No. 13437
I N THE SUPREME COIRT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1976
I N THE MATTER O SECRET GRAND JURY
F
I N Q U I R Y , J O H N AND J A N E DOES THIRTY
THROUGH THIRTY - N I N E
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING :
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena,
Montana
Howard M. G i l b e r t , S p e c i a l P r o s e c u t o r argued and
Thomas Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d ,
Helena, Montana
Hon. Gordon R. B e n n e t t , D i s t r i c t J u d g e , a r g u e d ,
Helena, Montana
Dexter T2. Delaney, a f f i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n a r g u e d ,
M i s s n u l a , Montana
For Respondent :
R o b e r t Emmons, n e g a t i v e p o s i t i o n , a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s ,
Montana
Submitted : J u l y 7 , 1976
Filed :
Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This is a petition of Hon. Gordon R. Bennett, presiding
district judge in charge of the Lewis and Clark County grand
jury, requesting in effect a declaratory judgment from this
Court on certain issues raised in the grand jury proceedings
of the Workmen's Compensation Division, Department of Labor
and Industry, State of Montana.
Three issues are presented:
1) What authority does the district court have over
grand jury subpoenas?
2) What authority has the district court to examine the
proceedings of the grand jury to determine if its instructions,
given upon empanelment are being adhered to?
3) What authority has the district court to determine
whether agents of the grand jury, such as investigators, are ad-
hering to the law or conducting themselves appropriately as
attaches of the court?
The petition was set for oral argument before this Court
on July 7, 1976, together with several other matters arising out
of the grand jury investigation. Several counsel argued for this
Court to accept the district court's petition, while others argued
this Court had no authority to issue an advisory opinion, and there
was nothing before the Court upon which to make a determination,
either by appeal or by supervisory control.
With the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction, we
cannot agree. In the first instance, the petition of Judge Bennett
is not one for an advisory opinion. Advisory opinions are those
opinions issued by a court in response to a request from some other
branch of government,such as the legislative or executive, asking
for information concerning matters of law. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional
Law 5 150. We are here involved with justiciable issues. ar'ising 6rom
bana ride c6ntroverk.l-es the dbstr'ict.court.
En
We consider Judge Bennett's questions as justiciable
controversies contempLaed by Rule 57, Montana Rules Civil Procedure.
First, a justiciable controversy requires that parties have
existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights
or interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the
judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from
a debate or argument invoking a purely political, administrative,
philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a contro-
versy the judicial determination of which will have the effect
final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights,
status or legal relationships of one or more of the real parties
in interest, or lacking these qualities be of such an overriding
public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them.
The decisions of this Court recognize and support this definition,
See: The Forty-Second Legislative Assembly v. Lennon, 156 Mont.
330; Conrad et al. v. Managhan et al., 157
Mont. 335, 485 P.2d 948; State ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, 159
Mont. 190, 496 P.2d 1127; Woodahl v. Montana. Board Natural Re-
sources and Conservation, 163 Mont. 193, 516 P.2d 383; State ex
rel. Irvin v. Anderson, 164 Mont. 513, 525 P.2d 564.
As this Court stated in Lennon, in taking jurisdiction
under the Montana Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Title 93,
Chap. 89, R.C.M. 1947:
"A d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n i s a proper proceeding
i n which t o r e a c h and answer t h e l e g a l i s s u e s r a i s e d i n
t h i s proceeding. A c o u r t of r e c o r d i n Montana i s s p e c i f i c a l l y
g r a n t e d t h e power ' t o d e c l a r e r i g h t s , s t a t u s , and o t h e r
l e g a l r e l a t i o n s ' of a p a r t y ( s e c t i o n 93-8901, R.C.M. 1947)
which ' a r e a f f e c t e d by a s t a t u t e ' ( s e c t i o n 93-8902, R.C.M.
