No. 12692
I N T E SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A
H OR F F OTN
1974
UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE
COMPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n ,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
STATE F R M T A AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
A M UU L
COMPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n ; HERBERT SOLLE,
i n d i v i d u a l l y and a s Administrator of t h e
E s t a t e s of DAVID SOLLE and GREGORY SOLLE,
Deceased, e t a l . ,
Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record :
For Appellants :
G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana
Sherman V. Lohn argued, Missoula, Montana
Worden, Thane, Haines and Williams, Missoula,
Montana
S h e l t o n C. Williams argued and Ronald A . Bender
argued, Missoula, Montana
Longan, Holmstrom and Cebull, B i l l i n g s , Montana
For ~ e s p o n d e n:
t
Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, P e e t e & Brown, B i l l i n g s ,
Montana
Rockwood Brown, Jr. argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana
Submitted : September 11, 1974
Decided : - 5 1975
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
P l a i n t i f f Universal Underwriters Insurance Company f i l e d i t s
complaint June 12, 1973, i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Missoula County,
seeking declaratory r e l i e f . A l l of t h e defendants appeared and
f i l e d answers. It was agreed between t h e p a r t i e s t h a t t h e m a t t e r
would be submitted upon an agreed statement of f a c t s .
The c o u r t on November 1 3 , 1973, e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t ,
c o n c l u s i o n s of law and judgment d e c l a r i n g t h a t defendants John
~ ' O r a z i , S r . , Darlyene ~ ' O r a z iand John Zachary ~ ~ O r a z Jr., were
i,
n o t persons i n s u r e d under t h e garage l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y
i s s u e d by Universal Underwiters Insurance Company t o C i s l o Chevrolet-
Olds, I n c . , and t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t l i a b l e f o r any a c t s o r
omissions of t h e DtOrazis p e r t a i n i n g t o an a c c i d e n t which occurred
on October 19, 1971, n o r any damages o r claims a r i s i n g therefrom.
It f u r t h e r d e c l a r e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t l i a b l e t o defend D t O r a z i s ,
o r any t h e r e o f , a g a i n s t t h e c i v i l a c t i o n brought by Herbert S o l l e
a g a i n s t t h e ~ ' 0 r a z i sp e r t a i n i n g t o t h e d e a t h s of David and Gregory
S o l l e , n o r pay t h e c o s t s of defense t h e r e o f .
Defendant S o l l e f i l e d exceptions t o t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclu-
s i o n s of law and t h e judgment and was j o i n e d i n such f i l i n g by
defendant S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. The c o u r t
o v e r r u l e d S o l l e ' s and S t a t e arm's e x c e p t i o n s . T h e r e a f t e r a l l de-
f endan t s appealed.
The agreed f a c t s a r e : O o r about A p r i l 1970, one J a n e Howard
n
purchased an automobile from Courtesy Chevrolet-Olds, I n c . of Polson,
Montana, and t r a d e d i n a 1962 Mercury Monterey autombile, i d e n t i f i -
c a t i o n number 22672518891,. She d e l i v e r e d t h e t i t l e c e r t i f i c a t e f o r
t h e 1962 Mercury, n o t a r i z e d and endorsed i n b l a n k , t o Courtesy.
Around June 1970, Courtesy s o l d t h e Mercury t o one Don Tidwell and
d e l i v e r e d t h e t i t l e c e r t i f i c a t e t o T i d w e l l , without e x e c u t i n g t h e
assignment, n o t a r i z i n g i t , o r forwarding t h e c e r t i f i c a t g o f owner-
s h i p , c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n , and an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e g i s t r a -
t i o n t o t h e s t a t e r e g i s t r a r of motor v e h i c l e s a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n
53-109, R.C.M. 1947.
- 2 -
I n August 1970, Tidwell t r a d e d t h e 1962 Mercury t o John ~ ' ~ r a z i ,
S r . , g i v i n g DtOrazi a b i l l of s a l e . O October 1 9 , 1971, John
n
DtOrazi, J r . , was d r i v i n g t h e Mercury automobile i n t h e c i t y of
Missoula when i t c o l l i d e d w i t h a motorcycle r i d d e n by David S o l l e
and h i s b r o t h e r , Gregory S o l l e . A s a r e s u l t of t h e a c c i d e n t b o t h
David and Gregory S o l l e d i e d .
