No. 13526
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF P40MTANA
1977
VIRGINIA FLAKE,
Claimant and Appellant,
-vs-
ST. VINCENTS'S HOSPITAL, Employer,
and
AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court
Honorable William E. Hunt, Judqe presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Kelly and Foley, Billings, Montana
William T. Kelly argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, Peete and Brown,
Billings, Montana
Weymouth D. Symmes argued, Billings, Montana
Submitted: September 20, 1977
Decided: QEC 1 3 jm
Filed:
der 2 s
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
This i s an appeal from a decision of t h e workers' compen-
s a t i o n c o u r t , B i l l i n g s , t h a t claimant sustained a 12% permanent
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y and awarding a lump sum payment i n t h e amount
of $2,431.20.
V i r g i n i a Flake, claimant and a p p e l l a n t , i s a l i c e n s e d
p r a c t i c a l nurse. She s u f f e r e d an i n j u r y t o h e r lower back
i n t h e course of h e r employment a t S t . Vincent's H o s p i t a l i n
B i l l i n g s on March 3, 1974. P r i o r t o h e r i n j u r y , she was
employed part-time, working an average of t h r e e e i g h t hour
days per week. The record r e v e a l s claimant worked one f u l l
f o r t y hour week j u s t p r i o r t o her i n j u r y .
Following the i n j u r y , claimant continued t o work u n t i l
March 30, 1974, when the paid of t h e i n j u r y forced h e r t o
discontinue h e r work. D r . D . R. Huard performed a laminectomy
on claimant i n August 1974. The workers' Compensation Division
paid a l l b i l l s and l o s t wages during t h e period of c l a i m a n t ' s
nonemployment.
O November 18, 1974, claimant resumed work a t S t . Vincent's.
n
She was unable t o do l i f t i n g because of t h e i n j u r y . However,
she was a b l e t o work t h r e e t o four days per week and h a s , i n
f a c t , worked s e v e r a l f o r t y hour weeks subsequent t o t h e i n j u r y .
Her wages have increased approximately eightycents per hour,
p r i m a r i l y due t o across t h e board c o s t of l i v i n g i n c r e a s e s , so
she makes somewhat more money now than before the i n j u r y .
On August 29, 1974, D r . Huard submitted a r e p o r t s t a t i n g :
"* * 9: I b e l i e v e t h e r e i s a p a r t i a l permanent impair-
ment. This following r e s u l t of laminectomy would be
20% of h e r s p i n e , which converts t o 12% of t h e man
a s a whole. * * *"
The insurance c a r r i e r f o r S t . V i n c e n t ' s , defendant and
respondent Aetna L i f e & Casualty Company concluded t h e 12%
impairment f a c t o r l i m i t e d i t s l i a b i l i t y under t h e ~ o r k e r s '
Compensation Act t o 12% o r 60 of t h e p o s s i b l e 500 weeks of
maximum b e n e f i t . Multiplying 60 weeks by t h e weekly compensa-
t i o n r a t e of $40.52 y i e l d e d $2,431.20, which sum was o f f e r e d
t o claimant.
Claimant r e j e c t e d t h e o f f e r and, on September 4 , 1975,
sought a de termination b e f o r e t h e workers ' compensation c o u r t .
During t h e h e a r i n g of November 5 , 1975, pursuant t o c l a i m a n t ' s
p e t i t i o n , claimant submitted evidence of h e r i n a b i l i t y t o
perform c e r t a i n types of work, such a s l i f t i n g , a s a d i r e c t
r e s u l t of h e r i n j u r y . The c o u r t , by i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and
conclusions of law dated August 23, 1976, accepted t h e c a r r i e r ' s
computation of $2,431.20, upon a f i n d i n g of no s u b s t a n t i a l l o s s
of e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y , based upon c l a i m a n t ' s work r e c o r d s and
t h e 12% impairment r a t i n g . Claimant a p p e a l s t h e c o u r t ' s
conclusions.
The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d by t h i s appeal i s whether t h e workers'
compensation c o u r t e r r e d i n a r r i v i n g a t a 12% permanent p a r t i a l
d i s a b i l i t y r a t i n g , given t h e f a c t s of r e c o r d . W hold i t d i d
e
not.