1947) and i n which a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment ' w i l l t e r m i n a t e
t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o r remove an u n c e r t a i n t y ' ( s e c t i o n 93-
8905, R.C.M. 1947). This i s p r e s c i s e l y t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t
e x i s t s i n the present case. * *I1
F i r s t , we o u t l i n e a b r i e f f a c t u a l s e t t i n g of t h e grand j u r y
cases. I n 1974, t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e enacted s e c t i o n 79-2315,
R.C.M. 1947, which provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
"The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s h a l l conduct on behalf of t h e
s t a t e , a l l p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r p u b l i c o f f e n s e s d i s c l o s e d by
an a u d i t of a s t a t e agency performed by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e
a u d i t o r . I f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s h a l l d e c l i n e such
p r o s e c u t i o n o r s h a l l f a i l t o commence a c t i o n on a p u b l i c
o f f e n s e w i t h i n a reasonable time t h e county a t t o r n e y of
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e county s h a l l conduct on behalf of t h e s t a t e
such p r o s e c u t i o n .'I
Pursuant t o t h e d i r e c t i o n of s e c t i o n 79-2315, t h e a t t o r n e y
g e n e r a l began an i n v e s t i g a t i o n a r i s i n g o u t of an a u d i t of t h e
Workmen's Compensation D i v i s i o n and r e q u e s t e d t h e two judges of t h e
f i r s t j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t t o c a l l a grand j u r y . T h i s r e q u e s t was
denied and t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a p p l i e d t o t h i s Court f o r a w r i t
of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l , d i r e c t i n g t h e two judges t o empanel a grand
jury. I n S t a t e ex r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, 166 Mont. 31,
530 P.2d 780, 32 St.Rep. 11, t h i s Court ordered t h e empanelment
of a grand j u r y and s i n c e t h a t time t h e grand j u r y has been func-
t i o n i n g , r e s d t i n g in a number of lndiccmentsc
. Due t o numerous d e l a y s i n g e t t i n g c a s e s t o t r i a l , t h i s
Court i s s u e d t h i s o r d e r d a t e d June 1 5 , 1976, e n t i t l e d " I n t h e Matter
of t h e Workmen' s Compensation L i t i g a . t i o n l ' , t h i s Court' s No. 13410 :
"It appearing in the light of recent events that
the rights of the public, the state, the defendants and
the judiciary are being subordinated to personal and
extraneous ends and purposes,
"And it appearing that the Montana Supreme Court
should act under its general supervisory powers pursuant
to Art.VIS, Sec. 2 of the Montana Constitution, in order
to remedy and mitigate the effects of the foregoing situa-
tion,
"IT IS ORDERED:
" (1) That the attorney general of Montana and other
public prbosecutors,all defense counsel, and the presiding
district judges in all pending criminal cases involving the
Workmen's Compensation investigations and prosecutions are
directed to appear at a Conference to be held in the Court-
room of this Supreme Court on the 21st day of June, 1976,
at 2:00 p.m.
( ) That the Commission on Practice is directed to
"2
investigate the conduct of all public prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys in pending Workmen's Compensation litiga-
tion, determine whether there are any violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and transmit the Commis-
sion recommendations, including disciplinary action, if
indicated, to this Court in the usual manner.
( ) That in order to prevent further injury to the
"3
rights of the public, the state, the defendants and the
judiciary pending the Conference herein provided, all counsel,
their staffs, clerks, stenographers and attaches are ordered
and directed to refrain directly or indirectly from public
comment in any way relating to the litigation heretofore des-
cribed. .
I ( ) Any violation of this order shall subject the
' 4
offender to proceedings for contempt of court.
( ) The Clerk of this Court is directed to cause
"5
notice to be given by mailing a true copy hereof forthwith
to all public prosecutors, defense counsel, and presiding
district judges in all pending Workmen's Compensation cases.
District judges shall bring the district court file to the
Conference herein provided.
( ) No excuses will be accepted for nonattendance at
"6
said Conference.I
'
Following the hearing on June 21St, 1976, Judge Bennett
petitioned this Court for a declaratory judgment, this Court's No.
13437, as to the heretbfore enumerated three questions. Underlying
the questions is a basic question as to the nature of a grand jury
proceeding, which must be answered b e f o r e g i v i n g s p e c i f i c answers
t o Judge B e n n e t t ' s q u e s t i o n s .
The Supreme Court of t h e United S t a t e s d i s c u s s e d t h e n a t u r e
of grand j u r y proceedings i n United S t a t e s v . Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
" T r a d i t i o n a l l y t h e grand j u r y h a s been accorded
wide l a t i t u d e t o i n q u i r e i n t o v i o l a t i o n s of c r i m i n a l
law. N judge p r e s i d e s t o monitor i t s proceedings.
o
I t d e l i b e r a t e s i n s e c r e t and may determine a l o n e t h e
c o u r s e of i t s i n q u i r y . The grand j u r y may compel t h e
production of evidence o r t h e testimony of w i t n e s s e s a s
i t c o n s i d e r s a p p r o p r i a t e , and i t s o p e r a t i o n g e n e r a l l y i s
u n r e s t r a i n e d by t h e t e c h n i c a l p r o c e d u r a l and e v i d e n t i a r y
r u l e s governing t h e conduct of c r i m i n a l t r i a l s . 'It is
a grand i n q u e s t , a body w i t h powers o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n and
i n q u i s i t i o n , t h e scope of whose i n q u i r i e s i s n o t t o be
l i m i t e d narrowly by q u e s t i o n s of p r o p r i e t y o r f o r e c a s t s
of t h e p r o b a b l e r e s u l t of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , o r by doubts
whether any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be found p r o p e r l y
s u b j e c t t o an a c c u s a t i o n of c r i m e . ' B l a i r v . United
S t a t e s , 250 US 273, 282, 63 L Ed 979, 39 S.Ct. 468
(1919).
