No. 12683
I N THE SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O MONTANA
O R F H F
1975
JERRY RANARD, a minor, by and
through h i s Guardian, C a r l M. Ranard,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
K T Y O'NEIL,
AH
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Gordon R. B e n n e t t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
P a t r i c k F. Hooks argued, Townsend, Montana
Smith and Harper, Helena, Montana
C h a r l e s A. Smith 111, appeared, Helena, Montana
For Respondent :
Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena,
Montana
Ronald F. Waterman argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted : Janua r y 16, 1975
Decided: FEB 10 1975
Filed :
Clerk
Mr. ~ u s t i c eFrank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a summary judgment g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t
i n a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y a c t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lewis and C l a r k
County. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d :
"* ** t h e d e f e n d a n t , Kathy O ' N e i l , i s en-
t i t l e d t o summary judgment, a s a m a t t e r of law,
f i n d i n g t h a t p l a i n t i f f , J e r r y Ranard, was g u i l t y
of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r of 12w and
defendant Kathy O r N e i l had no ' l a s t c l e a r chance'
a s a m a t t e r of law".
The summary judgment was g r a n t e d on t h e p l e a d i n g s , answers
t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s by b o t h p a r t i e s , and a d e p o s i t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f .
These documents d i s c l o s e t h a t , on December 7 , 1972, p l a i n t i f f was
s t r u c k and i n j u r e d by an automobile d r i v e n by d e f e n d a n t . The i n d i -
d e n t o c c u r r e d on a Helena c i t y s t r e e t a t approximately 9:00 p.m.
The s t r e e t was snow packed and i c y ; i t was i l l u m i n a t e d by s t r e e t
lights .
P l a i n t i f f , whose e i g h t h b i r t h d a y was on t h e day f o l l o w i n g t h e
a c c i d e n t , was on h i s way home from a boxing l e s s o n . H i s instructor
had d r i v e n p l a i n t i f f and h i s b r o t h e r t o t h e s t r e e t i n f r o n t of t h e i r
home, double-parking a c r o s s from t h e i r home. The b r o t h e r , who was
a y e a r o l d e r than p l a i n t i f f , r a n a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t , followed almost
immediately by t h e younger boy.
A s p l a i n t i f f reached t h e middle of t h e s t r e e t , he saw d e f e n d a n t ' s
h e a d l i g h t s , stopped, and t h e n r a n i n an a t t e m p t t o avoid b e i n g
struck. Defendant, upon s e e i n g t h e boy, a p p l i e d h e r b r a k e s b u t
was u n a b l e t o avoid h i t t i n g him. P l a i n t i f f was h o s p i t a l i z e d f o r
s e v e r a l weeks and c o n t i n u e d t o wear a c a s t on h i s broken r i g h t l e g
f o r some time t h e r e a f t e r .
P l a i n t i f f , i n a d e p o s i t i o n taken some e i g h t and one h a l f months
a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , a d m i t t e d t h a t he had n o t looked b e f o r e he r a n
i n t o t h e p a t h of d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e . Although he a d m i t t e d t h a t he
knew he should check f o r t r a f f i c , he s a i d t h a t he had j u s t f o r g o t t e n .
Although t h e d e t a i l s a r e n o t c l e a r , p l a i n t i f f d i d admit t o
having r e c e i v e d some i n s t r u c t i o n on p e d e s t r i a n s a f e t y , i n c l u d i n g
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s t o p , look and l i s t e n . He could n o t r e c a l l where
he had r e c e i v e d i t , o r p r e c i s e l y when i t was t a u g h t .
The complaint a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s were prox-
i m a t e l y caused by d e f e n d a n t ' s n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n o f h e r automobile.
The answer denied t h a t a l l e g a t i o n and a f f i r m a t i v e l y a l l e g e d t h a t
p l a i n t i f f ' s own n e g l i g e n c e was t h e proximate cause of h i s i n j u r y .
I t a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f had knowingly assumed t h e r i s k of
i n j u r y and, i n a l a t e r amendment, t h a t defendant had been con-
f r o n t e d w i t h a sudden emergency.
Following d i s c o v e r y , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s
motion f o r summary judgment, on t h e grounds s t a t e d i n t h e o r d e r
quoted a t t h e beginning of t h i s opinion. P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from
t h a t judgment, a l l e g i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g t h e
motion.
