No. 13462
I P J THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1977
DONALD R . McGEE,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
BURLINGTON NORTHERN I N C . ,
a corporation,
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l
District,
Ilonorable N a t A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
Gough, S h a n a h a n , J o h n s o n and Waterman, H e l e n a ,
Montana
C o r d e l l J o h n s o n a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
For Respondent:
Hoyt a n d B o t t o m l y , Great F a l l s , Montana
J o h n C . Hoyt a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Submitted: October 7 , 1977
Decided: NOV 1 5 1J
Cn
Filed:
dUV 1 , 5//
M r , J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e
Court :
This i s t h e second appeal t o t h i s Court of an a c t i o n f o r
damages i n i t i a ted by Donald R. McGee a g a i n s t Burlington Northern,
I n c , , a s a r e s u l t of i n j u r i e s sustained i n an accident occurring
on November 4 , 1971. The f i r s t jury t r i a l r e s u l t e d i n a v e r d i c t
f o r p l a i n t i f f McGee i n t h e amount of $525,000, That v e r d i c t was
appealed by defendant and t h i s Court held defendant was n e g l i g e n t
a s a matter of law, b u t remanded t h e case f o r r e t r i a l on t h e
i s s u e s of damages and c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence. McGee v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 167 Mont. 485, 540 P. 2d 298 (1975). Plaintiffts
p e t i t i o n f o r rehearing was denied by t h i s Court on September 12,
1975. P l a i n t i f f t s subsequent p e t i t i o n t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme
Court f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i was denied. McGee v. Burlington
Northern, I n c . , 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 857, 47 L ed 2d 83(1976).
R e t r i a l of t h e cause before a jury began A p r i l 27, 1976
i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Cascade County. Following t r i a l , t h e j u r y
returned a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f i n t h e amount of $618,000. Judg-
ment was entered. Defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l was denied.
Defendant appeals from t h e judgment.
The f a c t s developed a t r e t r i a l a r e :
On t h e evening of November 4 , 1971, p l a i n t i f f was a member
of t h e t r a i n crew engaged i n yard switching a t t h e s t a t i o n of
Omak, Washington. P l a i n t i f f was t h e "swingman" i n charge of
carrying o u t t h e orders contained i n t h e switching l i s t . The
remainder of t h e crew was composed of a conductor, an engineer,
a flagman responsible f o r stopping and making f a s t those c a t s
which were switched onto a d i f f e r e n t t r a c t , and a head brakeman,
who operated t h e switching mechanisms.
J u s t p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e switch engine was on t h e
main l i n e , facing e a s t . A boxcar was coupled i n f r o n t of t h e
engine, and a chip c a r coupled d i r e c t l y t o t h e f r o n t of t h e boxcar.
P l a i n t i f f determined t h a t t o s u c c e s s f u l l y accomplish t h e switch,
i t would be necessary t o "kick" t h e c h i p c a r upgrade, along t h e
main l i n e . The switch would then be thrown, such t h a t t h e engine
and t h e boxcar could proceed o f f t h e main l i n e and onto t h e passing
track.
I t was dark, and switching was being accomplished by way
of r a i l r o a d l a n t e r n s i g n a l s . P l a i n t i f f f i r s t gave a "kick"
s i g n t o t h e engineer. A s t h e engine moved forward, p l a i n t i f f
attempted t o p u l l t h e l e v e r which would r e l e a s e the coupling
mechanism and, when t h e engine stopped, send t h e c h i p c a r up t h e
main l i n e . The p i n i n t h e coupling mechanism d i d n o t p u l l , s o
the engine was stopped. P l a i n t i f f then a p p l i e d some d i f f e r e n t
pressures and was e v e n t u a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n p u l l i n g t h e pin. The
pin, however, d i d not remain i n t h e "up" p o s i t i o n . During t h e
second attempt t o "kick" t h e c a r , p l a i n t i f f was forced t o run
alongside t h e c a r while holding t h e l e v e r i n t h e "up" p o s i t i o n .