"The scope of t h e grand j u r y ' s powers r e f l e c t s i t s
s p e c i a l r o l e i n i n s u r i n g f a i r and e f f e c t i v e law e n f o r c e -
ment. A grand j u r y proceeding i s n o t an a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g
i n which g u i l t o r innocence of t h e accused i s a d j u d i c a t e d .
R a t h e r , i t i s an e x p a r t e i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o determine
whether a crime h a s been committed and whether c r i m i n a l
proceedings should be i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t any person. The
grand j u r y ' s i n v e s t i g a t i v e power must be broad i f i t s
*
p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s a d e q u a t e l y t o be d i s c h a r g e d . 9; *I'
There i s a grave p u b l i c need f o r a grand j u r y which may
conduct an u n f e t t e r e d and u n i n t e r r u p t e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The grand
i u r y h a s a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e p u b l i c t o thoroughly i n v e s t i g a t e
2
the matters before it. The p u b l i c must know t h a t no l e a d went unin-
v e s t i g a t e d , t h a t t h e p u b l i c may have c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e f u l l and f a i r
adrriinistration of j u s t i c e .
Measuring t h e p u b l i c need f o r a f u l l , broad grand j u r y
i n v e s c i g a t i o n a g a i n s t any p o t e n t i a l harm t o a w i t n e s s who h a s
been subpoenaed, i t i s c l e a r t h e need f o r an u n f e t t e r e d grand j u r y
is much g r e a t e r . What, i f a n y t h i n g , i s l o s t by anyone i f t h e grand
jury hears evidence from a witness a second time, even if that
evidence was conceded to be irrelevant to the grand jury's basic
investigation. The grand jury conducts its investigation in secret,
and its investigation is not adversarial. The grand jury does not
determine guilt or innocence, it only determines if criminal pro-
ceedings should be begun. Most of the witnesses that appear before
the grand jury will never be indicted, but the grand jury needs
their testimony simply to continue its investigation. The witnesses
lose nothing by testifying. The grand jury has a right to every
man's evidence, even if it would be embarrassing to him personally.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L ed 2d 626.
If a witness should be later indicted, he would be accorded the
full range of rights granted to him as a defendant in a criminal
case. If, at that time, evidence is offered that is irrelevant
an objection would lie, and the legal question can be determined
in a court of law.
The constant interruption of the grand jury by witnesses
who wish to litigate the validity of the subpoenas which call them
before the grand jury, could easily result in the investigation
coming to a grinding halt.
The logic of the United States Supreme Court in Calandra
explaining why the exclusionary rule should not apply to grand jury
proceedings applies with equal force to the questions now before
this Court:
"* * Because the grand jury does not finally adjudicate
guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to
pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded
by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable
to a criminal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the
exclusionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate
adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on
the merits and would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings.
Suppression hearings would halt the orderly progress
of an,investigationand might necessitate extended
litigation of issues only tangentially related to the
grand jury's primary objective. The probable result would
be 'protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings, t
* 9~ * effectively transforming them into preliminary trials
on the merits. In some cases the delay might be fatal to
the enforcement of the criminal law. Just last Term we
reaffirmed our disinclination to allow litigious interference
with grand jury proceedings:
"'Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with
minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly
impede its investigation and frustrate the public's
interest in the fair and expeditious administration of
the criminal laws.' United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,
17, 35 L Ed 2d 67, 93 S.Ct. 764 (1973) .'
I
The questions posed by Judge Bennett must be answered against the
backdrop of this strong policy against saddling the grand jury
investigation with delays for preliminary hearings that would
frustrate the public need for an unfettered grand jury investigation.
This Court will not tolerate "litigious interference with grand
jury proceedings".
We now consider Judge Bennett's concern as to the authority
of a district judge over grand jury subpoenas in the instant case.
The statutory section in the Code of Criminal Procedure which applies
to grand jury subpoena power is section 95-1407, R.C.M. 1947,
which provides:
"A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness before
the grand jury may be signed and issued by the county
attorney, by the grand jury or by the judge of the district
court, for witnesses in the state, in support of the pro-
secution, for those witnesses whose testimony, in his
opinion is material in an investigation before the grand
jury, and for such other witnesses as the grand jury upon
investigation pending before them may direct." (Emphasis
added.)
The statute allows the court, the county: attorney, or the grand
jury to issue subpoenas. It allows any one of the three to subpoena
witnesses whose testimony is, in the caller's opinion, material.
However, i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e j u d g e ' s charge i s Che
l i m i t i n g f e a t u r e t o t h e scope of t h e grand j u r y .