The r u l e governing summary judgments i s Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.,
which p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
"(c) * * * The judgment sought s h a l l be r e n d e r e d
f o r t h w i t h i f t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e show t h a t t h e r e
i s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e
moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r of law. II
Defendant, t h e moving p a r t y , h a s t h e burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g
t h e absence of any i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t s h e i s e n t i t l e d
t o judgment a s a m a t t e r of law. See, e . g . Meech v. Cure, - t.
Mon
, 525 P.2d 546, 3 1 St.Rep. 637; B e i e r l e v. T a y l o r , - t.
Mon
, 524 P.2d 783, 3 1 St.Rep. 554.
With t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n mind, we t u r n t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r
q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h i s a p p e a l . They a r e :
(1) Did t h e p l a i n t i f f have t h e c a p a c i t y t o be c o n t r i b u t o r i l y
negligent ?
(2) I f s o , was p l a i n t i f f c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t under t h e
f a c t s here?
(3) Was t h e p l a i n t i f f c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r
of law because of v i o l a t i o n of s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s governing
p e d e s t r i a n conduct ?
A t t h e o u t s e t , we observe t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had n o t h i n g
b u t t h e c o l d r e c o r d upon which t o b a s e i t s d e c i s i o n - - t h e same r e c o r d
which i s b e f o r e u s f o r review. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was
n o t a i d e d i n i t s assessment of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a p a c i t y by an o p p o r t u n i t y
t o view h i s demeanor i n c o u r t , s i n c e he d i d n o t appear.
Our t r e a t m e n t of t h e f i r s t two i s s u e s i s guided by two Montana
cases: Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co., 99 Mont. 372, 383, 43 P.2d 896;
and Graham v. Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 277, 435 P.2d 263. Both
d e a l w i t h a l l e g e d c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e by boys between e i g h t and
nine years old.
I n Lesage t h e p l a i n t i f f , a boy aged e i g h t y e a r s and n i n e months,
was s t r u c k by an automobile a s he played f o o t b a l l i n a c i t y s t r e e t .
The p l a i n t i f f a d m i t t e d t h a t he had n o t s e e n t h e c a r t h a t s t r u c k him,
b u t c o u l d have i f he had looked. There was testimony t h a t p l a i n t i f f
r a n i n f r o n t of t h e c a r when i t was a t a d i s t a n c e of o n l y t e n o r
twelve f e e t . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of t h e p l a i n t i f f
and defendant appealed c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t should e i t h e r
have n o n s u i t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f o r d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f was
c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r of law. T h i s Court a f f i r m e d ,
f i n d i n g evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a v e r d i c t f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f .
The f o l l o w i n g t e s t was suggested i n Lesage f o r t h e determination
of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e by a minor over t h e age of seven:
"Did he o r d i d he n o t e x e r c i s e t h e d e g r e e of c a r e
t h a t can o r d i n a r i l y be expected of c h i l d r e n of t h e
same a g e , t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e ,
i n t e l l i g e n c e and c a p a b i l i t i e s ? "
The t e s t was recognized a s one which o r d i n a r i l y should be submitted
t o the jury.
I n Graham, an e i g h t and one-half y e a r o l d boy was k i l l e d when
s t r u c k by an automobile w h i l e r i d i n g h i s b i c y c l e on a c i t y s t r e e t .
The o n l y eyewitness who t e s t i f i e d was t h e d e f e n d a n t , whose v e r s i o n
of t h e e v e n t s was found t o b e s o i n c o n s i s t e n t a s t o w a r r a n t l i t t l e
credence. The r e l e v a n t i s s u e was whether o r n o t t h e d i s t r i c t c n u r t
e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h e p l a i n t i f f was i n c a p a b l e of c o n t r i -
b u t o r y negligence a s a m a t t e r of law.
I n Graham, t h i s Court s e t f o r t h a f u r t h e r t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of a c h i l d ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence. A dual inquiry i s required
covering :
"(1) The c a a c i t of a p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d i n a given
c a s e t o + c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t ; and (2) t h e
I-e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n f a c t of t h e p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d ' s
c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e under t h e circumstances of a
given c a s e . 11
Applying t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e t e s t , we h e l d t h a t r e a s o n a b l e
men could d i f f e r a s t o p l a i n t i f f ' s c a p a c i t y t o be c o n t r i b u t o r i l y
n e g l i g e n t , and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had e r r e d i n removing t h a t c o n s i d e r -
a t i o n from t h e j u r y . The evidence showed only t h e b o y ' s a g e , h i s
grade i n s c h o o l , h i s a b i l i t y t o r i d e a b i c y c l e , and h i s r e s i d e n c e i n
t h e immediate neighborhood of t h e a c c i d e n t .
