No. 13107
I N THE SUPKEME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1976
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs -
EVELYN FARNES ,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
John Id. Adams, B i l l i n g s , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena,
Montana
Harold F. Hanser, : B i l l i n g s , Montana
Submitted w i t h o u t o r a l argument
Submitted: October 2 2 , 1976
.,
Dee i d ed : G'IL 2. , j i6
!
Filed : I- , y/j:
Hon. L.C. Gulbrandson, D i s t r i c t J u d g e , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e James T , H a r r i s o n , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion
of t h e C o u r t .
Defendant Evelyn F a r n e s a p p e a l s from a judgment
of c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e c r i m e of t h e f t , t r i e d i n t h e
D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n
and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone.
On F e b r u a r y 8 , 1975, one B i l l Stumpf a r r i v e d
a t t h e P u b l i c Auction Market i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, w i t h
a number of o t h e r p e o p l e , i n a cream-colored Oldsmobile,
towing a h o r s e t r a i l e r . An unbranded s o r r e l mare w a s
unloaded from t h e t r a i l e r , and was d e l i v e r e d by Stumpf
t o a n employee of t h e Market a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 12:30 a.m.,
t e l l i n g t h e employee t o r u n t h e h o r s e t h r o u g h " l o o s e "
a t t h e s a l e t h a t day. Horses which a r e r u n t h r o u g h " l o o s e "
a r e n o r m a l l y s o l d a s c a n n i n g h o r s e s , whereas h o r s e s which
a r e ridden through t h e s a l e s r i n g a r e normally s o l d a s
p l e a s u r e o r working h o r s e s . Stumpf d i d n o t c l a i m any
ownership o f t h e a n i m a l , b u t c o n s i g n e d t h e mare i n t h e
name o f one Ray Tanner.
A f t e r t h e s a l e , a t a b o u t 5:15 p . m . , February 8 ,
1975, a p u r p o r t e d b i l l of s a l e t o t h e a n i m a l s i g n e d by
one E a r l West t o Ray Tanner was d e l i v e r e d t o t h e A u c t i o n
Market by t h e d e f e n d a n t Evelyn F a r n e s . The employee
receiving t h e b i l l of s a l e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant
i n t r o d u c e d h e r s e l f a s Ray T a n n e r ' s w i f e , and when t o l d
t h a t payment would be d e l a y e d u n t i l t h e f o l l o w i n g Monday
waote t h e name of K a r l a R e i c h e r t on t h e back of t h e b i l l
of s a l e and t o l d t h e employee t o make payment t o h e r
f r i e n d Reichert. The employee r e c e i v i n g t h e b i l l of
s a l e from t h e d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d o v e r o b j e c t i o n t h a t
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 m i n u t e s e a r l i e r he had r e c e i v e d a phone
c a l l from a person i n q u i r i n g what he needed f o r t h e
h o r s e , and t h e employee answered t h a t a b i l l o f s a l e
would be r e q u i r e d , and t h e c a l l e r responded t h a t a b i l l
of sale would be d e l i v e r e d f o r t h e h o r s e .
The l o c a l brand i n s p e c t o r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he
photographed t h e mare on F e b r u a r y 8 , 1975, b e c a u s e he
knew t h e mare w a s on h e r way t o a dog food f a c t o r y i n
S o u t h Dakota and t h a t p r i o r t o t h e s a l e he p u t a s t o p
on t h e check f o r t h e s a l e of t h e h o r s e , and t h a t a t t h e
s a l e he s a w t h e d e f e n d a n t , i n t h e company of B i l l Stumpf,
Buzz F e e l e y , and K a r l a R e i c h e r t ,
The l o c a l i n s p e c t o r / d e t e c t i v e t e s t i f i e d t h a t on
F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 197 5 , he commenced a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n
r e g a r d i n g t h e s a l e of t h e h o r s e , l e a r n i n g t h a t Karla
R e i c h e r t w a s t h e d a u g h t e r of t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e g i r l
f r i e n d of B i l l Stumpf. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he w a s
u n a b l e t o l o c a t e anyone by t h e name of Ray Tanner o r
E a r l West, t h e p e r s o n s named on t h e b i l l of s a l e
d e l i v e r e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t .
