NO . 129 59
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1975
ARTHUR STEEN,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
ROSE GRENZ and CHRIS GRENZ,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r f c t ,
Honorable A . B. Martin, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Roland V. Colgrove and John M. K l i n e , Miles C i t y ,
Montana
Roland V.Colgrove argued, Miles C i t y , Montana
For Respondent :
Lucas, J a r d i n e and Monaghan, Miles C i t y , Montana
Thomas Monaghan argued, Miles C i t y , Montana
Submitted: June 12, 1975
Decided : -'-I9 1975
Filed :
Clerk
Mr. Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted by the
district court, Custer County, to defendants Rose and Chris Grenz.
Plaintiff Arthur Steen brought the original action to recover damages
for an injury allegedly suffered to his wrist while entering a
restaurant owned by defendants.
Plaintiff, at approximately 1:30 a.m., April 10, 1969,
ate dinner at the 600 Cafe owned by defendants. After paying for
the meal he left through the restaurant's front door and went down
the side street, heading towards his home. He stopped at the
restaurant's side entrance to give his wife,who worked at the
restauranG a message to call him early that morning because he had
to get to work earlier than usual that day. He stated that as he
started up the stairs he stumbled over some debris on the steps, fell
forward, and his hand broke the glass in the door seriously lacerating
his wrist.
Steen filed a complaint alleging defendants were negligent
in allowing the debris to accumulate around the door steps, especially
in light of the fact defendants were aware the public used the side
entrance to enter their restaurant.
Depositions were taken and after all discovery was com-
pleted defendants moved for a summary judgment. In support, they
argued plaintiff was a licensee at the time he attempted to enter
the restaurant's side entrance, there was no showing of willful or
wanton negligence on the part of defendants, and that that is the
only duty owed by the landowner to a licensee. The district court
granted defendants summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals.
Four issues are presented for review:
1. Should this Court abandon the licensee, invitee,
trespasser distinction?
2. Were defendants g u i l t y o f a c t i v e negligence and t k r e -
f o r e l i a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f f o r t h e damages he s u f f e r e d i n s p i t e of
the licensee relationship?
3. Was p l a i n t i f f a l i c e n s e e a t t h e time t h e a c c i d e n t
occurred?
4, Did d e f e n d a n t s , a s a b u t t i n g owners, owe t h e duty t o
t h o s e u s i n g t h e sidewalk t o u s e and keep t h e i r premises s o a s n o t
t o r e n d e r t h e sidewalk u n s a f e f o r o r d i n a r y t r a f f i c ?
F i r s t , p l a i n t i f f argues t h i s Court should abandon t h e
l i c e n s e e , i n v i t e e , t r e s p a s s e r d i s t i n c t i o n s i n favor of t h e reason-
a b l e negligence theory. W a r e n o t persuaded.
e The d i s t i n c t i o n s
between i n v i t e e , l i c e n s e e , and t r e s p a s s e r have been c o n s i s t e n t l y
a p p l i e d i n ~ o n t a n a ' sc a s e law and we f i n d no compelling reason t o
change t h o s e d i s t i n c t i o n s a t t h i s time.
Second, p l a i n t i f f argues t h e r e was a c t i v e n e g l i g e n c e on
t h e p a r t of defendants i n allowing d e b r i s t o c o l l e c t on t h e s t e p s
of t h e i r r e s t a u r a n t . F u r t h e r , t h a t such a c t i v e negligence i s an
exception t o t h e r u l e t h a t a landowner owes a l i c e n s e e only t h e
duty t o r e f r a i n from wanton and w i l l f u l negligence. W find that
e
argument t o b e n o t h i n g more than a hybrid of p l a i n t i f f ' s f i r s t
argument t h a t t h i s Court should abandon t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s between
l i c e n s e e , i n v i t e e and t r e s p a s s e r s . Again, we cannot s e e any
n e c e s s i t y t o abandon t h i s p r i n c i p l e of law which h a s been t h e r u l i n g
law of Montana f o r many y e a r s .
