No. 12858
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
THE STATE O MONTANA, e x r e 1
F
C I T Y M T R COMPANY, I N C . , a
OO
corporation,
Relators,
THE DISTRICT COURT O THE EIGHTH
F
JUDICIAL DISTRICT O THE STATE O
F F
MONTANA, I N AND FOR THE C U T O
O NY F
CASCADE, THE HON. PAUL G. HATFIELD,
DISTRICT JUDGE and FRED DOLBERG,
Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING :
For Relators :
Marra and Wenz, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Joseph R. Marra a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Church, H a r r i s , Johnson and W i l l i a m s , G r e a t Fa 11s ,
Montana
F o r Respondents:
Hoyt and Bottomly, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
John C. Hoyt a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana.
Submitted: December 1 7 , 1974
Decided : J N .. 9l57""s
A
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e James T. H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding. R e l a t o r C i t y Motor
Company s e e k s a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l o r o t h e r appro-
p r i a t e w r i t d i r e c t i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f Cascade County
t o v a c a t e i t s o r d e r d e n y i n g r e l a t o r ' s motion f o r summary judg-
ment under Rule 5 6 , M.R.Civ.P., and t o e n t e r i n i t s s t e a d an
o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e motion, a l l i n Cascade County c a u s e No.
73754C. -
T h i s C o u r t h e a r d c o u n s e l f o r r e l a t o r e x p a r t e and a n
a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t was i s s u e d s e t t i n g a show c a u s e h e a r i n g . Both
p a r t i e s t h e r e u p o n s u b m i t t e d b r i e f s and were r e p r e s e n t e d by
c o u n s e l on o r a l argument.
The f a c t s a r e s i m p l e : Ronald P h i l l i p s , c o d e f e n d a n t w i t h
r e l a t o r , was employed by r e l a t o r a s a new and used c a r salesman.
On t h e n i g h t of F e b r u a r y 27, 1971, p l a i n t i f f i n c a u s e No. 73754C
was d r i v i n g h i s c a r i n t h e c i t y of G r e a t F a l l s when he was s t r u c k
b r o a d s i d e i n a n i n t e r s e c t i o n by a v e h i c l e d r i v e n by P h i l l i p s .
A t t h e t i m e P h i l l i p s was u s i n g a " d e m o n s t r a t o r " owned by r e l a t o r
and p r o v i d e d f o r P h i l l i p s ' u s e . The c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t r e l a t o r
was p r e d i c a t e d on t h e t h e o r i e s of r e s p o n d e a t s u p e r i o r and n e g l i -
gent entrustment. However, t h e answer d e n i e d P h i l l i p s was a c t i n g
w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s employment when h e c o l l i d e d
w i t h p l a i n t i f f and t h a t r e l a t o r knew o r s h o u l d have known a b o u t
P h i l l i p s t driving record. I n s u p p o r t of i t s motion f o r summary
judgment, r e l a t o r r e l i e d on t h e d e p o s i t i o n s of P h i l l i p s and O l e
A a f e d t , s a l e s manager f o r r e l a t o r . I t i s contended t h e former
document c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t P h i l l i p s was i n no way en-
gaged i n r e l a t o r ' s b u s i n e s s when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d and t h e
l a t t e r shows t h a t r e l a t o r d i d e v e r y t h i n g r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d of
it i n a s c e r t a i n i n g P h i l l i p s 1 d r i v i n g a b i l i t i e s .
Rule 56, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
" ( b ) * * * A p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m * * *
i s a s s e r t e d * * * may, a t any t i m e , move f o r a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
pa.rt thereof.
"(c) * * * The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. * * * P summary
.
judgment * * * may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue
as to the amount of damages."
In Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d
167, this Court discussed the rationale behind the provision for
summary judgment:
"The general purpose of Rule 56 is to promptly dispose
of actions in which there is no genuine issue of
fact, thereby eliminating unnecessary trial, delay,
and expense. 6 Moore Fed.Prac.2dI S 56.11, page
2057 further states:
"'A summary judgment is a judgment in bar that
results from an application of substantive law
to facts that are established beyond a reasonable
controversy. The purpose of the hearing on the
motion for such a judgment is not to resolve fac-
tual issues. It is to determine whether there is
any genuine issue of material fact in dispute;
and if not, to render judgment in accordance
with the law as applied to the established facts.'
