No, 13191
I N THE SUPREME C U T OF T E STATE O MONTANA
OR H F
1976
J O H N 0 . REEVES, A d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e
E s t a t e of Douglas M. Reeves, Deceased,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs -
ILLE ELECTRIC COMPANY, YELLOIfi7STONE
ELECTRIC COMPANY, and OSbJALD BERG,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable W , W, Less l e y , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
Morrison & Hedman, Whitefish, Montana
J e r r y T r i e w e i l e r argued, W h i t e f i s h , Montana
or Respondent :
C o r e t t e , Smith and Dean, B u t t e , Montana
R. D. C o r e t t e J r , argued, B u t t e , Montana
Berg, Angel, Andriolo & Morgan, Bozeman, Montana
Charles F. Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana
K e l l e r , Reynolds and Drake, Helena, Montana
Glen L. Drake argued, Helena, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
Donald Smith appeared, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
Submitted: A p r i l 21, 1976
Decided :.J UN 8 1 1976
2
Filed: ,ji~[j 1976
Xr. J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
The a d m i n i s t r a t o r of d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e brought a s u r v i v a l
a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h r e e defendants seeking damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n -
j u r i e s and death of decedent, who was e l e c t r o c u t e d i n a w h i r l p o o l
bath. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , G a l l a t i n County, e n t e r e d a judgment of
d i s m i s s a l a s t o one defendant and s e p a r a t e summary judgments i n favor
of t h e o t h e r two defendants. P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from t h e s e judgments.
P l a i n t i f f Reeves i s t h e f a t h e r of decedent Douglas H. Reeves
and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r of h i s e s t a t e . Decedent was a s t u d e n t a t
Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y a t Rozeman, Montana i n 1973. I n October of
t h a t y e a r , he was t a k i n g a w h i r l p o o l b a t h i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y f i e l d
house when an e l e c t r i c a l charge emanated from t h e machine, e l e c t r i f i e d
the water and e l e c t r o c u t e d him.
Defendant I l l e E l e c t r i c Company, a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n , manu-
f a c t u r e d t h e w h i r l p o o l b a t h machine involved h e r e and shipped i t t o
Yontana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y . I t was i n s t a l l e d i n t h e f i e l d house by
defendant Yellowstone E l e c t r i c Company. The Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y
f i e l d house was designed by a r c h i t e c t Oswald Berg. The i n s t a l l a t i o n
o f t h e w h i r l p o o l machine and c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e f i e l d house were sub-
s c a n t i a l l y completed p r i o r t o 1960.
The complaint a l l e g e s I l l e f u r n i s h e d t h e w h i r l p o o l machine w i t h
a t e n f o o t c a b l e and plug e l e c t r i c a l connection. In installing the
w h i r l p o o l , Yellowstone made t h e e l e c t r i c a l connection by plugging t h e
c a b l e and plug i n t o a w a l l r e c e p t a c l e , d e s i g n e d by Berg,
The a l l e g a t i o n s of negligence upon which l i a b i l i t y i s p r e d i c a t e d
are :
I ) I L l e f a i l e d t o warn t h e purchaser of i n h e r e n t dangers i n
che machine w i t h r e s p e c t t o e l e c t r i c a l connections and f a i l e d t o provide
unmistakable i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r proper i n s t a l l a t i o n ; and provided t h e
whirlpool w i t h an e l e c t r i c a l cord r a t h e r than a d i r e c t w i r i n g a p p a r a t u s .
2) Y e l l o w s ~ o n e f a i l e d t o w i r e t h e whirlpool d i r e c t l y , and
i n s r a l l e d t h e cord and plug i n a manner which c r e a t e d t h e c o n d i t i o n
causing t h e e l e c t r o c u t i o n of decedent.
3) Berg f a i l e d t o design a d i r e c t w i r i n g system f o r t h e
whirlpool and designed and approved t h e e l e c t r i c a l w a l l r e c e p t a c l e
t o which t h e w h i r l p o o l was connected.
P l a i n t i f f seeks recovery of income t o d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e l o s t
a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h e concurring negligence of d e f e n d a n t s , i n t h e
amount of $900,000.
The i s s u e s i n t h i s c a s e t u r n on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y and
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of s e c t i o n 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, commonly r e f e r r e d t o a s
t h e " a r c h i t e c t s ' and b u i l d e r s ' s t a t u t e " which defendants contend b a r s
this suit.