The c a r was "kicked" along t h e main l i n e t o a p o i n t where t h e
flagman "chopped" t h e wheels t o prevent it from r o l l i n g back
down t h e grade. The engine and boxcar were positioned such t h a t
t h e frontwheels of t h e boxcar were d i r e c t l y over t h e switch p o i n t s .
Plaintiff t e s t i f i e d he was unaware of t h i s f a c t .
There i s a c o n f l i c t i n t h e evidence a s t o what s i g n a l
p l a i n t i f f then gave t o t h e engineer. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he
gave "a l i t t l e backup sign." The engineer t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e
next s i g n a l he received was a "come ahead" s i g n . According t o
p l a i n t i f f , he then t o l d t h e head brakeman t h e engine and boxcar
were t o be moved onto t h e passing t r a c k , and t h e brakeman
acknowledged v e r b a l l y . The brakeman f a i l e d t o r e c a l l t h e exchange,
but was aware t h e engine and boxcar were t o move onto t h e passing
track. He could n o t throw t h e switch, however, because of t h e
positioning of t h e f r o n t wheels of t h e boxcar.
I n any event, p l a i n t i f f began walking e a s t along t h e south
s i d e of t h e main l i n e and c a l l e d t o t h e flagman, " e a r e going
W
t o p u l l t h e pass.'' The flagman r a i s e d and lowered h i s l a n t e r n i n
acknowledgement. P l a i n t i f f , i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s according t o
r a i l r o a d s i g n a l movements a s a "come ahead" s i g n a l , relayed i t
t o t h e engineer. The flagman was, a t t h a t time, walking down
t h e passing t r a c k , o u t of t h e s i g h t of t h e engineer.
A f t e r r e l a y i n g t h e s i g n a l , p l a i n t i f f was standing along
t h e south s i d e of t h e main l i n e , facing e a s t , away from t h e
oncoming t r a i n movement, and was studying t h e switch l i s t b'y t h e
l i g h t of h i s l a n t e r n . A s he became aware t h e boxcar was passing
him, he was s t r u c k from behind by a s t e e l door handle protruding
from t h e s i d e of t h e boxcar. P l a i n t i f f was forced t o t h e ground
and s u s t a i n e d s e r i o u s i n j u r i e s t o h i s back, neck and l e f t knee
as a result, There were no d i r e c t witnesses t o t h e a c c i d e n t i t -
self. P l a i n t i f f has been unable t o work s i n c e t h e a c c i d e n t .
R e t r i a l was before t h e D i s t r i c t & u r t of Cascade County,
t h e Hon. Nat Allen presiding. Defendant admitted l i a b i l i t y on
t h e case and t h e t r i a l proceeded on t h e i s s u e s of damages under
t h e Federal Employers L i a b i l i t y Act (FELA) and t h e Federal S a f e t y
Appliance Act (FsAA), and c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence.
Following d e l i b e r a t i o n , t h e jury returned a v e r d i c t f o r
p l a i n t i f f i n t h e amount of $618,000 and judgment was entered
thereon. The D i s t r i c t Court denied defendant's subsequent motion
f o r a new t r i a l . This appeal followed.
The i s s u e s presented f o r review a r e :
1. Did counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f i n f i n a l argument, i n e f f e c t ,
improperly urge t h e j u r y t o a s s e s s p u n i t i v e damages a g a i n s t
defendant?
2. Did t h e t r i a l ' c o u r t e r r i n submitting t h e i s s u e of a
FSAA v i o l a t i o n t o t h e j u r y ?
3. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n g i v i n g and r e f u s i n g c e r t a i n
instructions?
4. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n permitting p l a i n t i f f t o
introduce i n t o evidence, over o b j e c t i o n , a s u r v e i l l a n c e r e p o r t
compiled by defendant?
5. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n allowing improper f e b u t t a l
testimony o f f e r e d by p l a i n t i f f ?
6. Was t h e v e r d i c t excessive, a s a r e s u l t of passion o r
prejudice?
I s s u e 1. Defendant Burlington Northern argues t h e c l o s i n g
statement of p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel contained statements which, i n
e f f e c t , were arguments f o r p u n i t i v e damages, impermissible under
t h e holding of t h i s Court i n t h e f i r s t McGee appeal. The j u r y ,
i t i s maintained, was incensed and prejudiced a s a r e s u l t .
