No. 13193
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1976
CHERYL LEIFER FOSS ,
A p p e l l a n t and P e t i t i o n e r ,
-vs -
JAMES T. LEIFER,
Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
J a r d i n e , Stephenson, B l e w e t t and Weaver, G r e a t F a l l s ,
Montana
K. Dale Schwanke a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
F o r Respondent :
Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and M a t t e u c c i , G r e a t F a l l s ,
Montana
B r e t t C. A s s e l s t i n e a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Submitted: A p r i l 19, 1976
Decided : &Fib! 1 4 'i976.
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This appeal concerns a petition seeking to modify child
custody provisions contained in a decree of divorce granted
to appellant on August 10, 1972. The judgment appealed from is
that of the district court, Jefferson County, entered December
17, 1975.
Appellant Cheryl Leifer Foss and respondent James T.
Leifer were married in the city of Butte, Montana, in November
1968. Their son Christopher Lance Leifer was born the following
year. The divorce decree provided,inter alia,that appellant
should have the care, custody and control of the child, subject
to the right of reasonable visitation by respondent. The court
ordered respondent to pay child support in the amount of $100
per month. Respondent has never defaulted-in paying the child
support payments .
Respondent made no attempt to contest the provisions of
the divorce decree at the time. Shortly after the divorce
respondent moved to the state of Michigan and later to Pullman,
Washington, where he spent approximately eighteen months com-
pleting requirements necessary to obtain a Master's degree.
Following his graduation respondent became employed in Yakima,
Washington. At the time of the hearing on the petition for
modification, respondent was contemplating the prospect of a
transfer on his employer's behalf to Hermiston, Oregon. It is
our understanding that he has now made that move.
Following her divorce, appellant was employed at several
local financial institutions in the city of Butte. She was
transferred by her employer to Great Falls in May 1974. She
gave birth to a second child in September 1973, and at the time
this matter was heard, the child was living with appellant and
her son Lance. In early January 1975, appellant began to date
Richard Foss. He moved i n t o a p p e l l a n t ' s home s e v e r a l weeks l a t e r .
They were subsequently married. S e v e r a l months a f t e r t h e marriage,
a p p e l l a n t was a b l e t o t e r m i n a t e h e r employment t o devote more
time t o t h e c a r e of h e r two c h i l d r e n .
Respondent commenced t h e a c t i o n t o p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n
of t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e s h o r t l y a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a l e t t e r from h i s
ex-wife informing him t h a t she and Foss had begun l i v i n g t o g e t h e r .
I n h i s p e t i t i o n respondent a l l e g e d t h a t circumstances b e a r i n g a
d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of h i s c h i l d had
m a t e r i a l l y changed s i n c e t h e d a t e of t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e i n t h a t :
"a. *** t h e s p i r i t u a l and moral atmosphere i n
t h e home has d e t e r i o r a t e d t o a s t a t e wherein t h e
i s s u e of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o , Christopher Lance L e i f e r ,
w i l l be m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t e d and a l t e r e d .
"b.Jc ** t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e above captioned m a t t e r
i s r e s i d i n g w i t h a male who i s n o t t h e spouse of t h e
above named p l a i n t i f f and t h e presence of t h i s i n d i -
v i d u a l has aided and contributed. t o t h e moral d e c l i n e
and decay of t h e atmosphere i n which t h e minor p a r t y
of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o must r e s i d e . I I
The p a r t i e s agreed by s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e m a t t e r be heard i n
t h e e i g h t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Cascade County, and a two-day
h e a r i n g commenced on October 16, 1975. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t
11
found respondent was b e s t s u i t e d and motivated morally and
emotionally t o meet t h e needs of Lance L e i f e r and i s t h e p a r e n t
most l i k e l y t o s e e t h e needs of Lance L e i f e r a r e met." and
granted respondent's p e t i t i o n .
I n Montana i t has been f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n m a t t e r s of custody i s of a c o n t i n u i n g n a t u r e .
Barbour v. Barbour, 134 Mont. 3 1 7 , , 3 3 0 P.2d 1093; Libra v. L i b r a ,
154 Mont. 222, 462 P.2d 178. This concept a l s o c o n t r o l s under t h e
r e c e n t l y enacted Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, s e c t i o n 48-
339, R.C.M. 1947, which c l e a r l y provides d i s t r i c t c o u r t s may n o t
e x e r c i s e d i s c r e t i o n a r y power t o modify a p r i o r custody d e c r e e un-
l e s s two b a s i c elements a r e shown t o e x i s t : 1 ) new f a c t s o r f a c t s
unknown t o t h e c o u r t a t t h e time t h e i n i t i a l d e c r e e was e n t e r e d
demonstrate that a change has occurred in the circumstances
of the child or those of his custodian; and 2) this change is
sufficient to warrant a modification in order to promote the
particular child's best interests. This basic standard was
applied in this jurisdiction long before the enactment of the
new law, and a determination of which law would be applicable
under the facts presented would have no bearing on the result.