Herbert S o l l e , i n d i v i d u a l l y and a s a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e e s t a t e s
of David and Gregory S o l l e , f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Missoula
County, a combined wrongful d e a t h s u r v i v a l a c t i o n . He named John
Zachary DtOrazi, J r . , a s a defendant based upon h i s n e g l i g e n t
d r i v i n g of t h e Mercury automobile and a l s o named John ~ ' O r a z i , S r . ,
and Darlyene DtOrazi, t h e p a r e n t s of John, J r . , on t h e b a s i s of
n e g l i g e n t entrustment a s defendants. He claimed g e n e r a l , s p e c i a l ,
and p u n i t i v e damages.
A t t h e time of t h e f a t a l a c c i d e n t defendant S t a t e Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company i n s u r e d Herbert S o l l e under t h r e e
automobile l i a b i l i t y p o l i c i e s . Included i n t h e coverage under each
p o l i c y i s uninsured m o t o r i s t coverage. S t a t e Farm has agreed t o
pay S o l l e t h e sum of $40,000, a l l o c a t i n g $30,000 t o Gregory and
$10,000 t o David, i n compromise of S o l l e ' s d e a t h claims under t h e
uninsured m o t o r i s t coverage p r o v i s i o n s of t h e t h r e e p o l i c i e s which
S o l l e c a r r i e d w i t h S t a t e Farm. The agreement a l s o provides t h a t
S o l l e may pursue d e a t h claims a g a i n s t t h e D t O r a z i s , and i n t h e
e v e n t of judgment and recovery under t h e Universal Underwriters
garage l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y , S t a t e Farm would be e n t i t l e d t o subrogation
a g a i n s t any recovery up t o t h e amount of i t s $40,000 payment.
A t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t t h e r e was i n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t
a garage l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y i s s u e d by U n i v e r s a l Underwriters t o C i s l o
Chevrolet-Olds, I n c . ( C o u r t e s y ' s s u e c e s s o r ) . On o r about March 2 ,
1973, Universal Underwriters r e c e i v e d n o t i c e from defendants ~ ' 0 r a z i
t e n d e r i n g defense of t h e S o l l e c a s e and c l a i m i n g coverage under
u n i v e r s a l ' s garage l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y on t h e grounds t h e 1962 Mercury
automobile was s t i l l owned by Universal Underwriters' i n s u r e d , by
reason of its failure to process the transfer of title when the
Mercury was sold to Don Tidwell in 1970. Universal Underwriters
has denied coverage to ~'Orazis
but has assumed the defense of the
underlying wrongful death and survival action upon an express
reservation of rights and nonwaiver of its defenses under the policy.
Paragraph V of the garage liability insurance policy containing
the definition of "Persons Insured" provides:
"Each of the following is an insured under this
insurance to the extent set forth below:
"3
() with respect to the automobile hazard:
"a
() any partner, or paid employee, or
director or stockholder thereof or a member of the
household of the named insured or such partner
or paid employee or director or stockholder while
using an automobile covered by this policy or when
legally responsible for the use thereof, provided
the actual use of the automobile is by the named
insured or with his permission, and
"b
() any other person or organization legally
responsible for the use thereof only while such auto-
mobile is physically operated by the named insured or
any such partner or paid employee or director or
stockholder, or member of the household of the named
insured or partner or paid employee or director or
stockholder, provided the actual use of the automobile
is by the named insured or with his permission. 11
Appellants present these issues for this court's review:
1. Whether there is coverage for the defendants D'Orazi
under the Universal Underwriters garage liability policy under the
Safeco Insurance Co. v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co.,
Ostermiller v. Parker, and Irion v. Glenn Falls Insurance Co., cases?
2. Whether the person insured provision of the Universal
underwriters' policy is ambiguous and should be construed against
the insurer?
3. Whether under the Cbner's Responsibility Law (section 53-438,
R.C.M. 1947), the Universal Underwriters' garage policy must contain
a mandatory omnibus clause?
4 Whether the limitation and/or exclusion of a permissive user
.
from the definition of insured, as respondent contends, is a limita-
tation or exclusion in an insurance contract which is unenforceable
as being violative of public policy?
Appellants i n t h e i r f i r s t i s s u e contend t h i s c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s i n
Sazeco I n s . Co. v. Northwestern Mutual I n s . Co., 142 Mont. 155,
382 P.2d 174; O s t e r m i l l e r v. P a r k e r , 152 Mont. 337, 451 P.2d 515;
and I r i o n v. Glenn F a l l s I n s . Co., 154 Mont. 156, 461 P.2d 199,
e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r u l e t h a t i f a c a r d e a l e r f a i l s t o comply w i t h
s e c t i o n 53-109(c), R.C.M. 1947, by f a i l i n g t o send t o t h e r e g i s t r a r
of motor v e h i c l e s a c e r t i f i c a t e of ownership, c e r t i f i c a t e of
r e g i s t r a t i o n , p l u s an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n upon t h e s a l e of
a c a r , and t h a t c a r i s involved i n an a c c i d e n t , t h e automobile
d e a l e r ' s l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y c o v e r s t h e person d r i v i n g t h e
c a r , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e language o r l i m i t a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g coverage
contained i n t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y .