The record i n d i c a t e s t h e remarks complained of were:
"* ** H w can t h e r a i l r o a d be encouraged t o do t h e s e
o
t h i n g s r i g h t ? H w can they be encouraged n o t t o allow
o
r u l e s v i o l a t i o n s ? H w can they be encouraged t o p r o t e c t
o
t h e i r men? Well, one way i s by your v e r d i c t i n t h i s c a s e .
"The r a i l r o a d i s n o t cheap when i t comes t o spending
money on such things a s surveillance --
surveillance
of one of i t s own employees, t h a t i t i n j u r e d through
i t s own gross and w i l f u l and r o t t e n negligence * * *."
Defendant o b j e c t e d , on t h e ground t h e argument went t o p u n i t i v e
damages, an impermissible element of damages i n a F E U c a s e ,
c i t i n g a s a u t h o r i t y t h e f i r s t McGee opinion. The o b j e c t i o n was
overruled. Defendant's subsequent motion f o r a m i s t r i a l on t h i s
b a s i s was denied. Following t h e c o u r t s r u l i n g , t h i s exchange be-
tween t h e c o u r t and defense counsel occurred:
"THE COURT: No. The Court t h i n k s you' r e being
completely --
you're misconstruing what he s a i d
completely. He never used t h e word ' p u n i t i v e ' o r
any synonym thereof i n h i s argument, d i d he?
"MR. JOHNSON: No, he d i d n ' t , Your Honor.
''THE COURT: And t h e J u r y would f a i l t o recognize your
motion i f they heard i t i n f r o n t of t h e j u r y a s being
applicable t o the facts.
"Your motion i s denied."
This Court r e c e n t l y considered t h e e f f e c t of i n s e r t i o n
of t h e element of p u n i t i v e damages i n t o t h e t r i a l of a FELA
action. Torchia v. Burlington Northern, I n c ., Mont . 9
568 P.2d 558, 34 St.Rep. 1011 (1977). I n Torchia, we h e l d
t h a t o f f e r e d evidence, argument and i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o
p u n i t i v e damages o r t h e concept of "gross and w i l l f u l negligence",
while having no place i n a FELA a c t i o n , were n o t a ground f o r
r e v e r s a l , a s t h e evidence f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h conduct which
would have supported an award of p u n i t i v e damages, and t h e j u r y
f a i l e d t o award them. Upon a review of t h e i n s t a n t record,
i t i s c l e a r t h e element of p u n i t i v e damages, a p a r t from t h e
p o s s i b l e connotations of counsel's statements s e t f o r t h above,
was wholly absent a t t h e r e t r i a l . This i s s u e w e s p e c i f i c a l l y met
i n Torchia, adversely t o t h e defendant's p o s i t i o n . H i l l v.
Chappel Bros. of Montana,Inc., 93 Mont. 92, 18 P.2d 1106 (1932).
I s s u e 2. Defendant a l s o maintains t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t
should have granted i t s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e
i s s u e of t h e a l l e g e d F A v i o l a t i o n .
S A The core of i t s argument
i s t h a t t h e r e was no showing t h a t t h e automatic coupler was
d e f e c t i v e by F A s t a n d a r d s , o r t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d a c a u s a l
SA
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e a l l e g e d d e f e c t and p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y ,
both elements being required under cases i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e p e r t i -
nent provision of t h e FSAA, 45 U.S.C. 52.
During t h e course of t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f attempted t o show
t h a t t h e automatic coupler mechanism between t h e boxcar and
t h e c h i p c a r was d e f e c t i v e , i n t h a t it would n o t remain uncoupled
during normal switching operations. Such f a i l u r e was a l l e g e d
t o have made necessary t h e second "kick" and caused t h e wheels
of t h e boxcar t o come t o r e s t on the switch p o i n t s , such t h a t
t h e engine proceeded along t h e wrong t r a c k , e v e n t u a l l y leading
t o p l a i n t i f f ' s injury.