The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a grand j u r y i s e n t i t l e d t o o b t a i n
testimony o r subpoena a l l evidence n e c e s s a r y f o r i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s .
However, i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e
a r e made. For example, t h e r e i s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r conformity w i t h
t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s requirements of t h e Fourth and F i f t h Amendments
t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
The c o u r t may quash a subpoena duces tecum which i s c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l l y overbroad. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. C t . 370,
50 L ed 652. The c o u r t may quash a subpoena duces tecum which
v i o l a t e s t h e F i f t h Amendment's r i g h t a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n .
,3,g!!/
Boyd v. United S t a t e s , 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct.-$&3f 29 L ed 746;
Losavio v. D i s t r i c t Court I n & For Tenth J u d . D i s t . , (Colo. 1975),
533 P.2d 32. A grand j u r y may subpoena a w i t n e s s even though i t i s
powerless t o f o r c e him t o t e s t i f y over a v a l i d c l a i m of s e l f - i n c r i m i n -
a t i o n a b s e n t a g r a n t of immunity. United S t a t e s v. Winter, 348 F.2d
204.
Quashing a subpoena because t h e r e i s no showing of t h e
m a t e r i a l i t y of t h e testimony sought i s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . United
S t a t e s v. United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court, 238 F.2d 713. T h i s does
n o t mean t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may never quash a grand j u r y sub-
poena no m a t t e r how f a r a f i e l d t h e grand j u r y may go from t h e a r e a
o f i t s o r i g i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , o n l y t h a t t h i s power i s l i m i t e d t o
t h e most extreme c a s e s where t h e c o u r t , by n o t quashing t h e subpoena,
would be p e r m i t t i n g a g r o s s abuse of p r o c e s s . I n United S t a t e s v .
United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 238 F. 2d 713, 722, t h e Court s a i d :
IT* * * While t h e judge has t h e s u p e r v i s o r y duty t o s e e
t h a t i t s p r o c e s s i s n o t abused o r used f o r purposes of
oppression o r i n j u s t i c e *** t h e r e should be no c u r -
t a i l m e n t of i t s i n q u i s i t o r i a l power except i n t h e
c l e a r e s t c a s e s of abuse ."
Applying t h a t t e s t , t h e c l e a r e s t c a s e of abuse r e q u i r e s something
more than r e c a l l i n g w i t n e s s e s whose testimony i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e
original inquiry. Oppression i s something s u b s t a n t i a l l y more
than t e l l i n g a w i t n e s s t h a t i f h e l i e s b e f o r e t h e grand j u r y he w i l l
be charged w i t h p e r j u r y . Only i n a much s t r o n g e r c a s e , where t h e r e
was g r o s s misconduct a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e use of p r o c e s s , would
t h e c o u r t be j u s t i f i e d i n i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e grand j u r y ' s i n v e s t i -
g a t i o n by quashing t h e grand j u r y ' s subpoena.
From t h e foregoing d i s c u s s i o n i t i s apparent and we h o l d ,
t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e grand j u r y ' s
subpoena power except ( a ) where t h e subpoena duces tecum i s over-
broad; (b) where t h e subpoena r e q u i r e s s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n ; ( c )
i n t h e c l e a r e s t c a s e of g r o s s l y abusive conduct; (d) where t h e
grand j u r y ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n goes beyond t h e scope s e t f o r t h above;
o r ( e ) where, i f t h e c o u r t d i d n o t i n t e r f e r e , t h e r e s u l t would be
an abuse of process.
Judge B e n n e t t ' s second i s s u e r e v o l v e s around t h e a u t h o r i t y
of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e grand j u r y proceedings
t o determine i f t h e l i m i t s of t h e charge a r e being v i o l a t e d . It
i s c l e a r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may i n q u i r e i n t o t h e grand j u r y proceedings
only t o s e e t h a t i t s t a y s w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n
79-2315, R.C.M. 1947.
The Code of Criminal Procedure d i r e c t s t h e grand j u r y t o
r e t i r e t o a " p r i v a t e roomf' and look i n t o t h e o f f e n s e s cognizable
by i t , s e c t i o n 95-1404(b), R.C.M. 1947. S e c t i o n 95-1406, R.C.M.
1947, allows t h e grand j u r y t o ask a d v i c e of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge,
b u t i t r e q u i r e s , absent a r e q u e s t f o r such a d v i c e , t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t
judge n o t be p r e s e n t during t h e s e s s i o n s of t h e grand
jury. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s n o t t o monitor t h e grand j u r y
proceedings. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Calandra a t
38 L ed 2d 561, 568, s a i d :
N judge p r e s i d e s t o monitor i t s proceedings.
