No. 12750
I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
H F F OTN
1974
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
DUARD TROPF,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Paul G. Hatf i e l d , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y General, Helena,
Montana
Thomas A. Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General,
Appeared, Helena, Montana
J. Fred Bourdeau, County A t t o r n e y , Great F a l l s , Montana
Norman L. Newhall, I11 Deputy County A t t o r n e y , argued,
Great F a l l s , Montana
F o r Respondent :
Ralph T. Randono argued, Great F a l l s , Montana
Submitted : September 1 7 , 1974
Decided: j A h i 2 3 1975
Filed : JR h. B 3 195
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court, Cascade
County, suppressing the state's evidence and refusing to allow
the state to either amend or dismiss and refile the Information.
On October 5, 1973, a complaint and an affidavit for a search
warrant, with duplicate originals, were prepared on standard forms
of the county attorney's office. The forms are headed "IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASCADE1'and contain a signature
line at the bottom of each form, under which is the designation
"DISTRICT JUDGE. "
On the day in question there were no district judges present
at the courthouse. The complaint and affidavit were submitted
to H. William Coder, police judge of the city of Great Falls, who,
upon hearing sworn testimony in support of the complaint and affi-
davit, signed the search warrant in duplicate and certified the
duplicate complaint and affidavit.
A search was then made of defendant Duard ~ropf'shouse. In
searching the premises police officers discovered numerous plastic
bags containing marihuana residue, some marihuana seeds, and drug
use paraphernalia. By following a path from the back door of the
premises into the back yard, the officers found an old board covering
a hole in the ground which contained a duffle bag, which in turn
, held approximately three pounds of marihuana.
Thereafter a return of the items seized upon execution of the
search warrant was made of record before a district judge. At that
time, the state maintains, one of the duplicate originals of the
search warrant was left with the clerk of the district court. This
is disputed and the records before this Court fail to reveal any
such filing with the clerk. The other duplicate original of the
search warrant and one duplicate original of the complaint and
affidavit were retained by a detective of the Great Falls police
department. The remaining duplicate original of the complaint and
a f f i d a v i t were n o t f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t and are un-
accounted f o r .
The s t a t e maintains t h e d u p l i c a t e o r i g i n a l s of t h e complaint
and a f f i d a v i t i n possession of t h e Great F a l l s p o l i c e d e t e c t i v e
were subsequently f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
T h i s i s d i s p u t e d by defendant and, a g a i n , t h e r e c o r d s b e f o r e t h i s
Court do n o t reveal t h a t t h e s e documents were f i l e d .
On October 16, 1973, an Information c o n t a i n i n g two c o u n t s was
f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court.
"Count I : *** possession c e r t a i n dangerous d r u g s ,
t o - w i t : Marihuana i n e x c e s s of 60 grams, i n v i o l a -
t i o n of S e c t i o n 54-133, R.C.M. 1947, as amended".
Evidence i n support of Count I was a c q u i r e d by a s e a r c h of d e f e n d a n t ' s
premises conducted pursuant t o t h e s e a r c h warrant i s s u e d by H.
William Coder, p o l i c e Judge of t h e c i t y of Great F a l l s .
"count 11: *** on o r about t h e 5 t h day of October,
A.D. 1 9 / 3 , and b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of t h i s Information,
t h e s a i d defendant then and t h e r e b e i n g , d i d then and
t h e r e w i l f u l l y , wrongfully, u n l a w f u l l y and f e l o n i o u s l y
, as
7-
amended". (Emphasis added).
Evidence i n support of Count I1 was a c q u i r e d (1) by a s t a t e m e n t
given by d e f e n d a n t ' s roommate t o t h e county a t t o r n e y t h a t on
October 2 , 1973, he observed t h e defendant s e l l dangerous drugs t o
one Ron Paulson a t d e f e n d a n t ' s apartment a t 904 6 t h S t . S.W.,
Great F a l l s ; (2) from t h e sworn testimony of Ron Paulson given
i n a proceeding t o d e c l a r e him a j u v e n i l e d e l i n q u e n t which t e s t i -
mony confirmed t h e f a c t of such s a l e ; and ( 3 ) from a t h i r t e e n page
p o l i c e department statement given by t h e same informant.
Defendant was a r r a i g n e d October 1 8 , 1973, and e n t e r e d a p l e a
of n o t g u i l t y . Various motions were i n t e r p o s e d by defendant and
t h e m a t t e r s e t f o r t r i a l on January 28, 1974, by o r d e r d a t e d Decem-
b e r 21, 1973. O January 8 , 1974, defendant under s e c t i o n 95-1803(d),
n
R.C.M. 1947, gave n o t i c e of h i s defense of a l i b i and l i s t e d s i x
witnesses.
