No. 1.3264
TN 'THE SUPKEME COUKT 9F THE STATE OF MONTAHA
1976
SCOTT PARKLSH,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
LIODNEY TI. WITT and SHIRIAY VITT,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s .
A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable R o b e r t Sykes, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Courlsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
Hash, J e l l i s o n & O ' ~ r i e n ,K a l i s p e l l , Montana
Kenneth E. O ' B r i e n a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
F'or Respondents :
Warden, W a l t e r s k i r c h e n & C h r i s t i a n s e n , K a l i s p e l l ,
Montana
M e r r i t t N. \,Jarden a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
Submitted: August 31, 1 9 7 6
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court .
T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t f o r d e f e n d a n t s
by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , F l a t h e a d County.
P l a i n t i f f S c o t t P a r r i s h was v i s i t i n g t h e mobile home of
Leo McDonald i n e a r l y A p r i l 1973, t o h e l p a f r i e n d move h e r
belongings. A s h e walked t o t h e mobile home from h i s pickup,
c a r r y i n g a s m a l l c h i l d , a sudden r a i n began. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t
a s he t r o t t e d up t h e wooden walkway l e a d i n g t o t h e mobile home
he s l i p p e d , s l i d two o r t h r e e f e e t , t h e walkway t t e , h i s f o o t
a; d
became anchored and a s he t w i s t e d t o keep t h e c h i l d from harm,
he f e l l , s u f f e r i n g a s e v e r e broken l e g .
P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a complaint which s e t o u t two c l a i m s f o r
relief. The f i r s t named Rodney D . and S h i r l e y W i t t , t h e owners
of t h e mobile home c o u r t , a s d e f e n d a n t s . The second named t h e
McDonalds a s d e f e n d a n t s . The second c l a i m w a s s e t t l e d o u t of
c o u r t and t r i a l was had on t h e f i r s t c l a i m . That t r i a l ended w i t h
a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t f o r defendant owners.
These d e f e n d a n t s , M r . and Mrs. W i t t , a r e owners of t h e
Greenwood Mobile Home T e r r a c e n e a r W h i t e f i s h , Montana. McDonalds
were t e n a n t s , l i v i n g i n t h e newly c o n s t r u c t e d p o r t i o n of t h e mobile
home c o u r t . When McDonalds moved i n t h e y brought w i t h them a
s e c t i o n of wooden walkway which t h e y i n s t a l l e d i n f r o n t of t h e
s t e p s l e a d i n g t o t h e mobile home. A s a courtesy t o the tenants,
because t h e a r e a would become muddy a s s p r i n g p r o g r e s s e d , t h e
manager of t h e mobile home c o u r t c o n s t r u c t e d and d e l i v e r e d a d d i -
t i o n a l walkway s e c t i o n s .
When t h e s e c t i o n s were d e l i v e r e d t o t h e McDonald residence
they were placed approximately i n l i n e w i t h t h e o t h e r s e c t i o n
o f walkway b u t t h e r e was no a t t e m p t t o p u t them i n f i n a l p o s i t i o n
o r s t a b i l i z e them. T h i s occurred f o u r t o s i x weeks p r i o r t o
the accident. I n t h e time between t h e d e l i v e r y of t h e a d d i t i o n a l
walkway s e c t i o n s and t h e a c c i d e n t , p l a i n t i f f v i s i t e d t h e McDonald
residence. Mrs. McDonald t e s t i f i e d s h e had n o t i c e d t h e s e
a d d i t i o n a l s e c t i o n s were u n s t a b l e and t h a t she had r e p o r t e d
t h i s t o t h e c o u r t manager.
The i s s u e r a i s e d on a p p e a l i s whether t h e d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t
was p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d .
I n S l a g s v o l d v . Johnson, Mont . , 544 P.2d 442,443,
3 2 S t . Rep. 1273, 1275, t h i s Court quoted w i t h a p p r o v a l a
p r i o r c a s e a s s t a t i n g t h e law of Montana on d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s :
'"* * * a s a g e n e r a l r u l e , t h e i s s u e s of n e g l i g e n c e
and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e must be decided by t h e
***
j u r y under a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s and t h e
s e t t l e d r u l e i s t h a t a c a s e should n o t be t a k e n from
t h e j u r y u n l e s s i t follows as a m a t t e r of law t h a t
p l a i n t i f f cannot r e c o v e r upon any view of t h e e v i d e n c e ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e s t o be drawn from
i t ; e v e r y f a c t w i l l be deemed proved which t h e evidence
t e n d s t o prove. "'
Other c a s e s have s e t o u t t h i s g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n i n t h e
form of t h r e e r u l e s : 1 ) The evidence i n t r o d u c e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f
w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o him. 2) The
c o n c l u s i o n s sought t o be drawn from t h e f a c t s must f o l l o w a s a
m a t t e r of law. 3 ) Only t h e evidence of t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l be
considered. H a n n i f i n v . R e t a i l C l e r k s , 162 Mont. 170, 511 P.
