Schend v. Thorson

Yo. 13166

I N rHE 3UPKdME I:OUK'.C ilF THE STkrE OF PlONTANA

1976

r i a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

J O H N M. THORSON, Mayor,
o f t h e C i t y o f W h i t e f i s h , Xontana,

D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t .

:jppeal f r o m ; ')is trict Court o f t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Robert Keller, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l o f Record :

For Appellant :

A s t l e and A s t l e , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
V i l l i a m A s t l e a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana

F o r Respondent:

Leo F i s h e r a r g u e d , W h i t e f i s h , Montana

Submitted: March 3, 1976

~ ei d e d :
c
MAY 7 !g)g
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from an o r d e r i s s u e d i n t h e e l e v e n t h

j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , F l a t h e a d County, d i s m i s s i n g p e t i t i o n e r ' s

r e q u e s t f o r w r i t of mandamus made p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 93-9102,

R.C.M. 1947. A t t h e time t h e p e t i t i o n w a s f i l e d , a p p e l l a n t

T e r r y Schend was a p r o b a t i o n a r y f u l l - t i m e p o l i c e o f f i c e r f o r

t h e c i t y of W h i t e f i s h , and r e s p o n d e n t John M. Thorson w a s t h e

mayor. The m a t t e r was h e a r d i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t on A p r i l 1 7 ,

1975, and judgment f o r t h e r e s p o n d e n t was e n t e r e d s e v e r a l

months l a t e r .

I n l i e u o f a t r a n s c r i p t , t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l h a s been

t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e C o u r t a s a n "Agreed S t a t e m e n t of Evidence"

i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Rule 9 ( c ) , Montana R u l e s of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

From t h i s document, it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t w a s

appointed t o t h e p o s i t i o n of p o l i c e o f f i c e r f o r t h e c i t y of

W h i t e f i s h on October 8 , 1974. The c i t y o f W h i t e f i s h i s a t h i r d

c l a s s c i t y i n t h e s t a t e of Montana w i t h i n t h e meaning o f s e c t i o n

11-1824 e t s e q . , R.C.M. 1947, t h e " M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e Law." As

s u c h , and p u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n , t h e com-

munity o f W h i t e f i s h h a s p l a c e d i t s e l f w i t h i n t h e purview o f t h e

M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e Law t h r o u g h t h e a d o p t i o n of Chapter 2.44.010,

W h i t e f i s h Municipal Code, which p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s :

"From and a f t e r t h e p a s s a g e and a p p r o v a l o f t h e
o r d i n a n c e c o d i f i e d h e r e i n , and from and a f t e r
t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e o r d i n a n c e a s c o d i f i e d
h e r e i n , and t h e p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t of t h e c i t y ,
s h a l l be under and w i t h i n t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e
M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e Law of t h e s t a t e . The p o l i c e
d e p a r t m e n t o f t h e c i t y s h a l l be o r g a n i z e d ,
managed, conducted and c o n t r o l l e d a s i n t h e s t a t e
l a w and t h i s c h a p t e r p r o v i d e d . "

C h a p t e r 2.44.040 of t h e W h i t e f i s h M u n i c i p a l Code, p r o v i d e s t h a t

a l l a p p l i c a n t s f o r t h e p o s i t i o n of p o l i c e o f f i c e r must be a p p o i n t -

ed by t h e mayor and confirmed by t h e c i t y c o u n c i l , b u t o n l y a f t e r

t h e a p p l i c a n t h a s s u c c e s s f u l l y passed a n e x a m i n a t i o n , and a
c e r t i f i c a t e of q u a l i f i c a t i o n h a s been f i l e d w i t h t h e mayor.

The a p p l i c a n t i s t h e n e l i g i b l e t o s e r v e a " p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d "

a s a p o l i c e o f f i c e r which may n o t exceed s i x months. Chapter

2.44.040 a l s o p r o v i d e s t h e means by which a n a p p o i n t m e n t may

b e revoked by t h e mayor:

" * * * A t any t i m e b e f o r e t h e end of such pro-
b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d t h e mayor may r e v o k e such a p p o i n t -
ment. A f t e r t h e end o f such p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d ,
and w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s t h e r e a f t e r , t h e a p p o i n t -
ment o f such a p p l i c a n t must be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e
c i t y c o u n c i l , and i f such a p p o i n t m e n t i s c o n f i r m e d
by t h e c i t y c o u n c i l , s u c h a p p l i c a n t becomes a
member of t h e p o l i c e f o r c e of t h e c i t y , and s h a l l
h o l d s u c h p o s i t i o n d u r i n g good b e h a v i o r , u n l e s s
suspended o r d i s c h a r g e d a s p r o v i d e d by law."