"At page 2131, Sec. 56.15 of 6 Moore Fed.Prac.2d
that authority states the burden placed upon the
party opposing summary judgment in these words:
" ' * * * the party opposing motion must present
facts in proper form--conclusions of law will
not suffice; and the opposing party's facts must
be material and of a substantial nature, not fan-
ciful, frivolous, gauzy, nor merely suspicious.'"
In Hager v. Tandy, 146 Mont. 531, 537, 410 P.2d 447,
this Court said:
" * * * on a motion for summary judgment the formal
issues presented by the pleadings are not controlling
and the court must consider the depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, oral
testimony and exhibits presented."
See: Daniels v. Paddock, 145 Mont. 207, 399 P.2d 740; 3
Barron & Holtzoff, S 1236.
Thus the determinative question here is whether respondent
has raised factual issues that are material and of a substantial
nature. A f t e r s t u d y i n g t h e whole r e c o r d , e s p e c i a l l y t h e d e p o s i -
t i o n s of P h i l l i p s and A a f e d t , we must c o n c l u d e t h a t r e s p o n d e n t
h a s f a l l e n s h o r t of m e e t i n g t h i s burden.
Was P h i l l i p s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e of h i s
employment a t t h e t i m e of t h e F e b r u a r y 27, 1971 a c c i d e n t ? Re-
s p o n d e n t p u r p o r t s t o f i n d agency r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l a t o r
and P h i l l i p s on t h e b a s i s of c e r t a i n s e l e c t e d p a s s a g e s from
Aafedt's deposition. F o r example:
"Q. And what i s t h e p u r p o s e of g i v i n g your sales-
men a d e m o n s t r a t o r ? A. W e l l , w e hope t o u s e i t
a s a t o o l t o sell Chevrolets. I would l i k e t o
t h i n k t h a t i s what t h e y u s e them f o r .
"Q. And it i s your b e l i e f , a t any r a t e , t h a t
any t i m e a salesman i s i n a d e m o n s t r a t o r t h a t it
i s a s a l e s a s s e t t o C i t y Motors? A. Y e s ; it c e r -
t a i n l y is.
"Q. Now, t h e n , do you t h i n k t h a t t h e more e x p o s u r e
you g i v e your new v e h i c l e s by u s e on t h e c i t y
s t r e e t s of G r e a t F a l l s t h e b e t t e r o f f C i t y Motors
i s ? A. I a m s u r e t h a t i s bound t o be t r u e .
"Q. And was M r . P h i l l i p s g i v e n a d e m o n s t r a t o r
i n p a r t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of d r i v i n g it on t h e s t r e e t s
s o t h a t p e o p l e c a n see your new v e h i c l e s ? A . Along
t h a t l i n e , yes.
"Q. So t h a t i s what he was d o i n g a t t h e t i m e of
t h e a c c i d e n t , w a s n ' t i t ? A. D r i v i n g one of o u r
demonstrators?
"Q. Yes. A. Right.
"Q. With your p e r m i s s i o n ? A. Right.
"Q. And you f e l t t h i s was i n f u r t h e r a n c e of t h e
b e n e f i t of C i t y Motor Company. A . Right."
Respondent a l s o q u o t e s s e c t i o n 53-118, R.C.M. 1947, c o n c e r n i n g
d e a l e r ' s motor v e h i c l e l i c e n s e p l a t e s , and c i t e s c a s e s i n o t h e r
j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have c o n s t r u e d l i k e s t a t u t e s t o g i v e r i s e t o
a presumption t h a t a salesman d r i v i n g a c a r d i s p l a . y i n g d e a l e r ' s
plates is operating it in the dealer's business, and this
presumption continues in the absence of unequivocable evidence
to the contrary.
