No, 12869
I N THE SUPREME C U T OF THE STATE O M N A A
OR F OTN
1975
A D D I E F. TAYLOR,
P l a i n t i f f and Appellant,
-vs -
JAMES E. TAYLOR,
Defendant and Respondent,
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Nat A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g ,
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Robert L. Stephens, Jr. argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana
For Respondent:
Berger, Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, B i l l i n g s , Montana
James J , S i n c l a i r argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana
For Amicus Curiae :
Honorable Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
James F. Walsh, 1 1 argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General,
1
Helena, Montana
Submitted: May 9 , 1975
Decided: JkiN 1 0 1975
Filed: J\)b{ lL,j -375
M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
This i s an a p p e a l from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
Yellowstone County, t h e Honorable Nat Allen p r e s i d i n g . The
judgment modified a d i v o r c e decree e n t e r e d June 23, 1965, by
s t r i k i n g t h o s e p o r t i o n s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e payment of alimony.
Appellant Addie F. Taylor was granted a d i v o r c e from respondent
James E. Taylor. The d i v o r c e d e c r e e provided t h a t a p r o p e r t y
s e t t l e m e n t agreement be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e decree.
The p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement was dated June 16, 1965.
It r e c i t e d t h a t husband and wife had l i v e d s e p a r a t e and a p a r t f o r
many months; t h e w i f e intended t o f i l e f o r d i v o r c e ; and, i t was
t h e d e s i r e of both t o s e t t l e and a d j u s t between themselves t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s and a l l claims each may o r might have
against t h e other. Then followed n i n e t e e n s e p a r a t e paragraphs,
t h e s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s of each a r e :
1) A agreement t o b e f r e e from i n t e r f e r e n c e .
n
2) A agreement t o r e l e a s e each o t h e r from a l l c l a i m s ,
n
except a s provided i n t h e agreement.
3) An agreement by t h e husband t o pay a l l c u r r e n t b i l l s .
4) A agreement by t h e husband t o support an a d u l t
n
daughter a t h e r C a l i f o r n i a r e s i d e n c e .
5) An agreement t o f u r n i s h a l i s t of a l l o b l i g a t i o n s ,
6) The p a r t i e s a r e n o t l i m i t e d i n t h e i r remedies a t law
o r i n e q u i t y f o r t h e enforcement of e i t h e r t h i s agreement o r t h e
decree.
7) The husband can c l a i m t h e minor son a s an income t a x
deduction.
8) Personal p r o p e r t y items.
9) T r a n s f e r of one c a r t o each.
10) Husband t o handle income t a x items and r e c e i v e a l l
refunds.
11) Husband t o execute a $1,000 n o t e t o be paid o f f a t
$25 per month f o r r e l e a s e of w i f e ' s c l a i m on a check f o r $5,500,
which was payable j o i n t l y on t h e s a l e of mineral p r o p e r t y i n North
Dakota.
12) Husband a g r e e s t o t r a n s f e r t h e home t o t h e w i f e and
t o pay t h e l o a n , t a x e s and i n s u r a n c e o b l i g a t i o n s .
13) Husband a g r e e s t o pay support money f o r minor son
and t o pay f o r a c o l l e g e education.
14) Small income checks endorsed t o wife.
II
15) The husband a g r e e s t o pay t o t h e w i f e t h e sum of
Four Hundred and no/100 D o l l a r s ($400.00) p e r month beginning
June 1, 1965, a s alimony, and a l i k e sum each and every month
II
thereafter.
16) Husband w i l l pay balance due on f u r n i t u r e c o n t r a c t .
17) Each w i l l e x e c u t e i n s t r u m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o e f f e c t
t h i s agreement.
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18) This agreement i s made and e n t e r e d i n t o f r e e l y and
v o l u n t a r i l y by each of t h e p a r t i e s , and i t s h a l l o p e r a t e a s a
II
complete p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t between them.
19) "It i s understood t h a t t h i s i s n o t an agreement t o
o b t a i n a d i v o r c e , b u t i n t h e event t h a t e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s
h e r e t o s h a l l o b t a i n a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e from t h e o t h e r , then
t h i s agreement i s t o b e made a p a r t of any Decree headed ( s i c )
11
by t h e Court.