T h i s seems t o go t o t h e q u e s t i o n of l i a b i l i t y of t h e garage
owner which i s n o t a t i s s u e h e r e . Here, t h e s o l e q u e s t i o n t o be
determined i s whether o r n o t t h e "garage" l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y i s s u e d
by Universal t o C i s l o Chevrolet-Olds, I n c . (formerly Courtesy)
a l s o i n s u r e s t h e ~ ' O r a z i s ;which i s a q u e s t i o n of coverage.
The confusion a r i s e s because t h e t h r e e c a s e s c i t e d by a p p e l l a n t s
a l l had "omnibus" c l a u s e s and coverage was n o t i n i s s u e b u t r a t h e r
ownership was t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n t o be determined. The t h r e e c a s e s
h e l d , a s a m a t t e r of law, t h a t i f t h e c a r d e a l e r f a i l e d t o comply
w i t h s e c t i o n 53-109(c), R.C.M. 1947, then t h e t i t l e t o t h a t automo-
b i l e remains w i t h t h e c a r d e a l e r , a s i n t h e c a s e h e r e . However,
a s i n a l l c a s e s of t h i s n a t u r e , once ownership i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e
language of t h e i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t i n f o r c e governs t h e coverage
available t o a person claiming coverage, if any. The s t a t u t e under
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s n o t penal.
A p p e l l a n t s ' i s s u e No. 3 i s n o t w e l l taken inasmuch a s p u b l i c
p o l i c y and t h i s C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 53-438, R.C.M.
1947, a r e l a i d t o r e s t i n Northern Assurance Co. v . Truck Insurance
Exchange, 151 Mont. 132, 439 P.2d 760, and i n Boldt v. S t a t e Farm
Mutual Auto. I n s . Co., 151 Mont. 337, 443 P.2d 33. Interestingly,
counsel h e r e f o r a p p e l l a n t s S o l l e and S t a t e Farm were involved i n
Northern Assurance. There has been no showing i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e
t h a t t h e p o l i c y i n q u e s t i o n was i s s u e d t o show proof of f i n a n c i a l
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n s 53-418 through 53-458, R.C.M.
1947.
A p p e l l a n t s ' i s s u e s 2 and 4 w i l l be d i s c u s s e d h e r e i n a f t e r i n t h e
c o n t e x t of t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on t h o s e i n s u r e d under Paragraph V ,
h e r e t o f o r e c i t e d , of t h e garage l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y . The e x c l u s i o n s a r e
n o t a t i s s u e here.
11
The p o l i c y under c o n s i d e r a t i o n h e r e does n o t c o n t a i n an omnibus"
c l a u s e b u t a l i m i t a t i o n of t h o s e i n s u r e d and hence i s n o t a s t a n d a r d
l i a b i l i t y policy. A p p e l l a n t s contend t h i s i s v i o l a t i v e of p u b l i c
policy. S e c t i o n 13-801, R.C.M. 1947, on unlawful c o n t r a c t s provides:
hat i s n o t l a w f u l which i s :
It
(1) Contrary t o a n e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n of law;
"(2) Contrary t o t h e p o l i c y of e x p r e s s law, though
not expressly prohibited; or,
"(3) Otherwise c o n t r a r y t o good mcrals. "
Many o u t of j u r i s d i c t i o n c a s e s have examined e x c l u s i o n s and
l i m i t a t i o n s of coverage c a s e s s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t one and have
n o t been moved t o d e c l a r e t h e absence of "omnibus" coverage a g a i n s t
public policy. T h i s Court i n Northern Assurance found e x c l u s i o n s
n o t v i o l a t i v e of p u b l i c p o l i c y i f n o t i n v i o l a t i o n o f s t a t u t e , and
t h e same would apply t o l i m i t a t i o n s . W have disposed of t h e
e
s t a t u t o r y argument concerning s e c t i o n 53-438, R.C.M. 1947, and w i l l
only comment t h a t t h e claimed a p p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 40-4403, R.C.M.
1I
1947, concerning omnibus" coverage t o be contained i n "uninsured
m o t o r i s t p o l i c i e s " has no a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e problem h e r e presented
t o t h i s Court i n t h e agreed statement of f a c t s .