On a p p r o x i m a t e l y F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1975, D r . Thomas
Morledge r e p o r t e d a s o r r e l mare a s m i s s i n g from h i s
w i n t e r p a s t u r e , and from photographs he had t a k e n and
t h e p h o t o g r a p h t a k e n on February 8 a t t h e Auction
Market, t h e h o r s e w a s i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e one d e l i v e r e d
by B i l l Sturnpf.
The d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s : t h a t on
F e b r u a r y 7 , 1975, a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 11:30 p.m. s h e and
"Buzz" F e e l e y w e r e d r i n k i n g i n a B i l l i n g s b a r when a
man a s k e d F e e l e y t o h e l p him h a u l a h o r s e t o t h e
A u c t i o n Market. F e e l e y a g r e e d , and t h e d e f e n d a n t d r o v e
h e r v e h i c l e , a c c 0 m p a n i e d . b ~ e e l e y and B i l l y Stumpf, t o
F
t h e North Yard where t h e y p i c k e d up F e e l e y ' s h o r s e
trailer. They t h e n f o l l o w e d a d a r k p i c k u p truck to
a p a s t u r e n e a r A l k a l i Creek where b o t h v e h i c l e s s t o p p e d
and t h e man i n t h e p i c k u p g o t o u t , c r a w l e d t h r o u g h a
f e n c e , and walked up t o a h o r s e , p u t t i n g a h a l t e r on
t h e h o r s e , t h e n l e a d i n g it t h r o u g h a g a t e , and p u t i t
i n t h e horse t r a i l e r .
She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e "Buzz" and
B i l l y Stumpf were o u t s i d e of h e r c a r , t h e s t r a n g e r came
by t h e d r i v e r ' s window of t h e c a r and handed h e r t h e
b i l l of s a l e , s a y i n g , "You w i l l need t h i s t o s e l l t h e
horse." The d e f e n d a n t t h e n d r o v e h e r v e h i c l e , p u l l i n g
t h e l o a d e d h o r s e t r a i l e r , back t o t h e a u c t i o n y a r d s
where B i l l y Stumpf unloaded t h e h o r s e and t o o k it i n
t o t h e Market.
She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e n e v e r saw t h e
s t r a n g e r a g a i n , t h a t s h e d i d n o t c a l l t h e Auction
Market o r have a c a l l p l a c e d f o r h e r , b u t o n l y d e l i v e r e d .
t h e b i l l of s a l e on t h e a f t e r n o o n of F e b r u a r y 8 t o t h e
Market b e c a u s e s h e assumed t h a t t h e y would need i t ,
t h a t s h e d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e h e r s e l f a s Ray T a n n e r ' s w i f e ,
t h a t s h e w r o t e h e r d a u g h t e r ' s name on t h e back of t h e
b i l l of s a l e s o s h e c o u l d h o l d t h e check u n t i l t h e
s t r a n g e r p a i d them $15.00 which s h e c l a i m e d he had
promised i n exchange f o r h a u l i n g t h e h o r s e t o m a r k e t .
Karla Reichert, t h e defendant's daughter,
t e s t i f i e d s h e knew n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e t r a n s a c t i o n o r
t h e b i l l of s a l e , and t h a t h e r mother had n e v e r a s k e d
h e r t o p i c k up t h e check a t t h e Market.
B i l l y S t u m p f l s t e s t i m o n y was c o r r o b o r a t i v e o f
t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e x c e p t he s t a t e d t h a t h e w a s n o t o u t
of t h e c a r a t A l k a l i Creek, w h i l e M r s . F a r n e s s t a t e d
t h a t he w a s when t h e s t r a n g e r handed h e r t h e b i l l of s a l e .
The a p p e a l p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s :
1. Ws t h e evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support
a
t h e conviction?
2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g
t o give defendant's offered i n s t r u c t i o n s
number 7 and 8?