Defendant produced a witness i n i t s c a s e - i n - c h i e f , one
O r v i l l e Busch, who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n an i n s p e c t i o n of t h e c a r i n -
volved i n t h e accident. H i s d u t i e s , a s an employee of defendant,
were t o i n s p e c t and r e p a i r f r e i g h t and passenger c a r s and d e t e r -
mine whether t h e c a r s s a t i s f i e d F A standards.
SA Busch t e s t i f i e d
t h a t , upon h i s i n s p e c t i o n , t h e coupler worked properly and no
portions of t h e mechanism were b e n t , broken o r missing. He
concluded t h e coupler was nondefective and, t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t
v i o l a t e t h e FSAA. However, upon cross-examination, Busch i n d i c a t e d
t h a t where t h e r e i s no abnormal condition a f f e c t i n g t h e automatic
coupler mechanism, primarily i t s being under " s t r e s s " a t t h e time
of t h e attempted r e l e a s e , i t i s a v i o l a t i o n of t h e F A i f it
S A
f a i l s t o uncouple. Throughout t h e t r i a l , however, i t was emphasized
by p l a i n t i f f t h a t t h e coupler was n o t under s t r e s s b u t , r a t h e r ,
under compression, a s t h e c a r s were being pushed, n o t p u l l e d ,
by t h e engine.
The r e l e v a n t s e c t i o n of t h e FSAA, 45 W.S.C. 9 2 , provides:
"Automatic couplers. I t s h a l l be unlawful foy any
common c a r r i e r engaged i n i n t e r s t a t e commerce by
r a i l r o a d t o haul o r permit t o be hauled o r used on
i t s l i n e any c a r used i n moving i n t e r s t a t e t r a f f i c
n o t equipped with couplers coupling automatically by
impact, and which can be uncoupled without t h e
n e c e s s i t y of men going between t h e ends of t h e cars."
The p r i n c i p a l p=@se i n t h e enactment of 45 U.S.C. 42
was t o e l i m i n a t e t h e various r i s k s a t t e n d a n t t o manual coupling
and uncoupling of r a i l r o a d c a r s , which required t h e employees t o
go between t h e ends of t h e c a r s . Gentle v. Western & A.R.R., 305
U.S. 654, 59 S.Ct. 252, 83 L ed 424 (1939). The s a f e t y r e q u i r e -
ments of t h e a c t have been held t o apply t o uncoupling operations
a s w e l l a s coupling operations. L o u i s v i l l e & N.R.Co. v. United
S t a t e s , 98 C.C.A. 664, 174 F. 1021 (Ala.1909); P h i l l i p s v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., C.A. Va. 1973, 475 F.2d 22.
The duty of t h e r a i l r o a d t o provide automatic couplers which
both couple and uncouple properly i s a b s o l u t e , without regard
t o negligence o r t h e normal e f f i c i e n c y of t h e couplers. Affolder
v. New York C. & St.L.R.Co., 339 U.S. 96, 70 S.Ct. 509, 94 L ed
683 (1950). The f a c t t h e coupler functioned properly before o r
a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t i n question i s immaterial. C a r t e r v. A t l a n t a
& S t . A.B .Ry.Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S.Ct. 226, 94 L ed 236 (1949) ;
P h i l l i p s v. Chesapeake & O.Ry. Co., supra.
By t h e weight of a u t h o r i t y , an i n j u r e d employee must, a s a
p r e r e q u i s i t e t o recovery, demonstrate t h a t t h e v i o l a t i o n of t h e
F A was a proximate cause of h i s i n j u r y .
SA Cobb v. Union Ry. Co.,
318 F.2d 33 (C.A. Tenn. 1963), cert.den. 375 u.S. 945, 84 S . C t .
352, 1 L ed 2d 275 (1963).
1
Here, p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h e coupling
device was nonoperative a t t h e time of t h e i n c i d e n t , f o r c i n g him
t o hold t h e l e v e r i n an "up" p o s i t i o n while running along t h e s i d e
of t h e c a r . Based upon t h e c i t e d a u t h o r i t y above, t h i s i n i t s e l f
was a v i o l a t i o n of t h e FSAA. The f a c t t h e coupler appeared non-
d e f e c t i v e upon i n s p e c t i o n by witness Busch i s immaterial. Further,
it i s evident t h e coupling mechanism was n o t under " s t r e s s " o r
o t h e r abnormal condition a t t h e time of t h e attempted k i c k , There-
f o r e , we conclude t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence of a F A v i o l a -
S A
t i o n t o submit t h e i s s u e t o t h e jury.