On January 23, 1974, t h e s t a t e by c o n s o l i d a t e d motions moved
f o r l e a v e t o amend Count I1 of t h e Information t o charge:
"* * * on o r about t h e 2nd day of October, 1973, ***
defendant *** did ***
s e l l a c e r t a i n dangerous drug,
t o w i t : Hashish, t o Ronald Paulson i n v i o l a t i o n of 54-132,
R.C.M. 1947 a s amended. "
The s t a t e a l l e g e d t h e proposed amendment was only i n form and
n o t substance and d i d n o t charge an a d d i t i o n a l o r d i f f e r e n t
o f f e n s e and no r i g h t s of defendant w e r e p r e j u d i c e d . In the alter-
n a t i v e , i t asked d i s m i s s a l of t h e Information pursuant t o s e c t i o n
95-1706, R.C.M. 1947, on t h e ground t h a t a mistake was made i n
c h a r g i n g t h e proper o f f e n s e and t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l be w i t h o u t
p r e j u d i c e t o f i l e a new Information.
A l l motions pending b e f o r e t h e c o u r t were b r i e f e d and t h e
c o u r t heard o r a l argument January 24, 1974. The c o u r t then suppressed
t h e evidence i n support of Count I a s i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d because t h e
s e a r c h w a r r a n t was f a t a l l y d e f e c t i v e f o r t h e s e reasons: (1) The
person s i g n i n g t h e w a r r a n t was without l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e
a warrant o u t of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e e i g h t j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t
i n t h a t he i s n o t a d i s t r i c t judge of t h a t c o u r t . (2) The a f f i d a v i t
and complaint on which t h e warrant was i s s u e d was n o t r e t a i n e d
by t h e judge a s i s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-706, R.C.M. 1947.
The c o u r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s motion t o amend Count
11 o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t o d i s m i s s and r e f i l e a new Information,
c o n s t i t u t e d an amendment a s t o substance r a t h e r than as t o form and
was i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947; and, t h e a f f i d a v i t
f o r l e a v e t o f i l e Count 1 d i d n o t support t h e f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s
1
i n Count 11. The c o u r t denied t h e s t a t e ' s motions and dismissed
Counts I and 11.
The s t a t e argues t h a t t h e term "Judge" a s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n
95-206, R.C.M. 1947, t o g e t h e r w i t h s e c t i o n 95-704, R.C.M. 1947,
a u t h o r i z e s a p o l i c e judge t o i s s u e s e a r c h w a r r a n t s .
S e c t i o n 95-704, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s :
1I
Any judge may i s s u e a s e a r c h warrant * * *. I'
Judge i s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 95-206, R.C:M., 1947, a s :
"'Judge' means a person who i s i n v e s t e d by law w i t h t h e
power t o perform j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n s and i n c l u d e s c o u r t ,
j u s t i c e of t h e peace o r p o l i c e m a g i s t r a t e
c u l a r c o n t e x t s o r e q u i r e s . '' (Emphasis adde
This is a qualified definition to give judicial stature to our
entire court system but is qualified so as not to be taken as
conferring jurisdiction where none exists merely because other
statutes use the term "judge".
It is well founded in Montana law that the police courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction and such courts have only such
authority as is expressly conferred upon them. State ex rel.
Marquette v. Police Court, 86 Mont. 297, 283 P.430; State ex rel.
McIntire v. City Council of the City of Libby, 107 Mont. 216,
82 P.2d 587; City of Billings v. Herold, 130 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d
263; State ex rel. City of Libby v. Haswell, 147 Mont. 492, 414 P.2d
652. The subject matter jurisdiction of the police court of the
city of Great Falls is defined by section 11-1602, R.C.M. 1947 and
Section 1-27-11 of the Municipal Code of the City of Great Falls.
Section 11-1602, R.C.M. 1947, provides:
"Jurisdiction of police courts. The police court has con-
current jurisdiction with the justice of the peace of the
following public offenses committed within the county:
"1
() Theft where the value of the stolen
property does not exceed one hundred fifty dollars
($150)-
"2
() Assault and battery, not charged to have
been committed upon a public officer in the discharge
of his official duty, or with intent to kill.
"3
() Breaches of the peace, riots, affrays,
committing willful injury to property, and all mis-
demeanors punishable by fine not exceeding five
hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding six ( ) months, or by both fine and impri-
6
sonment .
" 4 Proceedings respecting vagrants, lewd, or
()
disorderly persons. Such offenses must be prosecuted
in the name of the state of Montana.
