No. 13486
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1976
CAREY MATOVICH YUNKER,
P l a i n t i f f and P e t i t i o n e r ,
FRANK MURRAY, S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana,
i n h i s c a p a c i t y a s Secretary of S t a t e of t h e S t a t e of
Montana, e t a l . ,
Defendants and Respondents.
O r i g i n a l Proceeding:
Counsel o f Record:
For P e t i t i o n e r :
D a n i e l 3. Shea a r g u e d , Missoula, Montana
For Respondents:
Robert L.Woodah1, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana
William 3. Anderson a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
Helena, Montana
Submitted: September 7 , 1976
Filed : $El' I. 4 1976
Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
This is an o r i g i n a l proceeding seeking a d e c l a r a t o r y
judgment t h a t e a c h o f t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t j u d g e s o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t o f Montana i s a n " i n c u m b e n t " w i t h i n t h e meaning
o f A r t i c l e V I I , s e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n and must r u n
on a " r e t a i n o r r e j e c t " b a l l o t i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n p u r s u a n t
t o s e c t i o n 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947.
The p e t i t i o n was f i l e d on b e h a l f o f Carey Matovich Yunker,
a r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r i n p r e c i n c t 5 9 , Y e l l o w s t o n e County, Montana,
within t h e Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t . A copy o f t h e c o m p l a i n t
f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment was a t t a c h e d t o t h e p e t i t i o n f i l e d h e r e i n .
The m a t t e r was s e t f o r a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g and n o t i c e g i v e n
t o t h e Hon. F r a n k Murray, S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , and t o t h e t h r e e
d i s t r i c t judges of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . Notice w a s
n o t g i v e n t o t h e c l e r k and r e c o r d e r o f e a c h o f t h e f i v e c o u n t i e s
c o m p r i s i n g t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t named a s d e f e n d a n t s .
B r i e f s w e r e f i l e d by p e t i t i o n e r , t h e s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e , and two
o f t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t j u d g e s of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t .
A t t h e t i m e o f a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g c o u n s e l a p p e a r e d and
p r e s e n t e d o r a l argument on b e h a l f o f p e t i t i o n e r and on b e h a l f o f
t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . A s w e understand it, t h e s e a t t o r n e y s
s t i p u l a t e d t h a t procedurally t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e admitted t h e
e s s e n t i a l f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e p e t i t i o n and c o m p l a i n t b u t
n o t t h e l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n s , a g r e e d on t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d , and
r e q u e s t e d t h i s C o u r t t o r e n d e r f o r t h w i t h a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment,
i n view of t h e t i m e element involved. This Court took t h e m a t t e r
under advisement.
W e a c c e p t j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h i s d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n
on t h e b a s i s set f o r t h and u n d e r a u t h o r i t y o f Forty-Second Leg.
Assembly v . Lennon, 1 5 6 Mont. 416, 481 P.2d 330.
W e d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h e c l e r k s and r e c o r d e r s o f t h e f i v e
c o u n t i e s of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t n e c e s s a r y p a r t i e s
t o t h i s a c t i o n and o r d e r a l l s t r i c k e n a s d e f e n d a n t s h e r e i n . The
s t a t u t o r y d u t y of p r e s c r i b i n g t h e form of b a l l o t i s v e s t e d i n
t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . S e c t i o n 2 3 - 3 5 1 7 ( 3 ) , R.C.M. 1947. His
presence a s a p a r t y herein renders unnecessary t h e joining of
county e l e c t i o n o f f i c i a l s .
Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e , a bona f i d e j u s t i -
c i a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment h a s been p r e s e n t e d
t o us f o r determination. Here we have a c o m p l a i n t f o r d e c l a r a t o r y
judgment; a s t i p u l a t i o n i n open c o u r t t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t s
a r e u n d i s p u t e d and t h a t p r o c e d u r a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s a r e waived by
t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ; a n a d m i s s i o n by two o f t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t
judges i n t h e i r b r i e f t h a t " t h e f a c t s , i s s u e s , and law a r e now
s q u a r e l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t " ; and a n agreement on t h e s p e c i f i c
i s s u e t o be d e c i d e d under t h e f a c t s . Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
w e w i l l t r e a t t h e s t i p u l a t i o n and a d m i s s i o n s a s r e s p o n s i v e p l e a d -
i n g s t o t h e c o m p l a i n t and c o n s i d e r t h e c a s e r e a d y f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n .
