No. 13021
I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA
OR F F
1975
T E STATE O M N A A on t h e r e l a t i o n of
H F OTN,
t h e C i t y of Helena, Montana, a municipal
corporation,
Relator,
T E DISTRICT C U T O THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
H OR F
I N AND FOR T E COUNTY O LEWIS AND CLARK, and t h e
H F
HONORABLE PETER G. MELOY, Judge of s a i d Court,
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING :
Counsel of Record :
For Rela t o r :
P. Keith K e l l e r argued, Helena, Montana
C. W. Leaphart, Jr. , Helena, Montana
For Respondents :
H a r r i s , Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana
Robert Murdo argued, Helena, Montana
Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana
Loble, P i c o t t e and Pauly , Helena, Montana
Submitted: May 14, 1975
Decided : J U N 1 0 1975
Filed : 4 L !2 C 1975
1)?
Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is a petition by the City of Helena for a writ of
supervisory control alleging that the district court, Lewis and
Clark County, erred in denying defendant petitioner's motion
for summary judgment, in cause No. 36440, entitled Morland P.
Branning, Plaintiff, versus Rick McCullough, the State of Montana,
acting by and through its State Highway Commission, and the City
of Helena, Montana, Defendants. Petitioner argues the denial of
its motion necessitates a trial on the merits, even though peti-
tioner cannot be held liable as a matter of law, and that super-
visory control is the only effective remedy available.
The lawsuit involves an intersection collision which
occurred in the City of Helena on the evening of April 28, 1972.
The following diagram approximates the appearance of that inter-
section:
"OLD" 11th. I 3 x
B - Branning
M - McCullough
S - Stop Signs
x - Point of collision
Rickey P. McCullough was d r i v i n g e a s t on " o l d " E l e v e n t h
Avenue when h i s v e h i c l e c o l l i d e d w i t h one b e i n g d r i v e n s o u t h
on Fee S t r e e t by Morland P. Branning. McCullough and ~ r a n n i n g
b r o u g h t n e g l i g e n c e a c t i o n s a g a i n s t e a c h o t h e r , and b o t h j o i n e d
t h e C i t y of Helena and t h e S t a t e of Montana a s d e f e n d a n t s ,
a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was n e g l i g e n t l y d e s i g n e d , r e g u -
l a t e d and m a i n t a i n e d . The c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e were d i s -
missed a s b a r r e d by t h e d o c t r i n e of s o v e r e i g n immunity. his
p e t i t i o n i s b r o u g h t by t h e C i t y of Helena, s e e k i n g r e v i e w of t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of summary judgment i n i t s f a v o r .
The p e t i t i o n r a i s e s two i s s u e s n e c e s s a r y t o t h e d i s p o s i -
t i o n of t h i s c a s e :
1. A r e t h e r e g e n u i n e i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l f a c t which p r e -
c l u d e summary judgment under Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.?
2. Does t h e a b s e n c e of j u r i s d i c t i o n o r c o n t r o l o v e r t h e
i n t e r s e c t i o n by t h e C i t y , i f e s t a b l i s h e d h e r e , p r e c l u d e l i a b i l i t y
on t h e p a r t of t h e C i t y ?
T h i s Court h e l d i n Roope v . Anaconda Co., 159 Mont. 2 8 ,
32, 494 P.2d 922:
"The burden o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e a b s e n c e o f any
i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t i s on t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g
summary judgment. Byrne v . P l a n t e , 154 Iqont. 6 ,
459 P.2d 266, and c i t a t i o n s h e r e i n . But where,
a s h e r e , t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s no g e n u i n e i s s u e
a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e burden i s upon t h e
p a r t y opposing t h e motion t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e
of a m a t e r i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l n a t u r e r a i s i n g a
g e n u i n e i s s u e of f a c t . F l a n s b e r g v . Montana
Power Co., 154 Mont. 53, 4 6 0 P.2d 263, and
authorities cited therein."
The d e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e r e c o r d h e r e i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e i n t e r -
s e c t i o n was, a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , a p a r t of t h e S t a t e
Highway System and t h e F e d e r a l Aid Primary System. Respondent
d i s t r i c t c o u r t acknowledges t h e u n a n i m i t y among t h e deposed w i t -
n e s s e s , b u t a r g u e s t h a t no r e c o r d s have been produced which con-
c l u s i v e l y confirm those statements. I t c i t e s Live S t o c k Nat.
Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 303 I11.App. 445, 25 N.E.2d 613,
as establishing the necessity for such documentary evidence in
a case such as this. Without those records, it claims that a
factual dispute remains which bars entry of summary judgment on
the City's motion.
That argument ignores the evidence contained in this
record. Not only do the deposed witnesses all support the City's
claim of no jurisdiction or control, but exhibits to those depo-
sitions likewise support the claim. Employees of the State Highway
Department who were deposed claimed that the intersectidn was
within the department's jurisdiction. Among the exhibits is an
agreement between the State and the City which refers to construc-
tion known as "Federal Aid Project No. F. 9999(2)11, expressly in-
cluding this portion of Eleventh Avenue. That agreement also pro-
vides that the City will not erect any traffic control devices
giving preference to "local routes" without the express written
permission of the State.
