No. 13050
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE
F STATE O M N A A
F OTN
1975
THE STATE O M N A A
F OTN,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
D U L S C. THOMSON,
O GA
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and P h i l l i p s and
Douglas D. Dasinger, K a l i s p e l l , Montana
Douglas D. Dasinger argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
Thomas A. Budewitz , A s s i s t a n t Attorney General,
argued, Helena, Montana
Jack Yardley, County Attorney, argued, L i v i n g s t o n ,
Montana
David DePuy , Deputy County Attorney, appeared,
Livingston, Montana
Submitted: December 8, 1975
Decided : J A N 2 8 1376
.'q-y
Filed: .' ;p2" : , " .*
M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
This i s an a p p e a l from a judgment of c o n v i c t i o n e n t e r e d
on a j u r y v e r d i c t of g u i l t y . Defendant Douglas C . Thomson was
convicted on two c o u n t s , possession and s a l e of dangerous drugs
i n Park County, t h e Honorable Robert H. Wilson, p r e s i d i n g .
P r i o r t o t r i a l , defendant moved t o suppress any e v i -
dence obtained a s a r e s u l t of a s e a r c h w a r r a n t . The motion, a f t e r
h e a r i n g , was denied. The a p p e a l i s based on t h e d e n i a l of t h e
motion t o s u p p r e s s , and on two j u r y s e l e c t i o n procedural m a t t e r s .
One Paul H a l l e t t was a p r i s o n e r i n t h e Livingston c i t y
j a i l , having been a r r e s t e d on a f r a u d u l e n t check charge. O the
n
evening of November 16, 1974, H a l l e t t asked t o s e e an o f f i c e r and
asked i f t h e o f f i c e r would l i k e c e r t a i n information r e l a t i n g t o
drug s a l e s by defendant. H a l l e t t was l a t e r interviewed by t h e
county a t t o r n e y .
O t h e b a s i s of t h e information r e c e i v e d t h e county
n
a t t o r n e y prepared an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a s e a r c h w a r r a n t . In the
e a r l y morning hours of November 17, 1974, t h e a p p l i c a t i o n was
presented t o D i s t r i c t Judge Jack D. Shanstrorn i n h i s home. Two
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , t h e county a t t o r n e y , and H a l l e t t met w i t h Judge
Shanstrom. A f t e r examining t h e a p p l i c a t i o n , Judge Shanstrom
placed O f f i c e r Warren and t h e informant H a l l e t t under o a t h and
examined each of them f o r about twenty minutes. The examination
included d i s c u s s i o n s of H a l l e t t ' s information about defendant and
was
one Adams, wholthen under a d e f e r r e d imposition of sentence from
B i l l i n g s f o r drugs. The Judge was f a m i l i a r w i t h b o t h defendant
and Adams and examined t h e informer H a l l e t t e x t e n s i v e l y i n d e t a i l
on h i s knowledge of both s u b j e c t s , t h e d r u g s , and t h e l o c a t i o n
of t h e drugs. Based on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and on h i s independent
examination of t h e informant H a l l e t t a s t o both h i s own involvement
and h i s knowledge, Judge Shanstrom i s s u e d t h e search w a r r a n t .
P r i o r t o t r i a l a t a hearing on t h e motion t o suppress
Judge Robert H. Wilson p r e s i d e d , Judge Shanstrom t e s t i f i e d and
was cross-examined. Judge Wilson denied t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s .
Judge Wilson t r i e d t h e c a s e w i t h a j u r y .
~ e f e n d a n t ' sb a s i c i s s u e on a p p e a l i s whether t h e s e a r c h
warrant was i s s u e d on probable cause.