The f a c t u a l background w i l l i l l u m i n a t e t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d
for decision. P r i o r t o 1961 d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u d g e s h i p s i n m u l t i -
judge j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t s were n o t d e s i g n a t e d o r i d e n t i f i e d a s
separate offices. Each c a n d i d a t e , whether incumbent o r c h a l l e n g e r ,
ran against t h e f i e l d r a t h e r than against a p a r t i c u l a r individual
f o r a designated judgeship. I n a t h r e e judge d i s t r i c t , f o r example,
t h e t h r e e c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v i n g t h e h i g h e s t number o f v o t e s i n t h e
general e l e c t i o n w e r e declared e l e c t e d t o t h e t h r e e judgeships t o
be f i l l e d .
I n 1961 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e changed t h i s system by amending
s e c t i o n s 23-2001 t h r o u g h 23-2003, R.C.M. 1947, ( l a t e r r e p l a c e d
by s e c t i o n 23-4501, R.C.M. 1947). The new l e g i s l a t i o n p r o v i d e d
t h a t each d i s t r i c t judgeship i n a multi-judge judicial d i s t r i c t
was t o be a s s i g n e d a number and e a c h became a s e p a r a t e j u d i c i a l
office. A t t h a t t i m e t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judgeships i n t h e
T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t w e r e a s s i g n e d numbers a c c o r d i n g t o
t h e s e n i o r i t y of t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t j u d g e s . Thus t h e j u d g e s h i p
h e l d by J u d g e Derry became Department #1; t h a t of J u d g e F e n t o n
became Department # 2 ; and t h a t o f J u d g e Sande became Department
#3.
T h i s s i t u a t i o n continued u n t i l t h e r e t i r e m e n t of Judge
Derry i n 1967. A t t h a t t i m e by c o u r t r u l e i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , J u d g e F e n t o n became t h e s e n i o r d i s t r i c t judge
i n p o i n t o f s e r v i c e and succeeded t o Department #1; J u d g e Sande
t o Department # 2 ; and J u d g e Luedke, a p p o i n t e d t o s u c c e e d J u d g e
D e r r y , t o Department # 3 .
The s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e , however, r e t a i n e d t h e o r i g i n a l
d e p a r t m e n t d e s i g n a t i o n and s o f a r a s h i s e l e c t i o n r e c o r d s w e r e
c o n c e r n e d J u d g e F e n t o n remained i n Department # 2 , J u d g e Sande i n
Department # 3 , and J u d g e Luedke succeeded t o Department # l .
I n 1969 J u d g e F e n t o n d i e d and J u d g e Wilson was a p p o i n t e d
t o s u c c e e d him. The l o c a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t r u l e r e s u l t e d i n a n
o r d e r b e i n g e n t e r e d a s s i g n i n g J u d g e Sande t o Department #1, J u d g e
Luedke t o Department # 2 , and J u d g e Wilson t o Department # 3 .
The s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ' s e l e c t i o n r e c o r d s r e t a i n e d t h e
o r i g i n a l d e s i g n a t i o n s and showed J u d g e Luedke i n Department #1,
J u d g e Wilson i n Department # 2 , and J u d g e Sande i n Department #3.
I n t h e 1972 e l e c t i o n t h e r e c o r d s i n t h e s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e ' s
o f f i c e and i n t h e c o u r t r e c o r d s o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t
indicated t h i s situation:
Thirteenth Judicial
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e D i s t r i c t i n Billings
Dept. #1 J u d g e Luedke J u d g e Sande
Dept. # 2 J u d g e Wilson J u d g e Luedke
Dept. # 3 J u d g e Sande Judge Wilson
Confusion r e s u l t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h f i l i n g s by c h a l l e n g e r s .
One c h a l l e n g e r f i l e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e T h i r t e e n J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t
d e p a r t m e n t numbers, r a t h e r t h a n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t
numbers i n t h e e l e c t i o n r e c o r d s i n t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ' s
office. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n h i s f i l i n g a g a i n s t t h e wrong judge.
The e r r o r was d i s c o v e r e d b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g d e a d l i n e and t h e
f i l i n g was amended a c c o r d i n g l y .