The a b o v e - c i t e d s e c t i o n i s a l m o s t i d e n t i c a l t o s e c t i o n 11-1803,

R.C.M. 1947, e x c e p t t h a t t h e s t a t e law was amended i n 1973 t o

e x t e n d t h e maximum p o s s i b l e p r o b a t i o n a r y t e r m from s i x months

t o one y e a r . The p a r t i e s a r e i n c o m p l e t e agreement t h a t under

t h e s t a t u t e and code s e c t i o n c i t e d above, and under t h e r u l e

f o l l o w e d by a m a j o r i t y o f j u r i s d i c t i o n s , that the legislature

may v a l i d l y a u t h o r i z e t h e removal of a p r o b a t i o n a r y p u b l i c em-

p l o y e e o r o f f i c e r i n a summary f a s h i o n , w i t h o u t n e c e s s i t y o f

cause o r hearing. S t a t e ex r e l . Nagle v . S u l l i v a n , 98 Mont.

425, 40 P.2d 995.

On F e b r u a r y 28, 1975, a l m o s t f i v e months s i n c e h i s

a p p o i n t m e n t , Schend r e c e i v e d a l e t t e r from r e s p o n d e n t Thorson

p l a c i n g him o n n o t i c e t h a t h i s appointment t o t h e p o l i c e f o r c e

would be revoked as of March 1 5 , 1975. The l e t t e r a l s o c o n t a i n e d

c e r t a i n s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s performance a s a

police officer:

"Due t o your performance of d u t y , a t t i t u d e towards
and l a c k of d e s i r e t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h o s e i n
c h a r g e * * * your s e r v i c e s w i l l no l o n g e r be re-
q u i r e d o r d e s i r e d i n your c a p a c i t y a s a member
o f t h e W h i t e f i s h P o l i c e Department."

The a p p e l l a n t , p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947,

r e q u e s t e d a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e W h i t e f i s h P o l i c e Commission. This
request was denied.
From this summary of stipulated facts emerges but one
single issue of constitutional law. Does the mayor of a city,
which is subject to the provisions of a Metropolitan Police
Law, and which grants the authority to discharge a police
officer summarily during his period of probation, violate the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution when the notice of termination is accompanied
by a statement of reasons for letting him go and no opportunity
to dispute this statement is provided? We answer this question
negatively.
A similar question has been treated by the United States

Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570,
573, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L ed 548. The court held in that
case that the claimed right of a state teacher to a hearing prior
to the nonrenewal of his employment agreement did not come with-
in the purview of the concept of due process when that teacher
has not achieved the status of tenure. In rendering its decision,
the United States Supreme Court devoted a considerable portion
of its opinion to discussing what frame of reference is properly
employed in determining issues of procedural due process. In
Roth, the federal district court committed error when it reduced
the issue to a mere balancing or weighing of the interests involved
--that is the employer's interest in denying reemployment sum-
marily, as opposed to the employee's interest in reemployment.
The court was careful to point out that while the balancing pro-
cess is essential to the determination of what form a required
hearing must take in a particular situation, the question of
whether or not due process requirements are applicable at all
demands a different type of analysis:
" * * * But, to determine whether due process re-
quirements apply in the first place, we must look
 not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the
interest at stake. * * * We must look to see
if the interest is within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of liberty and property."

See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780,
28 L.Ed, 113. This essential distinction in analysis is one

which cannot be ignored by this Court in light of the ques-

tion presented.
The due process right to hearing was intended to provide
an opportunity for a person to vindicate only those claims to

which they are legitimately entitled. In Roth, the United

States Supreme Court could not sustain the teacher's Fourteenth
Amendment claim, because he failed to show how the decision not

to rehire, deprived him of an interest in "liberty" despite his
lack of tenure or formal contract. Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed. 570. In doing so, however, the

court, in Roth, left no doubt as to the possibility that such a

showing could be made in a future case:
"The State, in declining to rehire the respondent,
did not make any charge against him that might
seriously damage his standing and associations in
his community. * * * Had it done so, this would
be a different case. For '[wlhere a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.'
[Citing cases.] In such a case, due process would
accord an opportunity to refute the charge before
University officials. * * * " (Emphasis added.)
We take judicial notice that there is no substantial dif-

ference between the status of a nontenured teacher and that of a
probationary police officer.
Due process adjudication involves typically two analyti-
cally distinct issues--whether the right of due process is appli-
cable in the first instance; and if so, what specific procedures
are "due" in each case. The right itself only becomes applicable
where ones "property" or "liberty" interests within the meaning
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment are at stake. Whether an
individual's "entitlement to employment" is sufficient to give
rise to a Constitution's claim becames the threshhold question
in these types of cases.
In Roth, the court held:
" * * * To have a property interest in a benefit,
a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It
is a purpose of the ancient institution of prop-
erty to protect those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must
not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose
of the constitutional right to a hearing to pro-
vide an opportunity for a person to vindicate
those claims.
"Property interests, of course, are not created
by the Constitution. Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law--rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits. * * * "
Here the nature of the interest is the right to a job
as a policeman. Can this be said to be encompassed within the
terms "liberty" or "property"? We think not.
The very nature of the concept of property is not and
was not intended to be static. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra,
(procedural due process as extended beyond the actual ownership
of real estate, chattels or money); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L ed 2d9OI(driver's license); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L ed 2d 287 (welfare
benefits); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 91 S.Ct. 1772,
29 L ed 2d 418, (public emp1oyment);and Stanford v. Gas Service
Company, 346 F.Supp. 717, (Kan. 1972) (utility services) . HOW-

ever, the guide furnished by Roth clearly indicates that it is
only a vested right which cannot be taken away except by due
16 Am Jur 2d, 8365, p. 694.
process of law,/ A probationary police officer under Montana law
enjoys no property or vested right. His status is that of a
temporary employee and until confirmation he has no possible
property i n t e r e s t .

Mr. J u s t i c e Holmes w r o t e i n McAuliffe v . Mayor, E t c .

of C i t y of N e w Bedford, 155 Mass. 2 1 6 , 29 N . E . 517:

" * * * There a r e few employments f o r h i r e i n
which t h e s e r v a n t d o e s n o t a g r e e t o suspend h i s
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of f r e e speech a s w e l l a s
of i d l e n e s s by t h e i m p l i e d t e r m s of h i s c o n t r a c t .
The s e r v a n t c a n n o t complain, a s he t a k e s t h e
employment on t h e t e r m s which a r e o f f e r e d him.
On t h e same p r i n c i p l e t h e c i t y may impose any
r e a s o n a b l e c o n d i t i o n upon h o l d i n g o f f i c e s w i t h i n
i t s control. * * *"

See 4 1 U. o f Chicago Law Review 297; 26 S t a n f o r d Law

Review 335.

F e d e r a l c a s e s have r e c o g n i z e d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between

p r o b a t i o n and n o n p r o b a t i o n employees. A r n e t t v . Kennedy, 416

U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 4 0 L ed 2d 1 5 ; Sampson v . Murray, 415

U.S. 61, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L ed 2d 166. Here t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s

i n t e r e s t i s more one of e x p e c t a n c y of employment t h a n any

property i n t e r e s t . Leek v . T h e i s , 217 Kan. 784, 539 P.2d 304;

Wheeler v . School D i s t r i c t # 2 0 , i n County o f E l Paso, (Colo. 1 9 7 5 ) ,

535 P.2d 2 0 6 ; Tupper v. F a i r v i e w H o s p i t a l & Training C t r . , M.H.D.,

(0re.App. 1 9 7 5 ) , 540 P.2d 401; Turner v . Board of T r u s t e e s ,

Calexico U. Sch. D i s t . , 121 Cal.Rptr. 715, 535 P.2d 1171.

T h e r e f o r e , b e c a u s e t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e gave t h e

Mayor t h e r i g h t t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y o f f i c e r w i t h o u t

c a u s e and w i t h o u t a h e a r i n g w e f i n d no v i o l a t i o n o f any a c c u s e d

r i g h t of such p r o h i b i t i n g p o l i c i e s and no v i o l a t i o n of due p r o c e s s .
/ - '.
\
--.

'
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Justice
i
W concur:
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....................................
Justices

sitting in place of Mr. Chief Justice
James T. Harrison.
 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly dissenting:

I dissent.
The a p p e l l a n t - o f f i c e r a p p e a l s from an a d v e r s e r u l i n g

of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and h i s p r i n c i p a l i s s u e on a p p e a l i s t h a t
t h e " ~ e t r o p o l i t a nP o l i c e ~ a w "e s t a b l i s h e s h i s r i g h t t o a h e a r i n g ,
a s a p r o b a t i o n a r y f u l l - t i m e o f f i c e r , when c h a r g e s have been
made a g a i n s t him. As a secondary c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s

t h a t t h e s e charges r e f l e c t on h i s good name and r e p u t a t i o n , e t c . ,

i n t h e community and t h e r e f o r e he i s e n t i t l e d t o a h e a r i n g a s
a m a t t e r of p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s under t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amend-
ment t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s . He does n o t d e c l a r e
t h a t t h e C i t y p u b l i s h e d t h e c h a r g e s b u t t h a t i n s e e k i n g employment
t h e r e a f t e r he w i l l be s u b j e c t t o p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e a l l e g e d mis-

conduct which has never been e x p l a i n e d .
It
Respondent a r g u e s t h a t t h e mayor gave reasons" not
II
chargecupon dismissal. This i s n o t t o be argued b e f o r e t h i s
Court a s t h e m a t t e r comes t o us w i t h o u t a r e c o r d upon an "Agreed
Statement o f ~ v i d e n c e " . I n t h e agreed s t a t e m e n t of evidence i n two
s e p a r a t e p l a c e s i t i s agreed t h a t t h e s e a r e "charges" a g a i n s t t h e

officer.