The chief difficulty with this line of argument is that
it ignores the balance of Aafedtls testimony and Phillips'
testimony altogether. Aafedt further testified:
"Q. NOW, what do you expect your salesmen to do
with the demonstrators you furnish them? A. Well,
as I mentioned, want them to demonstrate them.
They are, however, available for their own per-
sonal use * * * they can even leave the city, they
can leave the state with permission, prior per-
mission. For personal use, but they are to be
used as a demonstrator."
On cross-examination:
"Q. You didn't mean to imply by your testimony,
did you, that at the time of the accident Ronald
Phillips was in the course and scope of his
employment? A. No; he was alone. He wasn't
demonstrating the car. He was going home, so he
wasn't heading toward a prospect, if that is what
you mean.
"Q. There was a question, somewhat ambiguous,
that Mr. Hoyt asked you, and that is whether or
not at the time of the accident, and I'm quoting
the question to the best of my memory, whether
or not at the time of the accident he was employed
by City Motors, and my question to you is that you
did not mean to imply by that answer, did you,
that he was in fact acting in the course and scope
of his employment at the time of the accident?
A. No."
The pertinent part of Phillips' testimony is this:
"Q. Where had you been just prior to the accident?
A. The Wrangler restaurant.
"Q. Where were you going from there? A. Going
home.
"Q. Did you stop anywhere after you left the
Wrangler before you had the accident? A. Yes,
I did, I don't recall where. I picked up some
hot dog buns and some milk or something of this
sort, I can't recall. I know I picked it up,
but I don't know if it was at a store, it might
have been at Super America, next door.
"Q. On i n s t r u c t i o n s from your w i f e ? A. Right.
"Q. And from t h e t i m e you l e f t t h e Wrangler t o
the t i m e of t h e happening of t h e c o l l i s i o n , w e r e
you d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y engaged i n any b u s i n e s s
for C i t y Motors C h e v r o l e t Company? A. I would
say no.
"Q. Would it be c o r r e c t i f I s a i d you were on
your way home t o have s u p p e r ? A . Right.
"Q. R e l a t i v e t o t h e d e m o n s t r a t o r program--and
I r e f e r t o t h e f a c t t h a t you w e r e p r o v i d e d w i t h
a demonstrator--was t h a t d e m o n s t r a t o r always
used i n t h e c o u r s e of C i t y C h e v r o l e t b u s i n e s s ?
A. No."
Respondent a l s o s t r e s s e s t h e f a c t t h a t w h i l e a t t h e r e s t a u r a n t
P h i l l i p s met w i t h o n e C h a r l e s P l a n t , who had p r e v i o u s l y l e d
s e v e r a l c u s t o m e r s t o him. However, t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e
r e c o r d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e i r v i s i t on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n
w a s anything but s o c i a l . Had a l l t h e s e t h i n g s been f a i r l y con-
s i d e r e d and weighed, r e s p o n d e n t may w e l l have found--as we do--
u n e q u i v o c a b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t P h i l l i p s was a c t i n g o u t s i d e t h e c o u r s e
and s c o p e of h i s employment a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t .
Beyond t h i s , we d e t e c t a r e c u r r i n g theme i n r e s p o n d e n t ' s
reasoning: t h e mere f a c t t h a t a d e m o n s t r a t o r on t h e s t r e e t i s
of b e n e f i t t o t h e d e a l e r i s enough t o make t h e d e a l e r answer f o r
t h e f a u l t s of h i s salesman who d r i v e s it. T h i s a s k s t o o much,
f o r it would h o l d t h e d e a l e r r e s p o n s i b l e a t a l l t i m e s . W are
e
n o t aware of any r u l e o r p o l i c y of agency law r e q u i r i n g s u c h a
sweeping a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of r e s p o n d e a t s u p e r i o r .
Moreover, t h e l a w i n Montana i s s e t t l e d on t h e p o i n t t h a t where
a n employee u s e s t h e m a s t e r ' s c a r on a m i s s i o n of h i s own, some
s l i g h t i n c i d e n t a l b e n e f i t which may t h e r e b y a c c r u e t o t h e master
is i n s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant holding t h e master l i a b l e f o r t h e
e m p l o y e e ' s n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n of t h a t v e h i c l e . Monaghan v .