2d 982; Mueller v . Svejkovsky, 153 Mont. 416, 458 P.2d 265;
P i c k e t t v. Kyger, 151 Mont. 87, 439 P.2d 57; Johnson v . Chicago,
M. & S t . Paul Ry., 7 1 Mont. 390, 230 P. 52.
The q u e s t i o n Lhen becomes -- whether, c o n s i d e r i n g only
rhe p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o him, i t
rollows a s a m a t t e r of law from t h e f a c t s proven t h a t t h e r e
i s no d u t y running from t h e l a n d l o r d t o t h e t e n a n t ' s g u e s t ?
T h i s Court i n d i s c u s s i n g l i a b i l i t y of t h e l a n d l o r d f o r
i n j u r i e s o c c u r r i n g on l e a s e d premises i n Gray v. Fox West Coast
S e r v i c e Corp., 93 Mont. 397, 18 P.2d 797, s a i d :
11 I I n t h e c a s e of i n j u r i e s t o t h i r d persons r e s u l t i n g
from t h e c o n d i t i o n o r u s e of t h e s e premises, it i s
a g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t prima f a c i e t h e b r e a c h of d u t y and
t h e r e f o r e t h e l i a b i l i t y , i s t h a t of t h e o c c u p a n t . a n d n o t
of t h e l a n d l o r d , and t h a t i n o r d e r t o r e n d e r t h e l a t t e r
l i a b l e more must be shown t h a n merely t h a t t h e premises
on which o r from which t h e i n j u r y a r o s e were l e a s e d t o
him by another."'
2'0 a v o i d t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e p l a i n t i f f must show more, h e must
show t h a t he f a l l s w i t h i n one of t h e e x c e p t i o n s t o t h i s r u l e .
Ln t h i s c a s e p l a i n t i f f r e l i e s on t h e e x c e p t i o n which h o l d s t h e
Lessor l i a b l e f o r r e p a i r s o r improvements which a r e n e g l i g e n t l y
made. The elements which must be shown i n o r d e r t o f a l l i n t o
t h i s e x c e p t i o n a r e s e t o u t i n 2 Restatement of T o r t s 2d, $362,
Negligent R e p a i r s by Lessor:
"A l e s s o r of l a n d who, by p u r p o r t i n g t o make r e p a i r s
on t h e land w h i l e i t i s i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of h i s l e s s e e , o r
t h e n e g l i g e n t manner i n which he makes such r e p a i r s
h a s , a s t h e l e s s e e n e i t h e r knows n o r should know,made
t h e l a n d more dangerous f o r u s e o r g i v e n it a deceptive
appearance of s a f e t y , i s s u b j e c t t o l i a b i l i t y f o r p h y s i c a l
harm caused by t h e c o n d i t i o n t o t h e l e s s e e o r t o o t h e r s
upon t h e land w i t h t h e consent of t h e l e s s e e o r s u b l e s s e e . "
L t i s c l e a r t h a t t o f i n d a d u t y on t h e p a r t of t h e l a n d l o r d
f o u r elements must be p r e s e n t : 1 ) The l a n d l o r d must make a
n e g l i g e n t r e p a i r o r improvement. 2) That r e p a i r o r improvement
must make t h e land more dangerous o r g i v e a d e c e p t i v e appearance
of s a f e t y . 3) The l e s s e e can n e i t h e r know n o r should he know of
t h e danger. 4) There must be p h y s i c a l harm caused b y t h e
c o n d i t i o n t o t h e l e s s e e o r t h o s e on t h e land w i t h h i s c o n s e n t .
Here, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e evidence shows t h e l e s s e e knew
of t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f claimed was dangerous. Even
assuming t h a t t h e l e s s e e d i d n o t know t h e c o n d i t i o n was p r e s e n t ,
i t i s a t l e a s t a r g u a b l e h e should have d i s c o v e r e d t h e dangerous
c o n d i t i o n i n t h e f o u r t o s i x weeks a f t e r t h e new s e c t i o n s were
delivered. Once t h e t e n a n t s knew of t h e c o n d i t i o n t h e y have t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t themselves and t h o s e who e n t e r on
t o t h e premises from harm. The l i a b i l i t y of t h e l a n d l o r d remains
only a s long a s t h e t e n a n t s had no knowledge of t h e danger, h i s
duty was t o warn of t h e danger, and once t h e t e n a n t s knew of t h e
danger t h e warning i s no l o n g e r n e c e s s a r y . A f t e r t e n a n t s know
of t h e danger, t h e y have t h e d u t y t o e i t h e r make t h e premises
s a f e o r t o warn. It i s from t h i s f a c t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e
l a n d l o r d had no d u t y running t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , f o l l o w s as a
m a t t e r of law.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r d i r e c t i n g a v e r d i c t f o r
defendant owners i s a f f i r m e d .
We concur:
Justices