Berg moved t o d i s m i s s t h e complaint on t h e b a s i s of s e c t i o n
93-2619, which provides:
" ~ x c e p ta s provided i n s e c t i o n s 2 and 3 [93-2620 and 93-
26211 of t h i s a c t , no a c t i o n t o recover damages ( o t h e r
than an a c t i o n upon any c o n t r a c t , o b l i g a t i o n , o r l i a b i l i t y ,
founded upon an instrument i n w r i t i n g ) r e s u l t i n g from o r
a r i s i n g out o f t h e d e s i g n , planning, s u p e r v i s i o n , i n s p e c t i o n ,
c o n s t r u c t i o n , o r o b s e r v a t i o n of c o n s t r u c t i o n o f , o r land
surveying done i n connection w i t h , any improvement t o r e a l
p r o p e r t y s h a l l b e commenced more than t e n (10) y e a r s a f t e r
completion of such improvement. 11
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted erg's motion without l e a v e t o
amend, on t h e grounds t h e conduct complained of took p l a c e p r i o r
t o 1960 and t h e a c t i o n was n o t commenced u n t i l 1975, more than t e n
y e a r s a f t e r completion of t h e improvement. O September 19, 1975,
n
judgment was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of Berg. Subsequently, s e p a r a t e summary
judgments were e n t e r e d i n favor of Yellowstone and I l l e based on t h e
same s t a t u t e .
The t h r u s t of p l a i n t i f f ' s appeal i s a broad c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
a t t a c k on s e c t i o n 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947. He c i t e s c a s e s from o t h e r
s t a t e s on t h e same q u e s t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r " a r c h i t e c t s ' and
builders' statutes1'. He a l s o q u e s t i o n s t h e summary judgment a s t o
I l l e , assuming t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 93-2619. Specifically,
the issues a r e :
1. Is section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, unconstitutional
in violation of:
a. Article 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana Constitution,
by denying plaintiff access to the courts, and denying him a speedy
remedy for the injuries and damages to the estate which he represents?
b. Article V, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution,
by embracing more than one subject and by not clearly expressing
that subject in the title of the act7
c. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, by granting immunity from
suit to one class of defendants and denying immunity to other possible
defendants3
, d. The due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article 11, Section 17, 1972
Montana Constitution, by depriving plaintiff of a common law right
without providing a reasonable substitute?
2. If section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, is constitutional does
it bar a claim against the manufacturer of personal property once
that property is attached to real property?
We commence inquiry into the constitutional questions with
the well-settled rule that when the constitutionality of a statute
is under scrutiny, the statute is presumed to be constitutional
and the party attacking it has the burden of proving its invalidity.
In the matter of Estate of Kujath, Mont . 9 545 P. 2d 662, 33
St.Rep, 117. This presumption of validity applies to all legislative
enactments and it is the duty of the court to resolve all conceivable
doubts in favor of validity whenever possible. State Highway Commission
v. Chapman, 152 Mont. 79, 446 P.2d 709; State ex rel. Abel v. District
Court, 140 Mont. 117, 368 P.2d 572. Additionally, some forty-two state
legislatures and the United States Congress for the District of
Columbia, have enacted architects' and builders' statutes similar to
Montana's.
The f i r s t c h a l l e n g e invokes A r t i c l e T I , 9ection 16, 1972
Xontana C o n s t i t u t i o n , which provides i n p e r t i n e n r p a r t :
II
The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . Courts of J u s t i c e
s h a l l be open t o every person, and speedy remedy
a f f o r d e d f o r every i n j u r y of person, p r o p e r t y , o r
c h a r a c t e r , JC >Y +r"
P l a i n t i f f contends s e c t i o n 93-2619 v i o l a t e s A r t i c l e 11,
Section 16, by b a r r i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s cause of a c t i o n b e f o r e i t a r o s e .
A r t i c l e 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n has n o t been
i n t e r p r e t e d by t h i s Court. However, A r t i c l e 111, Section 6 , 1889
Xontana C o n s t i t u t i o n , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t c o n t a i n s i d e n t i c a l language.