Jewett v. Jewett, 73 Mont. 591, 237 P.702; Trudgen v. Trudgen,
134 Mont. 174, 329 P.2d 225; Simon v. Simon, 154 Mont. 193,
461 P.2d 851.
Here, the issue to be decided is whether the district
court, in granting the petition for modification, abused its
discretion. Although no specific finding to this effect appears
in the order, such judicial action must inherently be predicated
on the conclusion that a change in circumstances had occurred
sufficient to endanger the welfare of the child to support
the modification order. In reviewing orders which affect the
custody of a child, this Court is mindful that the primary duty
of deciding the proper custody of children is the task of the
district court. Thus, all reasonable presumptions as to the
correctness of that determination will be made. No ruling will
be disturbed absent a clear showing the district court's dis-
cretion was abused. In re Corneliusen et al., 159 Mont.6, 494
P.2d 908; State ex rel. Veach v. Veach, 122 Mont. 47, 195 P.2d
697; Ex parte Bourguin, 88 Mont. 118, 290 P. 250; In re Thompson,
77 Mont. 466, 251 P. 163.
It is elemental that the phrase "change in circumstances"
is a term of art which must not be considered in a vacuum. No
change in circumstances, regardless of its substantiality, is
legally sufficient to support a modification order altering
custody unless the best interests and general welfare of the
child will be promoted. Altmaier v. Altmaier, 135 Mont. 404, 340
P.2d 829; Haynes v. F i l l n e r , 106 Mont. 59, 75 P.2d 802. In
a l l c a s e s , t h e l o d e s t a r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n e x e r c i s e of i t s
d i s c r e t i o n i s t h e w e l f a r e and b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d , and
n o t t h e parent. Grant v. Grant, 166 Mont. 229, 531 P.2d 1007,
32 St.Rep. 191; I n r e Adoption of B i e r y , 164 Mont, 353, 522 P.
2d 1377; Turk v. Turk, 164 Mont. 35, 518 P.2d 804.
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e p l e a d i n g s and testimony o f f e r e d
a t h e a r i n g suggest t h e i s s u e t o be decided should b e c o n s i d e r a b l y
narrowed. The r e c o r d i s r e p l e t e w i t h evidence t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s
t o t h i s a c t i o n a r e w e l l - q u a l i f i e d t o be f i t and proper p a r e n t s
t o Christopher Lance L e i f e r . Respondent i s a well-educated
i n d i v i d u a l w i t h promising and s t e a d y employment, The r e c o r d amply
demonstrates t h e a f f e c t i o n respondent has f o r h i s son and h i s
w i l l i n g n e s s t o do a l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y t o provide him w i t h an
environment conducive t o a happy childhood and t h e development
of a w e l l - a d j u s t e d adulthood.
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s made by t h e Department of S o c i a l and
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s e s t a b l i s h t h a t a p p e l l a n t i s a capable and
e n t h u s i a s t i c mother t o h e r two c h i l d r e n , and t h a t h e r p r e s e n t
husband i s q u a l i f i e d t o adopt t h e c h i l d r e n . Neither p a r t y
seriously challenges t h e general f i t n e s s of t h e other regarding
parenthood. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t made no f i n d i n g t o t h e e f f e c t
t h a t a p p e l l a n t was an u n f i t p a r e n t . Reports concerning b o t h
p a r t i e s were r e q u e s t e d and f u r n i s h e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t by a
c l i n i c a l psychologist. These r e p o r t s show a conspicuous absence
of t h e t y p e s of a d v e r s e psychological f a c t o r s which, i f possessed
by e i t h e r p a r t y , might tend t o a f f e c t unfavorably t h e well-being
of t h e child. The r e c o r d does show t h a t t h e c h i l d has been some-
what slow t o develop due t o a r a t h e r l o o s e l y d e f i n e d " l e a r n i n g
disability". The prognosis concerning t h i s problem was d e s c r i b e d
i n t h e r e c o r d a s good, and t h e r e c o r d f a i l s t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y connect
t h e problem t o t h e home environment.