I t was a l s o uncontroverted t h a t had t h e coupler operated
c o r r e c t l y , t h e boxcar bearing t h e handle which s t r u c k p l a i n t i f f
would have stopped w e l l s h o r t of t h e switch p o i n t s upon t h e f i r s t
kick operation. The boxcar would then have proceeded up t h e
passing t r a c k , and p l a i n t i f f would have escaped i n j u r y , d e s p i t e
t h e protruding door handle. T h i s , we f i n d was a s u f f i c i e n t showing
of proximate cause.
The i s s u e of t h e a l l e g e d F A v i o l a t i o n was t h e r e f o r e
SA
properly submitted t o t h e j u r y and we r e f u s e t o d i s t u r b any
f i n d i n g s o r conclusions drawn by t h e jury i n t h i s regard,
Issue 3. Defendant argues t h a t w r i o u s e r r o r s a l l e g e d l y
committed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n giving and r e f u s i n g c e r t a i n i n -
s t r u c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e grounds f o r r e v e r s a l . W disagree.
e
Defendant contends t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o give
i t s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 19 on the ground t h a t i t was r e p e t i -
t i o u s of c o u r t s I n s t r u c t i o n No, 18. Defendant ' s proposed i n s t r u c -
t i o n No. 19 reads :
" I n o r d e r f o r you t o f i n d i n favor of p l a i n t i f f McGee
on h i s claim of a Safety Applicance Act v i o l a t i o n ,
p l a i n t i f f must e s t a b l i s h by a preponderance of t h e
evidence n o t only t h a t t h e r e was a v i o l a t i o n of t h e
Safety Appliance Act, b u t a l s o t h a t t h e v i o l a t i o n
caused h i s i n j u r y i n whole o r i n p a r t . I f t h e i n j u r y
r e s u l t e d from some o t h e r cause, then you must f i n d f o r
defendant on t h e Safety Appliance Act feature."
Court's I n s t r u c t i o n No. 18 s t a t e s :
"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f McGee a l s o claims
t h a t defendant r a i l r o a d v i o l a t e d a law of t h e United
S t a t e s known a s t h e Safety Appliance Act a s explained
t o you more f u l l y i n o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s . P l a i n t i f f
McGee claims t h a t h i s i n j u r i e s r e s u l t e d i n whole o r
i n p a r t from t h a t v i o l a t i o n .
"Defendant has a l s o denied t h a t it committed any Safety
Appliance Act v i o l a t i o n .
"Defendant a l s o claims t h a t even i f i t d i d v i o l a t e any
of t h e provisions of the Safety Appliance Act, p l a i n t i f f
McGee's i n j u r i e s d i d n o t r e s u l t i n whole o r i n p a r t
from t h e v i o l a t i o n .
"These c o n f l i c t i n g claims and d e n i a l s p r e s e n t i s s u e s
t h a t you must decide."
A s previously s t a t e d , recovery f o r a F A v i o l a t i o n i s
S A
predicated upon a showing o f : (1) A v i o l a t i o n of the a c t , and
(2) i n j u r y proximately caused thereby. These elements appear
i n both i n s t r u c t i o n s , although phrased d i f f e r e n t l y . When two
analogous i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e , a s h e r e , o f f e r e d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t
i s vested with the d i s c r e t i o n t o give t h e i n s t r u c t i o n r e p r e s e n t i n g
t h e b e s t statement of t h e law t o t h e jury. Demaree v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 162 Mont. 47, 508 P.2d 570 (1973).
I n s o f a r a s defendant's o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n appears t o l i m i t
t h e concept of "proximate cause" t o one of " s o l e cause'' i t was
confusing, misleading and an i n c o r r e c t statement of t h e law. Such
i n s t r u c t i o n s were properly refused. Long v. Byers, 142 Mont.