IIo
I t d e l i b e r a t e s i n s e c r e t and may determine a-lone
t h e c o u r s e of i t s i n q u i r y . "
I n r e K i t t l e , 180 F. 946, 947, where F e l i x F r a n k f u r t e r
was t h e A s s i s t a n t United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y , F e d e r a l
D i s t r i c t Judge Learned Hand r e f u s e d t o r e l i e v e a w i t n e s s from
examination by a grand j u r y , s t a t i n g :
"* * They a r e t h e v o i c e of t h e community a c c u s i n g
i t s members, and t h e o n l y p r o t e c t i o n from such
a c c u s a t i o n i s i n t h e conscience of t h a t t r i b u n a l .
T h e r e f o r e , e x c e p t i n s p o r a d i c and i l l - c o n s i d e r e d
i n s t a n c e s , t h e c o u r t s have never t a k e n s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r
what evidence s h a l l come b e f o r e them * * *."
To summarize t h e second m a t t e r of concern t o Judge B e n n e t t ,
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a s a u t h o r i t y t o l i m i t t h e a r e a of a grand j u r y
i n v e s t i g a t i o n by i t s charge given a t empanelment and t h e d i s t r i c t
c a u r t may i n q u i r e i n t o t h e grand j u r y proceedings t o a s c e r t a i n
i f any i n s t r u c t i o n s which were g i v e n a r e n o t being followed.
However, such a u t h o r i t y i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e l i m i t s p r e v i o u s l y
r e f e r r e d t o i n t h i s o p i n i o n a s s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 79-2315, R.C.M.
Judge B e n n e t t ' s t h i r d m a t t e r of concern i s t h e e x t e n t of t h e
a u t h o r i t y of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t over t h e a g e n t s of t h e grand j u r y
t o a s c e r t a i n i f t h e s e a g e n t s a r e obeying t h e law o r conducting them-
selves appropriately w h i l e t h e grand j u r y i s conducting i t s i n v e s t i
gation.
W noted i n t h i s C o u r t ' s o r d e r s e t t i n g a h e a r i n g on t h i s
e
m a t t e r , t h a t one of t h e m a t t e r s of concern i s a p e t i t i o n f i l e d
b y counsel f o r John Boyer, William F . P e l l e g r i n i , John C. Drescher
and Wade J. Dahood to have certain subpoenas quashed. To summarize
the affidavits and their allegations, we note that the fact an in-
dictment came down, partially from their testimony on their first
appearance before the grand jury, does not close off further inquiry.
Each of the first three named witnesses later signed affidavits
which reflect upon the accuracy, veracity and completeness of their
prior grand jury testimony. Since an indictment against Dahood
was partially based on their testimony, it would appear to this
Court that it is not only relevant but absolutely necessary for
the grand jury to ascertain whether or not the allegations are
correct. The very integrity of the entire investigation leading
to the Dahood indictment may depend upon the veracity and accuracy
of the testimony given by the three witnesses,
The petition of Wade J. Dahood, filed earlier, related
to testimony of another witness, Henry T. Laughlin. The filing
of that affidavit resulted in an unusual closed hearing before
Judge Bennett at which Laughlin's testimony was taken, a transcript
of which was submitted and considered by this Court in State ex
rel. Woodahl v. District Court, Mont . , P.2d 9
33 St.Rep. 537, (June 1976). That transcript has possible dis-
crepancies between Dahood's affidavit and Laughlin's subsequent
testimony respecting the events described in the affidavit. To not
have called Laughlin back to the grand jury for more testimony,
as was done, would have interfered with the grand jury's full
investigation of the Dahood case. The Dahood petition contains
only speculation and its conclusions, that the witnesses are being
recalled for harassment and intimidation, are without grounds either
in law or fact. A legitimate and lawful purpose for the subpoenas
exists; they should issue. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum Addressed t o C e r t a i n Executive O f f i c e r s of t h e M.G. A l l e n &
A s s o c i a t e s , I n c . , 391 Fed. Supp. 991 (1975).
I n B l a i r v. United S t a t e s , 250 U. S. 273, 39 S. C t . 468,
6 3 L ed 979, 982, i t was n o t e d :
" ' I t i s c l e a r l y recognized t h a t t h e g i v i n g of
testimony and t h e a t t e n d a n c e upon c o u r t o r grand
j u r y i n o r d e r t o t e s t i f y a r e p u b l i c d u t i e s which
e v e r y person w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e govern-
ment i s bound t o perform upon being p r o p e r l y summoned
*** The p e r s o n a l s a c r i f i c e involved i s a p a r t of
t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o t h e
w e l f a r e of t h e p u b l i c . The d u t y , s o onerous a t t i m e s ,
y e t s o n e c e s s a r y t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e
according t o t h e forms and modes e s t a b l i s h e d i n our
system of government *** i s subject t o mitigation
i n exceptional circumstances; t h e r e i s a c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l exemption from being compelled i n any c r i m i n a l
c a s e t o be a w i t n e s s a g a i n s t o n e s e l f , e n t i t l i n g t h e
w i t n e s s t o be excused from answering anything t h a t w i l l
tend t o i n c r i m i n a t e him *** some c o n f i d e n t i a l m a t t e r s
a r e s h i e l d e d , from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p o l i c y , and p e r -
haps i n o t h e r c a s e s f o r s p e c i a l r e a s o n s a w i t n e s s may be
excused from t e l l i n g a l l t h a t he knows.