The c l i n i c a l psychofogist t e s t i f i e d :
"A. * * 9: I t h i n k t h i s youngster has a n a t u r a l
d i f f i c u l t y coping w i t h change, coping w i t h a
g r e a t many p i e c e s of information which might be -
given t o him a t one time * * *.
"Q. Would t h e f a c t t h a t your r e p o r t s a i d M r s .
Foss, formerly Mrs. L e i f e r had some g u i l t f e e l i n g s
about h e r p a s t and about h e r family **
affect a
c h i l d ? A. It could. But i n t h i s c a s e 1 do n o t
t h i n k i t does t o any marked degree." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ]
The f a c t t h a t a p a r e n t allows h e r paramour t o l i v e w i t h
h e r f o r a s h o r t time b e f o r e t h e i r marriage does n o t , by i t s e l f ,
?1
constitute a change i n circurnstances" s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e
g r a n t i n g of a c u s t o d i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n o r d e r . This Court has never
s p e c i f i c a l l y decided t h i s p r e c i s e i s s u e . But a number of r e c e n t
c a s e s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have examined t h e m a t t e r . They a r e
almost unanimous i n holding t h a t such conduct may be t h e b a s i s
f o r a change i n custody o n l y upon a showing t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n have
i n some way been a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d . Christensen v. C h r i s t e n s e n ,
3 1 Ill.App.3d 1041, 335 N.E.2d 581; Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 19
Ill.App.3d 647, 312 N.E.2d 395; C h r i s t i a n v. Randall, 33 Colo.App.
129, 516 P.2d 132; Howland v. Howland, (1nd.App. 1975), 337 N.E.2d
555. Of p a r t i c u l a r r e l e v a n c e i s t h e language o f t h e Washington
S t a t e Supreme Court speaking through J u s t i c e F a r r i s i n Wildermuth
v. Wildermuth, 14 Wash.App. 442, 542 P.2d 463, 466:
"We f i n d t h a t t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s more
than a showing o f i l l i c i t conduct by t h e p a r e n t who
has custody. There must be a showing of t h e e f f e c t of
t h a t conduct upon t h e minor c h i l d o r c h i l d r e n . ***
Unless t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s evidence from which t h e t r i e r
of f a c t can reasonably conclude t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s environ-
ment i s d e t r i m e n t a l t o h i s o r h e r p h y s i c a l , mental, o r
emotional h e a l t h and, f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e harm l i k e l y t o b e
caused by a change of environment i s outweighed by t h e
advantage of a change t o t h e c h i l d , t h e c o u r t e r r s i n
e n t e r i n g an o r d e r changing custody."
Here, t h e r e c o r d i s devoid o f evidence t o reasonably e s t a b l i s h
t h a t t h e conduct of t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t caused a "moral d e c l i n e "
i n t h e home which h a s e i t h e r m a t e r i a l l y o r a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e
well-being of t h e minor c h i l d . Further, the record e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t
p r o g r e s s concerning t h e c h i l d ' s aforementioned l e a r n i n g d i s a b i l i t y
might be i n t e r r u p t e d by a geographical change of r e s i d e n c e ,
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t change must be c l e a r l y j u s t i f i e d t o promote
the child's best interests.
Returning t o t h e i s s u e of abuse of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e
p a r t of t h e d i s t r i c t judge i n modifying t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e ,
we c o n s i d e r f i r s t whether any change of circumstances has
occurred which a f f e c t s t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s and g e n e r a l w e l f a r e
of t h e c h i l d . N change of substance appears from t h e r e c o r d .
o
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found no l a c k of f i t n e s s of t h e mother. There
simply appears no evidence upon which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t could
/fund such a l a c k of f i t n e s s i n c l u d i n g l o v e , a f f e c t i o n and c a r e .
Thus, t h i s amounts t o an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n t o change custody
without a f i n d i n g of changed circumstances.
The o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t modifying and awarding
custody t o respondent i s s e t a s i d e .
W Concur:
e
Justices
-- -
Hon. Arnold Olsen, D i s t r i c t Judge
s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James
T. Harrison.
M r . J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d i s s e n t i n g :
I f i n d s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence i n t h e r e c o r d
s u p p o r t i n g t h e custody award of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . In my
view, t h e m a j o r i t y h e r e h a s simply s u b s t i t u t e d i t s judgment
on custody f o r t h a t of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c o n t r a r y t o law.
22e&.&SAm
Justice.
M r . Arnold Olsen, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e
James T . H a r r i s o n , d i s s e n t i n g :
I a g r e e w i t h t h e foregoing d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e
/
Frank I . Haswell.
Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison.