Schiele v. Sager

                                         No.    13784

                 I N THE SUPREME C U T OF THE STATE O M N A A
                                  O R                F OTN

                                               1977



LINDA SUE (SAGER) SCHIELE,

                          P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l a n t ,

           -vs-

ROBERT L. SAGER,

                          Respondent and Respondent.



Appeal from:              D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l
                           District,
                          Honorable J a c k L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f r e c o r d :

           For A p p e l l a n t :

                  C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy, Ingraham and Wold, P o l s o n ,
                   Montana
                  Donald K. P e t e r s o n a r g u e d , P o l s o n , Montana

           F o r Respondent:

                  T i p p and Hoven, M i s s o u l a , Montana
                  Douglas G. S k j e l s e t a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana



                                                     Submitted:         September 1 2 , 1977

                                                         Decided :




            mv
F i l e d : --     9   : . ..
                        : -
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court:


       P e t i t i o n e r appeals from t h e f i n a l judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t

Court, Lake County, g r a n t i n g respondent's p e t i t i o n f o r modifica-

t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ' decree of divorce and awarding respondent

t h e c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l of t h e p a r t i e s ' two minor c h i l d r e n .

       P e t i t i o n e r and respondent were married a t K a l i s p e l l ,

Montana, on June 27, 1968.                 T h e i r marriage was dissolved by

decree of divorce dated March 28, 1973, i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court,

Lake County.         Pursuant t o s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s t h e g e n e r a l

c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l of t h e p a r t i e s ' minor c h i l d r e n ,

Richard Lee Sager, age 8 and S h e r r i e Sue Sager, age 5 , was awarded

t o t h e i r mother, t h e p e t i t i o n e r .   Respondent was granted v i s i t a -

t i o n r i g h t s and was ordered t o provide support f o r t h e minor

c h i l d r e n i n t h e sum of $50 per month per c h i l d .            Respondent has

remained c u r r e n t i n h i s payment of c h i l d support.               Both p a r t i e s

have remarried.           P e t i t i o n e r r e s i d e s i n Pablo, Montana, while

respondent r e s i d e s i n Republic, Washington.

       On J u l y 12, 1976, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t

Court, Lake County, seeking an o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court f i n d i n g

respondent i n contempt of t h e divorce d e c r e e ' s v i s i t a t i o n pro-

v i s i o n s and an award of $500 p u n i t i v e damages.              Respondent sub-

sequently f i l e d a p e t i t i o n on August 16, 1976, seeking modifica-

t i o n of t h e divorce decree and an award of t h e permanent c a r e ,

custody and c o n t r o l of t h e minor c h i l d r e n .         Petitioner similarly

f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r modification of t h e divorce decree on August

18, 1976, seeking a change i n respondent's v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s

and an i n c r e a s e i n t h e amount of respondent's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o

t h e support and maintenance of t h e minor c h i l d r e n .
       The causes were consolidated and heard by t h e D i s t r i c t Court

on September 22 and 24, 1976.                  O December 8 , 1976, t h e c o u r t
                                                n

issued i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law and judgment,

holding t h a t due t o t h e domestic c o n f l i c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p e t i -

t i o n e r ' s remarriage, t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e minor c h i l d r e n

d i c t a t e d t h a t t h e divorce decree of March 28, 1973, be modified

t o award respondent t h e c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l of t h e minor

children.       P e t i t i o n e r was awarded v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s , no c h i l d

support was awarded t o e i t h e r p a r t y , and each p a r t y was t o

assume h i s own a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s i n t h e a c t i o n .

       P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d p o s t - t r i a l motions t o amend t h e f i n d i n g s

of f a c t and conclusions of law; t o a l t e r o r amend t h e judgment;

and an a l t e r n a t i v e motion f o r new t r i a l .       I n i t s amended judgment

of January 17, 1977, t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied p e t i t i o n e r ' s

motions; affirmed i t s holding i n t h e previous judgment; pro-

vided f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e

matter; and, e s t a b l i s h e d a d a t e and procedure f o r t h e t r a n s f e r

of t h e custody of t h e minor c h i l d r e n .

