No. 12994
I N THE SUPREME COlJRT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1976
CLINTON SWEET,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
KENNETH EDMONDS,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record :
For Appellant :
J o s e p h P. Hennessey a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Crowley, K i l b o u r n e , Haughey, Hanson and G a l l a g h e r ,
B i l l i n g s , Montana
Ronald R. Lodders a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
Submitted : September 1 0 , 1976
Dec i d e d : fi c i : j
Filed :
Mr.J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by p l a i n t i f f C l i n t o n Sweet from a
judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t Kenneth
Edmonds' motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . Plaintiff w a s injured
when h i s a u t o m o b i l e was s t r u c k by a n o t h e r a u t o m o b i l e d r i v e n by
defendant. P l a i n t i f f ' s subsequent negligence a c t i o n a g a i n s t
d e f e n d a n t w a s t r i e d i n J a n u a r y 1975 b e f o r e a j u r y i n Y e l l o w s t o n e
County. A t t h e c l o s e of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e i n c h i e f , defendant
moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e grounds p l a i n t i f f was con-
t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t and t h e proof w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o show
t h a t any n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of d e f e n d a n t was a p r o x i m a t e
cause of t h e c o l l i s i o n . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s
motion. A f t e r c a r e f u l examination of t h e r e c o r d , w e hold t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h o u l d have a l l o w e d t h e c a s e t o go t o t h e j u r y .
The c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d i n t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s a t
t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n o f S i x t h S t r e e t West and Broadwater Avenue
i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. A t t h a t p o i n t Broadwater w a s a f o u r l a n e
t h r o u g h s t r e e t and t h e r e was a s t o p s i g n on S i x t h . The p o s t e d
speed l i m i t was t w e n t y - f i v e m i l e s p e r hour. The s t r e e t w a s d r y ,
t h e w e a t h e r was c l e a r , and t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was lit by a s t r e e t
l i g h t on t h e c o r n e r .
P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d a t t h e t r i a l t h a t he approached
Broadwater from t h e s o u t h , s t o p p e d a t t h e s t o p s i g n on S i x t h ,
and looked i n b o t h d i r e c t i o n s f o r t r a f f i c . H e s a i d h e was
t u r n i n g r i g h t o n t o Broadwater when h e was h i t from behind by
d e f e n d a n t ' s a u t o m o b i l e which was p r o c e e d i n g e a s t on Broadwater
i n t h e f a r r i g h t hand l a n e . P l a i n t i f f conceded he had a c l e a r
view t o t h e w e s t of a b o u t o n e c i t y b l o c k when s t o p p e d a t t h e
i n t e r s e c t i o n , b u t m a i n t a i n e d he n e v e r saw d e f e n d a n t ' s automo-
bile. Defendant t e s t i f i e d h e was d r i v i n g a b o u t t h i r t y m i l e s
p e r hour and saw p l a i n t i f f ' s a u t o m o b i l e o n l y a second b e f o r e
the collision.
Defendant a r g u e s p l a i n t i f f v i o l a t e d t h e right-of-way
r u l e e s t a b l i s h e d by s e c t i o n 32-2172, R.C.M. 1947, and was con-
t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r of law by e n t e r i n g Broad-
w a t e r when d e f e n d a n t ' s a u t o m o b i l e w a s s o c l o s e a s t o c o n s t i t u t e
a n immediate h a z a r d . The d e f e n s e of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e ,
by d e f i n i t i o n , r e q u i r e s proof of b o t h n e g l i g e n c e and p r o x i m a t e
cause. Grabs v. Missoula C a r t a g e Co., Mont. , 545 P.2d
1079, 3 3 St.Rep. 154; G i l l e a r d v . D r a i n e , 159 Mont. 1 6 7 , 1 7 1 ,
496 P.2d 83. W s a i d i n Erickson v. P e r r e t t ,
e Mont . I
545 P.2d 1074, 1077, 33 St.Rep. 109:
"We n o t e t h a t t h e m e r e happening of a n
a c c i d e n t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e o f neg-
l i g e n c e . F l a n s b e r g v . Montana Power Co.,
154 Mont. 53, 58, 460 P.2d 263; F r i e s v .
Shaughnessy, 159 Mont. 307, 310, 496 P.2d
1159. F u r t h e r when t h e b r e a c h of a s t a t u -
t o r y d u t y i s a l l e g e d , t h a t d u t y r e q u i r e d by
s t a t u t e must be t h e e f f i c i e n t o r p r o x i m a t e
c a u s e of t h e damages f o r n e g l i g e n c e t o be
p r e d i c a t e d on t h e v i o l a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e .
J o k i v . McBride, 150 Mont. 378, 436 P.2d 78;
Rauh v. J e n s e n , 1 6 1 Mont. 443, 445, 507 P.2d
520."