II
(5) Possession of beer or liquor by persons
under the age of eighteen (18) years in violation of
section 94-35-106.2 [94-5-6101.
tt (6) Selling, giving away or disposing of in-
toxicating liquors to minors in violation of section
94- [3]5-106 [94-5-609 .
I
II
The police court shall have no jurisdiction of any
civil cause, except as otherwise provided by law. II
Section 1-27-11 of the Municipal Code of the City of Great
Falls, provides:
"A
() Of all public offenses committed within the City
over which police courts are expressly granted the
"(B) Of all proceedings for the violation of any
laws or ordinances of the City, both civil and criminal,
which must be prosecuted in the name of the City. I1
(Emphasis added) .
Since police magistrates have never been given authority by
the legislature to issue search warrants, the word "~udge"used
in section 95-704, R.C.M. 1947, does not require the inclusion of
a police magistrate as a person authorized to issue search warrants.
Therefore, the search warrant issued in the instant case was void.
The district court correctly suppressed the evidence obtained
under the authority of that search warrant.
We need not proceed further to evaluate arguments advanced
by the state in regard to the search warrant itself or the pro-
cedure used in its issuance, execution and return, other than to
clarify some misconceptions and the weight to be given State v.
Meidinger, 160 Mont. 310, 319, 502 P.2d 58.
The state admits the affidavit, complaint and warrant were
entitled incorrectly as "IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
OF CASCADE", but asserts I1There is no requirement under the law,
however, that the warrant contain any heading specifying the court
in which application is made." The state relies on section 95-717,
R.C.M. 1947, which reads in pertinent part:
18
When search and seizure not illegal. No search
and seizure, whether with or without warrant, shall
be held to be illegal as to a defendant if:
"***
"b
() No right of the defendant has been infringed by
the search and seizure, or,
"c
() Any irregularities in the proceedings do not
affect the substantial rights of the accused."
The state also relies on Meidinger for support alleging the "highly
technical" defect in Meidinger was more serious than that presently
before this Court.
Section 95-703, R.C.M. 1947, by d e f i n i t i o n d i r e c t s t h a t a search
warrant "is an o r d e r i n w r i t i n g , i n t h e name of t h e s t a t e " . This
would contemplate, a s i n a l l o t h e r c r i m i n a l matters and p a r t i c u l a r l y
i n m a t t e r s t h a t p e r t a i n t o t h e a u t h o r i z i n g instrument t o search
a person's home, t h a t n o t i c e t o t h e person s u b j e c t t o t h e process
concerning t h e o r i g i n of t h e process and t o whom he may address
h i s grievances i n response f o r an inventory ( s e c t i o n 95-712, R.C.M.
1947) a r e m a t t e r s of due process and n o t t e c h n i c a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s .
Omissions i n t h i s regard would be s u b s t a n t i v e and i n f r i n g e on t h e
r i g h t s of t h e person whose residence i s being searched and would
n e c e s s a r i l y be p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r .
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t condemned f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h s e c t i o n
95-706, R.C.M. 1947, which r e q u i r e s :
"The a p p l i c a t i o n on which t h e warrant i s issued s h a l l
be r e t a i n e d by t h e judge b u t need n o t be f i l e d with
t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t nor with t h e c o u r t i f t h e r e i s
no c l e r k , u n t i l t h e warrant has been executed o r has
been returned ' n o t executed "'.
Again t h e s t a t e r e l i e s on s e c t i o n 95-717, R.C.M. 1947, and
a l l e g e s t h a t one of t h e d u p l i c a t e o r i g i n a l s of the a p p l i c a t i o n was
r e t a i n e d by a d e t e c t i v e of t h e Great F a l l s p o l i c e department and
i n its brief states: ''It i s submitted t h a t h i s [ p o l i c e ] agency
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e P o l i c e Judge i s a s binding a s t h a t of t h e
Clerk of Court t o t h e D i s t r i c t Judge and accordingly, Detective
H a l l ' s r e t e n t i o n of t h e Application c o n s t i t u t e s d e f a c t o r e t e n t i o n
by t h e Police Judge of t h e Application ** *." Thus t h e s t a t e
contends t h e requirements of s e c t i o n 95-706,R.C.M. 1947, were
s u b s t a n t i a l l y complied with.
This reasoning i s n o t v a l i d and w i l l n o t be pursued i n depth
b u t i n passing we w i l l comment t h a t t h e r e can be no agency r e l a t i o n -
ship between t h e executive and j u d i c i a l branches of government
by v i r t u e of t h e s e p a r a t i o n of powers d o c t r i n e . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t
was n o t i n e r r o r .