       O February 15, 1977, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d n o t i c e of appeal i n
        n

t h e D i s t r i c t Court.   The c o u r t stayed execution of i t s judgment

pending p e t i t i o n e r ' s appeal t o t h i s Court.

       P e t i t i o n e r p r e s e n t s four i s s u e s f o r review:

       1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by

f a i l i n g t o make f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law i n com-

p l i a n c e w i t h s e c t i o n s 48-332 and 48-339, R.C.M.             1947?

       2.    Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d when i t f a i l e d t o

cause a record t o be made of t h e in-chambers interview of t h e

minor c h i l d r e n pursuant t o s e c t i o n 48-334(1), R.C.M.               1947?
     3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when

it denied petitioner's request for the appointment of professional

personnel pursuant to section 48-335, R.C.M.   1947?
     4. Whether the District Court abused its discretion.in
accepting unfounded reputation testimony and making a finding
of reputation on the basis of that testimony?

     Petitioner's first issue considers areas of the Uniform

Marriage and Divorce Act, heretofore often before this Court.

See: Gianotti v. McCracken,      Mont.     , 569 P.2d 929, 34 St.
Rep. 1087; In re Custody of Dallenger,   - .
                                          Mont               , 568 P. 2d
169, 34 St.Rep. 938; Lee v. Gebhardt,      Mont   .          , 567 P.2d
466, 34 St.Rep. 810; Ronchetto v. Ronchetto,          Mont   .     7



567 P.2d 456, 34 St.Rep. 797; Groves v. Groves,         Mont.           ,
567 P.2d 459, 34 St.Rep. 790; Holm v. Holm,    - t.
                                                Mon      -
                                                         9



560 P.2d 905, 34 St.Rep. 118.    These cases announce the law

in Montana governing a petition for change of child custody
and modification of a divorce decree.
     Section 48-339 establishes the "best interest of the child1'

test, stated in section 48-332 as the primary consideration
controlling any proposed modification of child custody.          How-

ever, the criteria of the best in-teresttest is not put into

effect until the petitioning party seeking modification has

satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites announced in section


       "Modification. ( ) No motion to modify a custody
                        1
    decree may be made earlier than two (2) years after its
    date, unless the court permits it to be made on the
    basis of affidavits that there is reason to believe the
    child's present environment may endanger seriously his
    physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.

       "2
        ()   The court shall not modify a prior custody
    decree unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that
    have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown
     to the court at the time of entry of the prior
       --   -


     decree; that a change has occurred in the circum-
     stances of the child or his custodian, and that
     the modification is necessary to serve the best
     interest of the child. In applying these standards
     the court shall retain the custodian appointed pur-
     suant to the prior decree unless:

        "a
         ()     the custodian agrees to the modification;

        "b
         ()   the child has been integrated into the family
     of the petitioner with consent of the custodian; or

        I (c)
        '     the child's present environment endangers
     seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional
     health, and the harm likely to be caused by a change
     of environment is outweighed by its advantages to
     him.

         ( ) Attorney fees and costs shall be assessed
        "3
     against a party seeking modification if the court
     finds that the modification action is vexatious and
     constitutes harassment." (Emphasis added.)
    Although the District Court's findings of fact and conclu-
stions of law in the instant case recognize the domestic conflict

between petitioner and her present husband, the District Court
fails to make a specific finding there has been a change in

circumstances in the children's environment since the prior

divorce decree which seriously endangers the children's physical,
                                               that
physical, mental, moral or emotional health and/the harm likely

to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its

advantages to the children. The District Court bases its judg-
ment on the best interest of the children and fails to consider

the provisions of section 48-339,enacted to preserve the basic
policy of custodial continuity. Such modification of a divorce
decree's provisions for the custody of children disregards the
provisions of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
    The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the District
Court's failure to cause a record to be made of its in-chambers
interview with the minor children. Section 48-334(1),   R.C.M.
1947, provides:
     "Interviews (1) The court may interview the child in
     chambers to ascertain the child's wishes as to his
     custodian and as to visitation. The court may permit
     counsel to be present at the interview. The court
     shall cause a record of the interview to be made and
     to be part of the record in the case." (Emphasis added.)