The complaint f o r d i v o r c e by t h e w i f e r e c i t e d t h a t t h e r e
were t h r e e c h i l d r e n , two of age, and one, a son, a minor. Custody
was g r a n t e d t h e mother w i t h support a s provided i n paragraph 1 3 ,
f o r t h e minor son. Without f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n o r r e f e r e n c e i n t h e
complaint o r d e c r e e , except by r e f e r e n c e , paragraph 4 provided
f o r support of a d a u g h t e r , of age, i n C a l i f o r n i a .
The decree provided s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r custody and support
of t h e minor son. It then provided f o r alimony a t $400 per month,
a s agreed i n paragraph 15; b u t l i m i t e d t h e payments u n t i l r e -
marriage. Then, t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement was i n c o r p o r a t e d
i n t h e d e c r e e and t h e w i f e awarded h e r c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s .
The p e t i t i o n by James E. Taylor, defendant i n t h e d i v o r c e
c a s e i s simple. It r e c i t e s t h e d e c r e e p r o v i s i o n f o r alimony and
t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement, a s note'd.abovee, then a l l e g e s :
( . t h a t t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n i s based on s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M.
I)
1947; (2) t h a t A r t i c l e 11, Section 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n
provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h a t "* * * The S t a t e * * * s h a l l [ n o t ]
d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t any person * * * on account o f * * * s e x
* * *." and (3) t h a t s e c t i o n 21-139 i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t h a t i t
v i o l a t e s A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , and t h e
F i f t h and Fourteenth Amendments t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
I n response t o t h e p e t i t i o n , Addie Taylor a l l e g e d : (1)
t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n was n o t based upon s e c t i o n 21-139 b u t , r a t h e r ,
was t h e r e s u l t of an agreement and c o n t r a c t ; (2) i n any e v e n t ,
even i f s e c t i o n 21-139 i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e 1972 Montana
C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h i s would be an impermissible ex p o s t f a c t o a p p l i -
c a t i o n ; and, (3) t h e alimony s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947,
i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and r e f l e c t s a v a l i d p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Hearing was had and ex-wife Addie t e s t i f i e d t h e alimony
p r o v i s i o n i n t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t agreement was made a s an
accommodation t o t h e husband and was accepted i n l i e u of a
d i s t r i b u t i o n of o t h e r p r o p e r t y . Addie t e s t i f i e d :
II
I was going t o a s k f o r a s e t amount, and J i m s a i d
t h a t he could n o t come up w i t h t h a t amount of money,
so we decided on alimony payments i n l i e u of a cash
s e t t l e m e n t 9~ *
Yc."
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947,
p e r m i t t i n g t h e c o u r t t o award alimony t o a w i f e i n a d i v o r c e proceeding
where t h e divorce i s g r a n t e d f o r an o f f e n s e of t h e husband i s i n
v i o l a t i o n o f A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The
c o u r t then ordered s t r i c k e n t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e d i v o r c e
decree.
The issues on appeal, as stated, go to the constitutional
questions involved. However, in our view, the case can be deter-
mined, not on constitutional grounds, but, rather, on contract
rights. If the decree is one not subject to modification as
alimony, but rather one of contract, no constitutional problems
arise. Constitutional issues will not be determined if the case
may be determined on nonconstitutional grounds. See: Montana
State University v. Ransier, Mon t . 3 -
P. 2d 2
32 St.Rep. , and cases cited therein.
In Washington v. Washington, 162 Mont. 349, 512 P.2d 1300,
this Court considered whether or not, as a matter of law, the
alimony provision of a property settlement agreement was integral
to the agreement and not severable and as such not subject to
modification by the court. On appeal, this Court analyzed the
agreement that was incorporated into the decree and held that the
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alimony" was an integral part of the property settlement agree-
ment and was not severable, and the settlement agreement was fully
supported by consideration from the wife and could not be changed
without the consent of both parties. The Court then went on to
state that the payments were not alimony per se and the use of the
term alimony was only a label,
In Movius v. Movius, 163 Mont, 463, 517 P.2d 884,886,887,
31 St.Rep. 29, this Court considered another property settlement
agreementht was incorporated into a decree. The Court stated:
"Directing our attention to the first issue, the
underlying question is whether the alimony provision
of the property settlement is integral and not severable
from the rest of the agreement and as such not subject
to subsequent modification by the court. This question
was recently before this Court in Washington v. Washington,
Mont . , 512 P.2d 1300, 30 St.Rep. 674. There
we held that the alimony provisions of that particular
agreement were not in fact alimony payments at all, but
instead were an integrated part of a property settlement
which could not be severed therefrom without destroying
the contract, and accordingly were not subject to sub-
sequent modification by the court.