11 1But, a s i d e from e x c e p t i o n s and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s - -
and none such i s a s s e r t e d i n t h e p r e s e n t case---
t h e w i t n e s s i s bound n o t only t o a t t e n d , b u t t o t e l l
what he knows i n answer t o q u e s t i o n s framed f o r t h e
purpose of b r i n g i n g o u t t h e t r u t h of t h e m a t t e r under
i n q u i r y . " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge h a s l i m i t e d power over a grand j u r y .
Once i t i s c a l l e d , t h e grand j u r y i s n o t s u b j e c t t o c o n t r o l e x c e p t
a s h e r e t o f o r e s e t o u t and d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s o p i n i o n .
I n United S t a t e s v . Doe ( E l l s b e r g ) , 455 F.2d 1270, 1274, t h e
Court s a i d :
W recognize
11e *** t h a t grand j u r y proceedings cannot
be p o l i c e d i n any d e t a i l . I t i s a p r i c e we pay f o r
grand j u r y independence **
*.I1
I n t h a t same c a s e , i n a memorandum a t t a c h e d a t t h e end of t h e
o p i n i o n , a p p e a r s a s t a t e m e n t which we t h i n k a p p l i e s i n t h e i n s t a n t
case:
If* *
*defendants seek t o break up t h e p l a y b e f o r e i t
h a s s t a r t e d , and t h e n c l a i m t h e government was o f f s i d e . "
T h i s Opinion s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e
a\ e c l a r a t o r y
d judgment.
@
Chief Justiceu
..................................
Justices
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g
I dissent.
Judge B e n n e t t r e c e i v e d a p e t i t i o n i n h i s c o u r t J u n e 22,
1976 r e q u e s t i n g a n o r d e r t o show c a u s e t o suspend o r c a n c e l
subpoenas d i r e c t e d t o o n e P e l l e g r i n i , Boyer and D r e s c h e r , p e r s o n s
who had p r e v i o u s l y t e s t i f i e d b e f o r e t h e g r a n d j u r y . The p e t i t i o n
a l l e g e s c e r t a i n a c t s o f h a r a s s m e n t , i n t i m i d a t i o n and improper
c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t o f t h e o f f i c e r s i n c h a r g e of t h e g r a n d j u r y
function. The p l e a d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y a l l e g e s t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n
i s one and t h e same t h a t was p r e v i o u s l y p r e s e n t e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t and b r o u g h t t o t h e Supreme C o u r t on s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l .
T h i s C o u r t h e a r d t h e matter on J u n e 7 , 1976, and on J u n e 1 8 , 1976,
and o r d e r e d t h e o r d e r t o show c a u s e and s t a y s e t a s i d e a s t o t h e
p e t i t i o n e r s b e c a u s e no sworn s t a t e m e n t s by a p p l i c a n t s accompanied
t h e p e t i t i o n t h a t would a l l o w t h e C o u r t t o p r o c e e d . The sworn
s u p p o r t now h a s been f i l e d w i t h t h e p r e s e n t p e t i t i o n t o g e t h e r
w i t h memorandum of a u t h o r i t y .
Judge B e n n e t t a t t a c h e d a copy o f t h i s p e t i t i o n and s u p p o r t -
i n g documents t o a communication a d d r e s s e d t o t h e Chief J u s t i c e
of t h i s C o u r t a l l e g i n g t h a t it a p p e a r s t o be t h e same p e t i t i o n
p r e v i o u s l y p r e s e n t e d t o h i s c o u r t and t h e s u b j e c t o f o u r o r d e r
o f J u n e 1 8 , 1976, s u p r a , and a l l e g i n g c e r t i f i c a t i o n o r documen-
t a t i o n h e l d l a c k i n g b e f o r e h a s now been added.