Two p a r t i e s may c o n t r a c t i n any manner t h e y s o choose w i t h
any i n s u r a n c e coverage t h e y d e s i r e , a s long a s t h a t c o n t r a c t i s n o t
c o n t r a r y t o an e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n of law; c o n t r a r y t o t h e p o l i c y
of e x p r e s s law, though n o t e x p r e s s l y p r o h i b i t e d ; o r , o t h e r w i s e
c o n t r a r y t o good morals.
~ p p e l l a n t s ' i s s u e 2 a r g u e s t h e "persons insured" p r o v i s i o n
contained i n Paragraph V of t h e p o l i c y i n q u e s t i o n i s ambiguous and
should be construed a g a i n s t t h e i n s u r e r .
The p o l i c y of i n s u r a n c e between Universal and C i s l o Chevrolet
i s a c o n t r a c t , and s u b j e c t t o a p p l i c a b l e c o n t r a c t law of Montana.
The language of a c o n t r a c t governs i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i f t h e
language i s c l e a r and e x p l i c i t . S e c t i o n 13-704, R.C.M. 1947. The
i n t e n t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s i s t o be a s c e r t a i n e d from t h e
contract i t s e l f , i f possible. S e c t i o n 13-705, R.C.M. 1947. Where
t h e language of an i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y admits of only one meaning t h e r e
i s no b a s i s f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e p o l i c y coverage under t h e
g u i s e of ambiguity. Nelson v. Combined Insurance Co. of America,
155 Mont. 105, 467 P.2d 707. I n Kansas C i t y F i r e and Marine
Insurance Company v. C l a r k , 217 F. Supp. 231, 235, (D.C.Mont. 1963),
Judge Jameson noted t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t ambiguous o r u n c e r t a i n
p r o v i s i o n s of an i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y s h a l l be construed i n f a v o r o f t h e
i n s u r e d and a g a i n s t t h e i n s u r e r , b u t he c a u t i o n e d :
"On t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s
i s c l e a r , t h e c o u r t s have no a u t h o r i t y t o change t h e
c o n t r a c t i n any p a r t i c u l a r , o r t o d i s r e g a r d t h e e x p r e s s
language t h e p a r t i e s have used. I n James v. P r u d e n t i a l
I n s . Co., 1957, 131 Mont. 473, 477, 312 P.2d 125, 127,
1
the court said: But even though i t i s a c a r d i n a l p r i n -
c i p l e of i n s u r a n c e law t h a t a c o n t r a c t of i n s u r a n c e i s
t o be construed l i b e r a l l y i n f a v o r o f t h e i n s u r e d and
s t r i c t l y a g a i n s t t h e i n s u r e r , c o n t r a c t s of i n s u r a n c e
should be given a f a i r and r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Park
Saddle Horse Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 8 1 Mont. 99, 111,
261 P. 880. I n a r r i v i n g a t such c o n s t r u c t i o n , no m a t t e r
how s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d a g a i n s t t h e i n s u r e r , t h e i n t e n t i o n
of both i n s u r e r and i n s u r e d i s t o be a s c e r t a i n e d from t h e
language of t h e p o l i c y . R.C.M. 1947, !$ 13-704. E f f e c t
must be given t o every p a r t of t h e p o l i c y c o n t r a c t . R.C.M.
1947, $13-707. The words of t h e c o n t r a c t a r e t o b e under-
stood i n t h e i r u s u a l meaning. R.C.M. 1947, !$ 13-710.
Common sense c o n t r o l s . 1 Moreover, ' [ a l m b i g u i t y does n o t
e x i s t j u s t because a claimant s a y s so. It can only e x i s t
where t h e wording o r phraseology o f a c o n t r a c t i s reason-
a b l y s u b j e c t t o two d i f f e r e n t i n t e r r e t a t i o n s . ' Holmstrom v.
. M- I1 B e n e f i t Health & Accident A s s ?n , 1961, 139 Mont. 426,
364 P.2d 1065, 1066."
To t h e same e f f e c t t h e Ninth C i r c u i t Court of Appeals i n National
Farmers Union P r o p e r t y and Casualty Company v. Colbrese, 368 F.2d
405, 411, commented t h a t t h e foregoing r u l e :
"* * * does n o t prevent a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e more
g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t an i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y , l i k e
any o t h e r c o n t r a c t , must be given an i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n which i s r e a s o n a b l e and which i s consonant w i t h
t h e manifest o b j e c t and i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s . "
Paragraph V , s e c t i o n ( 3 ) ( a ) , of t h e p o l i c y provides t h a t i n
a d d i t i o n t o t h e named i n s u r e d , C i s l o Chevrolet-Olds I n c . , any
p a r t n e r , paid employee, d i r e c t o r o r s t o c k h o l d e r of t h e named
i n s u r e d , o r any member of t h e household of any of t h e f o r e g o i n g
a r e covered under t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i n q u e s t i o n . This s e c t i o n
i s c l e a r and unambiguous and c l e a r l y does n o t i n c l u d e t h e ~ ' 0 r a z i . s
under t h e f a c t s .