The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o refused defendant's proposed i n s t r u c -
t i o n No. 25A concerning t h e impact of income t a x e s upon t h e
damage award. Defendant a s e r t s i t s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was
based upon t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e recent FELA case of Burlington
Northern Inc. v. Boxberger, 9 t h C i r . 1975, 529 F.2d 284, and
i t s r e f u s a l was e r r o r .
I n r e j e c t i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t was i n
accord with t h e majority of decisions on t h e p o i n t . See:
Torchia v. Burlington Northern, I n c . , supra. W r e a f f i r m our p r i o r
e
boldin'g_;"- t h a t f u t u r e income t a x l i a b i l i t y i s an improper con-
s i d e r a t i o n i n formulating an award f o r l o s s of f u t u r e earnings.
Bracy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848 (1959).
Defendant f u r t h e r argues t h e t r i a l c o u r t erroneously gave
an i n s t r u c t i o n which c o n s t i t u t e d a comment on t h e .evidence, i n
e f f e c t d i r e c t i n g t h e j u r y t o f i n d f o r p l a i n t i f f on t h e i s s u e of
t h e FSAA v i o l a t i o n .
The i n s t r u c t i o n i n question, given a s Court's I n s t r u c t i o n
No. 20 s t a t e s :
"The Safety Appliance Act imposes an a b s o l u t e duty,
n o t based on negligence, upon t h e r a i l r o a d t o provide
i t s c a r s with an uncoupling device which operates e f f i -
c i e n t l y a t t h e time of t h e accident. I f you should f i n d
from t h e evidence t h a t p l a i n t i f f operated t h e uncoupling
device i n t h e u s u a l l y accepted and customary manner and
t h e uncoupler f a i l e d t o immediately respond i n an e f f i -
c i e n t manner, t h e r a i l r o a d was i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e S a f e t y
Appliance Act. It i s no defense t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d had
no knowledge of a p a r t i c u l a r d e f e c t i n t h e uncoupling
device a s t h e r a i l r o a d i s charged with knowledge of t h e
d e f e c t a s though i t a c t u a l l y had i t . I t i s immaterial
t h a t no d e f e c t was found i n t h e uncoupling device.
"It i s immaterial t h a t t h e uncoupler functioned properly
before o r a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t .
" I f you should f i n d t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d v i o l a t e d t h e
Safety Appliance Act, then you may n o t reduce p l a i n t i f f ' s
damages on account of any c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence on t h e
p a r t of p l a i n t i f f .
"Should you f i n d a v i o l a t i o n of t h e Safety Appliance
Act, t h e only f u r t h e r question i n s o f a r a s t h e Safety
Appliance Act i s concerned i s d i d t h e v i o l a t i o n play any
p a r t , no matter how small, i n producing t h e injury."
Defendant's o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s without merit.
The i n s t r u c t i o n i s a c o r r e c t restatement of a l l r e l e v a n t r u l e s
emerging from accepted c a s e a u t h o r i t i e s . P l a i n t i f f submitted t o
t h e j u r y evidence tending t o prove an a c t i o n a b l e F A v i o l a t i o n
S A
and was e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n adaptable t o h i s theory of
t h e case. Williams v. Montana National Bank of Bozeman, 167
Mont. 24, 534 P.2d 1247 (1975); Meinecke v. Skaggs, 123 Mont.
308, 213 P.2d 237 (1949).
The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o gave, a s Court's I n s t r u c t i o n No. 4 ,
an i n s t r u c t i o n concerning p l a i n t i f f ' s use of ordinary c a r e t o
avoid known dangerous conditions t o r t i o u s l y c r e a t e d by defendant.
Defendant argues t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s an i n c o r r e c t statement of
t h e law, confusing, and i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s of t h e case.
The i n s t r u c t i o n r e f e r s t o c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence, poten-
t i a l l y a t i s s u e i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Plaintiff steadfastly
maintained h i s a b s o l u t e lack of f a u l t i n bringing about t h e
injury. The i n s t r u c t i o n i s i n accord with t h e theory a s advanced
by p l a i n t i f f . The g i v i n g of such i n s t r u c t i o n i s not r e v e r s i b l e
e r r o r , absent a showing t h a t t h e jury was misled by it. O'Brien
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 145 Mont. 13, 400 P.2d 634 (1965).