Judge B e n n e t t a d v i s e s t h a t h e h a s n o t a c t e d on t h e p e t i -
t i o n and forwarded same t o t h e Supreme C o u r t b e c a u s e t h e Supreme
C o u r t h a s s u g g e s t e d " t h a t t h e p i t h and moment o f t h e s e workmen's
compensation p r o c e e d i n g s j u s t i f y s p e c i a l p r o c e d u r e s . This Court
[Judge B e n n e t t ' s ] h a s l e a r n e d by e x p e r i e n c e t h a t any a c t i o n t a k e n
i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e grand jury, o t h e r than approving of expense
v o u c h e r s and o r d e r i n g t h e f i l i n g of i n d i c t m e n t s , w i l l be m e t by
a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t o f s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l , which w i l l be
h e a r d by t h e Supreme C o u r t . I t i s t h e n , t h e i n t e n t o f t h i s pe-
t i t i o n [ B e n n e t t ' s ] t o e l i m i n a t e t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y e x p e n s e s and d e l a y
o c c a s i o n e d by s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s . "
Judge Bennett f u r t h e r r e q u e s t s :
" * * * t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t i s s u e i t s o ~ i n i o n
on t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e a i o r e -
s a i d p e t i t i o n " [The p e t i t i o n f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t
J u d g e B e n n e t t l i s t s t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s s e t o u t above i n t h e
m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n and c o n c l u d e s :
"You a r e r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t e d t o r e v i e w t h e
m a t t e r s s e t f o r t h h e r e i n and t o t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e
action o r advise t h i s court thereon." (~mphasis
supplied.)
W e have h e r e a p e t i t i o n p r o p e r l y f i l e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t t o g e t h e r w i t h sworn a l l e g a t i o n s t o move t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
t o g r a n t a f a c t hearing t o determine i f t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a r e
entitled to relief. I n s t e a d it i s h e r e on a r e q u e s t t h a t t h i s
C o u r t s i t a s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o s a v e e x t r a o r d i n a r y e x p e n s e and
d e l a y and t o " a c t " o n t h e p e t i t i o n o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e " a d v i s e "
the d i s t r i c t court.
F i r s t t h e m a j o r i t y t h r o u g h some k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g , n o t
a t a l l c l e a r t o m e , determines t h a t t h e r e q u e s t of Judge Bennett
i s n o t one f o r " a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n " o r "advice" a s set f o r t h above
b u t t h i s becomes, a s I u n d e r s t a n d i t , a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment
action. They c i t e R u l e 5 7 , M.R.Civ.P., and v a r i o u s p a s t d e c l a r a -
t o r y judgment c a s e s h e a r d by t h i s C o u r t , none o f which a r e i n
point i n t h i s matter.
R u l e 57 r e q u i r e s t h a t s e c t i o n 93-8901- 93-8916, R.C.M.
1947, must b e o b s e r v e d . The f i r s t o b v i o u s problem i s how do
w e s i t a s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t on t h i s p e t i t i o n a n d ' d e c i d e i s s u e s o f
f a c t without an evidentiary hearing? The f a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e
p e t i t i o n a r e n o t a g r e e d f a c t s by any means. S e c t i o n 93-8911, R.C.M.
1947, seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t i f f a c t s a r e t o b e r e s o l v e d a l l
p a r t i e s must b e h e a r d o r e l s e t h e y would n o t b e bound. Some
of t h e f a c t s t h e m a j o r i t y has decided w i t h o u t a e v i d e n t i a r y
hearing a r e t h a t t h e oppression pleaded i n t h e p e t i t i o n i s
not s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant r e l i e f ; t h a t c e r t a i n indictments
f i l e d w e r e b a s e d on t h e t e s t i m o n y o f p e t i t i o n e r s ; t h a t f u r t h e r
t e s t i m o n y o f p e t i t i o n e r s i s r e l e v a n t and n e c e s s a r y ; t h a t t h e
Dahood p e t i t i o n c o n t a i n s o n l y s p e c u l a t i o n and c o n c l u s i o n s ;
t h a t t h e r e a r e no g r o u n d s i n l a w o r f a c t t o s u p p o r t h a r a s s m e n t ;
t h e s u b p o e n a s a r e grounded on l e g i t i m a t e a n d l a w f u l p u r p o s e
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s " s e e k t o b r e a k up t h e p l a y b e f o r e it h a s
s t a r t e d , and t h e n c l a i m t h e government was o f f s i d e " ; t h a t ,
"Most w i t n e s s e s t h a t a p p e a r b e f o r e a g r a n d j u r y w i l l n e v e r b e
indicted* * * T.he w i t n e s s e s l o s e n o t h i n g by t e s t i f y i n g * * *.