Defendant approaches h i s argument--that t h e r e was n o t
probable cause shown--in a s o r t of two pronged manner. First,
he s u g g e s t s t h a t because Judge Shanstrom questioned t h e informant
about f e a t u r e s w i t h i n t h e ~ u d g e ' sown knowledge, such a s Adam's
p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n and d e f e n d a n t ' s r e p u t a t i o n , t h a t he was n o t a
"detached m a g i s t r a t e " . W need n o t dwell long on t h i s .
e It i s
c l e a r from Judge Shanstrom's testimony t h a t he was examining t h e
informant t o determine t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of h i s information. The
informant was, i n a s e n s e , an i t i n e r a n t unknown who was b e i n g
held i n j a i l on a n o t h e r c h a r g e , b u t he was a named person.
Judge Shanstrom was t h e n e u t r a l member of t h e j u d i c i a l
branch of government whose duty i t i s t o determine whether t h e r e
was probable cause f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of a s e a r c h w a r r a n t . The
probable cause f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of a w a r r a n t was s t a t e d i n t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n b u t t h e source of t h a t information was a named i n -
formant whose r e l i a b i l i t y had n o t been p r e v i o u s l y t e s t e d . Judge
Shanstrom' s examination of t h a t informant on information known t o t h e
Judge made a reasonably r e l i a b l e t e s t of t h a t information neces-
s a r y t o support r e l i a b i l i t y and t h u s probable cause. Defendant
c i t e s United S t a t e s v. United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court, 407 U.S.
297, 92 S . C t . 2125, 32 , ed 2d 752, and Coolidge v. New Hamp-
T
s h i r e , 4 0 3 U.S. 4 4 3 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564, f o r t h e propo-
s i t i o n t h a t a " n e u t r a l and detached" m a g i s t r a t e i s r e q u i r e d .
Neither c a s e i s appli-cable h e r e . Both c a s e s involved a t t o r n e y s
g e n e r a l , one without j u d i c i a l approval; t h e o t h e r t h e a t t o r n e y
g e n e r a l a c t i n g a s a j u s t i c e of peace i s s u i n g h i s own s e a r c h w a r r a n t ,
in effect.
The second prong of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t a c k i s t h a t t h e
i n f o r m a n t ' s r e l i a b i l i t y was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d because he was un-
known a s t o r e l i a b i l i t y . That i s why Judge Shanstrom examined t h e
informant--an independent means of e s t a b l i s h i n g r e l i a b i l i t y .
Rut, defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n must i n and of i t s e l f
e s t a b l i s h b o t h ( a ) t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e informant and (b) t h e
underlying circumstance g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e probable cause.
I n S t a t e ex r e l . Glantz, 154 Mont. 132, 137, 461 P.2d
193, t h i s Court s a i d :
11;1;
-
J,
whenever an i n f o r m e r ' s s t a t e m e n t s a r e
ik
r e l i e d upon a s probable c a u s e , t h e r e must b e a
demonstration of t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o r c r e d i b i l i t y
of t h e informer. I I
See: S t a t e v. Paschke, 165 Mont. 231, 527 P.2d 569, 31 St.Rep.
847; S t a t e v. Thorsness, 165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692, 3 1 St.Rep.
O r d i n a r i l y , t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e informer has been
shown by t h e i n f o r m e r ' s r e p u t a t i o n a s an upstanding c i t i z e n o r
by p a s t performance; and i n e i t h e r event t h e s e f a c t s can be s t a t e d
i n the application. But h e r e , a s p r e v i o u s l y s e t o u t , t h e s e f a c t s
d i d n o t e x i s t so t h e i s s u i n g m a g i s t r a t e t e s t e d t h a t r e l i a b i l i t y
i n a manner, under o a t h , designed t o independently s a t i s f y t h e
m a g i s t r a t e of t h e accuracy of t h e information. W hold t h i s t o
e
s a t i s f y t h e showing of probable cause n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e i s s u a n c e
of t h e w a r r a n t .
O o r a l argument, counsel c i t e d S t a t e ex r e l . Townsend
n
v. D i s t r i c t Court, .
I4on t -- 9
--- P. 2d , 32 St.Rep.