I s s u e 4. During p l a i n t i f f ' s case, t h e t r i a l c o u r t permitted
i n t r o d u c t i o n , over o b j e c t i o n , of t h e body of a s u r v e i l l a n c e
r e p o r t compiled by defendant's claims department. The r e p o r t
had been properly discovered and was considered by p l a i n t i f f t o
be h e l p f u l t o h i s case. Defendant had, i n advance of t r i a l ,
sought a motion i n limine t o prevent i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e r e p o r t .
The motion was denied. Defendant now p u t s forward t h i s permitted
introduction a s error.
Defendant maintains t h e s o l e purpose f o r t h e r e p o r t i s i t s
use f o r p o s s i b l e impeachment of a p l a i n t i f f ' s t r i a l testimony
concerning h i s i n j u r i e s , i n a personal i n j u r y o r r e l a t e d a c t i o n .
Defendant urges t h e r e p o r t i n t h i s c a s e , containing no p o t e n t i a l
impeachment m a t e r i a l , should h o t have been admitted i n t o evidence.
W cannot s u s t a i n such a p o s i t i o n .
e
- 12 -
C e r t a i n l y , an e s s e n t i a l i s s u e of p l a i n t i f f ' s case was
whether he was i n j u r e d and, i f s o , t o what e x t e n t . Here, t h a t de-
fendant engaged i n s u r v e i l l a n c e , a common p r a c t i c e i n s i m i l a r
a c t i o n s , i n d i c a t e s t h a t defendant hoped t o demonstrate t h e
contrary.
Evidence may be both r e l e v a n t and i r r e l e v a n t , depending
upon t h e purpose f o r which i t i s o f f e r e d , and t h e f a c t o r f a c t s
it i s t o prove. Here, p l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e r e p o r t ,
properly discovered, a s proof of t h e f a c t and e x t e n t of h i s
injuries.
Section 93-401-27, R.C.M. 1947, provides, i n p a r t :
'I* **evidence may be given upon a t r i a l of t h e
following f a c t s :
"1. The p r e c i s e f a c t i n d i s p u t e .
"15. Any o t h e r f a c t s from which t h e f a c t s
i n i s s u e a r e presumed o r a r e l o g i c a l l y i n f e r a b l e .
"16. Such f a c t s a s serve t o show t h e c r e d i b i l i t y
of a witness **
*.I1
The r e p o r t was c l e a r l y r e l e v a n t t o p l a i n t i f f ' s proof of
i n j u r i e s under subsections 1 and 15, s e c t i o n 93-401-27. We
f i n d i t was admissible, t o t h e same e x t e n t i t would have been
admissible had t h e r e s u l t s been favorable t o defendant and
t h e r e p o r t o f f e r e d t o impeach p l a i n t i f f ' s c r e d i b i l i t y under
subsection 16, s e c t i o n 93-401-27.
I s s u e 5. Defendant next contends t h e t r i a l c o u r t erroneously
permitted improper r e b u t t a l testimony by p l a i n t i f f ' s witness i n
t h e f i e l d of economics.
Counsel f o r defendant was permitted, by s t i p u l a t i o n , t o
read i n t o t h e record during t h e course of defendant's c a s e ,
f i g u r e s concerning t h e average income t a x t o which p l a i n t i f f ' s
annual income would be s u b j e c t . On r e b u t t a l , p l a i n t i f f was
allowed t o introduce testimony from an economics expert regarding
t h e impact of income taxes. Counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f was permitted,
over o b j e c t i o n , t o question t h e witness concerning t h e f u t u r e
earnings of a h y p o t h e t i c a l r a i l r o a d employee i n t h e p o s i t i o n
of p l a i n t i f f , f o r purposes of foundation. P l a i n t i f f had n o t
introduced s i m i l a r testimony i n h i s case-in-chief.
