of society. II
We find such extenuating circumstances warrant this Court's
intervention in this cause.
While we recognize respondent city's arguments as to the
desirability of maintaining local government control of zoning
regulations in its city, there is no question that the power of
the legislature over the city in this matter is supreme. The legis-
lature can give the cities of this state the power to regulate
through zoning commissions, and the legislature can take it away.
~es~ondent's
remedy lies not in this Court, but in the legislature.
This Court in State v. Holmes, 100 Mont. 256, 274, 47 P.2d 624,
said:
11* * * The powers granted to a municipal corporation
are of two classes. he first including those which
are legislative, public or governmental, and import
sovereignty; the second are those which are proprietary
or quasi private, conferred, for the private advantage
of the inhabitants and of the City itself as a legal
person. ' [Citing cases] * * *
"As to the first class of powers of a city enumerated
above, the power of the legislature is supreme except
as limited by express constitutional prohibitions * *."
This Court in State ex rel. Griffin v. City of Butte,
151 Mont. 546, 548, 445 P.2d 739, quoting from Leischner v. Knight,
(City of ~illings), 135 Mont. 109, 112, 337 P.2d 359, said:
"'1t is well-settled law in this state that cities
have only those powers granted them by statute or which
are necessarily implied as adjuncts to powers granted
by statute. This court has repeatedly stated that "unless
a power is vested in the municipality by express law
[or by necessary implication therefrom], the presumption
is against the exercise by the city of any such power. I I
State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Authority V . City of
Great Falls, 110 Mont. 318, 328, 100 P.2d 915, 921."'
In the instant case, while respondent city may well have
acted within the power granted it by the legislature in adopting
its t Ione-family" criteria for zoning, that power was modified by
later legislative language and respondent city should have revised
its zoning regulations to meet the legislative requirements.
That the legislature has power to modify or withdraw various
powers given a municipality has long been recognized in Montana.
This Court noted in Stephens v. City of Great Falls, 119 Mont. 368,
"There is no principle of law better established than
that a city has no power, except such as is conferred
upon it by legislative grant, either directly or by
necessary implication. [Citations] Resting as it does
upon legislative grants the legislative branch of the
government may, at t its pleasure, modify or withdraw the
power so granted. It may, if it chooses, repeal any
charter, or any law under which municipalities may be
created, and destroy any munici a1 corporation at its
will and pleasure. [Citation]. PI
~ o n t a n a ' sl e g i s l a t u r e having determined t h a t t h e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of t h e developmentally d i s a b l e d t o l i v e and develop
w i t h i n our community s t r u c t u r e a s a family u n i t , r a t h e r than t h a t
they be segregated i n i s o l a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , i s paramount t o t h e
zoning r e g u l a t i o n s of any c i t y i t becomes our duty t o r e c o g n i z e and
implement such l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n .
Respondent c i t y a r g u e s t h a t a r e c e n t opinion o f t h e
United S t a t e s Supreme Court, V i l l a g e of B e l l e T e r r e v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L ed 2d 797, 804, a f f i r m s t h e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l i t y of an ordinance d e f i n i n g T'family" which i s f o r a l l
p r a c t i c a l purposes i d e n t i c a l t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 32-2
o f t h e Missoula c i t y code d e f i n i n g "family".
W e do n o t s o view i t . V i l l a g e of B e l l e T e r r e i s an e n t i r e l y
d i f f e r e n t f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n and i s u n r e l a t e d t o s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n
t h a t i s focused on t h e c a r r y i n g o u t o f new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandates.