Returning t o s e c t i o n s 95-717 and 95-703, R.C.M. 1947, involved
i n Meidinger; Section 95-703 h e r e t o f o r e c i t e d i n d e f i n i t i o n of a
search warrant, a l s o r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e warrant be "directed t o
a peace o f f i c e r " and i n Meidinger t h e w a r r a n t w a s addressed t o
11
any peace o f f i c e r of t h i s s t a t e " . The f a c t s i n Meidinger were
n o t s i m i l a r n o r was t h e d e f e c t i n t h e w a r r a n t a m a t t e r of substance,
a s we f i n d here. The formal d e f e c t i n t h a t c a s e could i n no way
have i n f r i n g e d on t h e r i g h t s of t h e defendant and was n o t p r e j u d i c i a l .
The Court, i n Meidinger, was n o t moved t o a l t e r t h e s t r i c t a p p l i c a -
t i o n of s e a r c h warrant procedures and s t a t e d :
"While t h i s Court does f i n d t h a t t h e s e a r c h warrant w a s
d e f e c t i v e because i t was n o t d i r e c t e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r
p o l i c e o f f i c e r , we do n o t approve t h i s type of s e a r c h II
warrant and recommend t h a t such p r a c t i c e s be d i s c o n t i n u e d .
T h i s was n o t a l i c e n s e t o erode t h e process b u t an admonition t o
r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e procedures i n t h i s a r e a a r e t o be s t r i c t l y
a p p l i e d , v e r y simply because they d e a l w i t h a n exception t h a t
permits t h e sovereign t o e n t e r upon a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d
area.
The s t a t e ' s second argument i s t h a t i t should have been
allowed t o e i t h e r amend i t s Count I1 of t h e Information t o con-
form w i t h t h e a f f i d a v i t f o r f i l i n g d i r e c t , o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e ,
t h e c o u r t should have dismissed Count I1 and allowed t h e s t a t e t o
r e f i l e t h e Information. S e c t i o n 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947, provides:
"Amending t h e charge. ( a ) A charge may b e amended i n
m a t t e r s of substance a t any t i m e b e f o r e t h e d e f e n d a n r
p l e a d s , without l e a v e of c o u r t .
"(b) The c o u r t may permit any charge t o be amended
a s t o form a t any time b e f o r e v e r d i c t o r f i n d i n g i f no
a d d i t i o n a l o r d i f f e r e n t o f f e n s e i s charged and i f t h e
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e defendant a r e n o t p r e j u d i c e d .
" ( c ) N charge s h a l l be dismissed because of a
o
formal d e f e c t which does n o t tend t o p r e j u d i c e a sub-
s t a n t i a l r i g h t of t h e defendant." (Emphasis added.)
I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , l e f t t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t judge
whether o r n o t t h e information can be amended a f t e r pleading.
S t a t e v. H e i s e r , 146 Mont. 413, 416, 407 P.2d 370. Here, t h e r e i s
no showing i n t h i s r e s p e c t t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t abused i t s
discretion.
T h i s Court s t a t e d i n H e i s e r :
I1
The function of an information i s two-fold: (1)
t o g i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e c o u r t ; and (2) t o n o t i f y
a defendant of h i s o f f e n s e , thereby giving him an
opportunity t o defend. 11
See a l s o : S t a t e v. S t r a i g h t , 136 Mont. 255, 263, 347 P.2d 482.
Here, defendant a f t e r pleading n o t g u i l t y t o t h e Information,
prepared h i s defense of a l i b i and furnished t h e names of t h e
witnesses who would t e s t i f y a s t o t h e v e r a c i t y of h i s a l i b i . To
then allow t h e s t a t e t o change t h e d a t e , t.he elements of t h e crime,
and t h e drug involved would destroy t h a t defense and would i n
substance charge a d i f f e r e n t offense. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o r r e c t l y
refused t h e motion t o amend t h e Information.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was a l s o c o r r e c t i n i t s r u l i n g t h a t t o dismiss
because of a mistake i n t h e substance of t h e charge, admittedly
n o t i n conformity with t h e a f f i d a v i t , with leave t o r e f i l e would
be tantamount t o g r a n t i n g t h e motion t o amend a s t o a matter of
substance.
The order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s a f f i r m
2'
7
/ Justice
P
,Chief J u s t i c e
i _'
...................................
Justices.
Mr. Justice Wesley Castles dissenting:
I dissent as to both the authority of a judge, in this
case a police court judge, to issue a search warrant; and, the
refusal of the district court to permit amendment or refiling.
Suffice it to say that I feel that the majority opinion has
interpreted the statutes much too narrowly.