S e c t i o n ( 3 ) ( b ) of Paragraph V of t h e p o l i c y provides t h a t i n
a d d i t i o n t o t h e named i n s u r e d , any o t h e r person o r o r g a n i z a t i o n
l e g a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e u s e of a n owned automobile w i l l b e an
a d d i t i o n a l i n s u r e d under t h e p o l i c y provided t h a t such automobile i s
physically operated by t h e named i n s u r e d o r any such p a r t n e r o r
paid employee o r d i r e c t o r o r s t o c k h o l d e r o r member of t h e household
of t h e i n s u r e d , p a r t n e r , paid employee, d i r e c t o r o r s t o c k h o l d e r .
Since t h e 1962 Mercury was n o t p h y s i c a l l y operated a t t h e time
of t h e a c c i d e n t by t h e named i n s u r e d o r any p a r t n e r , paid employee,
d i r e c t o r o r s t o c k h o l d e r , o r member of t h e household of any of t h e
f o r e g o i n g s p e c i f i e d c a t e g o r y of persons, t h e ~ ' 0 r a z i sdo n o t come
w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f an i n s u r e d under S e c t i o n ( 3 ) (b) .
A p p e l l a n t s p r e s e n t c a s e law and a s t r o n g argument t h a t t h e term
II
p h y s i c a l l y operate" i s u n c l e a r and s u s c e p t i b l e of v a r i o u s con-
s t r u c t i o n s and more s o when t h e named i n s u r e d i s a c o r p o r a t i o n .
They r e l y on an Idaho c a s e , Mayflower I n s . Exchange v. K o s t e r i v a ,
8 4 I d a . 25, 367 P.2d 5 7 2 , 5 7 4 (1961) f o r p r i n c i p a l s u p p o r t . However,
11
t h e language t h e r e was o p e r a t e " i n an e x c l u s i o n o f m i l i t a r y p e r s o n e l .
II
The c o n t e n t i o n t h e r e was a c t u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l " o r "the r i g h t
o f d i r e c t i o n and c o n t r o l " , and t h e c o u r t found t h e term "operate"
a s used ambiguous and u n c e r t a i n .
II
Here, o u r term i s p h y s i c a l l y operated" and t k r e f o r e n o t i n
p o i n t w i t h t h e Idaho c o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s . A b e t t e r a n a l y s i s of our
problem, concerning t h e same p o l i c y p r o v i s i o n , a t a time when i t
c o n t a i n e d only t h e term "operatet', by t h e Ninth C i r c u i t Court i s
found i n Orth v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 284 F.2d
Orth involved a c o r p o r a t e i n s u r e d and t h e same argument was
advanced t o t h e Ninth C i r c u i t Court a s h e r e and i n t h i s regard
t h e Court concluded:
"Having reached t h i s conclusion through an a n a l y s i s o f t h e
c o n t r a c t language and f i n d i n g no ambiguity, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
t h a t Aronson i s n o t i n s u r e d under t h e ~ o l i c v s one of law
i
and n o t of f a c t . Since 1 o p e r a t e d ' a s Lsed i n c l a u s e (3)
does n o t i n c l u d e t h e concept of d i r e c t i o n and c o n t r o l , no
i s s u e of f a c t i s resented a s t o whether West S e a t t l e Motors
d i r e c t e d and c o n t k o l l e d Aronson i n t h e u s e of t h e automobile.
Having t h u s determined t h a t Arnson's o p e r a t i o n o f t h e a u t o -
mobile i s excluded i n any event from coverage under t h e p o l i c y ,
i t i s immaterial whether h i s u s e of t h e c a r was permissive,
a s r e q u i r e d by t h e p r o v i s o a t t h e end of c l a u s e (3).11 (Emphasis
added).
The t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y h e l d a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t t h e
DIOrazis were n o t p a r t i e s i n s u r e d under t h e garage l i a b i l i t y
i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i s s u e d by respondent U n i v e r s a l Underwriters
Insurance Company t o C i s l o Chevrolet-Olds, I n c . and i n q u e s t i o n
here.
The judgment of
W Concur:
e I
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Chief J u s t i c e