This language was i n t e r p r e t e d i n Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co., 55
Yont. 522, 532, 179 P. 499. I n Shea i t was argued t h e workmen's
Compensation Act was repugnant t o A r t i c l e 1 1 of t h e 1889 C o n s t i t u t i o n
1
i n t h a t i t denied i n j u r e d workmen t h e r i g h t t o maintain an a c t i o n i n
the courts. This Court s t a t e d :
II
But counsel a r e i n e r r o r i n supposing t h a t f o r t h i s
reason t h e Compensation Act i s repugnant t o t h e s e c t i o n
of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n quoted. T h e i r c o n t e n t i o n i s based
upon a misconception of t h e scope of t h e guaranty t h e r e i n
contained. A r e a d i n g of t h e s e c t i o n d i s c l o s e s t h a t i t i s
addressed e x c l u s i v e l y t o t h e c o u r t s , The c o u r t s a r e i t s
s o l e s u b j e c t m a t t e r and i t r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y t o t h e d u t i e s
of t h e j u d i c i a l department of t h e government. I t means
no more nor l e s s than t h a t under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n and laws c o n s t i t u t i n g them, t h e c o u r t s must
be a c c e s s i b l e t o a l l persons a l i k e , without d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,
a t t h e time o r times and t h e p l a c e o r p l a c e s appointed f o r
t h e i r s i t t i n g , and a f f o r d a speedy remedy f o r every wrong
recognized by law a s being remediable i n a c o u r t . The
term 1 i n j u r y ' a s t h e r e i n used, means such an i n j u r y a s t h e
law recognizes o r d e c l a r e s t o be a c t i o n a b l e . *** I f the
c o n t e n t i o n of counsel should be upheld, t h e consequence
would b e t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e would be s t r i p p e d of a l l power
t o a l t e r o r r e p e a l any p o r t i o n of t h e common law r e l a t i n g t o
a c c i d e n t a l i n j u r i e s o r t h e d e a t h of one person by t h e
negligence of a n o t h e r . I t i s t r u e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e cannot
d e s t r o y v e s t e d r i g h t s . Where an i n j u r y has a l r e a d y occurred
f o r which t h e i n j u r e d person h a s a r i g h t of a c t i o n , t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e cannot deny him a remedy. But a t t h i s l a t e day
i t cannot be c o n t r o v e r t e d t h a t t h e remedies recognized by t h e
common law i n t h i s c l a s s of c a s e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l r i g h t s
of a c t i o n t o a r i s e i n f u t u r e may be a l t e r e d o r a b o l i s h e d t o t h e
e x t e n t of d e s t r o y i n g a c t i o n s f o r i n j u r i e s o r d e a t h a r i s i n g
from n e g l i g e n t a c c i d e n t , so long a s t h e r e i s no impairment of
r i g h t s a l r e a d y accrued. This n e c e s s a r i l y follows from t h e
p r o p o s i t i o n , w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c o u r t s everywhere, t h a t
no one has a vested r i g h t i n any r u l e of t h e common-law.* * *"
See a l s o : Stewart v. Standard Publishing Co., 102 Mont. 43,
Assuming arguendo, t h a t p l a i n t i f f would have a c l a i m under
common Law, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o h i b i t e d
from e l i m i n a t i n g a common law r i g h t a s i t d i d i n Shea and S t e w a r t .
I n s e c t i o n 93-2619, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h any
v e s t e d r i g h t o f p l a i n t i f f , b u t simply c u t o f f a c c r u a l o f t h e r i g h t
t o sue a f t e r t e n y e a r s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , s e c t i o n 93-2620, R.C.M. 1947,
g r a n t s a n a d d i t i o n a l y e a r t o s u e a s t o any a c c r u e d r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e
ten year period. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , p l a i n t i f f ' s a l l e g e d c a u s e of
a c t i o n a r o s e more t h a n t e n y e a r s a f t e r c o m p l e t i o n ; hence t h e s t a t u t e
i s a v a l i d b a r t o h i s s u i t a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s p r o t e c t e d by i t .
P l a i n t i f f asserts s e c t i o n 93-2619 v i o l a t e s A r t i c l e V , S e c t i o n
11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , because t h e s t a t u t e embraces more t h a n
one s u b j e c t , one o f which i s n o t c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d i n i t s t i t l e .
However, p l a i n t i f f invokes p a r t of S e c t i o n 1 w i t h o u t a b i d i n g by
1
a n o t h e r of i t s p r o v i s i o n s :
"(6) A law may b e c h a l l e n g e d on t h e grounds o f non-
compliance w i t h t h i s s e c t i o n o n l y w i t h i n two
years a f t e r i t s e f f e c t i v e date." A r t i c l e V,
S e c t i o n 1 1 ( 6 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .
S e c t i o n 6 , Chapter 60, Laws o f Montana 1971, provided s e c t i o n
93-2619 became e f f e c t i v e on January 1, 1972. T h i s c a s e was commenced
June 5 , 1975, o v e r t h r e e y e a r s l a t e r . Because s e c t i o n 93-2619 was
n o t c h a l l e n g e d w i t h i n two y e a r s a f t e r i t s e f f e c t i v e d a t e , p l a i n t i f f
i s p r e c l u d e d from t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e .