1163, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t f o r s e a r c h warrant
cannot be supplemented by o r a l s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e . That
i s c o r r e c t and h e r e we p o i n t out t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t was wholly
s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h probable c a u s e , b u t being based on hearsay
from an informant, t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h a t informant may be checked
by t h e m a g l s t r a t e . It i s no doubt d e s i r a b l e t o have a w r i t t e n r e -
cord of t h a t examination, b u t t h e e x i g e n c i e s of t h e n i g h t t i m e s i t u a -
t i o n did n o t permit such. The Judge t e s t i f i e d and was s u b j e c t
t o cross-examination. H i s only concern was a s t o t h e r e l i a b i l i t y
of t h e h e a r s a y , and he s o t e s t i f i e d . Thus, h e r e o r a l testimony
i s n o t supplementing probable c a u s e - - - i t i s merely providing a
d i r e c t t e s t of r e l i a b i l i t y by a c o n s c i e n t i o u s m a g i s t r a t e . The
c a s e s on unnamed informants a r e n o t i n p o i n t .
The two procedural m a t t e r s i n j u r y selection complained
of a r o s e i n t h i s manner:
P r i o r t o t h e e x e r c i s e of peremptory c h a l l e n g e s , o u t s i d e
t h e presence of t h e j u r y , counsel f o r defendant challenged f o r
cause t h e s e a t i n g of a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r , J. E . Gaab, on t h e
grounds t h a t he was an employee of t h e S t a t e F i s h and Game Depart-
ment and had been i n law enforcement work. The c h a l l e n g e was
denied. Mr. Gaab d i d n o t s i t a s a t r i a l j u r o r , b u t defendant
claims e r r o r because he was o b l i g a t e d t o u s e a peremptory c h a l l e n g e .
I n d e f e n d a n t ' s b r i e f on appeal i t i s s t a t e d t h a t "Pros-
p e c t i v e j u r o r , J. E. Gaab, a d m i t t e d l y was a law enforcement o f f i c e r " .
I n p o i n t of f a c t j u r o r Gaab was an o f f i c e r of t h e Montana F i s h and
Game department.
Section 95-1909 (d) ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s t h a t "Each
p a r t y may c h a l l e n g e j u r o r s f o r cause, and each c h a l l e n g e must
be t r i e d by t h e court". Subsection (2) l i s t s t h o s e reasons f o r
which a c h a l l e n g e f o r cause may be taken. That s u b s e c t i o n a l s o
provides t h a t a c h a l l e n g e f o r cause may be taken " f o r any o t h e r
reason which t h e c o u r t determines". Of t h e reasons l i s t e d i n
s e c t i o n 95-1909 only t h e f i n a l one would provide a reason f o r
c h a l l e n g i n g a law enforcement o f f i c e r f o r cause. S e c t i o n 95-
1909 (d) ( 2 ) (x) s t a t e s :
"For t h e e x i s t e n c e of a s t a t e of mind on t h e
p a r t of t h e j u r o r i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e c a s e , o r
t o e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s , which w i l l prevent him
from a c t i n g w i t h e n t i r e i m p a r t i a l i t y and without
p r e j u d i c e t o t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of e i t h e r
party. It
That s e c t i o n does n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y exclude law e n f o r c e -
ment o f f i c e r s from s e r v i n g a s j u r o r s i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e . Not
being s p e c i f i c a l l y provided f o r , law enforcement o f f i c e r s must
s t a n d on an e q u a l f o o t i n g w i t h any o t h e r c i t i z e n a s a p r o s p e c t i v e
juror. Since defendant does n o t a l l e g e t h e e x i s t e n c e of any
p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind which would p l a c e him w i t h i n t h e s t r i c t u r e s
of s u b s e c t i o n ( x ) , o t h e r than t h e f a c t tha.t he i s a f i s h and game
o f f i c e r , no b a s i s e x i s t s f o r h i s d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r cause.
The b a r e f a c t t h a t he i s connected w i t h law enforcement does n o t ,
without more, n e c e s s i t a t e a f i n d i n g t h a t he would n o t be an i m -
p a r t i a l juror.