M r s . F a r n e s w a s c h a r g e d and c o n v i c t e d o f t h e
o f f e n s e of t h e f t a s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1) which
reads a s follows:
" ( 1 ) A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f t h e f t
when he p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly o b t a i n s o r
e x e r t s unauthorized c o n t r o l over property
of t h e owner, and:
( a ) h a s t h e p u r p o s e of d e p r i v i n g t h e owner
of t h e p r o p e r t y ; o r
( b ) p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly u s e s , c o n c e a l s ,
o r abandons t h e p r o p e r t y i n s u c h manner a s
t o d e p r i v e t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y ; o r
( c ) u s e s , c o n c e a l s , o r abandons t h e p r o p e r t y
knowing such u s e , concealment o r abandonment
p r o b a b l y w i l l d e p r i v e t h e owner of t h e
property. "
The t e r m "knowingly" i s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n
"A p e r s o n a c t s knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o
c o n d u c t o r t o a c i r c u m s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d by
a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e when h e i s
aware of h i s c o n d u c t o r t h a t t h e circum-
s t a n c e e x i s t s . When knowledge of t h e
e x i s t e n c e - of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s a n
-- . - - -
e l e m e n t of a n o f f e n s e , such knowledqe i s
e s t a b l i s h e d i f a Derson i s aware o f a
L
~ ~
h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t e n c e .
E q u i v a l e n t t e r m s such a s 'knowinq' o r
' w i t h knowledge ' have t h e same meaning. "
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d )
" P u r p o s e l y " i s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 94-2-101 ( 5 3 )
which r e a d s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
"A person acts purposely with respect to
a result or to conduct described by a
statute defining an offense if it is his
conscious object to engage in the conduct
or to cause that result. * * * "
The testimony presented at trial constituted
direct evidence of every element of the crime of theft
except intent. As in State v. Cooper, 158 Mont. 102,
489 P.2d 99 (1971) the element of intent may be, and
generally is, demonstrated by circumstantial evidence.
Citing State v. Madden, 128 Mont. 408, 276 P,2d 974 (1954)
the Court stated:
"The element of felonious intent in every
contested criminal case must necessarily
be determined from facts and circumstances
of the particular case--this for the reason
that criminal intent, being a state of
mind, is rarely susceptible of direct or
positive proof and therefore must usually
be inferred from the facts testified to by
witnesses and the circumstances as developed
by the evidence * * *
"The question of intent is a question for
the jury."
The rules that govern the weight and sufficiency
of circumstantial evidence are set out in the leading
Montana case of State v. Cor, 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d
86 (1964) at page 326:
"Circumstantial evidence is not always
inferior in quality nor is it necessarily
relegated to a 'second class status' in
the consideration to be given to it. The
very fact that it is circumstantial is not
a sufficient allegation to justify a
reversal of the judgment for such evidence
may be, and frequently is, most convincing
and satisfactory. In any criminal case.
evidence that is material, relevant and'
competent will be admitted, 'nothing more
and nothing less'. The test is whether
the facts and circumstances are of such a
quality and quantity as to legally justify
a jury in determining guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. If such be the case,
then the court should not, indeed cannot,
s e t a s i d e t h e solemn f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i e r
of f a c t s . " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d )
I t is a well-established p r i n c i p l e of law t h a t
i n a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of e v i d e n c e
t o p r o v e t h e main f a c t of g u i l t o r any e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t
looking t h e r e t o i s a matter peculiarly within t h e
p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s c o u r t h a s
stated that:
"The j u r y b e i n g t h e s o l e judge of t h e w e i g h t
t o be g i v e n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h e c o u r t
s h o u l d n o t t e l l them what p a r t i c u l a r weight
t o g i v e t o any p o r t i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y . "
S t a t e v . G l e i m , 17 Mont. 1 7 , 29, 4 1 P. 998
(1895).
The r u l e i s t h a t i f s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s
found t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t , t h e n it w i l l s t a n d .
S t a t e v . White, 146 Mont. 226, 229, 405 P.2d 761 ( 1 9 6 5 ) .
The c o u r t i n S t a t e v. S t o d d a r d , 147 Mont, 402, 408,
412 P.2d 827 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , s t a t e d :
F i r s t w e should note t h a t t h i s c o u r t i s n o t
a t r i e r of f a c t * * * I n view o f t h e
presumption o f innocence a t t h e t r i a l , t h e
j u r y must have been i n s t r u c t e d t o t h a t
e f f e c t , b u t on a p p e a l a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n t h e
r u l e changes. Then, i f t h e r e c o r d shows
any s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e
judgment, t h e presumption i s i n f a v o r of
s u c h judgment." p. 408.