T h i r d , p l a i n t i f f a l l u d e s t o t h e f a c t t h a t a t t h e time he
was e n t e r i n g t h e r e s t a u r a n t ' s s i d e e n t r a n c e he was n o t a l i c e n s e e .
W e cannot a g r e e w i t h any argument t h a t p l a i n t i f f w a s n o t a l i c e n s e e
a t t h e time he attempted t o e n t e r t h e e n t r a n c e i n q u e s t i o n . He
was e n t e r i n g f o r h i s own b e n e f i t , t h a t i s , t o g i v e h i s w i f e a message
t o phone him. The long s t a n d i n g law of Montana i s t h a t when a
person e n t e r s a n o t h e r p e r s o n ' s p r o p e r t y f o r h i s own p l e a s u r e , con-
venience o r b e n e f i t , he i s a l i c e n s e e and t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y
has a d u t y t o t h e l i c e n s e e t o r e f r a i n from w i l l f u l and wanton
negligence. Jonosky v. Northern Pac. Ry.Co., 57 Mont, 63, 187 P. 1014.
Having determined p l a i n t i f f was a l i c e n s e e a t t h e time
he a t t e m p t e d t o e n t e r t h e r e s t a u r a n t ' s s i d e e n t r a n c e ; having r e -
viewed t h e f a c t s ; and, having reviewed a l l d i s c o v e r y m a t e r i a l s f i l e d
by b o t h p a r t i e s we can f i n d no testimony which would t e n d t o show
w i l l f u l and wanton n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of d e f e n d a n t s . Since
t h e r e i s no i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h e r e h a s been no showing of
w i l l f u l and wanton n e g l i g e n c e , summary judgment i n f a v o r of d e f e n d a n t s
was p r o p e r , u n l e s s an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e above s t a t e d r u l e would
invoke l i a b i l i t y on t h e d e f e n d a n t s .
P l a i n t i f f ' s f o u r t h i s s u e argues t h a t defendants, a s abutting
owners, owe t h e d u t y t o t h o s e u s i n g t h e sidewalk t o u s e and keep
t h e i r premises s o a s n o t t o r e n d e r t h e sidewalk u n s a f e f o r o r d i n a r y
traffic. P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s t h a t by c o n s t r u c t i n g c o n c r e t e s t e p s on t h e
sidewalk on t h e s i d e of t h e i r r e s t a u r a n t t o be used f o r t h e purpose
of e n t e r i n g i t , d e f e n d a n t s have a d u t y t o t h e p u b l i c t o keep t h e
s t e p s f r e e of o b s t r u c t i o n s and by n o t doing s o t h e y a r e l i a b l e t o
anyone i n j u r e d by such n e g l i g e n c e .
I n Montana, t h e sidewalk i s owned by t h e c i t y . Mitchell
v. Thomas, 9 1 Mont. 370, 8 P.2d 639. The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t
an a b u t t i n g owner i s n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e sidewalk
i n f r o n t of h i s premises, and he owes no d u t y t o t h e t r a v e l i n g p u b l i c
t o keep t h e sidewalk i n f r o n t of h i s premises f r e e from o b s t r u c t i o n s .
C h i l d e r s v. Deschamps, 87 Mont. 505, 290 P. 261.
Exceptions t o t h i s r u l e a r e c o a l h o l e s , meter boxes, and
o t h e r d e v i c e s of s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r l o c a t e d i n t h e sidewalk which
b e n e f i t t h e a b u t t i n g owner a n d m e l o c a t e d where t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c
i s l i k e l y t o walk. I n t h o s e c a s e s , i t becomes t h e d u t y of t h e
a b u t t i n g owner t o keep such d e v i c e s i n good r e p a i r . Headley v.
Hammond B u i l d i n g , I n c . , 97 Mont. 243, 33 P.2d 574. S t e p s used
only f o r t h e purpose of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s of d e f e n d a n t s ' r e s t a u -
r a n t do n o t come w i t h i n t h e e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e . There-
f o r e , p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t s owed a d u t y t o him
to keep the steps free of obstruction is without merit.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Justice u
We Concur:
....................................
Chief Justice
\
Justices.