Claimant contends t h e c o u r t should n o t have determined
d i s a b i l i t y s o l e l y upon t h e b a s i s of t h e d o c t o r ' s medical
impairment r a t i n g b u t , r a t h e r , t h a t d i s a b i l i t y should be com-
puted upon a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of " l o s s of e a r n i n g capacity". In
making such computation, t h e c o u r t should p r o p e r l y e v a l u a t e
t h e d i s a b i l i t y i n view of c l a i m a n t ' s a g e , e d u c a t i o n , work
e x p e r i e n c e , p a i n and d i s a b i l i t y , a c t u a l wage l o s s , and l o s s
of f u t u r e e a r n i n g a b i l i t y . Here, c l a i m a n t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o
perform more than t h r e e o r f o u r days of work should be con-
s i d e r e d s t r o n g evidence of a l o s s of e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y . In
t h i s r e g a r d , c l a i m a n t submits t h e Workers ' Compensation Act
should be l i b e r a l l y construed i n favor o f recovery.
Respondent, however, s t r e s s e s t h a t c l a i m a n t i s p r e s e n t l y
working a t l e a s t a s many hours and, i n f a c t , i s e a r n i n g more
a f t e r than b e f o r e t h e i n j u r y , t h e r e f o r e t h e r e being no a c t u a l
wage l o s s t h e r e i s no l o s s of earning c a p a c i t y . Claimant s u s -
t a i n e d a "bodily f u n c t i o n a l impairment" o n l y , f u l l y compensable
by t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f f e r e d by respondent i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r . The
c o u r t p r o p e r l y based i t s award on t h e percentage of such i m -
pairment, t h i s being t h e only s u b s t a n t i v e evidence of d i s a b i l i t y .
Claimant's p e t i t i o n f o r workers' compensation b e n e f i t s pro-
ceeded under and i s governed by t h e workers' Compensation Act,
s e c t i o n 92-703.1, R.C.M. 1947. T h i s s e c t i o n provided p r i o r t o
amendment i n 1975:
"Compensation f o r i n j u r i e s causing p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y .
Weekly compensation b e n e f i t s f o r i n j u r y producing
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y s h a l l be s i x t y - s i x and two-thirds
p e r c e n t (66 2/3%) of t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e wages
r e c e i v e d a t t h e time of t h e i n j u r y and t h e wages t h e
i n j u r e d employee i s capable of e a r n i n g t h e r e a f t e r , sub-
j e c e . t o a maximum compensation of s i x t y d o l l a r s
($60.00) a week.
S e c t i o n 92-703.1 "* * * bases t h e b e n e f i t upon a c t u a l
l o s s of e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y r e s u l t i n g from t h e i n j u r y ** *.I'
McAlear v. Arthur G . McKee & Co., - .
Mont -
9 558 P.2d 1134,
33 St. R e p . 1.337, 1341 (1976). I t i s m a n i f e s t from a r e a d i n g
of s e c t i o n 92-703.1 t h a t t h e t e s t f o r such l o s s of e a r n i n g
c a p a c i t y under t h e Workers' Compensation Act i s " t h e d i f f e r e n c e
between t h e wages r e c e i v e d a t t h e time of t h e i n j u r y and t h e
wages t h e i n j u r e d employee i s c a p a b l e of e a r n i n g t h e r e a f t e r
yc +
; *.'I Also s e e : Olson v . Manion's, I n c . , 162 Mont. 197, 202,
510 P.2d 6 (1973).
Claimant r e l i e s on d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court a d o p t i n g t h e
" l o s s of e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y " t e s t . S h a f f e r v . Midland Empire
Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d 340 (1953); Lind v. Lind,
142 Mont. 211, 383 P.2d 808 (1963); Graham v . Tree Farmers,
Inc., 142 Mont. 483, 385 P.2d 83 (1963). Claimant draws
s u p p o r t p r i m a r i l y from t h e r e l a t e d r u l e emerging from such
c a s e s , t h a t l o s s of e a r n i n g power a s a r e s u l t of an i n j u r y
i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o b o d i l y f u n c t i o n a l impairment.