There, t h e c i t y of B e l l e T e r r e had an ordinance s i m i l a r t o iss sou la's
r e s t r i c t i n g land u s e t o one-family dwellings and p r o h i b i t i n g t h e
occupancy of a dwelling by more than two u n r e l a t e d persons a s a
"family". P l a i n t i f f s i n t h a t c a s e , t h e owners of a house, were
charged w i t h v i o l a t i n g t h e ordinance due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h r e e of
s i x c o l l e g e s t u d e n t s r e n t e d t h e house. P l a i n t i f f s argued t h a t t h e
ordinance v i o l a t e d e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n r i g h t s and r i g h t s of a s s o c i a t i o n ,
t r a v e l and privacy. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t upheld t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y
of t h e ordinance, t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t r e v e r s e d , and t h e United S t a t e s
Supreme Court i n an opinion authored by 14r. J u s t i c e Douglas, r e v e r s e d
the c i r c u i t court.
Elr. J u s t i c e Douglas gave a s t h e C o u r t ' s r e a s o n s f o r f i n d i n g t h e
ordinance c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e f a c t t h a t t h e ordinance ( a ) was n o t
aimed a t t r a n s i e n t s and t h u s d i d n o t v i o l a t e any r i g h t of i n t e r s t a t e
t r a v e l , (b) involved no procedural d i s p a r i t y i n f l i c t e d on some b u t
n o t on o t h e r s , (c) involved no fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t ,
such a s t h e r i g h t of a s s o c i a t i o n and p r i v a c y , and (d) w a s r e a s o n a b l e
and b o r e a r a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a p e r m i s s i b l e s t a t e o b j e c t i v e ,
t h u s n o t v i o l a t i v e of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n . Viewing our f a c t s i t u a t i o n
i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , we f i n d t h e V i l l a g e o f B e l l e T e r r e c a s e i n -
a p p l i c a b l e p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e c r i t e r i a of t h e opinion s e t f o r t h
under (c) .
Here, t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e adopted a new p o l i c y a s a p p l i e d
t o t h e developmentally d i s a b l e d i n an e f f o r t t o implement a new
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate, and i n s o doing i t was f u r t h e r i n g a per-
missible s t a t e objective. M r . J u s t i c e Douglas noted i n V i l l a g e of
B e l l e T e r r e t h a t every l i n e drawn by a l e g i s l a t u r e l e a v e s something
o u t t h a t might w e l l have been i n c l u d e d , b u t n o t e s , however, t h a t
t h a t e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n i s a l e g i s l a t i v e , n o t a j u d i c i a l , f u n c t i o n .
J u s t i c e Douglas then quotes t h e language o f M r . J u s t i c e Holmes i n
h i s d i s s e n t i n g opinion i n L o u i s v i l l e Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S.
11 IWhen a l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n i s determined, a s no
one doubts t h a t i t may b e , between n i g h t and day,
childhood and m a t u r i t y , o r any o t h e r extremes, a p o i n t has
t o b e f i x e d o r a l i n e has t o b e drawn, o r g r a d u a l l y
picked o u t by s u c c e s s i v e d e c i s i o n s , t o mark where t h e
change t a k e s p l a c e . Looked a t by i t s e l f without r e g a r d
t o t h e n e c e s s i t y behind i t t h e l i n e o r p o i n t seems a r b i -
t r a r y . It might a s w e l l o r n e a r l y a s w e l l b e a l i t t l e
more t o one s i d e o r t h e o t h e r . But when i t i s seen t h a t
a l i n e o r p o i n t t h e r e must b e , and t h a t t h e r e i s no mathe-
m a t i c a l o r l o g i c a l way of f i x i n g i t p r e c i s e l y , t h e d e c i s i o n
of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e must b e accepted u n l e s s w e can s a y t h a t
i t i s v e r y wide o f any r e a s o n a b l e mark."'
Under t h e f a c t s of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , we uphold t h e l e g i s -
l a t i v e a c t s providing f o r community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t i e s f o r
developmentally d i s a b l e d i n a l l r e s i d e n t i a l zones, i n c l u d i n g , b u t
n o t l i m i t e d t o , r e s i d e n t i a l zones f o r one-family dwellings.
Let the w r i t issue. Attorney f e e s a r e set i n t h e amount
Justices.