The e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n a t t a c k upon s e c t i o n 93-2619 i s based
on t h e f a c t t h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e s t o t h o s e who a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
making improvements t o r e a l p r o p e r t y b u t does n o t b a r a c t i o n s a g a i n s t
nzaterialmen and owners of r e a l p r o p e r t y who may l a t e r b e made t o
answer f o r n e g l i g e n t l y made improvements. P l a i n t i f f c i t e s t h r e e cases
which h o l d t h a t such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s i r r a t i o n a l c l a s s l e g i s l a t i o n
v i o l a t i v e o f t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment,
United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11.2d 455,
231 N.E.2d 588; Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7 , 514 P,2d 568; K a l l a s
Xillwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wisc.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454.
However, this Court finds other contrary authorities more
persuasive and compatible with Montana law. Rosenberg v. Town
of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662; Grissom v. North Amer-
ican Aviation, Inc., 326 F.Supp. 465; Josephs v. Burns, 260 0r.493,
491 P.2d 203; Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating
& Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.2d 528, 503 P.2d 108; Good v. Christensen,
(Utah 1974), 527 P.2d 223; Housing Authority of Town of Limon v. Leo
A . Daly Co., (Colo.App. 1975), 533 P.2d 937; Carter v. Hartenstein,
248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918, 920, cert.den. 401 U.S. 901, 91 S.
Ct. 868, 27 L ed 2d 800. In Carter, the Arkansas Supreme Court con-
sidered the contention that a statute similar to section 93-2619,
violated due process, was discriminatory, contravened equal protection
of the laws, and was local and special legislation. The court stated:
his Act only cuts off action after fdur years. But,
even then, if an accident or injury occurs before the
expiration of that four year period, it may still be
brought within an additional 12 months against those
furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observa-
tion of construction, or the construction and repairing
of any improvement to real property. All of the defendants
in this action are within this definition. However, it
does not include owners of buildings or materialmen who
-arenot othefiise involved. Such materialmen and the owners
of buildings or structures who are in sole control of
premises after completion of the work are not similarly
situated with the defendants in this case. They are not
in the same class with those described in the act. Parti-
cularly is this true after construction is substantially
completed and accepted by the owners. Part of acceptance
is to accept some future responsibility for the condition
of the premises.
"We have carefully considered Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11.2d
455, 231 N.E.2d 588, (1967), concerning this appeal.
In all deference and in respect to the decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, we cannot apply its reasoning to
this case. That court held the Illinois Statute, there
challenged, to be discriminatory against others similarly
situated. * * * Further, a vital distinction, nonetheless,
exists between owners or suppliers and those engaged in the
professions and occupations of design and building. This
is not arbitrary or unreasonable. It is a legitimate and
practical exercise of the legislative function.11
The reasoning in Carter is consistent with the law of Montana.
The test of the constitutionality of class legislation is whether
the classification has some reasonable, just and practical basis
and whether the law operates equally upon every person within the
class. Gullickson v.Mitchel1, 113 Mont. 359, 126 P.2d 1106; City
of Missoula v. Swanberg, 116 Mont. 232, 149 P.2d 248. A statute
will not be stricken down upon constitutional grounds unless its
violation of the fundamental law is clear and palpable, and the
classification it makes is illusory and unreal. Victor Chemical
v. Silver Bow County, 130 Mont. 308, 301 P.2d 730. Applying these
tests, section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, does not violate equal protection
of the laws.
Plaintiff's fourth constitutional attack upon section 93-2619
II
is that the statute impairs due process" guarantees by depriving
plaintiff of a common law right without providing a reasonable
substitute. This argument is without merit. Section 93-2621,
R.C.M. 1947, part of the same enactment as section 93-2619 (Ch.60,
Laws 1971), states:
"The limitation prescribed by this act shall not
affect the responsibility of any owner, tenant, or
person in actual possession and control of the im-
provement at the time a right of action arises. I1
The plain words of section 93-2621, refute the implication of
plaintiff's argument that he is without a remedy. As indicated in
Shea and Stewart, the legislature is not constitutionally prohibited
from eliminating common law rights which have not accrued or vested.
The Constitution does not freeze common law rights in perpetuity.
For these reasons, we hold section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, consti-
tutional.