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W r e a f f i r m t h e p r i n c i p l e s announced t h e r e i n , t h e
e
a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d i n s u p p o r t , and t h e r a t i o n a l e a p p l i e d
t o r e s o l u t i o n of t h e q u e s t i o n . Here, however, although
t h e agreement b e a r s some s i m i l a r i t i e s t o t h e agreement
i n Washington, i t s d i f f e r e n c e s command an o p p o s i t e r e s u l t .
I n Washington t h e w i f e d i d n ' t seek alimony o r support i n
t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n b u t both p a r t i e s simply sought an
e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s ; t h e agreement
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e d e c r e e i n Washington provided t h a t
t h e payments l a b e l e d a s alimony continued i f t h e w i f e
remarried and became a charge a g a i n s t t h e husband's
e s t a t e i f he d i e d p r i o r t o payment i n f u l l ; t h e agreement
provided t h a t t h e w i f e would assume a p r e - e x i s t i n g l i a b i l i t y
of $10,000 a g a i n s t some of t h e property.
wa ere, u n l i k e Washington, A l i c e sought an alimony award
f o r h e r s u p p o r t and maintenance i n h e r c r o s s c l a i m f o r
d i v o r c e , and t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e made such an award pursuant
t o t h e agreement o f t h e p a r t i e s . The alimony payments t o
A l i c e terminated a b s o l u t e l y i n t h e event of h e r remarriage.
The agreement h e r e i s s i l e n t on l i a b i l i t y f o r f u t u r e pay-
ments i n t h e event of d e a t h of e i t h e r A l i c e o r Arthur.
The alimony p r o v i s i o n s h e r e a r e c l e a r l y alimony and n o t
payments i n s e t t l e m e n t of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . Here A l i c e
assumed no l i a b i l i t y f o r any p r e - e x i s t i n g indebtedness n o r
i s t h e r e any evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t she gave up a n y t h i n g
i n t h e way of s u p p o r t and maintenance i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
r e c e i v i n g a more f a v o r a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d
during t h e i r marriage.
"In s h o r t , h e r e t h e r e i s no i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e
alimony p r o v i s i o n s and t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n t h a t would
d e s t r o y t h e r e s t of t h e c o n t r a c t i f t h e amount o f alimony
payments were modified by t h e c o u r t . Absent such mutual
interdependency, t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n s of t h e agreement
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e d e c r e e a r e n o t an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e
property settlement but a r e i n a l l respects separable there-
from and s u b j e c t t o subsequent m o d i f i c a t i o n by t h e c o u r t
i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n on a proper showing of changed circum-
stances. II
H e r e t o f o r e , we have s e t f o r t h t h e paragraphs of t h e agree-
ment h e r e and how they were adopted by r e f e r e n c e i n t h e d e c r e e and
changed i n p a r t . S i m i l a r i t i e s t o t h e agreements i n b o t h Washington
and Movius e x i s t . W hold t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t h e r e i s more l i k e t h a t
e
i n Washington, The testimony of Addie T a y l o r , n o t d i s p u t e d , makes
c l e a r t h a t t h e agreement was an independent b a r g a i n . Thus, whether
s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r n o t has no
II
bearing since the alimony" was p a r t of a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t of
t h e p a r t i e s respective property r i g h t s . O b l i g a t i o n s of a c o n t r a c t
executed i n 1965 cannot be i n v a l i d a t e d by subsequent passage of any
law.
Thus, we hold t h e alimony p r o v i s i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e -
agreement
ment / a s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e d e c r e e of d i v o r c e , was intended
t o a c t a s an i n s e v e r a b l e c o n t r a c t u a l p r o v i s i o n o f t h e agreement
and n o t i m p a i r a b l e by a subsequent change i n t h e law, i f indeed
there is.
Accordingly, we r e v e r s e t h e judgment and remand t h e m a t t e r
t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r e n t r y o f judgment f o r a p p e l l a n t . We
do n o t award a t t o r n e y f e e s a s r e q u e s t e d s i n c e no p l e a d i n g f o r
such was made; n o r , under our holding h e r e t h a t t h e agreement was
-
contractual could any a t t o r n e y f e e be awarded. Appellant s h a l l
have h e r c o s t s .
Justice
W Concur:
e
,/? >
/ Justices. /