Englund v. Englund

No. 13231 I N T E SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA H OR F F 1976 DANNIE E G U D , NLN P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - CLINTON E. ENGLUND, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Smith and Harper, Helena, Montana Charles A. Smith, 1 1 argued, Helena, Montana 1 For Respondent : Thomas A. Dowling argued, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Submitted: March 1, 1976 Decided: /h/\ti 2 $ 13/o I, ;*b . , Filed : , ' Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , L e w i s and C l a r k County. The a c t i o n w a s i n s t i t u t e d a s a motion t o v a c a t e a p o r t i o n o f a judgment made and e n t e r e d i n a d i v o r c e p r o c e e d i n g some f i v e y e a r s ago. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d t h e motion and t h i s appeal followed. A f t e r some t h i r t y y e a r s of m a r r i a g e t h e w i f e i n s t i t u t e d p r o c e e d i n g s f o r s e p a r a t e m a i n t e n a n c e i n 1969. The husband counterclaimed asking f o r a divorce. Following a h e a r i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e husband a d i v o r c e . The d e c r e e o r d e r e d a p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n c o n s i s t i n g of f o u r i n s t a l l m e n t lump sum pay- ments of $2,500 e a c h , o v e r a two y e a r p e r i o d , by t h e husband t o t h e w i f e , w i t h c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e a l p r o p e r t y conveyances from t h e w i f e t o t h e husband. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t o r d e r e d t h e husband t o pay $400 p e r month alimony. Immediately f o l l o w i n g t h e d e c r e e t h e w i f e f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l a l l e g i n g i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s by t h e c o u r t , i n t h a t i t d i d n o t r u l e on m a t e r i a l f a c t s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e a s s e t s of t h e p a r t i e s . Hearing was had on t h e motion b u t t h e c o u r t t o o k no a c t i o n . No a p p e a l was t a k e n from t h e d e c r e e . T h e r e a f t e r t h e husband s o u g h t enforcement of t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e d e c r e e d i r e c t i n g t h e s i g n i n g o v e r of c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y t o him and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h e w i f e i n contempt and o r d e r e d h e r t o e x e c u t e c e r t a i n d e e d s and documents t o t h e husband. She complied and t h e husband made t h e $400 monthly payments u n t i l 1 9 7 5 when he moved t o s e t a s i d e t h e alimony award payments on t h e grounds t h e y were v o i d b e c a u s e t h e d i v o r c e w a s g r a n t e d t o him. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h e alimony award was v o i d , b u t h e l d t h e husband was e s t o p p e d from d e n y i n g i t s v a l i d i t y a f t e r r e l y i n g upon t h e d e c r e e t o compel t h e w i f e t o t r a n s f e r c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y t o him. The husband a p p e a l s and r a i s e s t h e s e i s s u e s : 1. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n , power o r a u t h o r i t y t o award alimony t o t h e w i f e b e c a u s e t h e divorce w a s not granted t o t h e wife f o r an offense of t h e husband. 2. S e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, t h e s e c t i o n g o v e r n i n g t h e award of alimony o n l y t o t h e w i f e i n d i v o r c e a c t i o n s i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n s 4 and 1 7 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ; A r t i c l e 111, S e c t i o n 27 of t h e 1889 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ; and t h e F i f t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments o f t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . The t r i a l judge i n t h i s c a s e had d i f f i c u l t y i n t r y i n g t o under s t a n d what had moved t h e t r i a l judge i n t h e o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e a c t i o n i n t e r m i n g t h e award t o t h e w i f e a s alimony. In a memorandum and o r d e r he n o t e d : "There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e d e c r e e (denominated ' F i n d i n g s o f F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law and Judgment' and f i l e d May 1 4 , 1970) pro- v i d i n g f o r alimony payments by t h e d e f e n d a n t , who w a s g r a n t e d t h e d i v o r c e , was v o i d a b i n i t i o , a s such. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d , however, t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r i t s e l f s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e payments r e q u i r e d w e r e n o t alimony, a s d e s c r i b e d , b u t payments t o be made a s a p a r t of a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t , n o t a g r e e d upon between t h e p a r t i e s . The f i r s t o r d e r of t h e c o u r t p r o v i d e s f o r f o u r payments o f $2,500.00 e a c h 'as a p a r t i a l p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t . ' No r e f e r e n c e i s made t o any o t h e r p a r t of t h e ' p r o p e r t y s e t t l e - m e n t ' , which s u g g e s t s , i n f e r e n t i a l l y , t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t may be t h e payments t h a t were denominated 'alimony.' However, t h e t h i r d p a r t of t h e o r d e r deepens t h e m y s t e r y by p r o v i d i n g f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e ' a l i m o n y ' upon p r o p e r showing. If the ' a l i m o n y ' w e r e t o be deemed a p a r t o f t h e ' p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t ' t h e n m o d i f i c a t i o n would n o t be a p p r o p r i a t e . W a r e , then, a t a l o s s t o determine j u s t e x a c t l y e what was i n t e n d e d by t h e c o u r t i n r e g a r d t o t h e payments t h e d e f e n d a n t now w i s h e s t o s e t a s i d e . "Nor do I have any d o u b t t h a t t h e payments made t o d a t e i n compliance w i t h t h e ' a l i m o n y ' o r d e r do n o t and c a n n o t c o n s t i t u t e r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h a t o r d e r , i f t h e order i t s e l f i s void. It i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a v o i d o r d e r c a n n o t be made e f f e c t i v e by com- pliance. " However, t h e t r i a l c o u r t g o e s on t o h o l d t h a t due t o t h e f a c t a p p e l l a n t had s u c c e s s f u l l y t a k e n a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n t o e n f o r c e the decree, he was estopped from challenging its validity. We agree. We do not agree that the order was void. - The court was in jurisdiction at the time it made its decree and what obviously was intended to be a part of the "property settlement" became mistakenly labeled "alimony". Here the wife who had worked for most of the marital years in the business office of appellant's plumbing business, helped in the accumulation of considerable property. She signed over those interests at a time after she incurred a serious physical nerve disease and could no longer be a productive part of the labor market. Her medical and drug expenses had become far more costly than those of a person of her age. We find the $400 payments to be a part of the "property settlement" and not walimony" as re- ferred to by the district court. Appellant's second issue relates to the constitutionality of section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947. Having decided the alimony argu- ment, it is unnecessary to discuss the constitutional issue, but we note the question was not raised in the district court and could not on appeal be argued before this Court. It is fundamental that on appeal this Court will consider for review only those issues raised before the trial court. Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48; State Highway Commission v. Milanovich, 142 Mont. 410, 384 P.2d 752; Clark v. Worrall, 146 Mont. 374, The judgment is affirmed. L Justice \ We concur: / \ Justi I sitting in place of Mr. Chief Justice