Somehow t h e m a j o r i t y has completely avoided any t r e a t -
ment of t h e p r i n c i p a l i s s u e r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t . Then i t h a s
through some s y l l o g i s t i c method, n o t d i s c l o s e d , a r r i v e d a t t h e
II
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t from t h e f a c t s emerges b u t one s i n g l e i s s u e of
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law." From t h e r e t h e m a j o r i t y g e t s i n t o a j u n g l e
II
of "vested r i g h t s " a t t a c h e d t o " l i b e r t y " o r p r o p e r t y " and d e c l a r e s
none e x i s t . The a u t h o r i t y being t h e Roth c a s e , s u p r a , which h o l d s
t h a t a "property r i g h t " i s c r e a t e d from s t a t e laws n o t t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n and a h e a r i n g i s e s s e n t i a l when "good name, r e p u t a -
t i o n , honor o r i n t e g r i t y i s a t s t a k e because of what t h e government
i s doing --
t o him+<9
: 9:. "
 Roth does support t h e p r i n c i p a l argument on t h e s t a t u t e
made by t h e a p p e l l a n t , who draws h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p r o p e r t y
r i g h t from t h e S t a t e law.
The language of s e c t i o n 11-1806(1), R.C.M. 1947, i s
c l e a r and unambiguous; t h e p o l i c e commission s h a l l h e a r , t r y
and d e c i d e a l l charges brought by any person a g a i n s t any member
o r o f f i c e r of t h e p o l i c e department. The t h r e e f a c t o r s (1)
c h a r g e s , ( 2 ) brought by any person, and (3) a g a i n s t an o f f i c e r ,
e x i s t i n a p p e l l a n t ' s case. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found i n i t s
o r d e r of May 29, 1975, t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s p e t i t i o n "paragraphs
I through X a r e a f a i r r e c i t a t i o n of t h e f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e +i * +<.I1

Paragraphs I , 1 1 and V I I I of p l a i n t i f f ' s p e t i t i o n s e t f o r t h t h a t
1
O f f i c e r Schend was a " f u l l - t i m e P o l i c e O f f i c e r a t t h e time of h i s
removal" and t h a t t h e mayor a l l e g e d "charges" a g a i n s t O f f i c e r
Schend concerning O f f i c e r ~ c h e n ds "performance of d u t y , a t t i t u d e
'
towards h i s s u p e r i o r s and l a c k of cooperation w i t h h i s s u p e r i o r s " .
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e f a c t t h a t a p p e l l a n t was a " f u l l - t i m e P o l i c e
o f f i c e r " , and t h a t t h e mayor a l l e g e d "charges", i s p a r t of t h e
agreed statement of evidence b e f o r e t h i s Court. Clearly,
a p p e l l a n t i n h i s c a p a c i t y a s an o f f i c e r , was accused of charges
by t h e mayor.
On t h e b a s i s of t h i s c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n S t a t e ex r e l .
0 ' ~ e i I I . v . Mayor of C i t y of B u t t e , 96 Mont. 403, 30 P.2d 819,
wherein t h e Court h e l d t h a t t h e mayor has t h e a u t h o r i t y d u r i n g
t h e probationary period t o t e r m i n a t e t h e o f f i c e r , w i t h o u t cause
o r hearing, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e r e reasoned t h a t u n t i l once
confirmed by t h e c i t y councel a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 11-1803,
R.C.M. 1947, t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y a p p o i n t e e i s n o t a member of t h e
police force. Thus, concluded t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e
memorandum t o i t s o r d e r of May 29, 1975, t h e mayor had t h e a u t h o r i c y
t o t e r m i n a t e t h e employment of O f f i c e r Schend a s he had no s t a n d i n g
o r p r o t e c t i o n under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 11-1806, R.C.M.
1947, r e q u i r i n g a h e a r i n g . Therein t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d .
 There i s no c o n f l i c t i n t h e s t a t u t e s a s found by t h e
d i s t r i c t court. The mayor can a t any time d u r i n g an o f f i c e r ' s
p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d t e r m i n a t e t h e appointment. However, when
t h e mayor o r anyone e l s e s e l e c t s t o f i l e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t "any
o f f i c e r o r member of t h e p o l i c e department", t h e p o l i c e commission
n o t o n l y h a s " j u r i s d i c t i o n " b u t a "duty" imposed by s t a t u t e t o
h e a r , t r y and d e c i d e " a l l charges".
The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t should be r e v e r s e d ;
t h e o f f i c e r - a p p e l l a n t r e i n s t a t e d t o h i s p o s i t i o n on t h e p o l i c e
force.