This e l e c t i o n y e a r , according t o t h e B i l l i n g s judges, they
d e c i d e d t o f i l e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t o v e r which e a c h p r e -
sided a s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e c o u r t records of t h e Thirteenth Judi-
c i a l D i s t r i c t i n B i l l i n g s , t o avoid t h e confusion t h a t e x i s t e d
i n 1972. The r e c o r d s i n t h e s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e ' s o f f i c e w e r e
conformed t o t h o s e d e p a r t m e n t numbers used i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h
Judicial District. A c c o r d i n g l y , Judge Sande f i l e d f o r Department
#1, Judge Luedke f o r Department #2 and Judge Wilson f o r Department
#3.
However, p r i o r t o t h e e l e c t i o n t h i s y e a r , t h e 1972 Montana
C o n s t i t u t i o n had been a d o p t e d and t h e e l e c t i o n laws p e r t a i n i n g t o
d i s t r i c t judges changed. The 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e d
a l l unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judges t o r u n on a " r e t a i n o r
reject" basis. A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u -
t i o n ; K e l l e r v . Smith, 33 St.Rep. 828, Mont .-1 -P.2d
A form of b a l l o t w a s p r o v i d e d t o implement t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p r o v i s i o n by t h e 1973 l e g i s l a t u r e . S e c t i o n 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947;
K e l l e r v . Smith, s u p r a .
The s i t u a t i o n , i n a n u t s h e l l , i s t h a t e a c h o f t h e t h r e e
judges i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t was e l e c t e d i n 1972
t o a f o u r y e a r term i n a d i f f e r e n t d e p a r t m e n t o r j u d g e s h i p t h a n
t h a t f o r which t h e y a r e r u n n i n g unopposed i n 1976. The q u e s t i o n
f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s whether e a c h i s a n "incumbent" w i t h i n t h e
meaning of A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
and must r u n on a " r e t a i n o r r e j e c t " b a l l o t i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n
p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947.
A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n
provides :
" (2) I f , a t the f i r s t election a f t e r senate
c o n f i r m a t i o n , and a t t h e e l e c t i o n b e f o r e e a c h
s u c c e e d i n g t e r m o f o f f i c e , any c a n d i d a t e o t h e r
t h a n t h e incumbent j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t judge
f i l e s f o r e l e c t i o n t o t h a t o f f i c e , t h e name
of t h e incumbent s h a l l be p l a c e d on t h e b a l l o t .
I f t h e r e i s no e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t f o r t h e o f f i c e ,
t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l n e v e r t h e l e s s be
p l a c e d on t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n b a l l o t t o a l l o w
v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t t o approve o r
r e j e c t him. I f a n incumbent i s r e j e c t e d , a n o t h e r
s e l e c t i o n and nomination s h a l l be made."
S e c t i o n 2 3 - 4 5 0 1 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s :
"Each j u d i c i a l o f f i c e i n a d i s t r i c t which h a s more
t h a n one (1) d i s t r i c t judge i s a s e p a r a t e and i n d e -
pendent o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n purposes."
From t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n and s t a t u t e it i s a r g u e d
t h a t none o f t h e t h r e e unopposed d i s t r i c t judges i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i s a n "incumbent" b e c a u s e e a c h h a s f i l e d f o r a
d i f f e r e n t o f f i c e o r j u d g e s h i p t h a n t h a t t o which h e was e l e c t e d
i n t h e p r e c e d i n g e l e c t i o n i n 1972.
W e observe t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision i s d i r e c t e d t o
incumbent d i s t r i c t judges (and Supreme C o u r t j u s t i c e s ) . W e have
p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l pro-
v i s i o n a p p l i e s t o a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t judges i r r e s p e c t i v e o f
how t h e y o r i g i n a l l y a t t a i n e d t h e i r j u d i c i a l o f f i c e s and i n t h a t
c o n t e x t a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t judges must r u n on a " r e t a i n o r
reject" b a l l o t i n the general election. K e l l e r v . Smith, s u p r a .
The e x p l a n a t o r y n o t e s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention
f o l l o w i n g A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8, f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e word
"incumbent" a p p e a r i n g t h e r e i n a p p l i e s t o any judge i n o f f i c e .
"Convention Notes
" R e v i s e s 1889 c o n s t i t u t i o n * * * C o n t e s t e d
e l e c t i o n o f judges i s n o t changed, however i f
a judqe i n o f f i c e d o e s n o t have a n opponent i n
a n e l e c t i o n h i s name w i l l be p u t on t h e b a l l o t
anyway and t h e p e o p l e asked to approve o r r e j e c t
him. * * * I t (Emphasis a d d e d . )
T h i s e x p r e s s e s t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e l e g a t e s t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
Convention and t h e meaning t h e y a t t a c h e d t o t h e word "incumbent"
i n t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n t h e y framed and a d o p t e d . It
c l e a r l y shows t h e a p p r o v a l o r r e j e c t i o n b a l l o t was i n t e n d e d t o
a p p l y t o any unopposed judge i n o f f i c e . Keller v. Smith, s u p r a .
The s t a t u t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, was e n a c t e d l o n g b e f o r e
t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . O r i g i n a l l y e n a c t e d i n 1961 when
t h e system of e l e c t i n g judges was changed a s h e r e t o f o r e d e s c r i b e d ,
vcol
t h e s t a t u t e was s u b s e q u e n t l y c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 2 3 - M ( 2 ) , R.C.M.
1947, i n 1969. I t c r e a t e d a s e p a r a t e o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n purposes
f o r each judgeship i n a multi-judge d i s t r i c t i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h
head-on c o n t e s t s between two c a n d i d a t e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l j u d g e s h i p s
i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n c o n t i n u e t h e p r i o r system
whereby a l l c a n d i d a t e s r a n i n a f i e l d f o r t h e t o t a l number o f
j u d g e s h i p s t o be f i l l e d i n t h e e l e c t i o n .
Thus t h e purpose and o b j e c t i v e o f t h e s t a t u t e , on t h e o n e
hand, and t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n , on t h e o t h e r , a r e q u i t e
different. It follows t h a t t h e r e i s nothing inconsistent i n using
t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n t o mean any
judge i n o f f i c e and a t t h e same t i m e p r e s e r v i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y
mandate t h a t e a c h j u d g e s h i p i s a s e p a r a t e o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n
purposes. The two a r e n o t r e p u g n a n t o r i r r e c o n c i l a b l e , b u t c a n
be c o n s t r u e d and i n t e r p r e t e d as p a r t s o f a homogene0.u~wh01.e~
g i v i n g e f f e c t t o each.
W e find f u r t h e r support f o r our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h e
p r i n c i p l e of reasonable construction. This p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s
e q u a l l y t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n and h a s been
d e f i n e d and e x p l a i n e d i n t h i s language:
" I t h a s been c a l l e d a g o l d e n r u l e o f s t a t u t o r y
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t unreasonableness of t h e
r e s u l t produced by one among a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b l e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a s t a t u t e i s r e a s o n f o r r e -
j e c t i n g t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n f a v o r of a n o t h e r
which would produce a r e a s o n a b l e r e s u l t . It is
said to be a 'well established principle of
statutory interpretation that the law favors
rational and sensible construction.'" Suther-
land, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 2A,
Sec. 45.12, p. 37, and cases cited therein.
Montana has adopted this principle by statute. Section 49-134,
R.C.M. 1947.
Applying this principle to the case before us, is it reason-
able to construe the intent of the framers of the constitution to
permit nullification of the "retain or reject" ballot simply by
filing for a different district judgeship in the same judicial
district? To ask the question is to answer it. This could be
repeated in each succeeding election ad infinitum. We decline to
indulge in the assumption the framers of the constitution intended
to impose the requirement of a "retain or reject" ballot for
unopposed judges with their right hand, and at the same time ef-
fectively nullify it with their left.
Additionally, public policy supports our construction. In
Keller we quoted a recognized authority:
"Statutes regulating the rights of citizens to
vote are of great public interest, and therefore,
are interpreted with a view to securing for
citizens their right to vote and to insure the
election of those officers who are the people's
- -
choice." Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
4th Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 71.15, p . 366. and cases
. A
therein cited.
We applied this principle to Article VII, Section 8 ( 2 ) , 1972
Montana Constitution, in the context of the issue before us in
Keller. We apply it here for the same reasons and with the same
result.
We have considered the subsidiary arguments advanced in
opposition to our interpretation and find them not persuasive.
This opinion constitutes a declaratory judgment that each
of the three judges in the Thirteenth Judicial District of Montana
is an unopposed "incumbent" within the meaning of Article VII,
Section 8(2), 1972 Montana Constitution, and must run on a "retain
or reject" ballot in the general election in 1976 pursuant to
section 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. The secretary of state, pur-
suant to section 23-3517(3), R.C.M. 1947, should prescribe the
form of ballot accordingly.
7%d - g - M
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Justice
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* * * * *
Justice Wesley Castles dissents but is not available to
express his views at this time.