The final issue is whether Ille is immune from this suit by
virtue of its inclusion in the class protected by section 93-2619.
The section by its terms applies to those involved in the "design,
planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of
construction of * 7k * any improvement to real property,* * *'
.I
Ille contends that it is sued as part of the design or con-
struction team, therefore it is protected by the statute. Ille also
I1
emphasizes the whirlpool in question was a fixture1'and "improvement"
a t t h e time o f che e l e c t r i c a l charge which i s a l l e g e d t o have
caused t h e death of p l a i n t i f f ' s decedent.
O t h e o t h e r hand, p l a i n t i f f argues t h a t I l l e i s sued a s a
n
manufacturer of a hazardous machine and t h a t i n h e r e n t d e f e c t s
e x i s t e d p r i o r t o i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y f i e l d house.
P l a i n t i f f c h a r a c t e r i z e s I l l e a s a materialman, excluded from
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e a r c h i t e c t s ' and b u i l d e r s ' s t a t u t e .
A review of c a s e s concerned w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of
a r c h i t e c t s ' and b u i l d e r s ' s t a t u t e s r e v e a l s t h a t t h e c o u r t s , whether
f i n d i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s t a t u t e s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r n o t , recog-
n i z e t h a t materialmen a r e n o t w i t h i n t h e c l a s s p r o t e c t e d by t h e
sLatute. See t h e language of t h e Arkansas Supreme Court i n
Carter, heretofore s e t out. Thus, we look t o p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint
t o determine whether I l l e was sued a s a materialman; we f i n d t h a t i t
was.
I l l e took no p a r t i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e f i e l d house o r
i n t h e r e l a t e d phases of t h e w h i r l p o o l i n s t a l l a t i o n , I t simply
manufactured t h e w h i r l p o o l machine and shipped i t t o Montana S t a t e
University. P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s negligence i n f a i l u r e t o warn of
i n h e r e n t dangers, f a i l u r e t o n o t i f y and i n s t r u c t a s t o proper i n -
s t a l l a t i o n , and negligence i n design of t h e w h i r l p o o l machine by
providing only a c a b l e and plug r a t h e r than a d i r e c t w i r i n g system.
These a l l e g a t i o n s r e l a t e t o design and manufacture of t h e I l l e
I l l e was
w h i r l p o o l machine,/no p a r t of t h e f i e l d house c o n s t r u c t i o n team.
I l l e simply f u r n i s h e d an a p p l i a n c e t h a t was subsequently i n s t a l l e d
i n t h e f i e l d house. A s such, I l l e was simply a materialman whose
product was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Accordingly, p l a i n -
t i f f has s t a t e d a c l a i m a g a i n s t I l l e n o t b a r r e d by s e c t i o n 93-2619.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment i n favor of
Ille. (This Court, of c o u r s e , e x p r e s s e s no opinion a s t o t h e u l t i -
mate l i a b i l i t y of I l l e i n t h i s c a s e . )
W a f f i r m the judgment o f dismissal i n favor of Berg and
e
he summary judgment i n f a v o r of Yellowstone. W reverse the
e
summary judgment i n f a v o r of I l l e E l e c t r i c Company and remand
t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of G a l l a t i n County f o r f u r t h e r proceedings.
Justice
W Concur:
e
-
.
Hon ~ o b % ? t - ~ T ~ e l s o,n- ~ y s t r i t
Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e
James T. Harrison.
J u s t i c e C a s t l e s c o n c u r r i n g and d i s s e n t i n g , i n p a r t .
I concur i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e m a j o r i t y e x c e p t a s it
a p p l i e s t o t h e f i n a l i s s u e concerning defendant, I l l e E l e c t r i c
Co. The t h r u s t of t h e c o m p l a i n t i s a g a i n s t t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n
of t h e w h i r l p o o l machine o v e r which I l l e E l e c t r i c had no c o n t r o l .
To h o l d t h a t o v e r 1 3 y e a r s a f t e r i n s t a l l a t i o n , and summary judg-
ment f o r t h e o t h e r two d e f e n d a n t s , I l l e E l e c t r i c remains l i a b l e
under t h e s t a t u t e s i n v o l v e d i s n o t p r o p e r . I would a f f i r m
t h e judgments.
R. J. Nelson, Judge o f t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f H o n o r a b l e James T . Harrison, concurring
and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t .
I c o n c u r i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e m a j o r i t y e x c e p t as i t
applies t o t h e f i n a l issue concerning defendant, I 1l e E l e c t r i c
Company. I would a f f i r m t h e Judgments.