One exhibit is a pencil abstract indicating the entire
intersection is owned by the State of Montana. Other exhibits,
while less persuasive, also support the factual proposition that
the intersection is owned by the State and remains a part of the
State's jurisdiction.
Given this evidence, we find the City has met the burden
required before it can secure summary judgment, and respondent,
to prevail, must demonstrate "evidence of a material and substan-
tial nature, raising a genuine issue of fact." Roope, supra.
The only evidence which might be viewed as controverting that
produced by the City is contained in an amended answer to Branning's
Interrogatory Number 9, wherein the City stated:
"Inasmuch as the intersection is within the
corporate limits of the city, i.ts use is policed
by the city. Accordingly, the city performs re-
moval of automobiles and obstructions and injured
p e r s o n s on a n emergency b a s i s o n l y . Routine
maintenance was, and i s , performed by t h e
S t a t e of Montana. The C i t y of Helena, however,
performs s a n d i n g on t h e s t r e e t . "
B r a n n i n g s ' d e p o s i t i o n c o n t a i n s p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s which t e n d
t o c o n f i r m t h e s a n d i n g of t h e s t r e e t by t h e C i t y .
T h i s e v i d e n c e , i n o u r view, p r e s e n t s no g e n u i n e i s s u e of
material fact. Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e h a s e x p r e s s l y d e c l a r e d i t s
i n t e n t i o n t o "make t h e d e p a r t m e n t of highways c u s t o d i a n of t h e
f e d e r a l - a i d and s t a t e highways." S e c t i o n 3 2 - 2 2 0 2 ( 2 ) , R.C.M.
1947. E l e v e n t h Avenue's s t a t u s a s a f e d e r a l a i d highway i s
e v i d e n c e d by t h e d e p o s i t i o n s and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n c o n t a i n e d
i n t h e C i t y - S t a t e agreement e a r l i e r r e f e r r e d t o . Its s t a t u s a s
a s t a t e highway i s c l e a r under t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n a s ' ' [ a l n y
p u b l i c highway p l a n n e d , l a i d o u t , a l t e r e d , c o n s t r u c t e d , r e c o n s t r u c t e d ,
i m p r ~ v e d ~ r e p a i r e d , a i n t a i n e d , o r abandoned by t h e d e p a r t m e n t . ' '
m
S e c t i o n 3 2 - 2 2 0 3 ( 2 8 ) , R.C.M. 1947. W e f i n d nothing i n t h e C i t y ' s
s a n d i n g of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n which r a i s e s a g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o
t h e u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n o f S t a t e c o n t r o l and j u r i s d i c t i o n .
T h a t f i n d i n g r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n of whether o r n o t t h e
C i t y c a n be h e l d l i a b l e f o r a l l e g e d l y n e g l i g e n t d e s i g n , r e g u l a t i o n
o r maintenance of t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n , even though i t had no p o s s e s -
s o r y o r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l powers o v e r i t . W e f i n d t h a t it cannot.
I n r e a c h i n g t h a t c o n c l u s i o n , w e a r e a i d e d by t h e d e c i s i o n
i n H a r l a n v . C i t y of Tucson, 82 A r i z . ,11, 309 P.2d 244, 249. In
t h a t c a s e , an a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of a s t a t e
highway w i t h a c i t y s t r e e t i n Tucson. The S t a t e o f Arizona had
j u r i s d i c t i o n , c o n t r o l o v e r , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e maintenance
of t h a t highway. The C i t y o f Tucson o c c u p i e d a s i m i l a r s t a t u s i n
r e l a t i o n t o t h e f r o n t a g e r o a d s and c o n n e c t i n g c i t y s t r e e t s . The
c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d t h e C i t y was n e g l i g e n t i n c o n s t r u c t i n g , o r a l l o w -
i n g t o be c o n s t r u c t e d , a d a n g e r o u s i n t e r s e c t i o n , and i n f a i l i n g t o
g i v e warning of t h e d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n . The C i t y moved f o r summary
judgment on the ground that the intersection was within the
jurisdiction of the State, and thereforethe City could not be
found negligent, as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of
Arizona affirmed the granting of that motion:
"There being no jurisdiction or control in the
city over the intersection involved, it follows
there could be no duty, and without a duty in
the matter there can be no actionable negligence."
The Court there reached that determination in spite of the per-
formance of some traffic control and maintenance of the inter-
section by the City. The Arizona statutes quoted in that opin-
ion are, in many respects, similar to Montana's, and we find no
reason for a different result in the instant case. For other
pertinent authority, arriving at similar conclusions, see:
Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 553, 225 P.2d 522;
McNulty v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 314 F.Supp. 1274; 19
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., B 54.25~.
Petitioner here also raises an issue concerning alleged
failure to satisfy the notice requirements of Section 11-1305,
R.C.M. 1947. In finding that summary judgment should have been
granted on the grounds already stated, we need not consider this
additional issue.
As in State ex rel. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. District
Court, 159 Mont. 295, 496 P.2d 1152, a writ of supervisory control
is proper here as the sole means by which petitioner can avoid
the substantial prejudice of being forced to defend a suit where,
as a matter of Law, liability cannot be established.
Sunmary judgment should have been granted to petitioner,
and it is so ordered.
Justice
// Chief Justice