I n S t a t e v. A l l i s o n , 122 Mont. 120, 129, 131, 199 P, 2d
279, t h e Court s t a t e d :
"It i s a d i f f i c u l t m a t t e r a t b e s t t o a s c e r t a i n t h e
r e a l s t a t e of mind of a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r w i t h
r e s p e c t t o d e t e c t i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of b i a s o r pre-
j u d i c e a g a i n s t one accused of crime. For t h a t r e a s o n
t h i s c o u r t has s a i d ( S t a t e v. R u s s e l l , 73 Mont. 240, 249,
235 Pac. 712, 715) t h a t t h e determination of t h e
q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a j u r o r t o s e r v e i n a c a s e b e f o r e t h e
c o u r t 1 must b e l e f t l a r g e l y t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n
of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . 1 Again i n S t a t e v. Huffman 89
Mont. 194, 296 Pac. 789, 790, t h i s c o u r t s a i d : **
t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s t h e judge of t h e weight t o be given
t o t h e testimony adduced on a v o i r d i r e examination. I f 1
Assumedly, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t could have removed j u r o r Gaab f o r
cause even without a c l e a r showing of i m p a r t i a l i t y i f t h e c o u r t
had any doubt a s t o t h e j u r o r ' s s t a t e of mind. Such a determina-
t i o n i s w i t h i n t h e sound j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . Where
t h e c o u r t does n o t e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n removing a j u r o r f o r
cause when a c h a l l e n g e i s made, t h i s Court may r e v e r s e a c o n v i c t i o n
only where t h e r e i s demonstrated a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . In
t h e i n s t a n t c a s e no such abuse of d i s c r e t i o n can be shown by de-
f endant.
While a f i s h and game warden i s a law enforcement o f f i c e r
i n a narrow s e n s e , t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h o s e o f f i c e r s i s l i m i t e d i n scope
by Chapter 1, T i t l e 26, Revised Codes of Montana. S e c t i o n 26-110 ( 2 ) ,
R.C.M. 1947, s u b s t a n t i a l l y s t a t e s t h e law enforcement d u t i e s
of wardens:
"They s h a l l e n f o r c e t h e laws of t h i s s t a t e
and t h e r u l e s of t h e commission w i t h r e f e r e n c e
t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n , p r e s e r v a t i o n , and propaga-
t i o n of-game and f u r - b e a r i n g a n i m a l s , f i s h and game
b i r d s . 11
The i n s t a n t c a s e d e a l s w i t h a v i o l a t i o n of t h e g e n e r a l c r i m i n a l
law of t h e s t a t e of Montana, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e Montana Dangerous
Drug Act. P r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r Gaab, a s a game warden, has no
connection w i t h o f f e n s e s committed i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e drug laws
of t h i s S a t e . He has no power a s a law enforcement o f f i c e r i n
t h a t r e s p e c t and he s t a n d s a s a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n . Without a
showing of i m p a r t i a l i t y t h e r e can be no abuse i n d i s c r e t i o n by
t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n r e f u s i n g t o allow t h a t j u r o r t o be removed
f o r cause.
I n S t a t e v. Cadotte, 1 7 Mont. 315, 316 (1895), t h i s Court
found no e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g t o remove a j u r o r f o r cause where t h e
j u r o r was a b r o t h e r - i n - l a w of t h e county a t t o r n e y who was prose-
cuting. There t h e Court s a i d :
Furthermore, t h e examination of t h i s j u r o r wpon
11
h i s --does n o t a t a l l tend t o show any
voir dire
b i a s , e i t h e r implied o r a c t u a l . "
It i s c l e a r then t h a t , u n l e s s t h e j u r o r f a l l s w i t h i n one of t h e
c a t e g o r i e s of s e c t i o n 95-1909, he w i l l n o t b e removed f o r c a u s e
without a showing o f - W a r t i a l i t y . In t h i s case there i s not
only no showing o f & q a r t i a l i t y , t h e r e i s n o t even an a l l e g a t i o n
ofimpartiality. The b a r e f a c t of Gaab's p o s i t i o n a s a game
warden i s n o t enough t o c r e a t e a doubt a s t o h i s i m p a r t i a l i t y ,
without more.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t Gaab was
removed a s a j u r o r through a peremptory c h a l l e n g e by defendant.