Defendant's argument i n t h i s regard i s t h a t , having l i m i t e d
i t s testimony t o matters involving t h e e f f e c t of income t a x a t i o n
a l o n e , p l a i n t i f f ' s r e b u t t a l testimony should have been r e s t r i c t e d
t o r e b u t t i n g some p o r t i o n of defendant's o f f e r e d evidence. It
i s argued t h e permitted testimony f a r exceeded t h e scope of
t h e d i r e c t testimony introduced by defendant.
Admission of r e b u t t a l evidence i s a matter r e s t i n g l a r g e l y
w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Only when i t i s
shown t h a t such d i s c r e t i o n has been abused, w i l l t h e d e c i s i o n
be reviewed. S t a t e Highway Commission v. Ostwalt, 153 Mont.
8 3 , 454 P.2d 605 (1969); Morrison v. City of Butte, 150 Mont.
106, 431 P.2d 79 (1967). The g e n e r a l l y accepted test f o r
determining whether c e r t a i n r e b u t t a l evidence i s proper i s
whether it tends t o counteract new matters o f f e r e d by t h e adverse
party. Gustafson v. Northern P a c i f i c Ry. Co., 137 Mont. 154, 351
P. 2d 212 (1960).
Here t h e s u b j e c t of t h e e f f e c t of income t a x a t i o n upon
p l a i n t i f f ' s earning c a p a c i t y was f i r s t developed by defendant,
during t h e course of i t s case. W hold t h e s u b j e c t of p l a i n t i f f ' s
e
earnings and p o t e n t i a l t a x l i a b i l i t y was s u f f i c i e n t l y "opened up"
and t h a t t h e testimony o f f e r e d by p l a i n t i f f on r e b u t t a l was
proper. W f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e t r i a l
e
c o u r t i n admitting such testimony.
I s s u e 6. F i n a l l y , defendant contends t h e v e r d i c t should
be overturned by t h i s Court a s being excessive, r e s u l t i n g from
passion o r prejudice. I t i s submitted t h e cumulative e f f e c t of
t h e numerous a l l e g e d t r i a l e r r o r s engendered an atomosphere of
prejudice a g a i n s t defendant and, f u r t h e r , t h e r e i s no c r e d i b l e
evidence i n t h e record t o support a v e r d i c t a s l a r g e a s $618,000.
The proper standard f o r determining whether t h e evidence
presented by a p l a i n t i f f i n a FELA a c t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t t o
support a v e r d i c t i s set f o r t h i n Torchia v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., supra, quoted from Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.
C t . 740, 90 L ed 916,923 (1946):
'I'
*** Only where t h e r e i s a complete absence of
probative f a c t s t o support t h e conclusion reached
does a r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r appear. But where ***
t h e r e i s an e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s f o r t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t ,
t h e j u r y i s f r e e t o d i s c a r d o r d i s b e l i e v e whatever
f a c t s a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t with i t s conclusion. And t h e
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ' s function i s exhaus ted when t h a t
e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s becomes apparent * * *. '"
34 St.Rep. 1016; 568 P.2d 563.
The FEU standard o u t l i n e d above i s no l e s s a p p l i c a b l e t o
F A a c t i o n s o r a combined a c t i o n under both a c t s , a s here.
S A
W have, i n t h i s opinion, determined t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t
e
admissible evidence of a F A v i o l a t i o n and r e s u l t i n g damage
S A
f o r submission of t h e i s s u e t o t h e jury. P l a i n t i f f ' s evidence
of t h e FELA v i o l a t i o n was uncontradicted a s was h i s evidence
concerning t h e various items of damage, including pain and
suffering. None of t h e damage f i g u r e s so introduced were con-
t e s t e d by defendant during t h e t r i a l .
W can d i s c e r n no b a s i s on defendant's f i n a l i s s u e t o
e
d i s t u r b t h e v e r d i c t of t h e j u r y .
The judgment entered upon t -,verdict i s affirmed.
,
t ,\\
W Concur:
e
Hon. u a m e s S o r t e , D i s t r i c t
Judge, s i t t i n g ~ O L M ~ . Chief
J u s t i c e Paul G. H a t f i e l d .