The r u l e s e s t a b l i s h e d by Lesage and Graham i n d i c a t e a sub-
j e c t i v e standard. Each c a s e must b e measured by i t s own f a c t s , and
t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e d a r e d i f f i c u l t t o summarize i n a g e n e r a l
rule. I n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e c a p a c i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d i s h i s
a b i l i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e danger, e i t h e r t o himself o r o t h e r s , of t h e
a c t a l l e g e d t o be n e g l i g e n t . That c a p a c i t y i s determined by h i s
a g e , e x p e r i e n c e , i n t e l l i g e n c e and c a p a b i l i t i e s . His n e g l i g e n c e i n
f a c t can only be determined by f i n d i n g a f a i l u r e t o conform h i s
conduct t o a s t a n d a r d of c a r e which he can reasonably observe,
given t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of h i s c a p a c i t y .
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , p l a i n t i f f ' s responses t o t h e q u e s t i o n s
recorded i n h i s d e p o s i t i o n a r e commonly phrased i n a s i n g l e word.
While t h i s might be t y p i c a l f o r a c h i l d of h i s age, when s u b j e c t e d
t o an u n f a m i l i a r d e p o s i t i o n p r o c e s s , i t s a y s l i t t l e o r n o t h i n g
about h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e .
There i s evidence of p l a i n t i f f ' s experience -- he a t t e n d e d
school and was i n s t r u c t e d i n c e r t a i n r u l e s of s a f e t y f o r p e d e s t r i a n s .
P l a i n t i f f could n o t remember when t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was r e c e i v e d ,
where i t was r e c e i v e d , nor i t s i n t e n s i t y . W e are p r e s e n t e d w i t h
,
/
some evidence of experience, but the remainder an only be assumed
by comparison with others in his age group.
Finally, there is little evidence of plaintiff's capabilities.
Related to intelligence, this attribute would determine whether
plaintiff was likely to forget instruction received in pedestrian
safety; whether he was self-reliant or tended to rely on his older
brother's judgment, e.g. in the context of relying on his older
brother's decision to cross the street; what his attention span
was; and many other relevant considerations, too numerous to detail
here.
The record contains insufficient evidence to support a finding
that plaintiff had the capacity for contributory negligence as a
matter of law. This precludes summary judgment. plaintiff's actions
cannot be found negligent until they are measured by some standard.
Plaintiff's standard of care could not be determined until his capacity
for contributory negligence was found.
While the evidence produced in the district court might support
a jury verdict that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, it
cannot support such finding as a matter of law. Reasonable men
could differ on the facts presented and thus the requirements of
Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., governing summary judgments, are lacking.
However, defendant asserts that plaintiff violated Montana
statutes regulating the conduct of pedestrians, and therefore he
was contributorily negligent, as a matter of law. Her argument is
that section 32-2178, R.C.M. 1947, sets the standard for determining
the care which must be exercised by any pedestrian. That section
provides, in pertinent part:
"a
() Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point
other than within a marked crosswalk or within an un-
marked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the
right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway."
That statute makes no express exceptions for anyone, and
certainly not for children. Pedestrians are defined as I Iany person
afoot" and persons include "every natural person". Section 32-2111,
R.C.M. 1947.
Authorities recognize the inconsistency inherent in a standard
which imposes adult guidelines on children who violate statutes, but
applies a lesser-than-adult standard to a child's conduct outside
statutory regulation. See Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. 5 36, n.13.
2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5 288A, p. 32, uses this language:
"1
() An excused violation of a legislative enactment
or an administrative regulation is not negligence.
"2
( ) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed
not to permit such excuse, its violation is excused when
" a the violation is reasonable because of the
()
actor's incapacity".
This illustrative comment in 5 288A is particularly pertinent here:
"2. A statute provides that pedestrians shall not
step into the street without looking in both directions
for approaching traffic. A, a boy eight years of age,
dashes into the street without looking, in pursuit of
a ball. A's violation of the statute may be found not to
be negligence if his conduct was reasonable for a child
of similar age, intelligence, and experience.1 1
The statutory violation may thus be excused if the plaintiff
lacked the capacity for compliance.
The summary judgment for defendant is vacated. The case is
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Justice
We Concur: .,