I n A l l i s o n t h e Court recognized t h a t even i f a doubt d i d e x i s t
a s t o t h e j u r o r ' s s t a t e of mind, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e defendant l a t e r
removed t h e j u r o r through t h e e x e r c i s e of a peremptory c h a l l e n g e
precludes t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of any p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant.
I n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g S t a t e v. Sims, 5 1 N.M. 467, 188 P.2d 177,
t h e Court s t a t e d :
11;'; $ 9c I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , however, t h e defendant had
.
t h r e e peremptory c h a l l e n g e s l e f t a t t h e time t h e
court overruled t h e challenge against the witness
Leemhius and immediately following d e f e n d a n t ' s
t a k i n g o f exception t o t h e c o u r t ' s o v e r r u l i n g
s a i d c h a l l e n g e , t h e defendant e x e r c i s e d h i s s i x t h
peremptory c h a l l e n g e t o remove s a i d j u r o r . In
t h e c a s e a t b a r t h e c o u r t d i d n o t , a s i n t h e Sims
c a s e , f o r c e t h e o b j e c t i o n a b l e - j u r o r upon t h e
defendant a f t e r t h e l a t t e r had exhausted a l l h i s
peremptory c h a l l e n g e s , and so f a r a s p r e j u d i c e
t o t h e r i g h t s of t h e defendant i s concerned,
Leemhius d i d n o t s i t on t h e j u r y which t r i e d t h e
defendant. The f a c t t h a t defendant regarded j u r o r s
Jensen and Ronnin a s u n d e s i r a b l e gave him no
r i g h t t o have Leemhius excused f o r b i a s i n o r d e r
t h a t defendant might g e t r i d of one o r two o t h e r
j u r o r s , no showing having been made t h a t t h o s e
p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s were n o t q u a l i f i e d . I I
Defendant was n o t e n t i t l e d t o t h e removal of Gaab a s
a j u r o r f o r c a u s e , and even i f he had been s o e n t i t l e d he was
i n no way harmed i n h i s d e f e n s e s i n c e Gaab d i d n o t s i t on t h e
jury.
Next and l a s t , defendant claims e r r o r i n t h e answers on
v o i r d i r e examination of j u r o r s when j u r o r Richard Cain was
a l l e g e d t o have answered i n t h e n e g a t i v e a q u e s t i o n a s t o whether any
p o t e n t i a l j u r o r was a member of a law enforcement agency o r con-
n e c t e d w i t h a law enforcement agency. Defendant then a l l e g e s t h a t
M r . Cain was a member of t h e P o l i c e Commission of t h e c i t y of
Livingston. These a l l e g a t i o n s by defendant do n o t appear i n t h e
record. They come by way of c o u n s e l ' s a f f i d a v i t . The s t a t e pre-
s e n t e d a c o u n t e r - a f f i d a v i t from j u r o r Cain denying t h a t such
q u e s t i o n s w e r e even asked. Aside from t h e f a c t t h a t a p o l i c e
commissioner under Montana law, Chapter 18, T i t l e 11, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947, i s n o t a law enforcement o f f i c e r and t h u s t h e
answer would have been t e c h n i c a l l y proper i n any e v e n t , we do n o t
a c c e p t a f f i d a v i t s t o supplement an a p p e l l a t e r e c o r d i n t h i s manner.
S t a t e e x r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , -Mont . -2
540 P.2d 312, 32 St.Rep. 906.
F i n d i n g n o e r r o r , t h e judgment i s a f f i r m e d .
W Concur:
e 1
L%-
Justices.