I f a w i t n e s s s h o u l d l a t e r b e i n d i c t e d , h e would b e a c c o r d e d t h e
f u l l r a n g e o f r i g h t s g r a n t e d t o him a s a d e f e n d a n t i n a c r i m i n a l
case. I f , a t t h a t t i m e , evidence i s o f f e r e d t h a t i s i r r e l e v a n t
a n o b j e c t i o n would l i e , and t h e l e g a l q u e s t i o n c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d
constant
by a c o u r t o f law * * * T h e / i n t e r r u p t i o n o f t h e grand. j u r y by
w i t n e s s e s who w i s h t o l i t i g a t e t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e subpoenas * * *
c o u l d e a s i l y r e s u l t i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n coming t o a g r i n d i n g
halt.", and s o on. Even i f t h i s p r o c e d u r e c o u l d b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d
a s a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n it h a s gone f a r beyond t h e o r i g -
i n a l scope of i n q u i r y . S e e N a t i o n a l S u r e t y Corp. v . K r u s e , 1 2 1
Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317, 319. It i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o note
t h a t t h i s C o u r t i n 1962 seemed t o h o l d t h a t " P e t i t i o n e r f a i l s t o
u n d e r s t a n d t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e D e c l a r a t o r y Judgment S t a t u t e s which
a r e c i v i l and n o t c r i m i n a l r e m e d i e s " . H a r o l d Goff v . S t a t e o f
Montana and Ed E l l s w o r t h , J r . , 1 4 1 Mont. 605, 374 P.2d 862. See
a l s o I n t h e Matter o f Charges Against Robert D e W a r , P o l i c e O f f i c e r ,
Mont . , 548 P.2d 1 4 9 , 33 St.Rep. 353 (1976) and S t a t e e x r e l .
F o r s y t h e v . Coate, Mont . , 546 P.2d 1 0 6 0 , 33 St.Rep. 310,
(1976) .
- 16 -
I t i s my p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n s by J u d g e B e n n e t t
have a l r e a d y been g e n e r a l l y d e c i d e d by t h i s C o u r t . T h e r e i s no
l a w t h a t p e r m i t s t h i s C o u r t t o d e c i d e f a c t s i n a vacuum which
w i l l o p e r a t e d i r e c t l y on i n d i v i d u a l p e t i t i o n e r s i n a d i s t r i c t
c o u r t cause. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h o u l d f i r s t d e t e r m i n e t h e
f a c t s and make i t s r u l i n g and u n t i l a n o r d e r i s e n t e r e d by t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h e r e i s no p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t
o n which t h e m a j o r i t y c a n r e n d e r i t s o p i n i o n . T h e r e a r e no
c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d t h a t would i n law p e r m i t t h i s C o u r t t o
e n t e r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment which would be b i n d i n g o n t h e
petitioners i n the d i s t r i c t court.
The r e q u e s t by J u d g e B e n n e t t s h o u l d b e d i s m i s s e d and
t h e matter returned t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s o t h a t t h e foundation
p e t i t i o n p r e c e d i n g a l l of t h i s
o r d e r l y j u d i c i a l proceeding.
Justice
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d i s s e n t i n g :
I dissent.
I n m view, t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i s n o t a d e c l a r a t o r y
y
judgment, b i n d s no o n e , and it f u r n i s h e s no p r e c e d e n t i n f u t u r e
cases. There a r e no p l e a d i n g s a s r e q u i r e d by Montana's Uniform
D e c l a r a t o r y Judgments Act. S e c t i o n 93-8901 e t s e q . ; National
S u r e t y Corp. v . Kruse, 1 2 1 Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317. A l l persons
who have o r c l a i m a n i n t e r e s t which would be a f f e c t e d by t h e
d e c l a r a t i o n have n o t been made p a r t i e s a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n
93-8911, R.C.M. 1947. The i s s u e s i n t h i s m a t t e r have n o t been
framed i n a f a c t u a l s e t t i n g p e r m i t t i n g e n t r y of a d e c l a r a t o r y
judgment. N a t i o n a l S u r e t y Corp. v . Kruse, s u p r a .
I n s t e a d of a bona f i d e s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r o v e r s y between
i d e n t i f i a b l e p a r t i e s seeking s p e c i f i c r e l i e f through a decree of
conclusive c h a r a c t e r as required t o v e s t t h i s Court with j u r i s -
d i c t i o n (Chovanak v . Matthews, 120 Mont. 520, 188 P.2d 582), we
s i m p l y have a r e q u e s t f o r answers t o t h r e e b r o a d , t h e o r e t i c a l
and a b s t r a c t q u e s t i o n s . I n s h o r t , t h e m a j o r i t y has rendered an
advisory opinion without l e g a l a u t h o r i t y t o do so. The m a j o r i t y
o p i n i o n i s n o t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment b u t s i m p l y a g r a t u i t o u s
o p i n i o n , f u r n i s h i n g n e i t h e r g u i d a n c e n o r p r e c e d e n t , and b i n d i n g
no o n e , n o t even i t s a u t h o r . I f o r e s e e s u b s t a n t i a l mischief
i n t h e b r o a d , sweeping l a n g u a g e employed.
I would remand t h i s m a t t e r t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r
s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n t o b r i n g it w i t h i n t h e p r o v i s i o n s
of t h e Uniform D e c l a r a t o r y Judgments A c t b e f o r e a c c e p t i n g j u r i s -
diction.
Justice