S t a n d a r d Motor Co., 96 Mont. 1 6 5 , 173, 29 P.2d 278. Cases i n
o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s a r e i n agreement. See: Grier v . G r i e r ,
192 N . C . 760, 135 S.E. 852; S l a t t e r y v . O'Meara, 1 2 0 Conn.
465, 1 8 1 A. 610; and S u l l i v a n v. A s s o c i a t e d D e a l e r s , 4 Vlash,2d
S i n c e r e s p o n d e n t h a s shown no f a c t s a d e q u a t e t o s u p p o r t
t h e r e q u i s i t e agency r e l a t i o n s h i p between P h i l l i p s and r e l a t o r a t
t h e t i m e i n q u e s t i o n , w e a p p l y t h e p r e v a i l i n g r u l e of law a s
d e c l a r e d by t h i s C o u r t i n Monaghan:
" I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t even though t h e d r i v e r
o f a c a r i s t h e s e r v a n t of t h e owner of t h e c a r ,
t h e owner i s n o t l i a b l e u n l e s s a t t h e t i m e of t h e
a c c i d e n t t h e d r i v e r was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e
of h i s a u t h o r i t y and i n r e g a r d t o h i s m a s t e r ' s
business. "
To t h e same e f f e c t s e e : H a r r i n g t o n v . H. D. Lee M e r c a n t i l e Co.,
97 Mont. 4 0 , 33 P.2d 553; Wilcox v . Smith, 103 Mont. 182, 62
Did r e l a t o r n e g l i g e n t l y e n t r u s t a d e m o n s t r a t o r motor
vehicle t o Phillips? The g i s t of r e s p o n d e n t ' s argument h e r e
i s t h a t r e l a t o r , by n o t o b t a i n i n g a copy o f P h i l l i p s ' d r i v i n g
r e c o r d from t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l , f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e
proper c a r e i n s e l e c t i n g P h i l l i p s f o r i t s s a l e s force. As to
t h i s t h e o r y , r e l a t o r knew from P h i l l i p s ' j o b a p p l i c a t i o n t h a t
h e had had no motor v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t s d u r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g f i v e
y e a r p e r i o d and t h a t he p o s s e s s e d a v a l i d Montana d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e .
A a f e d t t e s t i f i e d t h a t p e r s o n s h i r e d f o r s a l e s , a s opposed t o
drivers p o s i t i o n s w e r e investigated f u r t h e r with r e s p e c t t o
t h e i r g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r and s a l e s a b i l i t y , b u t n o t h i n g more.
What else c o u l d reasonably be expected of relator u n d e r the
circumstances? Respondent c e r t a i n l y h a s n o t p r e s e n t e d any hard
f a c t s t o i n d i c a t e r e l a t o r knew o r s h o u l d have known P h i l l i p s had
a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a good d r i v i n g r e c o r d .
W e t h i n k t h a t r e l a t o r , upon d i s c o v e r i n g P h i l l i p s t o be
a d u l y l i c e n s e d motor v e h i c l e o p e r a t o r , prima f a c i e was e n t i t l e d
t o r e l y on h i s competency a s a d r i v e r . Piquet v. Wazelle,
3$16' a .
3 $-P 463, 136 A. 787. T h a t r e l a t o r i n q u i r e d even f u r t h e r o f
P h i l l i p s bears out i t s contention t h a t every reasonable e f f o r t
was made t o d e t e r m i n e P h i l l i p s ' f i t n e s s a s a n employee. To
i n s i s t t h a t r e l a t o r was under a n a f f i r m a t i v e d u t y ko a s c e r t a i n
o r keep a b r e a s t of P h i l l i p s ' d r i v i n g r e c o r d would be t,o p l a c e
upon r e l a t o r and o t h e r s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d a burden u n j u s t i f i e d
by e i t h e r i t s own n e e d s o r t h e p u b l i c good.
L e t a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l a s prayed f o r i s s u e
J
'
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r holdi';lg h e r e i n . ;
it
Chief J u s t i c e
W concur:
e
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