Defendant h a s computed from t e s t i m o n y i n t h e r e c o r d c o n c e r n i n g
t h e p o i n t of impact and t h e r e s p e c t i v e s p e e d s o f t h e two v e h i -
c l e s t h a t he w a s o n l y a b o u t n i n e t y - s i x f e e t away when p l a i n t i f f
began t u r n i n g o n t o Broadwater. As plaintiff t e s t i f i e d he had
a clear view t o t h e w e s t of a b o u t one c i t y b l o c k , d e f e n d a n t
c o n c l u d e s p l a i n t i f f was n e g l i g e n t i n n o t s e e i n g him and i n t h e
a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t i f p l a i n t i f f d i d s e e d e f e n d a n t ' s a u t o m o b i l e he
was n e g l i g e n t i n t u r n i n g o n t o Broadwater i n t h e f a c e o f o b v i o u s
danger.
On t h e o t h e r hand, p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he s t o p p e d a t t h e
i n t e r s e c t i o n , looked t o t h e w e s t , and d i d n o t see d e f e n d a n t ' s
automobile. I n J e s s e n v . O ' D a n i e l , 136 Mont. 513, 523, 349
P.2d 1 0 7 , w e s a i d :
" * * * A m o t o r i s t i s n o t required t o look f o r
m i l e s up a r o a d i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e r e
a r e no v e h i c l e s a p p r o a c h i n g . A l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d
of him i s t h a t he l o o k s u f f i c i e n t l y f a r t o be
s u r e t h a t t h e r e a r e no a p p r o a c h i n g v e h i c l e s which,
i n t h e mind of a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n , would
be l i k e l y t o c a u s e a n a c c i d e n t i f h e proceeded
into the intersection."
I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was d r i v i n g i n e x c e s s of t h e
l e g a l speed l i m i t , a f a c t which p l a i n t i f f w a s n o t bound t o
anticipate. Grabs v . Missoula C a r t a g e Co., Mont . I
545 P.2d 1079, 33 St.Rep. 154. Defendant a l s o t e s t i f i e d he
d i d n o t s e e p l a i n t i f f ' s a u t o m o b i l e u n t i l immediately b e f o r e
the collision. A f a v o r e d d r i v e r c a n n o t r e l y a b s o l u t e l y on h i s
right-of-way; he must a c t r e a s o n a b l y and m a i n t a i n a p r o p e r look-
out. Flynn v . Helena Cab & Bus Co., 94 Mont. 2 0 4 , 215, 2 1 P.2d
I n McGuire v . Nelson, 167 Mont. 1 8 8 , 1 9 5 , 536 P.2d 768,
32 St.Rep. 600, we s a i d :
" I t h a s l o n g been h e l d by t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e
l a w d o e s n o t f a v o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s and t h e
e v i d e n c e t h e r e f o r e w i l l be viewed i n t h e l i g h t
most f a v o r a b l e t o a p p e l l a n t s , a s having proved
what it t e n d s t o p r o v e . Johnson v . Chicago,
M. & S t . P. R. Co., 7 1 Mont. 390, 394, 230 P.
52. T h i s C o u r t h a s a l s o l o n g h e l d t h a t c a s e s
s h o u l d n o t be withdrawn from a j u r y u n l e s s
r e a s o n a b l e and f a i r - m i n d e d men c o u l d r e a c h
o n l y one c o n c l u s i o n from t h e f a c t s . In r e
E s t a t e of H a l l v . Milkovich, 158 Mont. 438, 492
P.2d 1388."
The f a c t s h e r e do n o t d i c t a t e t h a t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y
negligent. W e cannot say d e f e n d a n t ' s automobile w a s s o c l o s e t o
t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n when p l a i n t i f f t u r n e d o n t o Broadwater a s t o
c r e a t e a n immediate h a z a r d a s a m a t t e r o f law. Whether p l a i n t i f f
c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t t o c o m p l e t e t h e t u r n s a f e l y was a q u e s t i o n
f o r t h e jury. The j u r y s h o u l d a l s o have been a l l o w e d t o d e t e r -
mine whether p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n s were t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e
c o l l i s i o n r a t h e r t h a n d e f e n d a n t ' s e x c e s s i v e speed o r h i s f a i l u r e
t o keep a p r o p e r l o o k o u t .
S i m i l a r l y , t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s h o u l d n o t have been
granted on the basis that plaintiff failed to prove a causal
relationship between defendant's acts and the collision. The
evidence was undisputed that: (1) defendant was driving in
excess of the legal speed limit; (2) he had been drinking prior
to the collision; and (3) he did not see plaintiff's automobile
until immediately before the collision. When viewed in a light
most favorable to plaintiff, this evidence is sufficient to
enable a jury to reasonably find defendant's conduct was the
proximate cause of the collision.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for
a new trial.
We concur: f,- I
Chief Justice 'U
Justice