I t i s argued t h a t t o e q u a t e a percentage b o d i l y f u n c t i o n a l
impairment r a t i n g w i t h a percentage d i s a b i l i t y r a t i n g f o r
purposes of compensation under s e c t i o n 92-703.1, i s t o make
wholly a r b i t r a r y t h e concept of "compensable d i s a b i l i t y " .
While we a g r e e a s m a l l p e r c e n t a g e of b o d i l y f u n c t i o n a l
impairment can r e s u l t i n a s u b s t a n t i a l l o s s of e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y
and a g r e a t e r compensation award i n some c a s e s , t h e evidence
adduced a t t h e h e a r i n g i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e l e a d s t o t h e o p p o s i t e
conclusion. Claimant was shown t o be working a t l e a s t a s
oisny hours a f t e r t h e i n j u r y a s b e f o r e . The f a c t c l a i m a n t may
have worked more h o u r s , earned more pay, o r been promoted i n
h e r employment had i t n o t been f o r t h e i n j u r y , i s immaterial
t o a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of compensable d i s a b i l i t y e s p e c i a l l y where,
ds h e r e , t h e r e c o r d i s devoid of evidence i n s u p p o r t of such
~~onclusion.
Olson v . Manion's, I n c . , supra. The s a l i e n t
t a c t remains c l a i m a n t was a p a r t - t i m e employee b e f o r e and
axter the injury. To base an o r i g i n a l compensation award upon
any o t h e r c r i t e r i o n would be t o do v i o l e n c e t o t h e l i t e r a l
Language of s e c t i o n 92-703.1.
F i n a l l y , we n o t e t h e medical r e p o r t submitted by D r .
Huard was t h e s o l e evidence i n t h e r e c o r d s u b s t a n t i a t i n g
t h e percentage of c l a i m a n t ' s impairment. W f i n d t h e workers'
e
zon~pensationc o u r t had no a 1 t e r n a t i v e , based upon t h e f a c t s
L t h e r e c o r d , t h a n t o ground t h e award on t h e impairment
n
r a t i n g i n t h e l i g h t of c l a i m a n t ' s work r e c o r d s and, i n s o
doing, a c c e p t i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t f i g u r e o f f e r e d by respondent
insurance carrier.
The d e c i s i o n of t h e workers' compensation c o u r t i s a f -
tirmed.
i4e Concur:
- f L
-
Justices.
M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G . H a t f i e l d concurs i n the r e s u l t ,
but n o t i n a l l the discussion.
ief Justice.
- 6 -
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g :
I respectfully dissent. This claimant was performing
part-time employment before h e r i n j u r y i . e . , t h e r e was only
t h r e e o r f o u r days a week a v a i l a b l e t o h e r . Since h e r operation
-
she i s only a b l e t o work t h r e e o r four days a week even though
t h e r e i s more work now a v a i l a b l e t o h e r . There i s no doubt
claimant may be earning t h e same number of d o l l a r s o r even more
b u t t h i s i s n o t m understanding of t h e standard t o be a p p l i e d
y
when determining h e r r i g h t t o be paid under s e c t i o n 92-703.1
f o r diminished earning c a p a c i t y .
The number of d o l l a r s earned and hours spent performing
h e r employment c r e a t e a presumption of earning c a p a c i t y compatible
with h e r s t a t e d d i s a b i l i t y . This presumption may be r e b u t t e d by
evidence t h a t shows h e r p o s t - i n j u r y d o l l a r s earned and time
spent t o be an u n r e l i a b l e b a s i s f o r t h e determination of earning
capacity. Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211,
213, 259 P.2d 340,342 (1953).
Here, t h e r e seems t o be a l o s s of c a p a c i t y t o perform a s
well a s before t h e i n j u r y and a l o s s of a b i l i t y t o compete and
earn i n t h e open l a b o r market. This would b r i n g claimant within
s e c t i o n 92-703.1, R.C.M. 1947.
.........
M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J . Shea d i s s e n t i n g :
I concur i n t h e above d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e Daly.