I n S t a t e v . Medicine B u l l , J r . , 152 Mont. 34,
445 P.2d 916 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e j u r y i s
f r e e t o c o n s i d e r a l l t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d and t o p i c k
and choose which o f t h e w i t n e s s e s t h e y w i s h t o b e l i e v e .
That i f s u f f i c i e n t testimony w a s introduced t o j u s t i f y
t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g , t h e n t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n would n o t be
d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s t h e r e w a s a c l e a r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g by
t h e j u r y o r a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n made t o t h e j u r y .
The a p p e l l a n t i s g u i l t y of t h e crime of t h e f t
. i n t h i s c a s e i f s h e was aware t h a t t h e h o r s e was s t o l e n
o r i f s h e was aware o f a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e h o r s e
-
was s t o l e n . Under t h e weakest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e
f a c t s p r e s e n t e d by t h e s t a t e , t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e from which t h e j u r y c o u l d f i n d t h a t t h e
d e f e n d a n t w a s aware of a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e
horse w a s stolen. W e f i n d t h a t t h e evidence i s
s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e conviction.
D e f e n d a n t ' s second a l l e g a t i o n o f e r r o r would
be grounds f o r r e v e r s a l of t h e c o n v i c t i o n i f t h e
e x c l u s i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s 7 and 8
w a s e r r o n e o u s and d e f e n d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d by such
exclusion.
D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n number 7
reads as follows:
"You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t may
n o t be c o n v i c t e d on c o n j e c t u r e s , however
shrewd, on s u s p i c i o n s , however j u s t i f i e d ,
on p r o b a b i l i t i e s , however s t r o n g , b u t o n l y
upon e v i d e n c e which e s t a b l i s h e s g u i l t
beyond r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ; t h a t i s upon
proof such a s t o l o g i c a l l y compel t h e
conviction t h a t t h e charge i s t r u e . "
D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n number 8
r e a d s as follows:
"You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t p r o o f o f i l l e g a l
a s p o r t a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y t o prove t h e
c r i m e of t h e f t . By i l l e g a l a s p o r t a t i o n
i s meant t h e i l l e g a l t a k i n g o f t h e a n i m a l .
T h e r e f o r e i f you f i n d t h a t t h e r e i s no proof
beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t
knowingly p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e i l l e g a l
a s p o r t a t i o n of t h e a n i m a l o r proof beyond a
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t s h e knew t h e animal
had been s t o l e n when s h e p r e s e n t e d t h e b i l l
of s a l e t o t h e s t o c k y a r d s , s h e i s e n t i t l e d
t o an a c q u i t t a l . "
I t i s a n e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e of law i n Montana
t h a t when examining j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on a p p e a l t o
'determine if prejudice has occurred by erroneous admission
or erroneous exclusion of a jury instruction, all
instructions must be read as a whole. State v. Bosch,
125 Mont. 566, 242 P.2d 477. Where jury instructions
as a whole correctly state the law prejudice is not
created because of a refusal of a proposed instruction.
State v. Lukus, 149 Mont. 45, 423 P.2d 49.
Here the jury was instructed as to each of the
elements of the crime of theft, as to circumstantial
evidence, and as to the standard of proof necessary to
convict.
Defendant's proposed instruction number 7 is
often given but here the same subject matter was
covered in given instructions.
Objection to defendant's proposed instruction
number 8 was made on the grounds that it was an
incomplete statement of law. Here proof of asportation
was not essential to conviction and the jury was
instructed as to the element of "control" necessary to
convict.
Upon examining all instructions given we find
that the jury was properly instructed and defendant
was not prejudiced through the court's failure to give
defendant's proposed instructions number 7 and number 8.
The appellant further interjected the issue of
the admissibility of the telephone call made to the Market
approximately one-half hour before the defendant arrived
with the bill of sale. The caller was told that a bill
of sale would be required before the proceeds of the
.sale could be paid. Evidence of the contents of the
call did constitute hearsay, but was admissible as an
exception to the rule, the call being made as an
integral part of an overall criminal transaction.
~taeev. McCracken, 93 Mont. 269, 18 P.2d 302 (1933).
The judgment of conviction i
-
District
We concur:
Justices J