     The language of section 48-334(1) provides for'the District
Court's exercise of discretion in determining whether an in-

chambers interview ~ 5 t h
                         children is necessary and whether counsel
may be present.   However, once the District Court determines

the in-chambers interview is necessary, section 48-334(1)
mandates that a record of the interview be made and that such
record be part of the case record. The mandate of the statute

was not complied with in the instant case and the court erred in

failing to cause a record of the interview to be made.   Ronchetto

v, Ronchetto, supra.

     Petitioner's third issue challenges the District Court's

failure to seek the advice of professional personnel in making
its decision to modify the divorce decree and award custody of
the children to respondent, Section 48-334(2) provides :

    " 2 The court may seek the advice of professional
     ()
    personnel, whether or not employed by the court on a
    regular basis. The advice given shall be in writing
    and made available by the court to W1
                                        -     upon request   .
    Counsel may examine as a witness any professional
    personnel consulted by the court. (Emphasis added.)
     Section 48-335, provides :
     "Investigations and reports. (1) In contested custody
     proceedings, and in other custody proceedings if a
     parent or the child's custodian so requests, the court
     may order an investigation and report concerning custodial
     arrangements for the child, The investigation and report
     may be made by the county welfare department."
     The language of the statutes dictates an exercise of the

District Court's discretion in determining whether the findings
and/or advice of professional personnel is necessary to a reso-

lution of the pending action. This Court has long held the

District Court's exercise of discretion ought not be disturbed
except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. In the

Matter of Fish,        Mont   .   , 569 P.2d 924, 34 St.Rep. 1080;
Lee v. Gebhardt, supra.    Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

such an abuse of discretion and we fail to find the District

Court abused its discretion when it determined the aid of pro-
fessional personnel was not necessary to the resolution of the
instant case.

     Petitioner's final issue attacks the District Court's
exercise of discretion in admitting into evidence reputation

testimony concerning petitioner's present husband and its
reliance upon such testimony in finding he possessed a bad
reputation in the community for peacefulness.    Petitioner con-

tends the District Court erred in admitting such reputation
evidence and as a result petitioner incurred substantial pre-
judice.

     Section 48-332 sets forth the relevant factors to be con-

gidered in determining child custody:

          "U
          custody in accordance with the best interest of the
          child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
          including:

      " 1 the wishes of the child's parent or parents
       ()
       as to his custody;
      "2
       ()      the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
      I
      '   (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the
          child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and
          any other person who may significantly affect the
          child's best interest;
        "4
         ()        the child's adjustment to his home, school,
               and community; and

        "5
         ()   the mental and physical health of all indivi-
         duals involved." (Emphasis added. )

    The counterpart to section 48-332 is section 402 &f the

Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act as approved by the National

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.        The language
of the two sections is the same except for the last sentence
of section 402 which was not adopted by Montana:

     "* * * The court shall not consider conduct of a
     proposed custodian that does not effect his rela-
     tionship to the child."
Although Montana chose not to adopt this particular language,

case authority has established a precedent moving away from the
policy of admitting evidence of misconduct which did not effect
the relationship of a custodian with the child.        Solie v. Solie,
   Mont   .
          -s        561 P.2d 443, 34 St.Rep. 142; Foss v. Leifer,

- .
 Mont              , 550 P.2d   1309, 33 St.Rep. 528; 37 Montana Law

Review 119.       In the instant case, the admission of reputation

evidence concerned petitioner's present husband's violent con-

duct in the home and would be relevant as affecting his relationship

with the child.
     The ultimate concern of this Court is the welfare of the
minor children. The record in the instant case reveals disabili-
ties of both parents seeking permanent custody of the children.
Petitioner resides in an atmosphere of domestic conflict while
respondent labors under financial indebtedness. Therefore, to
protect the interests of the minor children upon rehearing of
this matter, we instruct the District Court to appoint independent
counsel for the minor children pursuant to section 48-324, R.C.M.

1947.   In the Matter of the Guardianship of Gullette, supra; In

the Matter of Fish, supra.

                                - 8-
     The judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court i s vacated.   The cause

i s remanded for a new hearing to determine permanent custody

of the children, consistent with this opini




W Concur:
 e


                                     -

Chief Justice




     Mr. Justice Daniel J . Shea deeming himself disqualified

took no part i n t h i s Opinion.